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 Abstract 
 
 
This thesis focuses on what stability is, and what interventions have supported stability 
in four communities in Afghanistan and Nepal. It is the author’s view that this is the 
first in-depth village level assessment of how populations conceive of stability and 
stabilisation and thus presents a challenge to existing analysis and research about how 
to foster stability in contexts in extreme tension and often violent conflict. The thesis 
argues that international, particularly Western, notions of stability and stabilisation 
processes have failed to grasp the importance of local political legitimacy formation, 
which is a vital aspect of contemporary statebuilding of a ‘non-Westphalian’ nature. 
The interventions, across defence, diplomatic and defence lines, have also at times 
undermined one another and in some cases contributed to instability. This is 
particularly acute when the interventions have been motivated by the conflicting 
demands of statebuilding, counter-insurgency (COIN) and development theories. The 
thesis argues that the nature of the interventions, their conception of stability and 
exogenously-driven goals limit the ability to promote stability. Research findings 
indicate that that local processes of stabilisation have, at times, proven to be more 
enduring but only in circumstances where a combination of local and national political 
processes have allowed political legitimacy to be formed and maintained. Research 
findings also suggest that the more successful stability interventions have been 
critically supported by humanitarian and security activities which have provided for the 
immediate needs of the population. Longer term stability has only been embedded in 
contexts which have also been able to exploit economic opportunities. 
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Chapter 1 - Introduction 
This thesis is about the evolution of Liberal ideology and the paradigm1 of intervention 
in other territories by Liberal states in order to maintain international order through 
stability and stabilisation. Despite stabilisation being a key tenet of intervention 
fundamental questions about what stability is and how it is formed have remained 
unanswered. These questions are the focus of this thesis which interrogates how 
activities that are supposed to promote stability actually impact on communities. 
Through the data analysis the research asserts a new model of stabilisation which can 
be used as a tool for designing interventions and creating a theory of stability. 
Failed states that are unable to control their territory, respond to climate change, 
eliminate criminal and terrorist networks, and contain nuclear proliferation are 
considered to be key threats to the current global system. The states who lead global 
politics want stability to continue their political affairs, grow their own and others’ 
economies, and allow their citizens to live in peace (Department of Defense, 2012, pp. 
1-4; HMG, 2011, pp. 4-5; White House, 2010, pp. 1-6; Cabinet Office, 2008, p. 3). 
Despite the relative success of ensuring inter-state stability since the end of World 
War II these leading states view the growing threats from fragile states with great 
concern; moreover, since the end of the Cold War, they have become increasingly 
focused on intra-state instability. Recognising that intra-state instability is complex, 
interventions termed ‘stabilisation’ have emerged out of the Liberal tradition as 
conflicts have evolved to incorporate ‘war amongst the people’ (Smith, R., 2005, pp. 1-
4). This innovation has drawn on theories about statebuilding and development as 
well as new military doctrines for counterinsurgency (COIN). 
Despite a lack of clarity about what stability is, or how to achieve it, interventions with 
the aim of stabilisation have attracted a great deal of attention amongst several major 
governments as tools for implementing multi-faceted programmes involving multiple 
government agencies in other states. These states are often hostile environments, and 
the interventions are commonly employ as a Whole-of-Government approach or 
Comprehensive Approach or the 3D’s – Defence, Diplomacy and Development (Patrick 
& Brown, 2007, pp. 1-3).2 Whilst stabilisation in the modern era is most readily 
associated with the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, it has also been practised in 
other regions including South Asia, the Horn of Africa and the Middle East (HMG, 
2011, p. 10). However, these types of intervention have also suffered from a lack of 
                                                     
1
 The use of the term paradigm in this thesis is not directly drawn from paradigm as a revolution in 
science (i.e. a paradigm shift) as put forward by Thomas Kuhn. Instead the paradigm is the framework 
within which interventions are conceptualised and justified. (Kuhn, T. 1962) 
2 Throughout this thesis these are referred to as political, security and development 
interventions. 
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coherence, and discussions about stabilisation fail to recognise the distorting 
influence of its modern Western Liberal heritage upon the type of activities 
implemented. 
This chapter, and thesis as a whole, will assert that there are significant challenges in 
the way stabilisation is conceived, in terms of the paradigm of state failure and what 
stabilisation means, because it does not grasp the local realities and political 
legitimacy which must underpin state formation. If the global system is to cope with 
the increasing stresses on states these local realities must be acknowledged and 
understood. The lack of clarity in stabilisation theory provides an opportunity not just 
to improve the efficiency and impact of interventions, but to radically re-think 
Western Liberal notions of how states can intervene in other territories that they 
perceive as a risk to international stability. 
Managing the global system 
It is now no longer possible for governments to ignore threats emanating from within 
their region and across the world at large. This is partly the result of globalisation - 
variously defined in economic, political, cultural and security terms (Bhagwati, 2004, 
p. 3; Giddens, 1999, pp. 9-13; Hobsbawm, 2008, pp. 23,36-7) - which has increased the 
threats that pervade national and international discourse and include insurgencies, 
secession movements, environmental disasters, the emergence of criminal and 
terrorist networks, and most recently the global financial crisis. Instability is now seen 
as a virus that threatens the Liberal project (see p.4) and it cannot be contained by 
national borders. Global powers wish to contain and treat this disease.3 
However, these threats are not new; before the Cold War they were normally dealt 
with by giving support to the state or colonial administration; as, for example, in 
response to the uprisings in Iraq in 1920 (Haldane, 1922, pp. 298-300). At the 
beginning of the Cold War new rules emerged in the context of decolonisation and the 
nature of external interventions were changed from colonial to post-colonial support 
between states with equal sovereignty; however, the Liberal intervening states 
maintained hegemonic power. Over the period of the Cold War responses to these 
crises became more interventionist, partially through using modern communication 
and transportation, which led to the micro-management of the affairs of another 
state; for example in the case of Rhodesia in 1979 when Britain re-established 
administration during the transition to the new state of Zimbabwe (Wiseman & 
Taylor, 1981, pp. 7-22).  
                                                     
3 Along with other authors Patrick (2006, pp. 27-9) asserts that threats in fragile states 
can have spill over effects, one of which includes the spread of infectious diseases, 
threats to stability can therefore be seen to be literally or metaphorically as viruses. 
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The twin processes of increasing intervention at the local level of other states, and the 
acceptance that seemingly minor crises in remote areas can spread to the rest of the 
global system, have presented a challenging environment for states in crisis to 
maintain their independence, freedom of action and integrity. Addressing these 
threats has also posed a significant burden on Liberal intervening states who are 
seeking to maintain stability in the international system. Amongst many leading 
nations including the United States (US), other G8 member states, China, India and the 
European Union (EU) there is agreement that their main international goal is stability.4 
The extent that all those partners are ‘Liberal’ is open to debate, however, in general 
terms the most Liberal states, which tends to exclude Russia, China and India,5 are 
significantly more interventionist in their foreign policy, military deployments and 
development spending.6 
Each bloc obviously has its core interests: for the EU, stability is regionalised rather 
than global, therefore it takes a keen interest in destabilizing trends in Africa because 
of the potential for instability to spread to Europe. For China, India and Russia, despite 
some tensions, the overriding aim is to provide regional stability for them to continue 
to grow, trade and lift their populations out of poverty (Singh, 2009;7 Tan, 2005;8 
                                                     
4 As an illustration a G8 declaration in 2009 talked extensively about stability, both in 
terms of macroeconomics (as a result of the recent banking and fiscal crises), but also 
of social stability and the importance of stability in partner nations (G8, 2009). 
5 It is beyond the scope of this thesis to fully explain the extent of Liberalism in Russia, 
China and India, though the following sources provide further insights; China and 
Russia’s commitment (as well that of the United States) to the principles of 
Responsibility to Protect, an archetypal Liberal instrument, are openly questioned (Lu, 
2009, pp. 96-7; Charvet & Kaczynska-Nay, 2008, pp. 279-80). For a discussion on early 
Chinese Liberalism see Fung, 2010, pp. 128-58. For discussion on early Indian Liberals 
and the connections between Ghandian thinking and Liberalism see Bourai, 2004, pp. 
45-62; 139-142 and on modern re-interpretations of Hindu thinking in the face of 
political challenges from India’s Muslim minority and their position in a secular state 
see Lal, 1989, pp. 218-224.  
6 It should be noted that all states are to some extent interventionary, and even 
smaller nations can be seen to appropriate the terminology and conceptions of 
stability and stabilisation, including for example Sri Lanka, see Goodhand, 2010, p. 343. 
7 “India has a vital interest in the stability and prosperity of our neighbours. The 
highest priority will be accorded to working with our friends in [the South Asian 
Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC)] to promote stability, development and 
prosperity in the region” (Singh, 2009, Paragraph 41). 
8 This cites outputs from China’s 2002 Congress which stated that the three core 
elements of Chinese security were “to propel its drive for modernisation; to achieve 
national reunification; and to safeguard world peace and promote common 
development” (Tan, 2005). 
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Haas, 2009, p. 39). The US has the most global conception of stability and views 
threats such as terrorism as warranting significant military responses.10 As a corporate 
statement of the leading nations of the world representing 77% of global GDP 
(estimated from IMF, 2009) and 53% of the world’s population (estimated from CIA, 
2009) there is, therefore with some regional variation, a significant degree of 
agreement between the blocs that their main global priority is stability. They may 
disagree about how to address destabilizing issues, such as the nuclear ambitions of 
Iran or North Korea or the current civil war in Syria, but ultimately they want to 
maintain stability. 
The Liberal state and the failure of fragility 
The Liberal states embody an ideology based around the individual rights of man, 
democratic political suffrage, property ownership, the necessity of economic growth 
and of human progress which collectively make up the Liberal project. This political 
philosophy is discussed in further detail in Chapter 2, but it is clear that these concepts 
shape interventionist tendencies in the Liberal states which have been the architects 
and staunchest defenders of the current state system. The sub-strands of Liberal 
thinking are a key logic driving the concept of intervention, in particular about the 
role, function and nature of the state, and have driven the types of interventions 
which are implemented in other territories. This can be clearly seen in their concerns 
about state fragility where states are considered to fail in their duties to protect their 
citizens, provide social goods and progress in the face of changes in globalised society 
and technology. 
The refrain coming from states and multilateral organisations over the last two 
decades is that the biggest threats to global stability come from the threats of climate 
change, terrorism and fragile states. The primary way of addressing these problems is 
thought to be coordinated state action, meaning that the best way of addressing 
climate change and terrorism can only be through the cooperation of ‘strong’ states 
(Zartman, 1995, pp. 4-5). Equally this means ‘weak’ or ‘fragile’ states are considered to 
be part of the problem because they cannot address threats to their own or other 
                                                     
9 The Russian security strategy is the least focused on global stability, except in 
Russia’s ‘near abroad’. However according to Haas “[the National Security Strategy] 
emphasized the interdependence between civil stability and national security, stating 
that social economic development was as important as military security” (Haas, 2009, 
p. 3). 
10 However there is now some recognition that having spent the decade since 9/11 
focusing on terrorist groups the US has taken its eye off the strategic issues it faces 
particularly with regard to foreign policy and security in Asia and it is now focusing on 
addressing the strategic shifts posed by the rise of China (Department of Defense, 
2012, pp. 1-2). 
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states’ stability. However by including the state as a security threat (i.e. a fragile state) 
rather than a type of regime (i.e. an authoritarian state) the ‘state’ itself is considered 
to be the security threat rather than the form of state. This has contributed to the 
discourse that the world is populated by weak, failing and collapsed states, which has 
been seized upon by interveners as the rationale for intervening in the myriad of 
threats facing the international system. 
In fact in many conceptions, including the Fragile States Index, even ‘strong’ states are 
considered to be at moderate risk of state failure, including half of Europe, North 
America and large parts of Asia (Fund for Peace, 2012). The essential problem of this 
discourse is that it promotes a ‘one size fits all’ understanding of what a state should 
look like, why a state may be weak, who it may be failing and what would happen if it 
collapsed; those states are often described as havens for criminal and terrorist 
networks (Call, 2008, pp. 1491-1507). The state failure discourse also ignores the fact 
that the existing state system and globalisation itself can place states and territories 
under extreme pressures. More damningly the very actions of interveners can 
precipitate fragility, or worse be designed to promote fragility as an excuse for 
intervention (Chuter, 2009, pp. 27, 33). 
As a concept state failure has been criticised as unhelpful and one which leads to 
extreme forms of external Liberal intervention which are a historical and do not 
consider national and sub-national state formation processes which are critical to 
stability (Boege, Brown, Clements, & Nolan, 2008, pp. 4-6; Jones, 2008, pp. 181-2; 
Leigh, 2012). Local processes of state formation and consolidation are poorly 
understood even by the elites in some states who may buy-in to the Liberal project in 
the face of opposition from political blocs in their own territories. A case in point may 
be Pakistan, whose avowedly Liberal political class are struggling to re-gain and 
maintain control of the state apparatus from the military and Islamic political blocs 
within the country (Hussain, 1985, pp. 224-5; Bhutto, 2008, pp. 167-70, 218-30). 
Instead interveners impose an externally imagined state which looks strikingly similar 
to the Liberal democratic free-trading countries in the West. This thesis suggests that 
interventions fail because state formation and consolidation is not simply the result of 
technocratic processes, be they elections, budget cycles or service provision, but of 
local political legitimacy formation (Jackson & Gordon, 2007, p. 653). Local political 
legitimacy seems to have been largely ignored by international relations theorists as 
too small scale (Huntington, 1991, p. 46) and development practitioners view it as too 
political for their mandates.11 There is almost no existing literature on the way in 
                                                     
11 Berry and Gabay go so far as to argue that Oxfam, as an example of a development 
organization, does not just attempt to be a political but is in fact anti-politics (Berry & 
Gabay, 2009, pp. 351-3).  
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which external support actually has affected local political settlements underneath the 
state apparatus which absorbs all the attentions of the international community. By 
ignoring local political legitimacy interveners risk misunderstanding the contexts they 
operate in, and have no conception of whether their activities have any impact 
beyond a state structure which may not promote stability or peace. 
Different lenses of stability and stabilisation 
The general consensus on the need for stability itself becomes more fragmented when 
looking at the concept of stabilisation. It is important to bear in mind that there are 
currently no indications of what constitutes ‘stability’ at a local level, nor which 
stabilisation activities actually help localities attain stability; these questions are the 
central thrust of this thesis. However, despite this lack of clarity some Liberal states 
have developed strategic focuses and bureaucratic systems to support the strategic 
goal of stability and stabilisation activities, but they have not done this within the 
constraints of a single Liberal tradition. Instead they have all brought different lenses 
or viewpoints to the stability problem and the stabilisation response, creating a 
significant degree of confusion about both concepts.  
UK military doctrine on stabilisation notes that the experience from Afghanistan 
suggests that organisations charged with stabilisation, i.e. the “Provincial 
Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), are shaped by the contributing nations’ political 
priorities and capabilities” (MoD, 2009b, p. 6 chp. 7); these viewpoints or lenses are 
the result of the different geographic locations, histories, cultures and bureaucracies 
of each state’s institutions. In effect individual state institutions in different states 
have evolved a different sub-set of ideas about stabilisation with different operating 
procedures, intervention logics, aims and outcomes. The confusing use of stabilisation 
has led some to question whether it has any credibility (van der Meer, 2009, p. 2); 
others have argued that there remain significant synergies between the states 
engaged with stabilisation (Blair & Fitz-Gerald, 2009, pp. 3-5) and amongst the tools 
available, such as Security Sector Reform (SSR) (Fitz-Gerald, 2010, pp. 158-165); this is 
critical because it explains why stabilisation interventions seem incoherent as 
strategic, operational and tactical choices.  
The table below illustrates the divergence between the US, United Kingdom (UK) and 
Canada as bi-lateral interveners and multi-lateral EU and United Nations (UN) 
institutions such as the United Nations’ Department of Peacekeeping (DPKO) from 
which there are several points to note. Firstly, that stabilisation can be a function, an 
activity or an approach (UK, US and Canada specifically). Secondly, it links directly to 
grand strategic aims of global or regional stability (i.e. US vs. EU concerns). Thirdly, 
that the lenses are not coherent, for example within the US view the US Agency for 
International Development (USAID) has no independent ‘development’ view on 
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stabilisation which subordinates its position under the US State Department, whereas 
the UK’s Department for International Development (DfID), Ministry of Defence (MoD) 
and Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) all specify their roles within an overall 
approach. Fourthly, each department or ministry’s lens colours the national approach 
(and vice versa) which is shaped by each individual state’s geo-strategic concerns (i.e. 
Canada pushes to the fore stabilisation and working with other states or coalitions, 
whilst the EU focuses primarily on neighbouring states (i.e. the Balkans, Middle East 
and North Africa), and the US focuses on global concerns of all fragile states). Finally, 
the starting point for stabilisation is also contested; the UN’s DPKO sees it occurring 
within the context of the Cold War, whilst others see it as a post-Cold War 
phenomenon. Unique to the UN is the propagation of the idea of Early Recovery 
which could be seen as a way of regaining some perceived lost ground in 
developmental operating space (Collinson, Elhawary, & Muggah, 2010, pp. 3, 11).  
Table 1. Lenses of stabilisation across selected states and multilateral organisations 
(Sources various including National Security Strategies and Departmental policy and 
strategy papers, Author)  
State or 
institution 
Definition or use of term 
stabilisation 
Lens 
UK 
Stabilisation is a function, process 
and strategy in resolving conflict 
and supporting states recovering 
or emerging from violence 
Stabilisation is rooted in civil-
military activities, and lies on the 
continuum from peacekeeping to 
peacebuilding 
US 
Stabilisation is both a higher level 
strategic tool for addressing 
conflict as well “an overarching 
term encompassing various 
military missions, tasks and 
activities conducted outside the 
United States in coordination with 
other instruments of national 
power” (DoD, 2009, p. 1) 
Stabilisation is a global force 
projection tool of the US and is 
operationally led by the military to 
provide a very wide range of 
services, infrastructure and aid but 
is supposed to be a whole of 
government approach 
Canada 
Stabilisation is primarily a military 
term and focuses on support to 
host nation institutions. This is 
despite the emphasis on military 
action being part of a whole of 
government approach 
Stabilisation is supported by 
military action through operations 
other than war, and is part of a 
Whole-of-Government approach 
EU 
Stabilisation is a strategic aim, 
rather than activity of the EU 
Stabilisation should be promoted 
through all the actions of the EU 
and is regionally focused (i.e. 
Balkans, Middle East) rather than 
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global 
UN 
DPKO and UNDP do not use 
stabilisation as a separate term but 
support Early Recovery; however, 
they argue that actions contribute 
to stability 
All post-conflict actions are 
supposed to support stability, and 
therefore they promote and use 
peacebuilding terminology 
Such an analysis may lead some to conclude that searching for common ground on 
what stability means is not possible because each state and institution interprets 
stability and stabilisation differently. Indeed this re-interpretation of stability and 
stabilisation is not limited to Liberal states but has been appropriated at times by 
states such as Syria and Pakistan (Black, 2012; Khan, 2011). Leaving the broader usage 
of stability aside, it is unhelpful to dismiss stability because it is too broad a concept. 
The focus that states and institutions afford stability in higher level strategic thinking 
and the plethora of bodies that seek to support ‘stability’ merit investigation. 
The evolution to stabilisation interventions 
As well as the various traditions of Liberal political philosophy from which the lenses 
above have evolved there are several levels of intervention which have presaged 
stabilisation. Given the localised nature of instability12 maintaining stability is not 
something that can be worked out at the UN Security Council by the issuing of 
resolutions by global powers.13 What bodies, such as the UN, acknowledge is that the 
causes of instability are too broad and multifaceted to be dealt with by one state or 
organisation, and so they permit, promote or allow direct intervention by a range of 
governmental and non-governmental institutions in the areas of politics, security and 
development in ‘fragile’ states. However, grand strategic concepts of stability also 
present implementation challenges because they are often unclear or so broad as to 
be all-encompassing.  
The two most recent UK and US national security strategies talk of the need to 
promote ‘stability’ and in the case of the US this leads to an all-encompassing project 
to promote Liberal values, not just victory, through which “[t]he United States 
                                                     
12 The author recognises that there are global and trans-national components to 
instability, not least those dealing with nuclear proliferation, e.g. the International 
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA); or financial and fiscal stability (e.g. the loans extended 
by the European Central Bank (ECB) to improve liquidity in the European banking 
system or the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) which is available to states in 
the Eurozone). However the focus of this thesis is on localised issues including 
terrorism and political conflict which present threats to stability. 
13 For an analysis of the confused nature of UN Security Council Resolutions with 
regard to Afghanistan see Dennys, 2011 pp. 6-8. 
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supports the expansion of democracy and human rights abroad because governments 
that respect these values are more just, peaceful, and legitimate ... Political systems 
that protect universal rights are ultimately more stable, successful, and secure” 14 
(White House, 2010, p. 37). For the UK the perception of threats is different and 
includes a “complex range of threats from a myriad of sources. Terrorism, cyber-attack, 
unconventional attacks using chemical, nuclear or biological weapons, as well as large 
scale accidents or natural hazards” (HMG, 2010, p. 3). 
These concerns about stability are coloured by the form of Liberal interventionism 
which grew out of the aftermath of the Cold War. Instead of patronising elites to act 
as channels for US or Soviet bloc foreign policy priorities, Liberal interventionism holds 
that it is the innate values imbued by democracy and the process of social and 
economic development which will secure stability and the people’s willingness to 
ensure their leaders provide stability (Duffield, 2001, pp. 11-17). As a result there has 
been an evolution in thinking by Western powers about how to assert stability, one 
which moves from the macro state level during the Cold War through to progressively 
more intrusive interventions. Drawing on the table above it may be useful in these 
terms to view stabilisation as a grand strategic objective, an operational approach 
(which evolved in the 1990s) and a tactical activity (which evolved post-2001). 
Cold War interventions drew their authority from the overall structure of the global 
system, including the Bretton Woods institutions, and were shaped by the 
competition between the United States and the Soviet Union. These interventions 
were often characterised as peacekeeping. Whilst covert support was given to non-
state actors who were vying for influence between the two powers, the majority of 
influence, money and material were given to states as the bulwark against 
encroaching enemies (Stoker, 2008, pp. 1-2, 8).  
Post-Cold War Liberal philosophy freed external intervention from the international 
competition of the Cold War. Interventions became increasingly nationally focused 
including the proliferation of bilateral development assistance and externally 
supported national strategies for political emancipation, security reform, economic 
liberalisation and development (Duffield, 2001, p. 12). These forms of intervention 
were often characterised as peacebuilding (drawing from peacekeeping) and latterly 
statebuilding.  
                                                     
14 This is consistent with the previous US National Security Strategy under President 
Bush which stressed that ‘democracies are the most responsible members of the 
international system, promoting democracy is the most effective long-term measure 
for strengthening international stability; reducing regional conflicts; countering 
terrorism and terror-supporting extremism; and extending peace and prosperity’ 
(White House, 2006, p. 3) and is further development in the new strategic direction of 
the US DoD (Department of Defense, 2012, pp. 1-4). 
The search for stability through stabilisation: Case studies from Afghanistan and Nepal 
10 
The post-2001 period saw a crystallisation of thinking about the ‘fragility’ of some 
states (Patrick & Brown, 2007, pp. 4-5), the nature of “new wars” (Kaldor M. , 2006, 
pp. 1-14) or “war amongst the people” (Smith, R., 2005, pp. 371-3), and a radically 
different security environment for Liberal states in the face of global terrorism which 
has led to the evolution of interventions focusing at an increasingly sub-national and 
local level. These types of interventions have often been characterised as stabilisation 
and are the focus of this thesis. 
As well as the overall evolution of intervention systems, the actual activities have 
become increasingly localised. From international processes developed to manage the 
international financial system and state sovereignty (during the Cold-War), through to 
national approaches involving economic reforms such as Structural Adjustment 
Programmes, state support programmes i.e. (SSR) and elections (from the 1980’s in to 
the post-Cold War period) recent stabilisation activities now focus on supporting local 
approaches to address alternative livelihoods, local forms of security, informal justice 
and local political settlements in the current period. (HMG, 2011, pp. 26-7) 
Stabilisation operations, the focus of this work, exist primarily in the latter area, 
though in effect they can be seen as an attempt to enforce other layers of stabilising 
interventions because the other layers are still prevalent. This also means that 
assessing stabilisation is not simply a case of focusing on projects but how those 
projects sit within a range of international, national and local interventions. In 
addition, by recognizing the bureaucratic evolution of stabilisation since the end of 
the Cold War, as well as the different lenses that states and institutions use to 
conceptualise stability and stabilisation, it is also possible to identify examples of what 
would now be called stabilisation activities in previous interventions, for example in 
Oman and Rhodesia in the 1970s and 80s. 
Stabilisation: a new term for old practices? 
As noted above part of the increase in interest in stability is the realisation that 
instability is caused by a number of factors (Starr, 2009, p. 1; Lambach & Gamberger, 
2009, pp. 105-6). These include traditional ‘conflict’ issues such as insurgencies and 
wars of secession which may include control over resources (Ross, 2001, pp. 325–61). 
However, they increasingly include the various impacts of globalisation, which 
threaten some governments (Chuter, 2009, p. 33) as well as environmental 
catastrophes that can make a seemingly ‘simple’ security threat exceptionally 
complicated. For example, in Haiti, whose political and developmental processes were 
interrupted by the 2010 earthquake and then re-cast by the international community 
through a UN-led mission (Blot, 2012, p. 195 & 199; Muggah, 2010, pp. S444-5), or 
Aceh in Indonesia where the conflict dynamic was radically influenced after the 
tsunami in 2004 (Waizenegger, 2011, pp. 113-7). 
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The sheer complexity of the problems, which involve violence, providing shelter to 
displaced people, provision of emergency services, long-term damage to livelihoods 
often in the context of a ‘new’ political settlement means that no single agency can 
provide the expertise necessary to deal adequately with the interlocking problems. 
This has led to the emergence of the concept of an integrated approach - called the 
Comprehensive Approach in the UK, Whole-of-Government in the US and 3D 
intervention relating to Defence, Diplomacy and Development in others - which would 
allow for more coordinated and ultimately more successful interventions (Patrick & 
Brown, 2007, pp. 1-3). One element of the stabilisation debate suggests that the 
Whole-of-Government or Comprehensive Approach is a brand new but ill-defined 
phenomenon (van der Meer, 2009, pp. 7 - 35). However, closer reading of historical 
experience across military, intelligence, diplomatic and development actions, seems 
to present an alternate view whereby states have previously undertaken ‘stabilisation’ 
activities in a coordinated manner.15 The newness of stabilisation may not be in the 
concept but in the bureaucratic response to evolving situations.16 The examples from 
the Dhofar campaign in Oman and the Lancaster House process (which ended the 
Rhodesian civil war) are briefly described below as an illustration of this. 
The Dhofar campaign was waged with international (British) advisors supporting and 
leading Omani government forces against a rebellion in the Dhofar region from 1965-
75. (McKeown, 1981, pp. 21-95). With regard to the Dhofar campaign Air Chief 
Marshal Sir Jock Stirrup notes experiences of what are now called stabilisation during 
the campaign in the 1970s “resonate strongly with our contemporary security 
challenges … there are some enduring principles here [from Dhofar] that survive the 
particular and extend to the general … looking at Oman today, there is ample 
evidence that the principles, when properly applied, do work.” (MoD, 2009b, p. xxvi) 
In the example of the transition of the Rhodesian government led by Ian Smith to the 
forming of the Zimbabwean government led by Robert Mugabe in 1980 it is striking 
that the attempt by Western powers (the UK) to ensure regional stability as an 
element of geo-strategic concerns was characterised by what would now be termed 
as a Whole-of-Government approach (though the term was not used at that stage). 
The intervention was split into three main activities: firstly, the politically focused 
Lancaster House negotiations; secondly, the assumption of temporary governance of 
                                                     
15 This concurs with the argument that stabilisation has antecedents dating back to 
earlier conflicts, including the Philippines (1889-1902), Algeria (1954-62) and Vietnam 
(1967-75) (Barakat, Deely, & Zyck, 2010, pp. S301-305) 
16 Van der Meer asserts that it is the frequency of these types of operations that is 
increasing; I would argue that it is not the frequency but the combination of 
increasingly intrusive interventions and the need for some Western powers to 
combine resources that is leading to the new appreciation of stabilisation. 
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the territory under Lord Soames; and thirdly, the deployment of the Commonwealth 
Multinational Force to carry out a DDR process and oversee elections; these three 
components remain classic elements of an international statebuilding initiative. 
Within a few months the combined political, governance and security activities had 
transitioned the state from Rhodesia to Zimbabwe under-pinned by a democratic 
election (Wiseman & Taylor, 1981, pp. 7-22; Stedman, 1988, pp. 177-203).  
Using the examples of Oman and Zimbabwe it is clear that stabilisation is not 
necessarily a new practice in and of itself. It often uses the same tools as 
peacebuilding and statebuilding, and at times incorporated military action including 
COIN, all of which were derived from tools deployed during the Cold War. This does 
not mean all prior experience can simply be used to explain current trends. US and UK 
conceptions of civil affairs activities in World War II were synonymous with those of 
military government17. While there have been changes in the contexts and doctrine 
there may be instructive lessons from previous interventions. In addition to earlier 
experience the UK’s most recent paper on ‘Building Stability Overseas’ illustrates that 
many existing activities can already be categorised as having a stabilisation intent, 
including those in Afghanistan, the Philippines, Nepal, Yemen, Somalia amongst others 
(HMG, 2011, pp. 25, 28-9).  
Table 2 gives a basic outline of the intervention logic in Liberal peacebuilding and 
stabilisation to three problems (political, security and development) and the ways in 
which these approaches would rationalise intervening using the same activities. For 
example, the holding of local elections will improve the ‘social contract’, secure the 
population’s support for the state, and expand the mandate of the state in the three 
generic interventions of peacebuilding, statebuilding and stabilisation. Some may see 
this continuity as a positive – the interventions are working in harmony – however 
there is little critical thinking exposed through this contrasting of analyses. For 
example, it is not clear what in the history of state formation would mean that 
democratic governance in another imagined state would be the ‘best’, ‘most effective’ 
or even ‘logical’ choice for addressing the ‘social contract’, securing support for the 
state and expanding the state mandate in the near-term.  
In reality this looks a lot more like an intellectual inability or political will to pursue 
alternative approaches and the following of ideological dogma rather than using 
different tools to address complex threats. It is striking that there may be little 
difference in the prescription of activities from the different approaches. Returning to 
the international intervention which led to the end of the Smith government in 
                                                     
17
 For a concise summary see Oehring, C. 2009, pp. 1-2. A seminal work in this area was written by Coles 
and Weinberg whose preface includes an insightful discussion of the issues associated with military 
actors working in civilian governance capacities (Coles and Weinberg, 1962, pp.ix – xiv). 
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Rhodesia and formation of the Mugabe government in Zimbabwe many of the basic 
precepts of peacebuilding, statebuilding and stabilisation are found, including the 
formal creation of a new political settlement (the Lancaster House process), a process 
of disarmament and reintegration for combatants, and the holding of an election 
(Wiseman & Taylor, 1981, pp. 7-22; Stedman, 1988, pp. 177-203).  
Table 2 Comparing peacebuilding, statebuilding and stabilisation intervention logics 
(sources various including UN, government and non-governmental material, Author) 
Problem 
Peacebuilding 
Intervention 
logic 
Statebuilding 
intervention logic 
Stabilisation 
intervention 
logic 
Activity 
G
o
ve
rn
an
ce
 is
 
u
n
re
p
re
se
n
ta
ti
ve
 Democratic 
governance is the 
best way of 
building a social 
contract 
The bureaucracy 
and executive 
must ensure an 
open process of 
forming 
government to 
ensure that 
citizens support 
the state 
A governance 
structure is 
necessary to 
expand the 
mandate of the 
central 
government 
Local elections 
for councils on 
political and/or 
development 
activities 
P
o
lic
e
 a
re
 
p
o
o
rl
y 
tr
ai
n
ed
 
an
d
 e
q
u
ip
p
ed
 
Better trained 
police help build 
the social 
contract between 
the population 
and government 
More professional 
policy will help 
enforce the social 
contract 
Better trained 
police can 
counter-arm 
threats and 
protect the 
population 
Train and equip 
programmes to 
support the 
police 
H
ig
h
 
u
n
em
p
lo
ym
en
t 
Employment 
improves 
household 
income helping 
to kick-start the 
local economy 
Employment helps 
increase economic 
activity which will 
raise tax revenues 
(possibly through 
indirect taxation) 
Employment 
stops young 
men from 
joining an 
armed 
opposition 
group 
Cash-for-work 
programmes 
 
This is not to say that stabilisation should be simply dismissed as a re-running of old 
habits – the opportunity that stabilisation presents is much greater than that – 
however there are some long term systematic processes which have led to the 
emergence of stabilisation doctrine amongst Western states which have as much to 
do with external changes in threats and their complexity as they do with internal 
dynamics of Liberal states. It is here that the lenses from which the interveners 
conceptualise a threat and develop a response become inhibiting in themselves, and 
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contribute to the lack of strategic coherence discussed above. This conundrum is 
central to this thesis and the twin issues of the Liberal heritage of stabilisation and 
how responses have been developed to address the threats is developed in the 
literature review in chapter 2. 
Outline of the thesis 
Stabilisation should not be seen simply as a new model for existing activities, despite 
the risk that it succumbs to the fate of peacebuilding and statebuilding. Stabilisation 
offers a radical re-thinking of how states can intervene in other territories they 
perceive as a risk to international stability by fore-grounding global and national 
security interests in stability. In order to interrogate this argument this thesis will 
attempt to understand how interventions by both national and international actors 
affect local political legitimacy and stability and how this ultimately challenges the 
Liberal project. It will use case studies from Afghanistan (a focus for Western states) 
and Nepal (a focus for India and China but also a concern for Western states) to 
compare approaches that the international community deploys in host nations in 
search of promoting stability through stabilisation activities and will seek to critique 
existing practices against conceptions of stability and stabilisation from the field sites.  
In Chapter 2 the theoretical discussion sketched in the Introduction is further 
developed, demonstrating that the key component of intervention is the continuation 
of the Liberal project. As the state system has been consolidated and dominated by 
the West, the Liberal states have sought to ‘stabilise’ the world in their own image. 
They have sought to do this through a number of approaches; the three most relevant 
to the field sites are statebuilding, COIN and development in support of stability.18 The 
most recent and invasive form has been ‘stabilisation’ activity in post-conflict 
environments which incorporates activities along political, security and development 
spheres. Importantly some literature mistakenly conflates stabilisation primarily with 
COIN (Blair & Fitz-Gerald, 2009 , pp. 8-9); instead the evolution of both the threats to 
international stability and the evolution of war amongst the peoples (Smith, R., 2005, 
pp. 394-8) have meant that ‘stabilisation’ is simply the most securitised of the range of 
interventions undertaken by the international community in pursuit of a stable system 
and draws on multiple theories including statebuilding and development as well as 
military doctrine. 
In Chapter 3 the research methodology is explained from the hypothesis that in order 
to understand stabilisation it is necessary to understand the impact of interventions 
                                                     
18 These three theories broadly correspond to political, security and development 
activities (or diplomacy, defence and development), though as explained in later 
chapters the author recognises that there is often considerable overlap between 
these theoretical areas. 
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(nationally and internationally driven) on both local legitimacy formation and local 
conceptions of stability. Field research was carried out between September 2010 and 
November 2011 in the two case study countries, Afghanistan and Nepal. In both 
countries interviews were collected in two village field sites as well as further 
interviews carried out at a national level in the search for commonalities and 
connections within and between the field sites and trends noticeable in other parts of 
Afghanistan and Nepal. 
Chapters 4 – 7 present the field research from the four field sites: Kalakan and Nahr-i 
Sarraj districts in Afghanistan, and Rolpa and Bara districts in Nepal. In each chapter 
there is a discussion of the conflict history of the site as well as the impacts of a range 
of political, security and development interventions by both the state, non-state and 
international actors. These four chapters present the bulk of the new primary data 
collected during the research and inform the development of the comparative analysis 
in Chapter 8 and the theory testing and development in Chapter 9. 
Chapter 4, entitled Indigenous Stabilisation, discusses the processes of stabilisation, 
both indigenous and exogenous in the district of Kalakan in the Kabul province, 
Afghanistan. Kalakan is described by respondents as a stable district, which they 
explain is due to several factors; chief among them for the respondents is the way in 
which the population, ‘the people’, have reached a consensus and addressed some of 
the grievances associated with the conflict in the 1980s and 90s, and a regional 
approach to political competition for the districts in the Koh Daman. In addition there 
have been a number of exogenous activities by a wide range of actors, including the 
government, NGOs, international military forces and local political actors which have 
affected stability in the district to varying degrees since 2001. The findings are 
significant because they describe a substantive process of indigenous stabilisation 
which can be used to understand why and how stability was achieved in the district.  
In Chapter 5, the importance of Exogenous Stabilisation is discussed with regards to 
Village A in Nahr-i Sarraj district in the Helmand province, Afghanistan. It reviews a 
range of sources of stability, attempts by local and foreign actors to promote stability, 
and assesses the corporate impact of these activities on stability. The chapter 
highlights the limitations of exogenous stabilisation when it is far in advance of local 
political will and physical capability of the Government of the Islamic Republic of 
Afghanistan (GIRoA). The chapter is divided into three main sections: the first provides 
a background to exogenous stabilisation and a conflict history of the district and 
Village A, which highlights the significant stabilisation themes that emerged in the 
interviews; this is followed by a section describing attempts at exogenous stabilisation 
as supported by ISAF primarily as well as civilian projects; the third section analyses 
the aggregate impact of stabilisation activities on the district. 
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Chapter 6 discusses the first of the Nepal field sites as a process of Insurgent 
Stabilisation and focuses on the processes of stabilisation that were undertaken by 
pro-government and insurgent Maoist actors in and around the Gajul Village 
Development Committee (VDC) in Rolpa district Nepal. Gajul lay at the edges of what 
the Maoists termed their ‘base area’ which formed their proto-state of the Magarant 
Autonomous State, meaning the VDC lay in a conflict zone sandwiched between 
increasingly confident Maoist forces and government forces that were pushed back 
from positions in the village during the course of the conflict. As part of this contest 
insurgent forces used a range of approaches across the political, security and 
development spheres which it has been argued promoted stability in their attempts to 
govern the population. Pro-government forces received little external support during 
the conflict but still employed many of the tactics, and indeed strategies, espoused by 
Western academics and practitioners, but were ultimately unsuccessful in retaining 
control of Gajul. As they gradually ceded ground Government of Nepal ‘development’ 
activities became increasingly securitised and limited to the district centre. External 
actors only entered the arena late in the conflict, primarily through development 
activities which were used by both sides to shore up their ‘stabilisation’ approaches.  
The final field site is discussed in Chapter 7, which focuses on Haraiya VDC in Bara 
district, Nepal, and is called Failed self-stabilisation. This chapter explores the limits of 
indigenous processes of stabilisation outside of broader political processes and 
support. The Maoist insurgency arrived in Bara in 2000, and the People’s Liberation 
Army (PLA) and People’s Government attempted to assert authority in the district and 
Haraiya VDC, though ultimately only succeeded in pushing the government back 
rather than establishing coherent Maoist governance, security and development 
activities. The conflict did not stop with the signing of the Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement (CPA) and the Madeshi Andolan in 2007. The killings of Maoist cadres in 
the wider Terai region brought a new wave of instability. Throughout this period there 
were attempts at stabilisation by Maoist forces, the government of Nepal and by self-
organised groups within Haraiya but all failed to bring stability in their own way. The 
case study suggests that none of the political, security, or development interventions 
provided explanatory evidence for the limited stabilisation that was achieved in the 
VDC, instead the data suggests that processes beyond the control of Haraiya dictated 
the extent of stability that was enjoyed by the population.  
Chapter 8 is based on data analysis comparing all four sites and demonstrates 
commonalities in perceptions of stability formation and the relative significance of 
interventions that could be undertaken as stabilisation activities. This chapter 
challenges the research hypothesis outlined in Chapter 3 through a comparative 
analysis across the case studies by looking at: 1) periods of stability; 2) culture and 
context; 3) the mode of intervention; 4) political legitimacy; and 5) conceptions of 
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stability. The chapter concludes by suggesting a new stability hypothesis which is 
tested in Chapter 9 against the three theories of intervention: statebuilding, COIN and 
development, that underpin the Liberal project, and which are discussed in Chapter 2. 
In Chapter 9 the analysis in the preceding chapters is married to present a critique of 
the Liberal project and stabilisation interventions along political, security and 
development lines. It suggests that while the stabilisation hypothesis does draw on 
elements of the Liberal agenda contained in the three theoretical areas of 
statebuilding, COIN and development, it also breaks new theoretical ground. These 
critiques are then built upon to present a potential theory of stability as a way to 
assess stability by considering the connections within and between the political 
leaders, local elites and the population which would address some of the critiques of 
existing theories and frameworks. It also suggests a hierarchy of requirements for 
stability. 
Chapter 10 concludes the thesis outlining the main findings and the limitations of the 
research findings before suggesting potential avenues of further research and 
provides an epilogue from the researcher’s time spent at the Helmand PRT in spring 
2012.  
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Chapter 2 – Literature Review 
Introduction 
The first chapter described the way in which in current discourse there are 
overlapping interests in producing and maintaining stability amongst the nations who 
ensure international security. Stability is threatened by fragile states, which are a risk 
to their own citizens as well as the Liberal Western states and their ways of life (The 
White House, 2010, p. 37; IPPR, 2008, p. 5; Patrick & Brown, 2007, pp. 4-5). These 
states incubate dangerous viruses such as terrorism which can transcend international 
boundaries and destabilise the international system. Fear of these threats is ingrained 
in Western society and within the governments which promote and carry out 
interventions in ‘fragile’ countries in the name of global stability (Chandler, 2004, pp. 
187-206; Duffield, 2007, pp. 24-9; Jahn, 2007, pp. 187-206). Whilst there is some 
divergence about how to address stability and operationalise interventions to address 
these threats the logic of the Liberal paradigm in the early 21st Century necessitates 
this intervention in other countries to ensure ‘stability’. As the threats have become 
more virulent, more and more intrusive interventions have been designed to contain 
them, the most recent form of which is now referred to as ‘stabilisation’.  
This chapter focuses first on Liberalism, which has structured and driven Western 
power and intervention over the last three centuries; it builds on the conclusion in the 
introduction that in order to understand stabilisation it is necessary to understand the 
nature of the Liberal state. The second part of this chapter will focus on the modes of 
intervention undertaken in the name of stabilisation across politics, security and 
development. This literature review covers substantial ground but is meant to identify 
the centrality of Liberal thinking to stabilisation interventions through notions of 
Liberal state formation, interventionism and the changes in the international system 
since the end of the Cold War, which have necessitated the evolution of stabilisation.  
With such a broad approach it is necessary to focus on the core authors and texts 
within each component of the literature review that have relevance to current 
interventions. As noted below there is a wealth of literature on political philosophy, 
but for better or worse it is Liberalism that is the dominant strand of thinking and 
therefore other traditions are noted only where they have a direct impact on current 
interventions. Equally, the discussion on stabilisation practice along political, security 
and development lines focuses on the most significant or common forms of 
intervention. This excludes overly technical discussions on, for example, trade reform; 
instead it focuses on the overarching theoretical positions taken from the Liberal 
tradition in each area of activity: politics, security and development. 
Beginning with Liberalism as the overarching narrative within which international 
order is maintained, the review describes how Western states justify their expansive 
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and interventionist roles in protecting international stability. This is critically 
important to recognise because every intervention that is designed or implemented 
now is carried out within the Liberal paradigm. The discussion identifies several key 
elements of Liberalism and identifies the ways in which they shape thinking about 
stability and stabilisation. This includes notions of social order, state formation, 
democracy, the role of markets and the economy, and social progress based on the 
writing of Hobbes, Rousseau, Locke, Adam Smith and others (see Hobbes, 1651, 
Rousseau 1762, Locke, 1960, Smith, A. 1776).  
Based on these foundational Liberal precepts the chapter discusses the nature of 
Liberal European state formation including the work of Max Weber and Charles Tilly, 
as well as Beetham’s work on legitimacy formation and the state. Their theoretical 
work may have significant application to indigenous European state formation but its 
relevance to exogenous statebuilding is unexplored in the literature. After this 
introduction to the nature of the Liberal state the chapter outlines the academic 
literature from anthropologists and historians regarding state formation in non-
European contexts. This includes including Asia, Africa and the Middle East, starting 
with the Early State School of Claeseen and Skalnik, which is significant because of the 
influence that history, culture and context has upon societies today. 
This is followed by tracing the way in which the Liberal state has become the template 
for all states as Liberalism has become increasingly interventionist. In particular it 
notes the shift since the Cold War as interventions have become increasingly localised 
resulting in policies which aim to promote stability through stabilisation despite the 
fact there is no agreed definition of either term. The philosophy of interventionism is 
structured around the international bodies, primarily the Bretton Woods institutions, 
which seek to secure Liberal power, as well as promote Liberal values through Human 
Rights and Democracy. These institutions have legalised interventions since the end of 
the Cold War in increasingly humanitarian and developmental language, such as the 
‘Right to Protect’. The final part of this section focuses on the emergence of 
stabilisation as a policy tool of Liberal interventionism designed to face the threats of 
the new wars fought amongst the people. Taking the work of Mary Kaldor and Rupert 
Smith to demonstrate the emergence of new threats that stabilisation is meant to 
address in the post-Cold War era.  
Following the discussion on Liberalism the chapter turns to stabilisation practice as 
the policy meant to achieve the strategic goals of stability on the three primary 
spheres of external intervention: politics, security and development. As a corporate 
collection they are related to diplomacy, defence and development – the 3Ds, often 
identified as being the three main modes of engagement by states in other territories 
and also the three primary lines of operation for promoting stability and 
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stabilisation.19 These are broad themes and because they originate in the Liberal 
tradition there is some overlap in their definitions as well as in their implementation. 
Indeed COIN may be viewed as simply the most robust form of intervention on a 
spectrum in which development would be one of the least intrusive. There is also a 
cross over between various strands of political philosophy and different forms of 
intervention, for example: the intrinsic importance of education forms part of Liberal 
political philosophy but in execution lies in the development sphere. However, for 
clarity it is important to discuss political, security and development theories and 
interventions separately. 
Political activity supporting stability in this thesis encompasses external interventions 
in another state that affects or structures political systems (often in terms of 
democracy) and systems of governance which may include technical reforms but are 
generally conceived of as statebuilding. These interventions are rooted in a specific 
political philosophy about the appropriate role of the state. As a result the literature 
discussed under politics includes statebuilding and governance sources. The political 
realm also drives much of the action in the security and development spheres and is 
discussed first throughout the thesis on the basis of its structuring role for all other 
actions. 
Security actions related to stability include direct military intervention by a foreign 
state, as well as long-term, often bi-lateral, military to military engagement in terms of 
training and the supply of material. Beyond physical infrastructure and training it 
includes the philosophical conception of the appropriate role of the armed forces, 
police and intelligence services and the relationship between those services and the 
population. Therefore along with drawing out shifts in the nature of war and conflict, 
including Rupert Smith and Mary Kaldor as mentioned above, the literature reviewed 
here also encompasses authors focused on COIN and SSR, including John Nagl, David 
Kilcullen and Nicole Ball. 
Development is in some respects the most amorphous and broad of the Liberal 
themes. It incorporates the idea of human and social progress often embodied in 
Western thought in terms of economic expansion and improving living standards, and 
is termed in this thesis economic and social development. However this theme also 
includes humanitarian action which seeks to protect life through the meeting of 
essential needs. The literature discusses the notions of freedom from want and fear as 
                                                     
19 The author notes that some quarters have identified another area of activity, 
sometimes called the “4th D” (Mashatt & Polk, 2008, p. 1); however, given that the 
three primary state bodies represented by diplomats, soldiers and development 
practitioners actually carry out most of the interventions the other departments are 
not considered in detail. 
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discussed by Amartya Sen as well as the economic liberalism of Milton Friedman and 
Friedrich Hayek. It also notes the connection to humanitarian principles embodied by 
institutions such as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), and the 
tensions some have identified with increasing military involvement in, and delivery of, 
development projects. This has often been through Civil-Military Coordination (CIMIC) 
or Military Stabilisation Support Teams (MSSTs) in ‘hot stabilisation’ (IFRC & ICRC, 
1994, pp. 1-3; Stabilisation Unit, 2007, pp. 1-2). 
Within each of the three lines of operation three theories or policy prescriptions are 
identified (statebuilding, counterinsurgency and development) which highlight the 
way in which the policy discourse on stability has outstripped academic theory and are 
used in the thesis to test the relevance of each theory to the notions of stability and 
stabilisation. The chapter concludes that the key gaps in the literature are two-fold; 
firstly, in understanding what local stability is and how it is formed; and secondly, the 
extent to which external actions support stability. This conclusion is used as the basis 
to develop the research hypothesis and methodology in Chapter 3.  
The Liberal state and Western state formation 
Liberalism, which first emerged in Britain and France more than three centuries ago, 
embodies several of the defining tensions of political and social life in Europe and the 
wider Western world. The theories of Locke, Hobbes, Rousseau and others may not be 
entirely consistent with one another (Gray, 1991, p. 158) but they form a conception 
of the individual who has innate rights, and who confers legitimacy upon a state which 
has a willingness to engage and intervene in the international system. This provides 
Liberal states with a natural tendency to export their values on to other states. 
There are four components of Liberal thinking which bear relevance to the state and 
intervention: the structure of the state; the state and religion; the state and 
democracy; and the market orientation of the state, which are introduced below. The 
nature of the state was of particular concern for Hobbes who saw it is a way in which 
man could find shelter from the harsh realities of the world. Indeed he argued that the 
basic needs of the people were "security, [and] peace" which would be the foundation 
of legitimate political institutions (Manent, 1995, p. 20). Furthermore, the Liberals also 
promoted the ideas of the separation of powers between the monarch (the 
executive), the legislature and the judiciary so that man could be assured that their 
rights would not be infringed (Gray, 1991, pp. 90-1; Hayek, 1978, pp. 112, 116-7). This 
principle is now one of the fundamental components of the international system 
based on the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights (Charvet & Kaczynska-Nay, 
2008, pp. 48-50). 
Beyond the structure of the state, Liberal thinkers also took aim at other key 
institutions, especially the church, towards which they were often significantly 
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antagonistic, though this tension is partly directed at the Catholic tradition rather than 
the Protestants, who perhaps imbibed Liberal thinking more readily (Manent, 1995, 
pp. 6, 20-1). Whether or not the Liberal agenda succeeded in constraining the Church 
in the short-term may be debated, but in the long-term they promoted a process of 
secularisation which has itself become quasi-religious in its inability to accept faith 
groups in other states as being legitimate actors. This itself presents a significant 
tension in Liberal philosophy which has been commented on in India as well as in 
Europe (Dhareshwar, 1999, pp. 203-7; Charvet & Kaczynska-Nay, 2008, pp. 318-9, 
348).  
The Liberals also sowed the seeds of democratic governance through their appeal to 
“classical republicanism” which called on men to rule themselves freely (Manent, 
1995, pp. 21-2). This exhortation was built upon the concept of individual rights which 
also supported the centrality of economic rights, in particular that man has the right 
to property ownership, which is a requirement for successful labour (ibid., 1995, pp. 
42-3; Gray, 1991, p. 146).20  The concept of economic rights is further enhanced with 
the importance of the free market on economic relations as espoused by Adam Smith 
(Smith A., 1999, pp. 121-6). 
Whilst this may be the broad story of early Liberal thinkers, it is also apparent that 
Liberalism itself has morphed over time as it has adapted to the world and has been 
changed by both the French revolution and the political story of the United States. The 
latter is significant because a key component of the evolution of the United States has 
been that it has not had to enforce equal citizenship by overthrowing a monarch. 
Instead citizens were created as equal through their constitution, meaning US 
conceptions of change and struggle are inherently disposed to seeking rapid, 
foundational change as opposed to European gradualism (Manent, 1995, pp. 83, 103-
5).21  
This is a heady mixture but these radical changes to European society are all the more 
important for the rest of the world because Liberalism also contains strong support 
for the creation and maintenance of empire, drawing on early Roman experience. This 
                                                     
20 This also connects with the work of Moore who argued that the enclosure 
movement which promoted land ownership (for some, not all) was a key component 
of establishing a strong democracy despite the fact it was a significant abuse of power 
by the landed class against the peasantry over a sustained period (Moore, 1966, pp. 
20-9). 
21 The author recognises that this did not apply to women and non-White individuals; 
de Tocqueville’s point remains valid however because even though female suffrage 
and black equality were only addressed later – and through significant pressure and 
violence – those changes did not affect the basic structure of the United States’ 
governing system, unlike the revolutions in France and the United Kingdom. 
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may predispose the Western world towards intervention based on Liberal conceptions 
of the state, government, democracy and economic relations (ibid., 1995, p. 3; 
Charvet & Kaczynska-Nay, 2008, pp. 359-64). These philosophical innovations have 
played a critical role in shaping current Western societies and the way in which they 
conceive of the world around them. Therefore in order to understand the 
statebuilding paradigm used in the 20th and 21st Centuries it is important to 
understand this heritage and how it impacts on the understanding of Liberal state 
formation.  
Building on this Liberal heritage, the contribution of social scientists to the 
assumptions about state formation presents a further dimension of theory. Weber 
argued that states must attain ‘legitimate domination’ which demonstrates the extent 
to which bureaucracy and social groups acknowledge the authority of a ruler to issue 
commands and rule over lives. Weber outlined three types of legitimate domination: 
charismatic, traditional and rational-legal with ‘modern’ society (i.e. Liberal) relating 
to the last type. Importantly, Weber recognises that legitimacy formation, creation 
and maintenance were not one-off events, but continual processes based on engaging 
not just the physical group but also their emotions. This is a quality which is very 
difficult to convey in matrices and logical frameworks because they promote a 
projectised approach to understanding an intervention which ‘should’ occur in a linear 
fashion (Collins, 1986, p. 155-7). Whilst Weber was concerned with state formation as 
embodied by bureaucracy, Tillian thinking focuses on the processes of forming the 
state, which he argues involves war-making and taxation (Tilly, 1990, p. 16-25). The 
process of war brings more areas under a ruler’s control, which then require 
maintenance and protection, and in turn taxation and the formation of bureaucracies. 
Taxation then becomes the primary driver of resource accumulation for fighting new 
wars (ibid., 1990, p. 87-91).  
Tillian and Weberian thinking have several things in common. Firstly, the formation of 
the state requires significant violence. Secondly, once in power, elites must 
monopolise violence. Thirdly, elites must create an administration to raise taxes to 
provide basic benefits (normally only basic security) and protect the region from 
external threats or wage more war. These issues are not especially surprising and are 
relatively ‘simple’ for Liberal interveners to recognise because they are physical (i.e. 
security, taxation and the formation and protection of a bureaucracy). However, the 
lynchpin of these issues is legitimacy.22 Despite some arguing that legitimacy is a 
‘mushy concept’ (Huntington, 1991, p. 46), both Tilly and Weber assert that it is key to 
                                                     
22 Rawlsian theory suggests there other components to state formation, such as 
justice, which may be more important than legitimacy, though it is not entirely clear 
why justice and legitimacy should be separate (Peter, 2009, pp. 58-62). 
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the way in which states more generally have formed and as David Beetham has 
argued it shapes and controls the use of coercive power.23  
There is a rich literature on political legitimacy in political theory though very little 
about exogenously supported statebuilding presenting an undeveloped theoretical 
area.24 Even when considering the application of Weberian and Tillian thought to 
endogenous state formation some believe that their thinking lacks clarity (Beetham, 
1991, p. 38). The current theoretical problem in applying Liberal philosophy of the 
state and experiences of Western state formation to modern statebuilding is that 
Weber, Tilly and Beetham do not discuss the attributes of externally sponsored 
exogenous state formation (or statebuilding). This is critical because, as discussed 
later, the interventions supported by Western states primarily derive their 
intervention logic from the experiences of European state formation, which were 
internally driven state formation processes. The following subsection outlines the 
limitations of basing modern interventions on Liberal philosophy and European state 
formation theory through an examination of non-European state formation. 
Culture, context and the Liberal state 
Before the state system was fully codified it is clear that there were variations to 
European state formation models which have been identified in historical 
anthropology. The Early State School led by Claessen and Skalnik drew on some of the 
same components of Western state formation (namely class/surplus imbalances and 
coercive force (Claessen and Skalnik, 1978, pp. 3-30) to argue that there were multiple 
approaches to understanding state formation.25 They argued that not only are there 
several forms of state (an idea which also draws on Weberian thinking) but that state 
formation in different parts of the world had distinct attributes. There may in fact be 
                                                     
23 This is not just important for state formation but also for the conduct of insurgent 
groups. As Jeremy Weinstein has found groups who are able to build upon social 
bonds of legitimacy are less likely to inflict significant casualties on the local 
population because they derive their power and authority from them. In areas where 
this relationship is weak insurgent groups replace the legitimacy derived from their 
social networks to legitimacy derived from resource access and wealth (Weinstein, 
2007, p. 7). 
24 A notable exception to this is the recent paper on legitimacy formation in fragile 
states: OECD, 2010. 
25 In their typology this includes the inchoate state - where kinship dominates and 
taxation is ad hoc; the typical state - where kinship is more or less on a par with more 
distant bureaucratic administration and taxation systems are becoming systematised; 
and the evolving state - where the importance of kinship is declining and the 
bureaucratic state is emerging with more complex forms of resource management 
(Claessen and Skalnik, 1978, pp. 640-5). 
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several processes of state formation which draw upon local physical attributes (land 
mass, climate etc.) and the cultures that evolved in those spaces reached toward 
different forms of states for different reasons. It is in applying this theory to other 
states that anthropologists have identified a number of forms of state formation 
which suggests there is not one species of state, but several species which have similar 
attributes but are attuned to their natural and social habitats. These may seem to be 
ancient history but they can have significant impacts currently on how societies view 
the state they live in and the boundaries of action the state can take for its own 
legitimisation and the paths it is driven down through the happenstance of the 
presence of natural resources or exposure to natural disasters. 
There is a rich body of literature which has argued consistently that processes of state 
formation in Africa, Asia and the Middle East were distinct from those in Europe 
(Tymowski, 2009, pp. 36-48). Lamont King examined state formation in several parts 
of Africa over several centuries and noted that there were several forms of nation-
states and multi-ethnic states in the pre-Colonial period including: the Pharonic 
kingdom (middle kingdom) which ruled an ethnically homogenous, territorially 
defined space in the period between 2000BC and 1600BC (an example of the nation-
state); the Kasar Hausa (West Africa) who formed a complex hierarchy of entities 
within an overarching monarchy which was multi-ethnic, included a tax collection 
system, the maintenance of an army and a legal framework during the 16th – 19th 
Centuries (an example of the multi-ethnic state) and finally the Zulu/Mfecane state 
that emerged at the end of the 18th Century as wealth was accumulated and 
concentrated after the Zulu conquest. Whilst ethnically led by the Zulus they 
incorporated other ethnic groups into leadership to further their conquest during the 
18th – 19th Centuries (an example of the nation; King, 2006, pp. 26-30, 84-6, 106 and 
133-5). 
In the Middle East, comprising the Arabian Peninsula, Northern Africa and the Levant, 
there have also been several forms of state from the Pharaohs noted above to the 
Islamic Caliphates as well as Turkish and Persian Imperial rule. It is too easy to see 
ancient Mesopotamia, medieval Europe, or the Islamic east demonstrating processes 
of state formation as a single moral narrative associated with the Abrahamic faiths, 
but this is not the case. There are issues with the fact that ‘the state’ is in some areas, 
like the Yemen, a more recent phenomenon (Dresch, 1990, pp. 252-287). The Yemen, 
being largely mountainous and therefore difficult to control, has been ignored by 
conquerors and empires because it would be too expensive to impose order; 
therefore state formation in Yemen is distinctly Yemeni. In addition the tribal nature 
of Arab society has had important influences on the forms of state that have emerged 
from Morocco to Iraq. At times these social structures with their established loyalties 
have resisted the state, in other points they have acted as the state’s defender 
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(Khoury, 1990, pp. 1-24). Further central components of Western state formation, like 
taxation, are manifestly different in the Middle East because of Islamic principles of 
zakat (Dresch, 1990 pp. 252-287). Devolved taxation systems also highlight the fact 
that the Ottoman Empire evolved and developed distinct forms of control which were 
able to cope with the demands of heterogeneous populations for several centuries, 
something which modern democracies often struggle to do (Bromley, 1994, pp. 48-
50). 
The Asian experience of state formation is similarly varied, from the nomads of the 
Central Asia Steppe, the Indic cultures and the fusion of Confucian, Buddhist and 
Islamic values overlaid by modern experiences of colonialism and independence. 
Using the example of South East Asia Tony Day argues that Western ‘concern’ about 
violence (or stability) in states in Southeast Asia fails to recognise that there are 
cultural boundaries at play in what the state is allowed to do within its repertoire. 
Therefore there may be peculiar elements to state formation in Southeast Asia, 
including the strength of kinship networks and their influence on state formation, 
which means violence is a more acceptable part of state formation and state 
maintenance in some non-Western societies (Day, 2002, pp. 288-291). As a result 
there is a cultural understanding of state violence and state order which is distinct 
from Western notions, which is overlaid by deep cosmological forms of state 
formation that drove early state formation in the region and have an enduring impact 
on the forms of states today in Southeast Asia. Finally, when we investigate the 
bureaucracies that now exist they are less a form of structure according to the 
Weberian concept and more of a repertoire which presents a fluid and continually 
evolving relationship between state and the people (Day, 2002, pp. 205-7).26 
In summary, these three regions have shown that state formation can be 
heterogeneous, which provides a powerful critique of modern Liberal interventionism 
predicated on bolstering states to address perceived threats. The empirical evidence 
base for ideas of state formation that rests upon Western European experience may 
not be entirely applicable to non-Western state formation, particularly those without 
colonial histories (Ayoob, 1995, p. 71). State formation in the European context was a 
process of forming a state system; whereas nowadays fragile, weak or failed states are 
not being encouraged to establish the state system but to find a place within it 
(Sørenson, 2001, pp. 347-9). And the wars that formed European states are not the 
                                                     
26 Interestingly he borrows the idea of ‘repertoire’ from Charles Tilly, though Tilly’s 
application is on the form of struggle between social classes and the state. For Day, 
‘repertoire’ in the Southeast Asian context allows a discussion on the ‘rules of the 
game’ of state function and creation. 
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same as the ‘new wars’, which are more likely to be internal or civil wars rather than 
inter-state wars (Kaldor, 2006, pp. 27-32; Smith R., 2005, pp. 278-89). 
Beyond the historical narratives of the formation of states in these regions there is a 
more recent discourse on the importance of local political economy both on the 
nature of the state. A component of this focuses on the way in which conflicts are 
initiated within them and then prosecuted. This includes Cramer’s work on Angola and 
Iraq and which connects not only the economic factors in conflict and civil wars, but 
also the shortcomings of international interventions in engaging with those realities 
(Cramer, 2006, pp. 139-161 and 179-195). Similarly other work has focused on 
assessing the political economy of armed conflict and their relationship to lootable 
commodities and the impact these have on interventions Bray J. et al, 2003, pp. 107-8; 
Yannis, A., 2003, pp.167-70). Additional research has focused on how the complexities 
of each context affect the implementation of programming when investigated from an 
anthropological or ethnographic lens (Fithen, C. & Richards, P. 2005, pp.117-124; Utas, 
M., 2005, pp. 139-141). These more modern discussions on the nature of conflict and 
the state bolster the previous arguments about the complexities of each different 
intervention location.  
Despite this, as a result of both Tilly and Weber providing stages through which rulers 
must go in order to produce a stable state, the end aim imagined is one which involves 
the creation of a democratic state run by an efficient bureaucracy with territorial 
integrity which can raise taxes (Helander, 2005, pp. 194-5; Call C., 2008b, pp. 1491-
1507). These theories do not take into account the processes required for externally 
led (or assisted) state formation and the dangers this may engender (Barnett & 
Zürcher, 2009, pp. 31-35). Indeed, externally led state formation may require certain 
pre-conditions to be successful including a homogeneous core of political leaders and 
the creation of national identity (through ideology) as part of a war (Taylor & Botea, 
2008, pp. 48-52).  
The bar for state formation is actually incredibly high. There are very few examples 
since the 17th Century where any sovereign state has actually been able to provide all 
of the aspired for attributes of the model state in all of its territory (Milliken & Krause, 
2003, p. 1). Therefore the concept of the ‘failed’ state may mean that the states 
identified as failing are being prevented from growing into their ‘statehood’ because 
they are subject to interventions. It is also difficult to compare state formation 
processes in the early to mid-20th Century with those currently in existence because of 
changes within the international system. For example Reno (2006, p. 43-56) has made 
the point that the processes of state formation in the 20th Century Congo are not 
applicable in the present time because the state system in which Congo finds itself has 
changed. These changes include economic codification of international trade through 
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the World Trade Organisation (WTO), the expansion of the Human Rights agenda and 
the impact of globalisation and technology (Bourdieu, 1998, pp. 94-7). These critiques 
support the argument that there may not only be different processes of state 
formation, but that in different historical periods different approaches are required 
(Bromley, 1994, pp. 119-154).  
As described in Chapter 1 each intervening state or body applies their own lenses to 
the problem of state fragility and the reason that historical conceptions of state 
formation are important to the debates on stabilisation is that each intervener brings 
with them their own philosophical traditions about state formation and applies them 
to the fragile state conundrum. However, in practice interveners fail to recognise that 
current interventions which are supposed to support the state to tackle problems of 
fragility are moulded and shaped by a range of factors specific to the tradition of state 
formation in that area, which may be distinct from Liberal European tradition. This 
may mean that notions like the social contract are not relevant because the way in 
which the state derives and maintains legitimacy is different depending on the length 
and depth of ‘state’ experience amongst the populations and competing social 
structures which exist within these societies.  
The Early State school and recent global experience of state formation suggests that 
Liberal interventions to form states or maintain and strengthen fragile states, which is 
premised on European experience, is likely to be weak and incoherent and does not 
offer solutions as to how interventions could be conceived to ensure that they are 
more in tune with local realities. This introduces the second broad gap in the 
literature, which is that current theory provides little help in identifying how to form, 
maintain or stabilise a state. Having identified this theoretical issue, the next section 
explores some of the practical applications of the assumptions made as a result of 
Liberal state formation models being used in international interventions. This is then 
followed by a discussion about how this international practice has fed into 
stabilisation activities. 
From the Liberal state to Liberal interventionism and statebuilding 
As noted the Liberal states which dominate global politics and statebuilding have 
sought to promote Liberal values in their engagement with other states and their 
attempts to manage the international system. There is no one overarching theory of 
intervention, instead there is a Liberal paradigm through which more discrete theories 
of governance, security and development are effected. The central thrust of the 
paradigm is that the state must be strengthened to provide a bulwark against the 
array of threats facing humanity in the 21st Century. This has led to the emergence of 
statebuilding as a vehicle to operationalise and implement Liberal values in other 
countries in the belief that stronger states will promote stability. This section will 
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outline current thinking on statebuilding as a precursor to discussing how 
statebuilding has moved from theory to practice, which lays the ground for the final 
discussion on stabilisation activities as the embodiment of current Liberal 
interventionism in the political, security and development spheres. 
Statebuilding’s theoretical foundations are rooted in a Western Liberal interpretation 
of Weberian thinking about state formation (OECD, 2010, pp. 51-3). This form of 
Liberalism asserts that the most important way to ensure the legitimacy of the state is 
to attain a ‘rational bureaucratic’ system which supports the ‘social contract’. It is not 
necessary to critique the validity of Weber and Rousseau’s categories because 
statebuilding approaches short-cut their theories into a simple remedy for modern 
fragile states. This remedy includes the imposition of democratic governance, a 
liberalised trade regime and a process of ‘development’ (Jahn, 2007, p. 88). It is this 
intellectual compression, and the nature of the overall package of intervention, which 
has led to the increasing numbers of interventions by Western countries. 
Since the end of World War II interventions have become increasingly robust. Initially 
interventions were limited by fears over the potential reaction of the Soviet Union and 
were largely focused at the international and higher state levels. The Cold War had a 
secondary effect in distorting the originally close relationship between Development 
and Security as outlined in the Truman Doctrine of 1947, which became siloed as the 
US and Soviet Union sought influence through development spending (Truman, 1947). 
The post-Cold War period was characterised by an increasing focus on the need for 
state-centred interventions, such as Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAP – for 
trade and economics); SSR (for the control of armed forces, discussed on p. 49) and 
the expansion of democratic governance (to expand the social contract). This was 
often through dealing with state structures where the Liberal states asserted the 
sovereignty of their recently de-colonised territories. For example, Stedman (1988, pp. 
176-7) discusses British concerns that their engagement with Rhodesia in the 1970s 
and 1980s might lead to the perception that Britain was attempting to recolonise 
parts of Africa.  
However the increase in intervention did not provide the peace dividend that was 
expected from the end of the Cold War as it became clear that the global governance 
system, including the United Nations and other Bretton Woods institutions, was faced 
with a growing number of serious, at times catastrophic, crises. This included the 
unravelling of the state, the challenges from globalisation and the supposed ‘end of 
history’ (Fukuyama, 1992, p. xi). It seemed a darker Hobbesian future was emerging. 
With some hindsight it is possible to see the contours of the process which led to a 
more engaged international community striving to ensure that governance was 
secured and expanded in some parts of the world. This section describes the 
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evolutions in Liberal tools for addressing threats in the international system, with a 
particular focus on the UN and SSR. 
The basis for exogenous statebuilding by the international community comes from a 
range of instruments, normally centred on the UN Security Council which can 
mandate interventions, particularly politically orientated UN missions under Chapters 
6 and 7 of the UN Charter (Law, 2006, p. 2). The political nature of UN interventions 
has grown since the end of the Cold War which enabled the UN to take on a more 
robust role (Boutros-Boutros Ghali, 1992) followed by the Brahimi Report (2000). As a 
result the number of UN Peacekeeping missions has grown rapidly since the 1990s 
and the number of missions from 1990 onwards is far greater than those between 
1950 – 1989. This has been augmented by expanding multi-lateral interventions, 
particularly from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), stemming from SAPs in the 
1980s, and the World Bank with the agreement of Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers 
(PRSPs) since the late 1990s.  
These UN missions gradually evolved since they were formed post-World War II. 
However, both First and Second Generation peacekeeping interventions were 
constrained by ongoing US–Soviet competition (Richmond, 2001, pp. 317-348). In 
order to meet the increasingly political goals individual UN agencies also expanded 
their remits accordingly. Particularly around the agendas of peacebuilding and 
peacekeeping, supported by the gradual bureaucratisation of development and 
statebuilding practice such as SSR (Ball, 2001, p. 45-66). 
In conjunction with the expanding multi-lateral programmes bi-lateral donors have 
also increased their attention, spending and political involvement in programmes 
aimed at statebuilding in response to their geo-strategic concern for stability. This has 
involved an expansion of the terminology to address emerging issues, and as 
peacekeeping evolved into peacebuilding in the 1990s, then statebuilding and latterly 
stabilisation, an acceptance of intervention at the lowest levels of other states has 
developed (Richmond, 2001, pp. 317-34; Tuck, 2004, pp. 17-8). These interventions 
are carried out by a number of institutions and organisations from the UN to the 
European Commission (EC), to the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) and 
the UK’s Department for International Development (DfID). Similarly in stabilisation, 
there are now academic and bureaucratic departments mobilising to cope with the 
most extreme examples of state ‘failure’ (introduced below). 27  
                                                     
27 The names of some of the departments and basic information about their functions 
are available at: The Stabilisation Unit www.stabilisationunit.gov.uk; US Office of the 
Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) http://www.crs.state.gov/; 
Canada Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force (START) 
http://www.international.gc.ca/START- ; the Netherlands does not have a dedicated 
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The statebuilding paradigm which has expanded since the UN mission to Namibia in 
1989-1990 to shore-up embattled governments or institute ‘peace’ has drawn heavily 
from Liberal traditions of state formation discussed previously. Not only that, they 
have drawn heavily from modern Western experience and systems of governance 
which seek to promote accountability, responsiveness and transparency.28 This has 
been instead of rather than the more nuanced, more ethically challenging processes 
thrown up by social scientists who saw the formation of states as often being bloody, 
divisive and heterogeneous. In addition, as David Chuter has argued, when discussing 
the supposed ‘fragility’ of states in Africa it is important to recognise that it is Western 
inspired nation-states that have struggled in the context of being launched into 
statehood by de-colonisation effort. This is in contrast to the gradual expansion and 
deepening of state formation that occurred in much of Asia which has arguably been 
more stable (Chuter, 2009, p. 38). 
While this may seem to be problematic on a conceptual level it also affects practical 
interventions. For example SSR processes which have been driven by the evolution of 
largely European states to cope with the post-Soviet era are now used to promote the 
democratic control of armed forces in all post-conflict states (Knight, 2009, p. 2-7). 
Why a state that has little experience of democracy would want to not only re-
orientate its political system but also the way that it controls its armed forces (and by 
extension maintains the monopoly on the use of violence) is not clear, and is not 
logical. David Chuter (2006, p. 20) acknowledges that the idea that security sectors 
may be dysfunctional is not a specifically Western problem. There may indeed be 
requests from national leaders to Western states to assist with reform – however the 
application of these activities tends to take on Western form and the culture of the 
advisors themselves. (OECD, 2010, pp. 51-2) 
Technical programmes to support statebuilding, including current account reform, 
electoral law changes or significant disarmament and demobilisation programmes are 
delivered in a manner which assumes that they are largely the same as the last place 
they were implemented. The emerging practice is then to implement a form of 
‘Liberal peace’ (Chandler, 2004; pp. 187-206; Duffield, 2007, pp. 2-8) as a path of 
expanding international, normally Western, influence. This is not dissimilar to the 
process of learning and application of statebuilding in the colonial period in the 20th 
Century. In that era in the Middle East British colonial officers drew from experience 
across the Empire and current thinking about the British state to institute 
                                                                                                                                                          
unit for stabilisation but coordinates amongst the three core ministries (Grandia, 2009, 
pp. 15-6). 
28 McGee & Gaventa, 2010, pp. 4-6; World Bank, 2012, pp. 20-21. 
The search for stability through stabilisation: Case studies from Afghanistan and Nepal 
32 
statebuilding across the new Middle Eastern protectorates (Dodge, 2006, p. 187 — 
200).  
Currently, this can be seen in the new focus on ‘core state functions’ (DfID, 2009, p. 
69-72). This emphasis on service delivery as a method for ensuring the social contract 
between a population and the state that mirrors Western notions of the role of the 
state is a core Liberal concept (Ghani and Lockhart, 2008, p. 124-168). These 
approaches essentially argue that by delivering a number of services, often basic 
security, education, health, transport facilities and justice, local populations will 
‘accept’ the state and be less inclined to violently resist it.29 
However, these approaches fail to take account of the highly heterogeneous nature of 
states in conflict, within the states themselves as well as between them. Approaches 
which may be valid in one part of Yemen, Nepal, Afghanistan or Somalia may not only 
be inappropriate but could be ineffective if not plainly counter-productive to state 
formation in another (Anten, 2009, pp. 29-31). This heterogeneity means that 
relabeling interventions for different countries is simply a waste of time – but this is 
precisely how a large proportion of the peacebuilding and statebuilding sectors 
function. In an example from Afghanistan a retired military officer working for a 
consultancy company approached the Ministry of Interior in Kabul with a new plan for 
securing the capital. The title of the proposal was Security Plan for Baghdad (personal 
communication). This is critical in understanding the troubled processes of 
international interventions. They are not simply failing because they are not robust 
enough, focused on too few areas or led by fallible human leadership. They simply are 
not applying the right types of interventions for the countries they are working in and 
they often act in an a historical manner. 
The interventions are further hampered by several factors. :Firstly, that ‘intervention’ 
is able to escape the realpolitik of international relations (Chandler, 2004, pp. 59-81). 
Secondly, that in and of itself intervention is in the best interests of the local 
population who are assumed to be unable to improve the situation (Weinstein, 2005, 
pp. 4-5). Thirdly, that the population wants or needs the intervention to ‘build’ their 
state when it is not clear that all populations want the kind of states that are being 
built (Hellander, 2005, p. 193-202). Fourthly, at a practical level it is assumed that the 
intervention will have the intended outcomes (Dennys & Fitz-Gerald, 2011, pp. 6, 16, 
18). The failure of statebuilding is arguably the result of significant flaws in applying 
existing state formation theory to post-conflict situations (Jenkins and Plowden, 2006, 
                                                     
29 These also seem to reflect very closely the discussions on what makes states fragile, 
e.g. USAID, 2005 and DfID, 2005, and therefore a tautology is reached where a state is 
fragile because it is not doing something it may not want to do, or its people demand 
(in the Western notion of demand). 
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pp. 154-6) or in the a historical interpretations of Liberal political philosophy (Shapiro, 
1986, pp. 4-6). Despite the weaknesses of Liberal state formation theory and 
intervention have not stopped them from being used to structure and articulate 
statebuilding interventions aimed at supporting stability. 
The discussion thus far has argued that Liberal political philosophy which drove 
European state formation and consolidation has been misconstrued to create a 
modern form of Liberal interventionism which attempts to implement a range of 
reforms – political, social and economic – in other countries that are deemed to be a 
threat to the international system dominated by the Liberal states. This section has 
concluded that the overarching package of Liberal intervention, focused on the state, 
is not internally coherent and fails to address experiences of state formation that have 
occurred across the globe, contributing to the failure of interventions. The following 
section examines the theoretical gaps in stability and how they contribute to the 
confused discourse and implementation of stabilisation. 
The emergence of stabilisation  
This section discusses how stabilisation emerged, in the wake of US and NATO-led 
military efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq, as the Liberal states in the international 
community struggled to cope with the post-Cold War environment and the ‘new wars’ 
that occurred amongst the people (Smith R., 2005, pp. 267-9; Kaldor, 2006, pp. 2-11). 
The argument is that stabilisation draws on the Liberal tradition in three areas – 
politics, security and development – whose interventions are either constructed in a 
manner that ignores the philosophical and theoretical underpinning of Liberalism or 
demonstrate illiberal tendencies.30 This is critically important, and supports the 
contention that current forms of Liberalism are in fact a historical; a point made by 
philosophers for a generation (Shapiro, 1986, pp. 4-6).  
The discussion above argued how interventions moved from structuring the 
international system to intervening in nation states as a process to support 
statebuilding and thus the international system. Stabilisation has evolved this 
engagement to a more local level and takes the distorted Liberal form of exogenous 
statebuilding. As it emerged in the 1990s on the back of peacebuilding, based largely 
on Weberian and Tillian thinking about Liberal state formation (Call, 2008a, pp. 7-11) 
to promote technical reform processes in situations which are in extreme flux.  
It has then been assumed that stabilisation processes will produce a state which 
relates directly to Weber’s rational-legal form of legitimate domination, which will 
                                                     
30 In this regard this thesis concurs with Sultan Barakat et al’s analysis that 
stabilisation is a new term for old practices which has been adapted in current 
operations and activities (Barakat, Deely, & Zyck, 2010, pp. 298-9). 
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promote international stability (ibid., 2008a, p. 7; Morrison, 1995, p. 364). In some 
senses the increasing localisation of intervention is an extension of the recognition 
that seemingly marginal ‘periphery’ states such as Somalia or Afghanistan (in 
international terms) can have a significant impact on the ‘centre’ of international 
order. For stabilisation, threats to the state in any region can undermine the viability 
of the state itself. 31 This logic then determines that interventions should be carried 
out at lower and lower levels of administration from capital to province to district to 
village.  
It is important to recognise that there is no significant theoretical foundation for 
stabilisation beyond the extension of Liberal interventionism as embodied in 
statebuilding, COIN and development. Instead there have been a series of practice-
orientated evolutions in programming which have attempted to tie almost all forms of 
intervention to stabilisation.32 The only element of theoretical evolution comes from 
Jackson & Gordon who assert that ‘it (stabilisation) is essentially a process that is 
ultimately rooted in local perceptions of the legitimacy and, crucially, the 
sustainability of their political authorities. As such, ‘stabilisation’ involves the 
construction of a complex political discourse rather than the imposition of any 
particular political model” (Jackson & Gordon, 2007, p. 653 – emphasis added), 
Stabilisation is currently more of a policy and political aim than a theory and its 
application bears testimony to the confusing creation of new bureaucratic systems 
across the Liberal states and the ever increasing intensity of external interventions. 
Across the leading international agencies the UK Government’s Stabilisation Unit33 
provides a much more focused aim which argues that stabilisation is “the process by 
which underlying tensions that might lead to a resurgence in violence and a 
breakdown in law and order are managed and reduced, whilst efforts are made to 
support preconditions for successful longer term development” (Stabilisation Unit, 
2007, p. 1).34 This encourages a rational-legal framework in the application of 
                                                     
31 For example Helmand in Afghanistan, the Ferghana valley in Tajikistan or the 
Hadrawmawt in Yemen; also see Jonathan Goodhand’s work on centre-periphery 
relations in Afghanistan (Goodhand, 2009). 
32 See for example the Stabilisation Issue Note series published by the UK’s 
Stabilisation Unit which covers everything from SSR, Rule of Law, Disarmament, 
Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR), Governance, Development (including 
infrastructure and private sector development) and Gender (Stabilisation Unit, 2010a; 
Stabilisation Unit, 2010b; Stabilisation Unit, 2010c; Stabilisation Unit, 2010d; 
Stabilisation Unit, 2010e; Stabilisation Unit, 2010f). 
33 The UK’s lead unit for stabilisation. 
34 Alternative definitions of stabilisation are offered by the US government, which 
links stabilisation to stability, security, transition and reconstruction (USAID, 2008, p. 
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programmes to ‘manage and reduce’ which seems at odds with the recognition that 
the best that could be hoped for in some cases is a less than optimal outcome. This is 
further at odds with the political and social context in fragile states which in Weberian 
terms embody ‘traditional’ legitimacy with patrimonial administrative systems or 
patron-client relations with the facade of rational-legal frameworks i.e. a Western or 
Soviet style bureaucracy (Rubin B.,2006, p. 175 – 185; Giustozzi A., 2008, p. 1; 
Hachhethu, 2009, pp. 42-4). 
The paucity in the theory of stabilisation has undermined its use and applicability to 
ongoing operations and programmes. It raises questions about whether it is another 
element of the ‘linear’ process from humanitarian aid to developmental support or 
does it supersede some elements of emergency response. Does it represent a 
‘securitisation of aid’ or re-emergence of development as a political tool, or in effect 
are all interventions from peacekeeping, peacebuilding, aid and development 
undertaken in the grander process of stabilisation? Alternatively, is it a part of COIN? 
Is COIN part of stabilisation, or if in fact they are separate, do they require different 
approaches?35  
These are questions which have been asked by many of the commanders and civilian 
representatives operating in extreme environments not only in Afghanistan and Iraq 
(van den Meer, 2009, p. 37-43). But they are also increasingly debated in parts of 
Mindanao in the Philippines, Nepal, Yemen, Somalia and at least a dozen other 
countries (HMG, 2011, pp. 8-14, 20, 25-8, 30-1; Stabilisation Unit, 2008b). This has led 
to a high degree of confusion about whether stabilisation should be led by military 
commanders or civilians, what are the most appropriate activities to undertake to 
promote stability or even what ‘stability’ looks like. In most states where stabilisation 
activity is at a relatively low level this confusion may be less problematic, but in 
environments where there is significant international focus, such as Iraq, where there 
are effectively half a dozen versions of stabilisation being implemented, it leads to a 
lack of strategic vision and operational effectiveness.  
Even if it is possible to surmount this ambiguity there are several critical issues 
concerning stabilisation: it tends to assume that its interventions can be implemented 
in a linear programmatic fashion. For example, there is an assumption that a move 
                                                                                                                                                          
1). For the US military “Stabilization involves activities undertaken to manage 
underlying tensions, to prevent or halt the deterioration of security, economic, and/or 
political systems, to create stability in the host nation or region, and to establish the 
preconditions for reconstruction efforts” (DoD, 2006, p. 2). 
35 For example, David Kilcullen observes that one of the critical differences between 
stabilisation and COIN is that in COIN you want to see the government writ extended, 
whereas in stabilisation the government is likely to be part of the problem and 
extending their writ is probably harmful (Kilcullen, 2010). 
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from emergency aid and hearts and minds activities to force acceptance, to 
stabilisation operations will flow directly into longer-term development programmes 
(Collinson, Elhawary, & Muggah, 2010, pp. 3, 11). However, there is growing evidence 
of both the positive and negative effects of stabilisation programmes. For example the 
Wheat Seed Distribution programme in Helmand, was largely irrelevant in reducing 
opium cultivation in 2009 but conversely had surprising governance benefits which 
were then not capitalised on (Dennys & Fitz-Gerald, 2011, pp. 10-13).  
In reality stabilisation interventions are an out-growth of trends within statebuilding 
and Liberal interventionism which themselves draw on Liberal assumptions regarding 
democracy, trade and security that may be so ingrained they are not even recognised 
(Roberts, 2009, pp. 63-86, Richmond, 2009, 324-344). Arguments about the failures of 
peacebuilding since the end of the Cold-War have not recognised these assumptions 
and by default have argued that failure means that a more extensive intervention 
should be tried in the future (Paris, 2004, pp. 234-5). Further there has been a re-
discovery of the development-security nexus first articulated in the Truman doctrine 
as a way of making interventions more comprehensive and complex (Truman, 1947; 
Chandler, 2007, pp. 356-7). This has promoted development as a way to solve the 
stability problem rather than attempting an alternative approach.36 This is despite the 
fact that there is often no single organisation that has the mandate to implement – let 
alone lead – on such an intervention. 
When trying to understand the outcomes of stabilisation it may be useful to 
remember that not only do interveners have different lenses (as described in Chapter 
1) through which they activate stabilisation, but that the host nations can also 
instrumentalise incoming resources clouding who is benefiting from interventions and 
why (Goodhand and Walton, 2009, p. 303-323).37 Therefore, as in Figure 1Error! 
eference source not found. below, it is worth viewing stabilisation operations and 
their impacts as the result of multiple levels of fractionalisation or distortions as the 
initial intent for an intervention is moulded and shaped away from the original aims. 
Initially the departments of intervening states place their own technical and 
philosophical lenses on what stabilisation should be (see p. 7); these viewpoints are 
then transformed by both international and national politics (for example in the 
framing of a UN mandate or Status of Forces Agreement). This alters the original 
strategic intent but even from this point it does not continue in a linear fashion 
                                                     
36 Amongst other alternative approaches see Barnett, 2006, who proposes 
Republicanism; or Roberts, 2009, who suggests Hybrid Polities. 
37 The model below does not take into account ‘regional’ actors or other states not 
fully aligned with Liberal intervention (such as China, Iran or India) whose activities 
can have both macro state-level impacts and micro impacts on operational areas. 
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because both the host nation and interveners have different, at times competing, 
demands of what a ‘stabilised’ outcome is. Therefore, in the implementation of 
stabilisation actions there is a distortion of outcomes. This fractionalisation is on top 
of the distortion which occurs between Liberal state formation theory and 
statebuilding reality as noted above, which leads to a dual distortion between the 
conception of intervention at a strategic level and the reality of outcomes at an 
operational level.  
 
Figure 1 The distortion of stabilisation strategy to operations (Source: Author, 2012) 
These distortions are only part of the weakness of stabilisation which also has not 
adequately addressed the broader issue that the mere presence of the international 
community can be destabilising (Chuter 2009, p. 39). Stabilisation has not fully 
accounted for the way in which activities undertaken as stabilisation can be violent, 
can undermine one another and undermine the ultimate goal of stability. Finally, by 
aligning itself with statebuilding, stabilisation makes the logical fallacy that 
statebuilding can be somehow benign. Building states through stabilisation is not a 
benign process, but one which involves the imposition of a political order, often by 
violent means, rather than the fostering of local political relationships which were 
suggested as being central to stabilisation. The technocratic approaches applied in the 
field mask the reality that statebuilding (or stabilisation) must be violent for it to 
succeed because state formation theory demonstrates that this cannot be escaped in 
heterogeneous societies no matter the form of state that emerges.  
Stabilisation theory remains under-formulated and seems to continue and extend 
Liberal interventionism unquestioningly. This contributes to the distortions of 
interventions so that the connection between the conception shaping the 
intervention, the desire for stability and the reality of outcomes becomes opaque. This 
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masks two gaps or questions identified in applying Liberal philosophy to stability: how 
do you build a state and how can external actions support it by promoting stability? 
The next section will discuss some of the ongoing activities and approaches in 
stabilisation practice across the political, security and development spheres before 
providing some concluding remarks. 
Stabilisation practice  
This section will examine stabilisation in practice, first by looking at the 
comprehensive nature in which stabilisation interventions are planned in a multi-
national context, secondly through a closer inspection of the main thrusts of activity 
along political, security and development lines before closing with a discussion on the 
limitations of stabilisation practice. 
Structures to implement stabilisation 
The implementation of stabilisation has been built upon the Comprehensive Approach 
as a bureaucratic innovation that defines how to intervene in fragile states, which has 
developed over the last decade (Patrick & Brown, 2007, pp. 1-2). These innovations, 
which are aimed at improving coordination, coherence and the impact of 
interventions, are known by several terms including the Comprehensive Approach (EU 
term), Whole of Government (US) or the 3Ds – Defence, Diplomacy and Development 
(Canadian).38 These approaches do not just focus on the ‘core’ departments of 
Defence, Foreign Affairs and Overseas Development, but can also include the 
Departments of Interior (policing in particular), Trade, Industry, Customs, Environment 
and so on, which are sometimes collectively called the fourth ‘D’ (ibid., 2007, pp. 1-3; 
Mashatt & Polk, 2008, pp. 1-2). 
A detailed discussion on the limitations of the Comprehensive Approach is beyond the 
scope of this paper as there are a myriad of specific national critiques; suffice it to say 
that it is not without substantial shortcomings. Firstly, the lack of strong coordinating 
bodies with actual authority to make major ministries work together causes a lack of 
direction and allows them to champion their own lenses of intervention. Secondly, 
even when there is direction there is often not the funding available to the 
coordinating body to direct activities. Thirdly, where there is both specific unity and 
funding available there is often no common set of tools, concepts, doctrine and even 
language between departments, meaning they can discuss the same issue in radically 
different terms leading to competing activities. Fourthly, despite gallant attempts at a 
central level to ensure coordination this often breaks down in the field (ibid., 2007, 
pp. 6-8). These criticisms about the overly ambitious attempts at coordination are 
magnified by the fact that the majority of interventions are carried out in multi-
                                                     
38 Coning, Lurås, Schia, & Ulriksen, 2009, p. 10 
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national operations which draw on a long pedigree of international missions. ,The 
assumption is however that in order to improve the legitimacy of international 
stability operations they must be multi-national military and UN-led missions. 
The different lenses of stability outlined in Chapter 1 suggest that there are multiple 
interpretations of stability and consequently stabilisation which stem in large part 
from the multiple interpretations of Liberal interventionism. The analysis of 
departmental and cross-governmental papers about their understanding of 
stabilisation suggests that stabilisation can be a function, an activity or an approach. 
Each entity within each government presents their own conception of stabilisation 
leading to a continual reification of understanding through various lenses such that 
stabilisation in a multi-national operation can mean all things to all people. This leads 
to the chief critique of the Comprehensive Approach in addressing fragility, which is 
the conceptual lack of clarity about what is a fragile state and what form an 
intervention in such a state should take. These problems lead to a dizzying array of 
positions, approaches and modalities of intervention (ibid., 2007, pp. 4-6).  
Irrespective of the confused discourse surrounding stabilisation interventions, for the 
UK at least stabilisation is considered a form of support to countries emerging from 
violent conflict and is operationalised by the four Ps: 
1) Preventing or reducing violence  
2) Protecting people and key institutions  
3) Promoting political processes which lead to greater stability  
4) Preparing for longer term non-violent politics and development  
(Stabilisation Unit, 2008a, p. 2 and 2009). 
The need to implement stabilisation, or address weak states, has led to the formation 
of units and departments in several Western bureaucracies tasked with promoting 
stability.39 Whilst a broad discussion on other approaches to ‘stabilisation’ is beyond 
the scope of this thesis (there is a useful discussion in Blair and Fitz-Gerald, 2009), it is 
important to emphasize that the technocratic approach explicit in the design of UK 
interventions is not unique. It can be broadly applied to other major states promoting 
stabilisation, including the US, Canada and the Netherlands.40 
Most of these bureaucratic entities are concerned with three objectives: 1) the 
management of a fund to support stabilisation activities in target countries;41 2) the 
                                                     
39 See footnote 27 above. 
40 This is in effect a process that began with the Liberal interventionist politics from 
the 1990s which is now embodied in new bureaucratic responses to Liberal 
interventionism (Duffield, 2001, pp. 7-12). 
41 In the UK this is called the Stabilisation Aid Fund and is taken from the Ministry of 
Defence (MoD), though the Foreign and Commonwealth office (FCO) and the 
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deployment of civilians to posts overseas;42 3) ensuring that the fund and deployed 
personnel work towards a single plan agreed between the parent ministries of the 
(stabilisation) department. What is striking in the evolution of these units and the 
setting of priorities is that there seems to be a disconnect between the politically 
orientated goals of stabilisation, the technical approaches advocated, and the lack of 
influence over policy that these bodies have. While recognising that there has been an 
evolution in stabilisation practice (Gordon, 2010b), the broadest public operational 
framework is the Stabilisation Tasks Matrix, which covers 14 sets of tasks.43  
These tasks are overwhelmingly technical in nature and cover a bewildering array of 
potential actions from public finance, to education, irrigation, electrification and SSR. 
Though the matrix is described as a menu to choose interventions from it is striking 
that the interventions primarily reflect technocratic developmentalist thinking along 
with an emphasis on military delivery in non-permissive environments like Helmand 
(Stabilisation Unit, 2008a). This reaffirms the analysis that stabilisation practice has 
evolved in a theoretical vacuum by extending exogenous intervention to the local or 
village level. 
This is not a criticism that can solely be levelled at the UK, or simply at stabilisation 
activities. More broadly when looking at governance interventions by international 
actors they are predominately designed by civilian donors with a heavy emphasis on 
quantitative progress indicators, used to demonstrate ‘impact’, and almost no 
consideration of what governance actually means (Ahmar & Kolbe, 2011, pp. 8-9; 
Cohen, 2006, pp. 2-4). Services are often used as a proxy for governance and ignore 
issues of trust in the formation of legitimate government. Most programmes also fail 
                                                                                                                                                          
Department for International Development (DfID) also have budgetary control of the 
£269m, which was agreed as part of the Comprehensive Spending Review in October 
2007 (Stabilisation Unit, 2009). 
42 In the UK this is the Deployable Civilian Experts and the newly established Civil 
Service Stabilisation Cadre.  
43 The full list includes; (1) Pre-entry Strategy Formulation and Planning; (1b) In 
Country Stabilisation Oversight; (2) Immediate Security: Enforcement of Ceasefires 
and Peace Agreements; (3) Counter Starvation, Destitution; Stabilise Population 
Movements; (4) Effective Peace Processes, Political Reconciliation and Settlement; (5) 
Public Order: Provide Internal Security; (6) Immediate Restoration of Basic Services, 
Infrastructure and Livelihoods; (7) Rebuild and Reform Security Sector; (8) Ensure 
Territorial Integrity; (9) Effective Government Economic and Financial Management; 
(10) Reconstruct and Reform Justice Sector; (11) Facilitate Acceptable Democratic 
Political Processes; (12) Re-establish Essential Machinery of Government; (13) Begin 
Long-term Social Service and Infrastructure Development; (14) Strategic 
Communications and Support Building (Stabilisation Unit, 2008a). 
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to recognize that there are negative outcomes from their activities which can 
undermine legitimate governance, such as corruption. 
This section has briefly outlined the Comprehensive Approach used to operationalise 
stabilisation activities employed by the Liberal states. The following sections discuss 
some of the basic activities along the three major lines of implementation: Political, 
Security and Development (or the 3Ds of Diplomacy, Defence and Development). Each 
section starts with a broader discussion about how, for example, diplomacy has 
evolved as an external intervention before highlighting some of the activities currently 
being undertaken. As well as highlighting the deficiencies in each area the section 
concludes that a more useful understanding of stabilisation is possible by reasserting 
the primacy of politics which also sheds light on the deficiencies in the 
statebuilding/stabilisation paradigm. This identifies the areas of focus for the research 
questions and hypothesis that are developed in Chapter 3. 
Politics: The state and stabilisation 
Political stabilisation encompasses more traditional diplomatic relations, but is also 
focused on the implications of activities normally termed governance in support of 
statebuilding, or in US parlance, nation-building. The term political is retained because 
both in their implicit intention and in the focus of activities, governance interventions 
have significant political resonance. In this subsection the theory of democratic 
nation-building, as derived from Liberal philosophy is introduced as well as the paucity 
of academic evidence for the impact of local level governance interventions. 
Political interventions by Liberal states in other countries draw heavily on Liberal 
philosophy. At their heart is the assertion behind the ‘democratic peace’ argument 
derived from Kantian thinking which suggests that democracies are more likely to be 
at peace with themselves and their neighbours. This also foregrounds the importance 
of individual rights and liberty championed by Hayek amongst others. These ‘reforms’ 
are completed by reforms to address the market (Smith), labour and land ownership 
rights (Locke) and to provide the population with services, via the state, to inculcate a 
social contract (Rousseau). These changes are backed up by the necessity of force to 
‘protect’ the civilian population from themselves (Hobbes, see p. 21). 
There are many interpretations of this story which can be used to exemplify Liberal 
interventionist tendencies.44 For the purposes of this thesis the statebuilding theory 
articulated through the RAND Corporation was chosen because whilst it was published 
after the Nepal conflict ended and late in the prosecution of the current Afghan 
conflict it draws on social and political theory from the previous decade, including 
                                                     
44 This could include Call, 2008a, pp. 3, 7-16; Duffield, 2001, pp. 9-12; Barakat, Deely, 
& Zyck, 2010, pp. S315-6. 
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other work which explicitly links nation-building, military operations of various forms 
and economic and social development in one package (Dunlop, 2008, p. 180). Their 
core definition of nation-building (the US term for statebuilding): 
“[nation-building] involves the use of armed force [Hobbes] as part of a 
broader effort to promote political [Hayek] and economic reforms [Smith and 
Locke] with the objective of transforming a society [Rousseau] emerging from 
conflict into one at peace with itself and its neighbors [Kant].” (Dobbins et al, 
2007, p. 1 – names in parentheses added)  
The selection of a particularly US-centric model of statebuilding is deliberate as it is 
the model under which Liberal statebuilding is likely to be attempted by external 
interveners, but by adding in the philosophical forebears of the US concept of nation-
building it is possible to identify the progression from Liberal political philosophy to 
modern day Liberal interventionism. From amongst the range of political and 
governance activities the discussion here will focus firstly on democracy promotion 
and then introduce other elements of governance activity. 
The political concept of democracy, where the majority of an electorate make 
decisions of concern to them is laudable, but is largely separate from the way 
democracy is exported through Liberal interventionism which relies on a specific 
interpretation of Kantian thinking and the functioning of modern Liberal states.45 The 
Democratic Peace agenda argues that democracies are more peaceful than non-
democracies, and that in particular they never go to war against each other (Tures, 
2001, p. 227). Where this principle was first established is a matter of some debate, 
but some researchers have suggested that the ancient Greek democratic city states 
were the first examples of the democratic peace agenda (Weart, 2001 , pp. 609-613). 
The paradigm thus promotes the Kantian view of a perpetual democratic peace 
(Mitchell et al, 1999, p. 771-792) where democracies do not go to war with each other 
which may be very attractive but is deeply flawed in implementation (Hermann and 
Kegley, 2001, p. 237 -245; Mann, 1999, pp. 1-34). 46 
Despite the mixed practical applications, democratic systems have been promoted 
and instituted as part of international interventions in states in a wide range of post-
                                                     
45 The difference between the core concepts of democracy and what Liberal societies 
call democracy is not readily understood by interventionists, or even some academics 
and is a point well made by Hayek, 1978, pp. 152-3. 
46 Academics have sought to measure monadic, dyadic and systemic relations 
between states (Mitchell et al, 1999, p. 771-792) but interpretations tend to ignore 
long-term trends. Farber and Gowa (1997, p. 393-417) argue that it is not democracy 
in itself that produces peace, but a collection of states with common interests 
(Kupchan, 2008).  
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Cold War crises including East Timor, Iraq, Afghanistan and Nepal, which all have 
different political economies.47 The promotion of democratic values is ingrained in the 
intervention strategies of Liberal states and forms a key component of the lens they 
use to understand conflict (HMG, 2011, pp. 11, 32; The White House, 2010, p. 37). The 
inherent and inevitable success of the Democratic peace argument has unhelpfully 
supported the triumphalism of the democratic paradigm after the Cold War and the 
apparent explosion in ‘freedom’ and democracy which may not be as sustainable as its 
proponents hope (Huntington, 1991, pp. 21-6; Diamond, 1993, pp. 97-105, 335 and 
Puddington, 2009). 
Democratisation models48 focus on inter-state relations and ignore the basic fact that 
establishing democracy can be highly conflictual within states (Mitchell et al, 1999, p. 
771-792). Much of the literature around the peaceful nature of the democratic system 
ignores the potentially destabilising impact that the enforced introduction of 
democratic institutions can cause. Instead they seem much more concerned about 
promoting the Liberal governance agenda, for example see the work of Freedom 
House’s Freedom Index (Puddington, 2009; or Paris 2004, pp. 40-2). This is particularly 
problematic in weak and failed states where the imposition of democracy on entities 
which are still a priori conflictual may allow conflict to flourish by allowing space for 
dissent (Mousseau, 2001, p. 547- 567). The fact that democracy allows space may 
contribute to the ability for actors to overcome collective action problems and make 
resistance easier to mobilise. 
This rush to support democracy amongst Liberal states fails to acknowledge its 
shortcomings. One of the causes of instability can be external intervention in the 
governance system which can be destabilising in and of itself (Stewart and O’Sullivan, 
                                                     
47 Roland Paris identified 8 instances between 1991 and 1997 (1997, pp. 54-89).  
48 Some of the main theories around democracy promotion come from structuralist, 
modernist and transitional positions. Barrington Moore’s structuralist theories about 
the social origins of democracy and dictatorship relied heavily on using class 
explanations for the paths taken by different states (Moore, 1966, pviii-ix), though the 
level of causation between class structure and political strategy is in doubt (Potter et 
al, 1997, p. 24-30). Lipset’s modernist approach argues democracy is a natural 
evolution as development indices increase – such as incomes or literacy (Lipset 1959, 
cited in Clague, 1997, p. 91; Rustow, 1970, p. 337-363, Potter et al, 1997, p. 10-23). 
Inevitably this is linked to the Liberal peace agenda which tries to combine 
development, economic growth and democratic governance all in one (Duffield, 2001, 
pp. 9-12; Paris, 2004, p. 41) but it is difficult to identify causality in the variables 
(Potter et al, 1997, p. 24-30). Rustow (1970, p. 337-363) proposed a theory that relies 
on the notion of transition, with key requisites including national unity and conflict, 
and that there must at some point be a conscious decision by all parties to move to a 
(competitive) democratic system which must be habituated.  
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1998, p. 27-30). For example, the imposition of democracy on Haiti in the 1990s by the 
Clinton administration was lauded as a success despite Haiti lurching from crisis to 
crisis for the next decade (Cramer, 2006, pp. 272-6). David Chuter has suggested that 
a good indicator of where there will be conflict is where democratic institutions have 
been imposed by the West (Chuter, 2009, p. 36). There continue to be regular 
examples of democratic events causing conflict and violence including, East Timor in 
2007, Kenya in 2007, Afghanistan in 2009 or Iraq in 2010. Furthermore, most 
democracy promotion supporters tend to ignore the need for significant coercive 
force to control a territory. This is in part because they often equate democracy with 
small security sectors, which given the nature of state formation seems counter-
intuitive (ibid., 2006, p. 9). Some point to the more ‘successful’ cases, but these have 
been relatively small states, Bosnia and Rwanda for example, whose own processes of 
democratisation have not been without significant problems (Chandler, 2006, pp. 101-
120). 
The striking feature of the democratisation debate within political intervention and 
stabilisation is that the intervention cherry picks convenient elements and ignores 
unpalatable realities. International practice in conflict afflicted countries unpacks a 
series of interventions with underlying assumptions about the ‘correctness’ of certain 
approaches, including democratisation which do not necessarily fit well within the 
classic understanding of how to form a state. These biases run so deeply that they 
may not even be realised, leading to inexorable failure (Jahn, 2007, pp. 89-90). This 
inability to realise paradigmatic weaknesses also leads to assumptions that there 
cannot be any alternatives to democracy promotion which are viable and legitimate. 
This blindness may also contribute to the fact there is not enough literature about the 
way in which democracy promotion can undermine statebuilding. 
Whilst there is often a strong focus on the national systems of democratic 
governance, Liberal states also intervene heavily in local governance systems to 
promote ‘good governance’ through a variety of approaches which can broadly be 
described as being focused on institutional governance to promote local stability. 
However, it is striking that there is a significant paucity of evidence as to whether sub-
national governance interventions promote the state (let alone promote stability). 
There is some literature on historical colonial administration; for example the use of 
political officers in Pakistan’s North-Western Frontier Province (NWFP now known as 
Khyber-Pakhtunkwa). Tripodi (2008, pp. 123-151) argued that whilst the individual 
officers in the NWFP may have had good cultural understanding this in itself was not 
enough to keep the peace. They often failed to fully understand the nature family and 
tribal loyalties; their interpretations of what was happening was subject to re-
interpretation by their managers in the administrative hierarchy; and at a strategic 
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level the options open to the political officers were limited by overriding concerns. 
However, this was during a period of colonial administration and the application to 
the modern era where the host nations maintain their sovereignty is not entirely 
clear.49 
The little theoretical thinking about political intervention that has addressed sub-state 
diplomatic action has tended to focus on para-diplomacy (or constituent diplomacy). 
This looks at the way in which sub-state actors in different countries interact with one 
another, such as the London Mayor’s role in the 2012 Olympic bid or cities boycotting 
trade with Myanmar. In the case of India cities have engaged with the IMF and World 
Bank on lending to the Indian (nation) state, which would then in turn benefit that city 
(Kleiner, 2008, p. 321-349). Again, this is not entirely relevant to the context of one 
state funding sub-national governance reforms in another state to counter a politically 
orientated threat such as an insurgency. 
This section has highlighted the academic and philosophical concerns with the 
unbridled promotion of democracy and good governance in fragile contexts. It has 
further suggested that stabilisation activities which purport to broaden governance 
engagement follow in the same Liberal vein of thinking and that these twin processes 
are in tension and may threaten stability as much as they could support it. This 
tension is particularly acute because there is so little evidence about the impact of 
political governance interventions at a sub-national level. Changes in de jure political 
and governance processes are irrelevant without the will and capability to enforce 
them through the provision of security, which acts as a key enabler for any state and is 
discussed in the next subsection. 
Security: Defence and stabilisation 
The nature of modern conflicts means war is no longer fought for victory50 but rather 
to protect a population, preserve a peace deal or government, or for stability as an 
end in itself (Kaldor, 2006, p. 29; Smith R., 2005, p. 17; Angstrom, 2007, pp. 2-5). In 
addition the range and scale of military activities have increased at the same time as 
military forces themselves have, overall, shrunk (Addinell, 2005, pp. 27-31). The 
combined pressures of the changing nature of conflict, increasing demands on the 
military, in addition to the cutting or restructuring of expenditure and priorities in the 
context of significant long-term deployments in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere, has 
forced the Western military organisations in NATO to address their role in promoting 
                                                     
49 For similar reasons the application of lessons from civil military activities in World 
War II must be applied sensitively in the modern era. 
50 In this regard Karl von Clausewitz’s work is the seminal piece on identifying the aims 
of interstate warfare which simply states; “the object is victory” (Clausewitz, 2006, p. 
68). 
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stability. The following subsections address the two main areas of military activity that 
have resonance for discussions on stabilisation: COIN and SSR.  
Counterinsurgency and stabilisation doctrine 
The related emergence of stabilisation doctrine and revision of COIN doctrine in the 
same period, and the difficulty in distinguishing between COIN and stabilisation 
operations has been a critical point of confusion about the antecedents of both 
concepts. This section will briefly outline current doctrinal thinking about COIN and 
stabilisation.  
Insurgency and COIN have been defined doctrines for over a century but have 
changed significantly since the colonial period. The wars of de-colonisation in Malaya, 
Algeria and Vietnam are the main sources of 20th Century discourse when COIN 
doctrine was vigorously debated. This debate has continued in the post-Cold War era 
encompassing the conflicts in Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, Nepal, the Philippines, 
Somalia and most recently Syria. Irrespective of the era insurgencies have always been 
understood as political rather than military crises (Galula, 1964, p. 4; Taber, 2002, p. 
10; Nagl, 2002, p. 25).  
Doctrine developed in the post-colonial era was found to be wanting in the context of 
the new wars being fought amongst people in the 21st Century, which led to a revision 
of military theory and doctrine. A secondary issue has been the technological changes 
that have affected the way insurgencies can be fought (Nagl, 2002, pp. 24-5).51 
However it has been the changes in the nature of war, where the Liberal states are no 
longer contesting outright victory but pursuing more prosaic less well defined 
outcomes, such as stability, that has shaped the locus of military doctrine (Smith R., 
2005, p. 23; Cassidy, 2006, pp. 1-4). Irrespective of the changes in doctrine the 
political imperative and the requirement for a political counterrevolution to 
insurgency have remained constant components of the literature.  
Stabilisation for both the US and UK military is focused on support to fragile states and 
aims to protect the population.52 UK doctrine asserts that the military are there to 
                                                     
51 Principally the decreasing costs and greater availability of weaponry, explosives and 
communications technology, which have allowed insurgents to disseminate their 
messages more easily than the previous generations; see the writings of Che Guevara 
(Guevara, 2009) or the lengths to which Mao went to mobilise the population in the 
early phase of the People’s War (Mackinlay, 2009, pp. 15-19; Cheek, 2010, pp. 6-13) 
with evidence of Nepali Maoist or Taliban approaches which utilise social media, 
mobile video sharing (Gwakh, 2011) as well as more traditional letters and posters put 
up in villages (Lecomte-Tilouine, 2009).  
52 In much the same way as COIN focuses on the protection of the population, which is 
in the top ten COIN principles, the first three principles being focused on organisation 
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‘support’ other states but it does not reveal how that support can be delivered – nor 
what the form of the desired outcome is.53 This places stabilisation operations firmly 
within the Liberal paradigm and links it to both political governance objectives as well 
as humanitarian imperatives. Whilst this may be laudable, the context in which 
stabilisation has been developed means that it is also closely associated and reliant 
upon COIN doctrine. Indeed for some authors, particularly those in the policy domain, 
stabilisation operations are simply part of the broader concepts of COIN, complex 
operations and reconstruction (Lindley-French, 2009, p. 9). Others link stabilisation 
primarily with nation-building, though as argued above the counterrevolutionary 
nature of COIN means that it is akin to re-making a nation or state. (Binnendijk & 
Johnson, 2004, pp. xiv-xvi).  
For the purposes of this thesis it is important to assert that simply labelling an activity 
as a stability operation or stabilisation does not necessarily link the activity to, or 
equate to prompting ‘stability’. They instead link to the Liberal philosophy of 
intervention.54 There is a functional difference between trying to understand 
conceptions of stability and processes that support it, i.e. stabilisation, which is the 
aim of this thesis, and doctrine which outlines options for stability operations. 
Importantly UK stabilisation doctrine identifies the threats to stability being 
insurgency, failed states and humanitarian disasters - in that order – meaning that 
COIN and stabilisation operations in current doctrine are closely linked and the 
stronger heritage of COIN and its dominance in operations means that it should be the 
primary doctrinal theory tested. (FM3-07, 2008, pp. 2-1) 
Comparing US and UK COIN and stabilisation doctrine is instructive particularly as the 
teams developing the doctrines fed off one another, but it is clear that the primary 
difference between stabilisation and COIN operations is in the identification of an 
insurgent threat. In practical terms though the activities and the proposed impact of 
                                                                                                                                                          
and understanding: “1. Primacy of political purpose; 2. Unity of effort; 3. Understand 
the human terrain; 4. Secure the population” (MoD, 2009, pp. 1-1). 
53 “Stabilisation is the process that supports states which are entering, enduring or 
emerging from conflict, in order to prevent or reduce violence; protect the population 
and key infrastructure; promote political processes and governance structures which 
lead to a political settlement that institutionalizes non-violent contests for power; and 
prepares for sustainable social and economic development” (JDP 3-40, 2009, p. xv). 
54 The doctrine on Stability Operations states: “Stability operations aim to stabilize the 
environment enough so the host nation can begin to resolve the root causes of 
conflict and state failure. These operations establish a safe, secure environment that 
facilitates reconciliation among local or regional adversaries. Stability operations aim 
to establish conditions that support the transition to legitimate host-nation 
governance, a functioning civil society, and a viable market economy” (FM3-07, 2008, 
pp. 3-2). 
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those activities (i.e. supporting governance, protecting the population etc.) are very 
similar despite some confusion about whether stabilisation is part of COIN or vice 
versa. The UK stabilisation doctrine effectively situates the military contribution to 
COIN within stabilisation (MoD, 2009b, pp. I-4), whereas the US military’s Counter 
Insurgency Doctrine JP 3-24 places ‘stability operations’ as part of COIN strategy 
(Thruelsen, 2008,pp. 7-15).  
The US conception is disputed by some authors such as David Kilcullen, who sees the 
causes of instability in Afghanistan as being broader than the insurgency, but at the 
operational level the terms in Afghanistan seem to be used synonymously (Kilcullen, 
2010; Ucko, 2009, pp. 10-11; Kilcullen, 2009, pp. 46-8). Given the overlapping nature 
of COIN and stabilisation, and that COIN has a more significant focus and doctrinal 
pedigree, this thesis will interrogate COIN theory as one of the concepts against which 
to test the stability hypothesis developed through the field work. Across the COIN 
literature this thesis will consider US Counterinsurgency Doctrine JP 3-24 as the 
primary source.55  
As well as conceptual similarities regarding their aims, both COIN and stabilisation 
doctrine pre-supposes the need for robust engagement by civilian actors. This places 
substantial importance on the political aspects of operations which occur in fragile 
states,56 and then gives military COIN and stabilisation objectives two potentially 
competing aims. Firstly, is a politically viable state to control the territory of the host 
nation that the intervention is supporting. Secondly, by placing stabilisation within the 
concept of state fragility for which the remedy is statebuilding, the military is 
                                                     
55 “COIN is comprehensive civilian and military efforts taken to defeat an insurgency 
and to address any core grievances. COIN is primarily political and incorporates a wide 
range of activities, of which security is only one. Unified action is required to 
successfully conduct COIN operations and should include all [Host nation (HN)], US, 
and multinational agencies or actors. Civilian agencies should lead US efforts. When 
operational conditions do not permit a civilian agency to lead COIN within a specific 
area, the joint force commander (JFC) must be cognizant of the unified action required 
for effective COIN. Ideally, all COIN efforts protect the population, defeat the 
insurgents, reinforce the HN’s legitimacy, and build HN capabilities. COIN efforts 
include, but are not limited to, political, diplomatic, economic, health, financial, 
intelligence, law enforcement, legal, informational, military, paramilitary, 
psychological, and civic actions. As capable insurgents evolve and adapt, 
counterinsurgents must evolve and adapt” (JP3-24, 2009, p. I2). 
56 It is significant that military doctrine has also used the concept of state fragility, 
which as outlined in Chapter 1 has significant deficiencies; for the US “ A fragile state 
still has a viable host nation government, but it has a reduced capability and capacity 
to secure, protect and govern the population. Without intervention it is likely to 
become a failed state” Lexicon p. 10, JDP 3-40. 
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instructed to lay the foundations for statebuilding processes as described in the 
previous section. Whilst a combined civilian-military effort may promote synergies, 
efficiency and increasing impact, the processes of statebuilding currently employed by 
civilian leadership are blunt instruments often not tailored to the differing 
environments (Call, 2008, p396; Keen, 2008, pp. 116-119). This would seem to suggest 
that military operations are led into territory they may not be suited to address, such 
as development and local governance. 
Support to Security Sector Reform (SSR) 
SSR has been a significant component of the security related interaction between 
Liberal states and other states that they engage with. Its apparent transformative 
power is growing in credence since it emerged as a concept in the post-Cold War era 
as both Western democracies and Eastern bloc countries grappled with how to reform 
their military forces. SSR has not remained confined to the former Soviet Republics to 
where it was first exported and has since featured as a key component of most 
international transitions. However it has defied comprehensive definition amongst 
practitioners and academics (Hendrikson and Karkoszka, 2002, p. 178-181). The 
example below has been developed by Nicole Ball and Michael Brzoska which includes 
the key components; 
The security community 
• Core security institutions: armed forces; police; paramilitary forces; coast guard; militias, and 
intelligence services 
• Security sector oversight bodies: legislatures and legislative committees; ministries of defence, 
internal affairs, justice, foreign affairs; office of the president; and financial management bodies 
(ministries of finance, budget offices, auditor general’s offices)  
• Non-core security institutions: judiciary, customs, correctional services, and other uniformed bodies 
• Non-statutory security force institutions: liberation armies, guerrilla armies, traditional militias, 
political party militias, and private security companies. 
Source: Wulf, 2002, p. 14 citing Ball and Brzoska, 2002, p. 8 
Whilst largely focused at a central level SSR has a strong democratizing component 
which links the structure, control and composition of the security sector directly to the 
political and governance spheres and the ideals of the democratic peace argument 
discussed above (Knight, 2009, p. 2-7 and Nathan, 2007, pp. 14-5). At a more local 
level it is not clear whether stabilisation as a more localised form of intervention is 
linked to SSR or not. As Fitz-Gerald notes stabilisation has a short-term focus coupled 
with an overriding national security impetus which competes with long-term, allegedly 
locally owned, SSR processes (Fitz-Gerald, 2010, pp. 163-5). Irrespective of the 
theoretical debate, in practice SSR (and DDR) are considered to be closely linked to 
stabilisation in practice and linked inexorably to the enforcement of political 
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agreements (Stabilisation Unit, 2010a, p. 1; Stabilisation Unit, 2010b, p. 1). It is 
instructive that a review of post-conflict SSR in Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Haiti, Kosovo, Sierra Leone and Timor-Leste argued that SSR has to proceed before 
“any legitimisation of the process through an electoral process” (Law, 2006, p. 2). This 
calls into question the idea that SSR can in any way be said to include or promote 
democratic oversight (Knight, 2009, p. 17), but also succinctly assumes that SSR is in 
some way a natural process that must occur in the post-conflict environment. 
Falling between COIN and stabilisation operations and policy and programme 
orientated SSR lies the issue of ‘train and equip’ programmes which can involve the 
significant transfer of military expertise and hardware, and this can have implications 
across the modes of security engagement. These activities have largely been under 
the purview of Special Operations Forces of which the US army has had particular 
experience in Latin America (Waghelstein, 2008, pp. 151-167), as has the UK in Nepal 
through its longstanding engagement with the Gurkhas.  
The US programmes, which were initiated after the Cuban Missile Crisis by President 
Kennedy, have led to the aggressive use of counter-terror and counter-narcotics 
initiatives that not only have had a range of unforeseen outcomes. This has included 
the militarisation of police forces and growth of paramilitary forces, but has often fed 
directly into the conflict dynamics and instability of those states. In addition these 
trained forces have spread their influence not just to the hard security arena, but to 
the control of criminal activities that have threatened the state (Spencer, 2001, pp. 1-
7). The amorphous nature of train and equip means that in this thesis it is considered 
a tool for both approaches to stabilisation in the security sphere; statebuilding 
focused SSR and locally focused COIN support.  
This subsection has described how security support in areas deemed to be of interest 
to the Liberal states has expanded since the end of the Cold War as there has been 
less international competition and resistance to support by Western states. Current 
interventions have dealt extensively with COIN operations where external forces have 
been engaged directly in operations as well as providing equipment and training for 
host nation forces. At the same time SSR processes, which first emerged in the 
Western and Eastern blocs in Europe have been applied to other contexts in an 
attempt to ‘democratise’ the security sector. The multiplicity of interventions with 
overlapping goals has led to tensions and there are concerns that the implementation 
of divergent programmes in the security sector may be self-defeating. These pressures 
become particularly acute when the strategic aim is stability and in areas where 
military-led COIN and stabilisation operations are being deployed.  
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Development and humanitarian action 
Development, which has been the element of the 3Ds which operated most 
independently during the Cold War, has become a central tenant of stabilisation 
practice. The increase in pressure to see ‘impact’ and ‘progress’ in fragile 
environments where stabilisation doctrine posited that development could be used to 
instil the support of the local population for political/military operations (MoD, 2009b, 
pp. 4-11), address root causes of conflict (Eavis, 2003/4, pp. 58-9), and can also be 
used to explain to electorates at home the reasons for the troops being deployed 
oversees (Fishstein & Wilder, 2012, p. 24). Whatever the intention of the 
interventions they are still rooted in developmentalist approaches to intervention and 
are separated into economic and social development in this discussion. These are 
tacitly promoted as being part of the Liberal intervention and form a key component 
of stabilisation, particularly for the United States.  
Whilst there are many interpretations of development theory they are fundamentally 
interventions that aim to promote a “sustainable Economy … the ability of the people 
to pursue opportunities for livelihoods within a system of economic governance bound 
by law … [and further] Social Well-Being [which is the] ability of the people to be free 
from want of basic needs and to coexist peacefully in communities with opportunities 
for advancement” (USIP, 2009, p. 2.9). This version of development theory is used as 
the basis to discuss development interventions and stability. 
Alongside development intervention is humanitarian action, which is often conflated 
with development activities.57 The distinctive nature of humanitarian action is the 
application of principles, most notably those of the ICRC (IFRC & ICRC, 1994), which 
attempt to de-politicise the activities and to focus solely on the immediate protection 
of life. This approach in itself contains within it strong political conceptions of the 
worth of people and the requirement for other nations to respond to their need. 
Indeed in the statebuilding theory outlined on page 41 the authors expressly link 
development contexts and humanitarian crises based on the work of Amartya Sen, 
who advanced the conception of development as a means to freedom from want and 
fear (Sen, 1999, pp. 15-17, 292-3; Dobbins et al, 2007, pp. 118-9). This is significant 
because along with the blurred distinction between humanitarian and development 
activities there is an important element of development theory and practice, which is 
almost universally ignored – development interventions are almost all assumed to be 
humanitarian, which they are not, development and humanitarianism are quite 
                                                     
57 This is unsurprising given both political leaders and professional bodies blur the 
lines between humanitarian and development action, the most well-known was Colin 
Powell’s aphorism that NGOs were force multipliers (Stoddard, 2003, p. 5). 
The search for stability through stabilisation: Case studies from Afghanistan and Nepal 
52 
distinct - and further they are also assumed to be positive, or at least have positive 
intentions.  
Humanitarian action has become a central component of the Liberal agenda. Its utility 
in justifying intervention and the conflation of life-saving humanitarian action and 
long-term development allows Western states to engage in other states over the long-
term on a transformative basis, often with the direct support of elites in recipient 
countries who tacitly agree with the ideals of the Liberal project (Curtis, 2001 , pp. 6-
7). Whilst effort in the field sites is weighted towards development, humanitarian 
action does present some useful issues which challenge the prioritisation of activity in 
stabilisation. An additional challenge has been provided by the emergence of the 
concept of early recovery, from the United Nations amongst others, has contributed 
to the continued blurring of boundaries between humanitarian action and 
development (Bailey & Pavanello, 2009, pp. 1-2; Collinson, Elhawary, & Muggah, 2010, 
p. 11). 
The conflation of development and humanitarian action belies a historic philosophical 
assumption about Western ideas of ‘progress’ (Duffield, 2001 pp. 22-34) but 
theoretically this can lead to two very significant overestimations of the impact of 
development. Firstly, that development interventions have the impacts that are 
ascribed to them (which is often exceptionally hard to demonstrate in insecure 
environments). Secondly, that development can and will be used against interveners, 
if only through the re-distribution of resources via corruption (Keen, 2008, p116). Put 
most crudely, if interventions such as development and incentives such as money can 
be construed as a weapons system (Mallinson, 2010) then it must also be assumed 
that the weapon can be turned against those who deploy it. As a result the 
interveners should develop strategies to cope with this. 
At the other end of the implementation spectrum are humanitarian and development 
activities delivered under the notions of ‘hot stabilisation’ which are effectively the 
same potential areas of activity implemented in hostile environments (Stabilisation 
Unit, 2007, pp. 1-2). Delivery is often carried out exclusively by the military and 
effected through the use of CIMIC and MSSTs to implement Quick Impact Projects 
(QIPs) or Consent Winning Activities (CWAs).58 The range of potential actions they can 
carry out is vast, encompassing everything from the provision of emergency food 
supplies, education aids such as pens and books, to veterinary or health services 
(Stabilisation Unit, 2008a, pp. 4-37). The interventions can last a day or several 
months depending on the scale of the project. The interventions are ultimately rooted 
                                                     
58 For a discussion on some of the tensions between military, diplomatic and 
development viewpoints on the utility of these approaches see Gordon, 2011, pp. 36-
40. 
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in the conception that the provision of services can inculcate a population against the 
overtures of insurgent groups or help persuade the population that they should 
support the state. 
Ultimately all of these modes of intervention, whether through NGOs, private 
development companies or military personnel are aimed at promoting economic and 
social well-being. This is discussed further in the following subsection and the 
discussion is then expanded to focus on whether there is an evidence base to support 
the idea that these activities support stability or stabilisation. 
Economic and social development 
The heritage of economic development theory reaches back to the writings of Adam 
Smith but was pushed further by Milton Friedman in the 20th Century who explicitly 
linked economic growth and economic development to the pursuit of liberty 
(Friedman, 1962, pp. 10-14). Whilst this represents the acme of economic progress, 
authors in the 20th Century have also developed the ideas of John Stuart Mill 
regarding education to promote an agenda of social development. More recently re-
articulated by Amartya Sen who advocated for social, as well as economic, 
development, as a means to freedom from want and freedom from fear (Sen, 1999, 
pp. 15-17, 292-3). 
It is clear that early conceptions of development and security held that they were 
intimately linked. The Truman Doctrine of 1947 spelled out the fact that half of the 
world’s population living in poverty was “a threat to them[selves] and the more 
prosperous areas” (Truman, 1947). In the current discourse this argument is 
embodied in debates around the root causes of conflict and the need to meet basic 
needs to prevent conflict.59 However, it was the political conditions of the Cold War 
which prevented development and humanitarian action from being incorporated with 
security and which in effect distorted their relationship for the next 50 years (Duffield, 
2001, p. 35). 
Providing support to the security sector (described above) during the Cold War 
effectively became “an instrument of power politics” (Cooper and Pugh, 2002, p. 4). 
Security was essentially a military issue – protecting borders and maintaining the state 
(Cooper and Pugh, 2002, pp. 5-6). This meant that non-military institutions did not 
engage with military issues in general, and in particular the economic institutions did 
not engage with the effects of military expenditure (Ball, 2001, pp. 45-66). 
Development during this period, while linked to foreign diplomatic policy and 
                                                     
59 An early assertion of the need to address basic needs can be found in Streeten, 
1981, pp. 8-18 and this has been developed in debates regarding conflict and basic 
needs (USIP, 2009, pp. 2-9;10-162). 
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overshadowed by the Cold War, was separate from military activities. The space 
created for development and humanitarian action was often then filled by the non-
governmental sector. Towards the end of the Cold War – and with the beginning of 
the Reagan administration in the US – there was a greater appreciation of the links 
between security and development as a tool for foreign policy. There was also an 
understanding that development was useful for democratisation, for example, in El 
Salvador. However, while some parts of the administration saw this link they admitted 
it wasn’t possible to change the way the military, state and development agencies 
worked together in practice (Thompson, 1987, pp. 102-116).  
Part of the issue with discussing ‘development’ is the difficulty in separating out 
economic and social development interventions. This means that while they may be 
broad, their core assertion that development (in some form) is a moral imperative for 
humankind is unchallenged. The only real debates are around how that development 
should be achieved. There is, however, added complexity in the differences between 
indigenous and exogenous development processes, often driven by bi-lateral and 
multi-lateral donors. This makes generalisation difficult in particular when local 
development is fostered by non-state armed actors.  
The developmental approach favoured by the exogenous actions of the international 
community tend to focus on nationally led processes, often being carried out in the 
context of a global policy framework. So ubiquitous is the approach that local 
understandings of development and post-conflict recovery are almost indiscernible 
from mainstream Liberal interventions which are often referred to as the Washington 
Consensus (Upreti, 2008, p. 7; Gore, 2000, pp. 789-90). The Liberal paradigm includes 
the developmental elements of joining the WTO or the production of a Poverty 
Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) for the World Bank. It tends to ignore the strength, 
relevance and importance of indigenous forms of development, which may lie outside 
formalised national development processes. 
This exogenous thinking is promoted even in stabilisation, with Clare Lockhart’s 
contribution to the Economic Development section of JDP 3-40 focusing on the need 
to support national frameworks and programmes (MoD, 2009b, Chp. 6A-1).60 This is 
conceptually challenging for development activities aimed at supporting stability 
which may in reality be focused on a relatively small part of a country. Furthermore, in 
multi-national complex environments which are highly heterogeneous, it is 
                                                     
60 A broader critique of Lockhart’s work, on fragile states, is that it focuses on 
rebuilding states at a macro-level which may not be applicable in all contexts. It may 
be relevant for a context such as Afghanistan where stabilisation could be argued to 
be a national process, but in some fragile states approaches need to be localised to be 
effective for a specific sub-region of a country which is fragile. 
The search for stability through stabilisation: Case studies from Afghanistan and Nepal 
55 
questionable that one approach can be replicated easily in other areas without 
significant modification in implementation. Therefore when discussing development, 
in the context of processes of statebuilding and stabilisation, it is important to 
understand whether those processes are exogenous or indigenous, and whether they 
are managed within a national framework or attuned to local idiosyncrasies. 
The a historical split between development and the other components of 
international system management has contributed to the issue identified by Shapiro 
above, which is that components of the Liberal project have evolved separately and 
now do not form an internally coherent body of thought (ibid., 1986, pp. 4-6, 274). In 
effect the wheel has turned and the expansion of developmental space free from 
specific political goals has tightened the idea of generic development as a public good 
which supports ‘progress’. However it is now clearly instrumentalised to support the 
winning of the ‘hearts and minds’ of the local population and promote stabilisation 
(Stubbs, 1989, pp. 155-6).  
In less militarised terminology it represents part of the peace dividend that actors can 
buy into as a result of not resisting political processes and in some senses it 
compensates groups for a loss or change in their political power. The military are keen 
to emphasize this role, and the way in which operations have paved the way for 
military personnel to interact with the local population often whilst giving 
development assistance (see Military Operations, 2007). This also serves as a public 
information goal for home countries and for those keen to emphasize the peace 
element of military deployments as a convenient fig-leaf for doubting electorates. 
Impact of development intervention on stability 
These debates however do not help in identifying whether development and 
humanitarian action support stability. Whilst it may be logical to assume that 
humanitarian action can be stabilising, through the provision of life saving 
interventions, the impacts of development aid – both in the short and long-term – on 
stability seem to be in doubt. This section introduces some of the key literature but it 
should be noted that whilst there is only limited literature regarding development’s 
impact on stability there is no relevant critical literature regarding the impacts of 
political and security interventions on stability. 
The literature on the impact of humanitarian action rarely uses the term stabilisation 
or stability and its link to stability remains relatively un-assessed in the field. Academic 
discourse has noted a number of connections and military doctrine explicitly links 
stabilisation operations with their role in supporting humanitarian action (for example 
the provision of military helicopters in support of emergency food deliveries). For 
Liberal states this kind of humanitarian support has been considered to bolster their 
own interests as well as provide lifesaving support to the population, although 
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evidence from the aftermath of the Pakistan Earthquake would not seem to support 
this assertion (Wilder, 2010a, pp. S414-418). Non-state civilian actors have refrained 
from determining their humanitarian action as stabilising in part because of their 
concerns about the erosion of humanitarian space, which has been particularly acute 
in Afghanistan and Iraq (Collinson, Elhawary, & Muggah, 2010, p. S276). In particular 
the interpretation of COIN and stabilisation doctrine has led to a significant expansion 
of military interventions in traditionally civilian activities such as the delivery of health 
or veterinary services and support to education. This is broader than the strictly 
humanitarian actors are comfortable with (Gordon, 2010a, pp. S380-2). 
Beyond humanitarianism, what is novel in development geared towards stabilisation 
is the significant interest taken by bi- and multi-lateral donors in the way their 
activities support their politically orientated goals. Of critical importance in debates 
about the role of development in stabilisation is understanding the degree to which 
development can actually contribute to stability and the trade-offs in externally driven 
development interventions. In the first element it is not clear that development 
activities implemented in insecure environments necessarily lead to greater stability. 
One way which development is assumed to promote stability is that it fosters a sense 
of social contract or support for the state. Some studies have attempted to determine 
the impact of civilian development action but have often used the first level of sub-
national governance as the main level of analysis rather than the village (Lawson et al, 
2010, pp. xvii-xix).  
Other evidence from the field in Afghanistan seems to indicate that there is no causal 
link in delivering a development project and increased long-term support for, and 
legitimacy of, the host nation (Wilder, 2010, Fishstein, 2010, Gordon, 2010b, Zürcher 
et al 2010, pp. 33-5). Furthermore, in some cases communities seem to have no 
difficulty in accepting development from the government at the same time as assisting 
or actively participating in attacks against the government (review of interviews 
carried out for Ladbury & CPAU, 2009). In other contexts such as in Nepal, some noted 
that developmental marginalisation was a key driver of armed resistance (Thapa, 
2002, pp. 86-9) but this has little explanatory value for why even more politically and 
developmentally marginalised areas have not revolted in the past (Social Inclusion 
Research Fund, 2007, pp. 17-29).  
In already stable areas in Afghanistan development does seem to have a supporting 
role in promoting state legitimacy, but those gains are often short-lived and can be 
reversed by deteriorating security (Zürcher et al, 2010, pp. 33-5). Even when 
legitimacy can be improved it is not clear that it is state legitimacy that is benefitting, 
but rather that it might be local leaders or the implementing agency (Wilder, 2010). 
Therefore whilst development spending can have benefits in opening access to 
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communities and supporting consent, these are short-term very specific outcomes. 
They are also generally small scale and have low developmental impacts which have 
not been linked to stability by other authors (Zürcher et al, 2010, pp. 31-2, Wilder, 
2010, Fishstein, 2010). 
There is evidence dating back to the 1990s that not only can development be 
ineffective but that it can also be counter-productive in elucidating stabilisation. 
Macrae argued in the 1990s “that inappropriately designed rehabilitation strategies 
can obstruct rather than enable the development of sustainable health systems” 
(1995, p. 1). Whilst this example is from the health sector a similar process seems to 
have occurred in Helmand in Afghanistan where aid has been destabilising (Wilder 
2010). Nepal’s expansion of the education sector may have been a destabilising factor 
in its political development (Whelpton, 2005, p. 86). 
Whilst these concerns are emerging from the field, there is also broader concern 
regarding the ability for development aid at a macro level to encourage stability. 
Evidence from Sri Lanka seems to suggest that international pledges of aid in the 
context of non-aligned donors and national policies can stymie the potential impact of 
aid (Goodhand and Walton, 2009, pp. 316-9). Therefore statements such as 
‘development leads to security’ would seem to be overstated. There continue to be 
significant doubts about the impact of development in highly insecure environments. 
Though in more hard-headed terms this is not so much about respecting the space for 
development agencies but about demonstrating the impact of military support to 
development and efficient use of resources (Wilder, 2010 and Gordon, 2010b). 
In summary, whilst there is a strong theoretical assumption that aid spending (both 
developmental and humanitarian) has a positive impact on stability. Field research 
indicates that the causal link is far from certain in the short-term and that over the 
long-term development may be destabilising simply because it is a process of change. 
Humanitarian aid is not linked in the literature to stability because humanitarian 
actors have sought to distance themselves from military activities that support 
stabilisation. 
This section has demonstrated that none of the main theories used to articulate 
stabilisation activities, statebuilding, COIN and development, provide a grounded basis 
from which to argue that their interventions contribute to stability. This presents the 
final theoretical gap in the literature review which has traced the evolution of 
stabilisation activity from Liberal political philosophy through Eurocentric ideas about 
state-formation and the bureaucratic processes developed to intervene in fragile 
states. This builds on the gaps identified in the liberal philosophy of intervention 
about what stability is, whether states can provide it and how exogenous activities can 
promote stability.  
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The stabilisation gaps 
This chapter has attempted to situate the emergence of stabilisation doctrine, 
operations and activities across the spheres of politics, security and development 
action within the context of the Liberal states and their willingness to intervene in 
other territories. It has attempted to establish that there is often an unfulfilled 
evidence base for claims about which activities support stability and that at a 
theoretical level there are significant gaps in the conception of stability.  
The working hypothesis of stabilisation activity to date has been that all interventions 
across politics, security and development can promote stability; however, the 
philosophical evolutions and evidence base for this assertion are weak. As the 
components of Liberal interventionism have evolved they have each mutated into 
forms which are no longer necessarily true to the original Liberal intention and which 
are internally inconsistent because they undermine one another (Gray, 1991, pp. 141-
3). Firstly, this also ignores the cultural and context and historical heritage of nations 
where interventions are implemented, secondly, their historical experience of 
previous periods of stability, and thirdly, undermines the formation of legitimacy that 
could create and maintain the state which would then be responsible for a significant 
degree of security and which would permit development.  
Fourthly, stabilisation policy recognises that the goal is a stable political settlement at 
a local level, but the focus of effort at a local level ignores the degree of influence of 
national level issues, which are inevitably connected to local political settlements. The 
activities which are therefore undertaken are at best not going to achieve the desired 
outcome and could make the situation worse. Finally, this misdirection is made worse 
because the individual states and agencies that intervene each have their own lenses 
or conceptions of stability, which make a coherent engagement by the international 
community in another space almost impossible. It also suggests that the structure of 
international intervention to support legitimacy formation is incorrect and a 
significant level of effort and money focused by the international community is in the 
wrong area. These five areas are analytical themes which run throughout this thesis 
and are developed further in Chapter 3. 
While stabilisation practice is structured along the lines of a Comprehensive Approach 
it is shaped by the individual agencies tasked with implementing stabilisation. In the 
context of multi-national interventions these interpretations become reified so that it 
is increasingly difficult to pinpoint the core values of stabilisation. The confusion 
brought by departmental variations in stabilisation practice hides the fact that 
stabilisation flows from the flawed, theoretical conceptions of Liberal interventionism 
that have evolved in statebuilding (politics), COIN (security) and civilian intervention 
(social and economic development and humanitarian action). This was a result of the 
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need to implement activities before a theoretical framework was established. This 
background noise distracts analysis from the fact there are two very real distortions 
occurring in stabilisation at a strategic and operational level. 
At a strategic level it is not clear that the Western models of state formation can be 
applied to 21st Century state consolidation. For example bureaucratic reforms of 
taxation or the social contract that are promoted in the context of ongoing conflict 
may be overly ambitious, despite the avowedly restrained aims of stabilisation. This 
strategic assumption, that it is possible to exogenously promote a rational 
bureaucratic outcome in the midst of conflict, adds to the second layer of distortion, 
which lies partly in the inability to link stabilisation activities together in a 
comprehensive manner. It has so far proved too difficult for interveners to apply a 
unified series of interventions because of the limitations of the systems for delivering 
stabilisation (i.e. the Comprehensive Approach). In addition it is impossible at this 
juncture to assert that the elements of the Comprehensive Approach, political, 
security and development interventions, actually have the stabilising effects they 
claim, in particular because they may in fact undermine one another. This leads to the 
conclusion that it is necessary to try and understand local conceptions of stability in 
order to identify the nature of engagement and to identify which interventions have 
an impact on stability.  I.e. what should be done and in what order. This is the central 
focus of the thesis and the starting point for the research questions and hypothesis in 
the following chapter. 
Conclusion 
This literature review has shown that increasing instability has led to more and more 
interventionist approaches that are effectively attempts at state formation using 
modern Liberal experience and may actually undermine existing state structures. 
These interventions are inappropriate because they do not understand how 
exogenous actors can promote local political legitimacy formation that should support 
stability. Eurocentric Liberal approaches to statebuilding do not always translate to 
the processes experienced in other parts of the world and Early State theories help 
explain alternative processes, incentives and impediments to state formation in 
different regions which may result in an understanding that there is more than one 
species of state. This also supports the argument that state formation in the 21st 
Century is very different from state formation previously. However, when state 
formation is exogenously supported in other countries through stabilisation, because 
they are deemed weak, failing or collapsed, the interveners do not use a historical 
Eurocentric view of what the state should be. Instead they employ a modern Liberal 
paradigm which may be at odds with the context in which they are attempting to build 
a state. At best this can lead to ineffective interventions, at worst this can contribute 
to failure. 
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In practice stabilisation suffers from two weaknesses: firstly, an ill-defined theoretical 
base which contributes to programmatic confusion about the goals and aims of 
stabilisation i.e. what is the stability that stabilisation aims to promote? Secondly, the 
evidence that political, security and development interventions support stability is 
missing and policy is based on assertions which suggest they have more impact than is 
actually the case. Therefore in the interventions of the international community to 
support stability there are two levels of distortion: at the strategic level (in 
statebuilding) and operational level (in stabilisation).  
These distortions lead to programmes which are not only highly technical and 
promote an idealised version of a state which may be irrelevant, but may in actual fact 
promote tensions which undermine strategic and programmatic success and 
contribute to instability. These distortions are allowed to continue because there is a 
lack of theory and academic understanding about how to intervene in states which 
have distinct patterns and processes of state formation which are at the same time 
struggling to cope with the pressures of the international system and globalisation. 
However, the current state of world affairs has effectively closed the most common 
form of state formation – open bloody warfare – and alternatives are required by the 
international system. 
The inability to understand non-European state formation in the 21st Century is a 
critical issue which contributes to strategic level failure, made worse by the fact that 
stabilisation has emerged as a policy tool for international interventions which has 
essentially evolved peacebuilding and statebuilding practices in local level 
interventions by external states. These processes are then applied in fragile, often 
violent contexts, and fail to take account of an actual benchmark which would secure 
stability, namely, the formation of local political legitimacy. 
Political activities relating to stability and stabilisation are very broad but have been 
embodied by central state support for democratisation and local level governance 
reform activities. Conceptually and theoretically the democratic peace argument 
which underpins a substantive section of statebuilding theory and localised 
stabilisation activity has developed in an a historical manner, pre-supposing that the 
imposition of modern Western Liberal institutions will be feasible and stabilising in the 
context of fragile states with very different state formation histories. This structures 
the overarching engagement of political activities as well as related security and 
development interventions. There is also a strong Liberal reformist agenda amongst 
governance interventions which stretches the fabric of the population’s engagement 
with the state and their politicians, whose reliance on external support continues to 
undermine their legitimacy. 
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Security activities relating to stabilisation have resulted in conflating COIN with 
stabilisation activities, which masks the wider implications of the SSR agenda, and 
which also seeks to stabilise states by adapting the democratic governance agenda 
from the political sphere to security institutions and governance systems. Whilst these 
reforms are attempted centrally they are divorced from the more robust and 
interventionist forms of COIN and stabilisation support that have been developed in 
military doctrine in the last decade. These new doctrines build on 20th Century 
conceptions of COIN but again place substantive emphasis on state formation in the 
Liberal form and attempt to apply them across a broad array of sectors, though there 
is little evidence they actually support stability. These competing agendas are not 
necessarily compatible, but are further complicated by the continued military-military 
engagement through train and equip programmes which are able to appropriate the 
labels of SSR, COIN and stabilisation to suit their needs. 
Development activities aimed at stabilisation have, in the eyes of some, been heavily 
affected by military conceptions of stabilisation which has drawn criticism from 
humanitarians who view military engagement in certain aspects of humanitarian 
action with suspicion. Despite this military engagement in humanitarian activity has 
unproven impacts on stability. Longer-term development aid has also been weakly 
linked to some improvements in the acceptance of military forces, but the impacts are 
highly localised and other evidence suggests that development interventions seem to 
have little link to improving stability. 
The potential of stabilisation is that it can provide a critique to the Liberal and 
statebuilding paradigm which has failed to adapt to local environments. Stabilisation 
offers the potential to refocus international community support and local political will 
towards an approach which can foster real stability, rather than an externally driven 
model of the Western state. By developing a stability hypothesis in the following 
chapter the thesis will attempt to address some of the conceptual and theoretical 
weaknesses in the simple extraction of stabilisation intervention from Liberal political 
philosophy.  
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Chapter 3 - Methodology 
This chapter articulates the methodology applied in the research into stability and 
stabilisation. It provides a rationale for the research based on the argumentation in 
the preceding chapter that fundamental questions regarding international 
intervention and stability remain unarticulated and presents a hypothesis which will 
be tested through the research. It argues that the most effective way of investigating 
the gaps that have been identified is to root the research methodology in a 
phenomenological approach which explores local interpretations of stability and 
stabilisation through qualitative interviewing in support of a case study approach. The 
chapter also presents the key dependent and independent variables which are drawn 
from the hypothesis and used in the analysis and testing through the research. 
Alternative approaches were considered during the research design and are discussed 
as well as the potential sites for field work that were not selected. 
The chapter goes on to describe how the case studies were structured, addressing 
issues of language, power and access to the field sites and the sampling frame. 
Following this discussion, each field site is briefly introduced to evidence the degree of 
comparability within and between the field sites. A description of how the data has 
been analysed is provided and the chapter concludes with discussions on research 
ethics, assumptions and limitations. The appendices also include additional 
information including a risk matrix, Gantt chart, budget and information supplied to 
research participants. 
Rationale and hypothesis 
The preceding chapter demonstrated how stabilisation of fragile states or regions is 
seen as a way of containing international public ‘bads’ (often described as terrorism, 
criminal networks, climate change and nuclear proliferation) and promoting 
international stability which some link to the expansion of globalisation. 
Governments, particularly in the West, are increasingly concerned about regions, 
states and territories which seem unable to contain these threats and attempt to 
employ their resources through political, security, development pressure and 
assistance to ensure a politically acceptable form of stability. Despite a degree of 
agreement over the need for stability, the actions required to deliver it, i.e. 
stabilisation, are contested.61 It is not clear what should be stabilised or who should 
do it. It is not clear if, for example, local solutions, possibly via autonomous recovery, 
would be more effective than external intervention. Would such an approach be 
feasible and would it produce outcomes that are less politically acceptable for the 
international community? Operationally, which department(s) should lead and how is 
                                                     
61 This is not dissimilar to the disagreements about what is required for statebuilding 
in Liberal peacebuilding discourse see the table on p. 14 as an example. 
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it best to coordinate national activities in a multilateral intervention in a state which is 
overwhelmed by a vast array of international actors? As argued in the preceding 
chapter the answers to these questions across states and relevant departments are 
vague and varied because fundamentally there is often little coherence to the 
arguments about which actions contribute to ‘stability’ or what ‘stability’ looks like – 
and it is this starting point that the research attempts to explore. 
In order to explore the core question: ‘what is stability?’ the research has been 
focused at a local level; this is partly because at a national or even international level 
there is broad agreement about some key concepts of stability and previous research 
has tended to focus at the national or first layer of sub-national governance rather 
than the lower level of a village. It is also because intervening states are quite 
comfortable engaging with other states, but they struggle with addressing issues 
within another states’ territories which may present a risk or threat to either the 
intervening states’ interests or the host nation state itself. 
The lack of understanding about local stability within and between intervening and 
host nation states at both the strategic and operational levels militates against the 
creation of coherent strategy and contributes to confusion because it is not clear what 
the aim is. This also helps to explain the divergent lenses through which stability is 
viewed have shaped national responses to the challenges of supporting or promoting 
‘stability’ and the action of ‘stabilisation’ (See p. 7). As a result the second research 
question is: ‘what activities support stability?’ 
Using these two core research questions the thesis proposes a hypothesis based on 
the argumentation in Chapter 2. The literature review suggested that there are key 
theoretical gaps inherent in the Liberal project which means that political, security 
and development interventions ignore the importance of local legitimacy formation in 
stability as posited by Gordon and Jackson (Jackson & Gordon, 2007, p. 653). As a 
result the research hypothesis states “that stability is driven by local political 
settlements and produced by local political legitimacy formation which can be 
supported by interventions.”  
In trying to understand how external intervention supports local stability it is 
necessary to test what supports stability. The hypothesis being tested here is that 
local stability is supported by local political legitimacy formation. In order to test the 
hypothesis interventions must be tested in each field site against what the population 
believes stability is and what is politically legitimate locally. It is critical not to look at 
these issues just in the present time but to be cognizant of historical trends and 
experiences, as these are used by local populations to frame and understand the state 
and the actions of external interveners. By investigating the heritage of the state and 
interveners in each of the case study locations the research will explore how best to 
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understand stability and legitimacy as the fundamental elements of state structures 
and uncover earlier experiences of stability. 
Methodology  
The research design straddles both phenomenological and interpretavist traditions in 
understanding social processes. This is necessary because the research is attempting 
to understand, and to some extent reconcile, the differing viewpoints of host nations 
and external interveners in the process of stabilisation. The research is trying to 
identify the ways in which different processes, actions and events affect the 
production of stability and local political legitimacy, which is defined through 
intersubjectivity – i.e. that individuals in a group recognise and validate a position or 
act which has political meaning and value (there is a long and useful discussion in 
Crossley, 1996). This uses Scheff’s definition of intersubjectivity as "the sharing of 
subjective states by two or more individuals” (Scheff, 2003, p. 8).  
The phenomenological approach will be taken to attempt to verify, identify and 
understand the logic behind stabilisation activities as conceived, planned and 
executed by both national and international interveners. As noted in Chapter 2 an 
unvoiced concern in the conception of interventions is that they are grounded in a 
narrow cultural and historical moment. Therefore in order to understand what 
interventions ‘do’ in other contexts one must attempt at least to shed preconceptions 
about how the intervention should be viewed – an abandonment of dogma to accept 
the challenges that arise from others’ conceptions of the world. This takes as its start 
point Husserl’s central insight that it is not easy to interrogate one’s own 
consciousness and perception and it must be drawn out through philosophical 
innovation, or in the form of this research design, through discussions where the 
researcher searches for patterns in the consciousness (or perceptions) of the 
respondents across the research sites (Moran, 2000, pp. 1-6, 60-61).  
There is however a limit to which philosophy can bridge the gap between conscious 
perception and external realities, as in the critique of Nabert’s work. Philosophy 
cannot reconcile the philosophical desire for freedom of thought with the realities of 
normative existence (McCormick, 1974, pp. 216-8); instead, a more moderate path 
absorbing the elements of phenomenology that allow exploration of another’s 
consciousness has been chosen rather than a fully discursive attempt to analyse every 
word respondents utter, following Heidegger’s view that the opportunity provided by 
phenomenology is that it allows other possibilities to be explored (Moran, 2000, p. 
195). In a similar manner the use of ethnographic techniques has not been taken to 
extremes, though, where applicable they have been utilised and are supported by the 
association of phenomenology and ethnography in theory development (Maso, 2001, 
pp. 137, 143-4). 
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There is a further limitation to consider: the research is not attempting to address the 
psychology of interventions and how they are viewed, though this may be important 
for other studies; the attempt is to match perception against actual realities and 
norms. In this design the focus is on reality or the space through which interventions 
occur; put another way “space is not the setting (real or logical) in which things are 
arranged, but the means whereby the position of things becomes possible” (Merleau-
Ponty, 1962, p. 243). It is through understanding those spaces and how acts within 
them are perceived that the research has been effected. 
Bearing in mind the limitations of the external position of the researcher, this will 
attempt to understand how stabilisation action is viewed by individuals and 
communities in the host nation. As a result the research will “search for regularities” 
(Swedberg, 2005, p. 145) over time and between locations and areas with different 
political economies. This selection is partly driven by the position of the researcher, a 
white male European, whose natural affinity is more likely to be with interveners 
rather than the host nationals for a range of linguistic, social and cultural reasons 
(these biases remain despite the fact the researcher has lived and worked in 
Afghanistan since 2004, has strong family connections to the wider sub-continent, is 
fluent in Dari and speaks Arabic).  
Given the epistemological approaches being used it is important to clarify the 
variables being assessed. The independent variables include the stabilisation 
interventions which are the primary subject of the research. These interventions are 
intended, at least partially, to address a threat, in each case an insurgency, and have 
to contend with societal dynamics and local political economy. The particulars of each 
insurgency and the economic contexts are the other independent variables. The 
challenge in the research design, in particular the participant selection and form of 
interviewing, is in separating the internal biases of the researcher (Bowie, 2000, pp. 4-
5) from the competing noise of local political economy and the threat that the 
stabilisation intervention is supposed to be addressing.  
The dependent variables are the concepts of stability and legitimacy. Stability is the 
objective of the interventions and in the hypothesis legitimacy is entwined with 
stability. These are used in order to understand how the stabilisation intervention in 
the context of the society and threat affects the twin goals of local political legitimacy 
and externally driven demands for stability. This approach operationalises the 
hypothesis, which is that stability is driven by local political settlements and produced 
by local political legitimacy formation. 
As a result there are two levels of falsification: local political legitimacy is either 
relevant to stability (or not); and externally driven stabilisation interventions directly 
affect stability (or not). The analysis will attempt to identify causal linkages between 
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the concepts and stability as described by the participants in the research. A third 
layer of analysis is that external stabilisation supports local legitimacy formation (or 
not) which in turn promotes stability (or not). This final step is the central element of 
the research hypothesis and will be tested in Chapter 9.  
An added element of complexity is that conflicts occur over a long timeframe, 
meaning that time represents an important part of stability formation and 
maintenance. For example, when looking at an environment that was stable prior to a 
conflict, concepts of what stable meant then may affect what stability means now or 
in the future. Further, given many conflicts occur across a significant period of time, 
they also witness substantial changes in the international contexts in which they are 
prosecuted. This affects not only the political interests of intervening states (for 
example between a Cold War and post-Cold War paradigm) but also affects the 
methods that can be employed as part of the conflict because of technological 
changes. This presents a challenge to the comparability within and between case 
studies. To mitigate this and to search for the underlying connections between and 
within the case studies the thesis will analyse the data by time period across the 
independent and dependant variables. The diagram below provides a representation 
of the dependent and independent variables. 
Independent Variables 
Insurgency Local Political 
Economy 
Stabilisation 
intervention 
Dependent Variables 
Legitimacy Stability 
Time periods 
Pre-conflict During conflict Current period 
Figure 2 Independent and dependent variables in the research design 
The variables are used to structure the thematic analysis of the field sites (Chapters 4-
7) and comparative analysis of the data in Chapter 8. Based on the variables the data 
is analysed according to five themes 1) periods of stability; 2) culture and context; 3) 
mode of intervention; 4) political legitimacy and; 5) conceptions of stability. The 
themes are briefly introduced here. 
The independent variables of the local political economy and insurgency are 
addressed collectively under the themes of culture and context, which seek to isolate 
specific issues within the nature of the field sites and the conflicts which shed light on 
stability. The range of stabilisation interventions across the political, security and 
development lines of operation are analysed under the title mode of intervention to 
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provide analysis across the operational areas to investigate which elements have 
supported stability and which have not. The dependent variables, stability and 
legitimacy, are analysed through the themes of local conceptions of stability and 
political legitimacy which assess the field data according to notions of stability and 
political legitimacy amongst the respondents. The final theme, periods of stability, 
interrogates past experiences of stability in the field site and their relevance to 
stability at the time of research. 
Using the epistemological approach outlined above and identification of the variables 
and research analysis themes, the research has been designed to test the 
statebuilding, COIN and development theories outlined in Chapter 2 to interrogate the 
feasibility of indigenously or exogenously supported stabilisation. Out of this process 
the research will suggest how a new conceptual framework of local stability.  
Alternative methods 
Several models were considered during the research design, which are outlined in this 
section, including using macro quantitative analysis and participatory observation. 
Their relative strengths and weaknesses in comparison to a semi-structured interview 
based case study approach are discussed which explains why they were not selected. 
Alternative case study sites were also considered, which are also discussed below. 
Quantitative analysis 
Early in the design phase it was decided that large scale use of quantitative data 
across multiple sites, such as panel data used in the Correlates of War project, would 
be inappropriate (Sarkees & Wayman, 2010). On a conceptual level this is because 
quantitative analysis often tells a researcher very little about what an intervention 
feels like to local communities and fixes the analysis at the macro rather than micro 
level. These are critical issues when trying to understand local legitimacy formation 
and local stability which is as much an art as a science, and is the central component 
of the hypothesis being tested by the research. Further, the significant critiques of the 
work of the Correlates of War project and other macro-econometric approaches to 
conflict such as Paul Colliers’ work suggest that it is not necessarily possible to identify 
macro-level causality between, say, development assistance and democratic stability 
(Nathan, 2005). 
On a practical level the kinds of quantitative data that could be of use in 
understanding stabilisation often do not exist for the very practical reason that the 
areas are usually at war or have endured significant conflict over a substantial period 
and as a result sufficient quantitative data that would be considered reliable simply 
does not exist. That is not to say that quantitative data should be ignored where it is 
available, but it has not been consistently and systematically collected in many states 
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affected by conflict and therefore has limited reliability. As a result of these issues a 
small scale case study approach focused on qualitative data has been chosen. 
Participatory observation 
Within case study based research there are a number of methods through which data 
can be collected. Amongst the options considered was a participatory observation 
method whereby the researcher would use his ability to access interveners in a case 
study country to situate himself on the side of the interveners in return for work. For 
example, this could have been carrying out a small piece of work for DfID and using 
the offices of DfID to understand the internal workings of the interveners in 
stabilisation. This method was attractive particularly because it offered enhanced 
access to privileged information which would inform analysis more systematically. It 
does however present both validity and practical issues. 
In terms of validity this kind of research would present a rather one-sided view of the 
intervention. If the researcher was hosted by an agency they would naturally have 
better access to the intervener than the communities and field sites, which may be 
unintentional, but is almost unavoidable and may hamper the quality of data 
collected. On a practical level it was not possible to arrange this kind of participatory 
observation in both case study countries. Had the research gone ahead with one case 
study being based partly on participatory observation and one using non-participatory 
methods there would be doubts about the validity of the results. This is also the 
rationale for not conducting further research in Afghanistan when the researcher was 
based in the Helmand PRT after the main data collection phase (see p. 79). 
Country selection 
In addition to alternative approaches different case study sites were considered. This 
short section provides a brief description of why those sites, including Somalia, 
Yemen, South Sudan and Pakistan, were not chosen. The section on the field site areas 
goes into more detail about the comparability between the two case studies and four 
field sites (see pp. 82-97). 
Sudan, Yemen, Pakistan and Somalia all present interesting and complex issues of 
intervention, ‘fragility’ and statehood. The presence of ongoing insurgencies in three 
countries and the secession of South Sudan from Sudan as a result of an insurgency 
presented good comparisons with Afghanistan. There are also many cultural (i.e. 
Islamic) and historical links between these four countries and Afghanistan; and three 
of them are partly or fully Arabic speaking, which would allow for exploration of 
Islamic concepts of resistance. Both Yemen and Pakistan receive significant 
international military support, though not in the form of a conventional international 
military deployment but rather small special forces and mentoring teams which are 
often hard to engage as research participants; they are also the focus of a particular 
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form of stabilisation, sometimes referred to as ‘hot-stabilisation’ by mainly Western 
powers, which would mean it would not be possible to disaggregate some of the 
‘noise’ from the processes of what is termed ‘hot stabilisation’ (see p. 21 for an 
description) from more common forms of intervention. This is important because one 
of the contentions in the research design, as outlined in Chapter 2, is that stabilisation 
is not a new concept but rather the progression of pre-existing approaches. Had the 
research only looked at one form of intervention it would have limited the 
extrapolation of potential findings. 
Somalia and Sudan/South Sudan both have international military deployments 
mandated as UN Peacekeeping or African Union deployments, which themselves have 
their own distinctive characteristics, and there is a rich literature on the history of UN 
peacekeeping missions (Paris & Sisk, 2009). Alongside the military deployments there 
are ‘stabilisation’ activities by a number of UN, bi- and multi-lateral institutions which 
present complex conflict environments that could have been useful comparators to 
Afghanistan. However these potential sites presented a number of key weaknesses. 
For Yemen, Somalia and Pakistan it was primarily an issue of similarity: each country 
was effectively part of the same conflict system (the War on Terror initiated by the 
Bush administration). By confining the research sites to predominantly Muslim 
countries targeted as part of the fight against Al-Qaeda the outcomes of the research 
would have been criticised for focusing on a specific 21st Century conflict. This would 
mean that generalisations from the analysis beyond North Africa and the greater 
Middle East may have been difficult, and the utility of the research would have been 
reduced. Sudan and South Sudan were also rejected because, despite falling outside 
the War on Terror, the creation of South Sudan represents a significant new dynamic 
in that conflict, namely the formation of a new state, which would have skewed the 
research sample. 
Methods applied in field work 
The theoretical underpinnings of stabilisation reach back to several other areas of 
academia, including: Liberal political philosophy, state formation, statebuilding, COIN 
and development (see Chapter 2). This complexity means, for example, that it would 
be futile to apply an international relations theory on to military doctrine to 
understand whether a development activity has had an impact on stability. Whilst 
some of these concepts will be tested in Chapter 9, they could not drive the research 
design alone because they would limit the research. Instead, the field methodology 
has been to invert the complexity in to a simplified research approach which brings 
together the lived experiences of the communities and the actions of the interveners 
using phenomenological and interpretivist approaches; this will allow an assessment 
of the interlocking nature of the political, security and development inputs. The focus 
on phenomenology and interpretation leads the research design towards ethnography 
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and anthropology, though due to the complexity of the areas covered, the 
multicultural aspects of the design and time constraints, the study is not fully 
ethnographic nor anthropological.62 In effect the research approach has been to make 
a broad audit of the socio-economic contexts of the communities and assess what has 
happened in the locality (and why) in order to identify if any of those events have 
impacted on what the local community considers stability. 
A key theoretical argument from the literature review that informs the research 
design is the importance of being able to assess stabilisation activities across a 
number of factors which relate to one ultimate goal. The hypothesis being tested 
through the research is that local political legitimacy formation is central to stability, 
and activities undertaken as stabilisation should be measured against this benchmark. 
This is different from the manner in which interventions, normally associated with 
political, security and development activities, are measured against including 
quantitative outcomes of numbers of kilometres of road built, of children attending 
school or of security incidents.  
By breaking down the research question the research attempts to identify a causal link 
between action and stability; this helps with a practical research problem which is that 
no one individual could have the technical knowledge spanning the breadth of fields 
necessary to carry out research using a project-based approach.63 Therefore it is 
important to keep a focus on the overall impact of activities and not to try and assess 
or investigate all of the outcomes from different types of projects across political 
interventions, security and development. The research is not interested in, for 
example, the effectiveness of development activities in terms of health benefits or 
literacy improvements – the impact of the activities on these sectors is incidental to 
the hypothesis that the intervention may have had an impact on stability. 
Recognising the fact that the research has not needed to assess each intervention in-
depth allows the research to look across a number of sectors and to investigate the 
other environmental and incidental issues which may have impacted stability. As a 
result, within the stabilisation approach (which is cross-governmental and therefore 
                                                     
62 As noted above and below, elements of the research design draw on both 
ethnography and anthropology. The main constraints on employing these approaches 
lies in the time required to cover the sites in an adequate fashion across multiple 
different sectors. There are examples which discuss the ethnography of development, 
anthropology and religion, or anthropology and culture, which in one way or another 
attempt to revolutionise the methods in their specific sub-spheres but would be 
inadequate on their own to address the research question (Pocock, 1998, pp. 4-5; 
Friedl, 1976; Mosse & Lewis, 2005; Bowie, 2000).  
63 For example the Stabilisation Unit’s implementation matrix has 14 Requirements 
(sectors for activities) each with multiple activities (Stabilisation Unit, 2008). 
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almost all-encompassing) the research has looked at a range of actions taken by 
interveners which have included: 
 Humanitarian aid delivery 
 Support to health or education services 
 Cash and food for work schemes 
 Interim justice arrangements and the role of informal justice systems 
 Security sector activities including operations, training of the police, army or 
disarmament processes 
 Political appointments, processes and local political settlements 
Some of these issues were more relevant than others in the different research sites. 
For example, education interventions were not a significant element of the story of 
the site in Nahr-i Sarraj in Afghanistan, however they form an important part of the 
conflict story in Gajul Village Development Committee (VDC), Nepal. In another 
example both Haraiya VDC in Nepal and Aqa Sarai in Afghanistan have local brick kilns 
which form an important part of their local economies and forms part of the 
reconstruction and stability narrative of two of the four field sites but is not present in 
the other two field sites. As a result the research topics in each site were moulded 
around the sectors and areas of interest to the local community and the types of 
interventions carried out by either the state or external interveners. 
Breaking down the research frame to carry out a socio-political audit of four villages 
informed the selection of the research methods in the field. Primary data collection 
focused on the semi-structured qualitative interviews which were conducted with 151 
respondents (see Table 5, p.79). Further primary data was also collected regarding 
development expenditure, governance actions and security activities, at times 
supplied by the interviewees, which were used to triangulate the interview data and 
enrich the data analysis.  
Following on from the hypothesis and methodology the research objectives are:  
1. Review existing literature on state formation and stabilisation (Chapter 2) 
2. Understand local perceptions of what stability is and challenge the research 
hypothesis (Chapters 4-8) 
3. Identify what actions have been perceived to create stability in the local area 
(Chapters 4-8) 
4. Analyse the impact of both internal and external stabilisation activities upon 
local (political) legitimacy formation (Chapters 4-8) 
5. Based on research findings test the three intervention theories outlined in 
Chapter 2 – statebuilding, COIN and development – and present a more 
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comprehensive framework which caters for local stability formation (Chapters 
4-7 and Chapter 9) 
6. Present a conclusion and recommendations for future research (Chapter 10)  
Interviews 
In the Afghanistan and Nepal case studies, two sites plus the capital city were selected 
as field sites, which enables comparison between the two field sites in a single case 
study as well as between the four field sites. More than one site was chosen in each 
case study to ensure that one field site does not represent an idiosyncratic example of 
the conflict in that country. The national level was included to provide a narrative 
behind the research in the two field sites; to provide comparative insights from 
international actors and interveners about the specific idiosyncrasies in each field site 
(and to control them during analysis); and to highlight which trends identified in the 
field sites were common in other parts of the case study countries. Overall 140 
interviews were carried out and used in the analysis64 which involved 151 participants. 
Table 3 Number of interviews by case study and field site 
Number of Interviews 
Afghanistan 
Kalakan 
Afghanistan 
Nahr-e-
Sarraj 
Afghanistan 
National 
Level 
Nepal  
Rolpa 
Nepal 
Bara 
Nepal 
National 
Level 
25 25 12 34 33 12 
Total number of interviews 141 
 
A total of sixty-one interviews were carried out in the Afghanistan case study and 
seventy-nine for the Nepal case study. The slightly higher numbers of interviewees in 
the Nepal case study reflects the different governance structures present in 
Afghanistan and Nepal which resulted in different ‘village’ sizes and the inclusion of 
more female respondents in Nepal. In Afghanistan villages tend to be smaller than in 
Nepal because Nepal has implemented a formalised system of Village Development 
Committees (VDCs), which are clusters of villages, split into nine wards. 
The form of sub-national governance is not yet formalised in Afghanistan. Traditionally 
most villages will recognise they are part of a manteqa, effectively a neighbourhood or 
locality. In hill areas this is often demarcated by geography, where a manteqa may 
include the upper part of a valley and the villages in that part of the valley would 
                                                     
64 Several more interviews were carried out but were not included in the analysis for 
methodological reasons; some are referred to in this chapter to demonstrate the 
limitations of the research. 
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identify themselves by the name of the largest village (which may also carry the name 
of the valley) but in fact the village extends up the valley.65 However, this is not 
consistently applied and they can vary in size significantly and in particular for external 
interventions these conventions have for the most part, rightly or wrongly, been 
ignored. 
Formally there are Community Development Councils (CDCs) that govern the 
implementation of development projects that were selected through the National 
Solidarity Programme (NSP), however villages of less than twenty-five households 
were not included in the programme (Beath, Christia, & Enikolopov, 2008, p. 2). Given 
this limitation and the current security concerns it means that CDCs are not present in 
all Afghan villages.66 There have also been attempts to ‘cluster’ CDCs into larger 
groups which would bring an ‘Afghan village’ into roughly the same size as a ‘Nepali 
village’ but these attempts have been sporadic and in any case don’t have any 
relevance to the field sites in Afghanistan. As a result of the lack of coherence in 
governance structures, it is more valid to focus on specific villages or locally defined 
manteqas rather than use a partially implemented formal system. This has meant that 
the Afghan sites were physically smaller (from 25 to 300 households)67 than the Nepali 
villages (up to 800 households in one of the cases included in the sample). Further, it 
was socially acceptable for the researcher to interview some Nepali women which was 
not feasible in Afghanistan. This meant that the sample size had to be adjusted for the 
Nepal field sites to ensure an appropriate sample was interviewed. 
For the most part interviews were conducted one on one, though a few focus group 
sessions were useful in order to, firstly, gain consent from the community to carry out 
the interviews and secondly, to understand how group dynamics and thinking affected 
individual concepts of legitimacy. The interviews were semi-structured but based on a 
core set of topics or issues that are the focus of the research (see Table 4, p.75). Given 
the breadth of the interview subjects the researcher re-visited the field sites multiple 
times to re-interview respondents and investigate specific issues or subjects. Where 
possible the interviews were recorded and, where permission was not granted for 
recording information the researcher and interpreter made extensive notes. Notes 
taken by hand were written up on the day of the interviews. All transcripts and notes 
were typed up to be used in the analysis (see p. 95). 
                                                     
65 This is in fact also the way Gajul, one of the Nepal field sites, is structured. 
66 In this research Village A had a CDC which is now defunct; the village in Kalakan 
district does have a functioning CDC. 
67 The randomised evaluation of the NSP indicated the average CDC included 136 
households (Beath, Christia, & Enikolopov, 2008, p. 39). 
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In Afghanistan interviews were carried out over a 3-month period from September to 
December 2010; two additional interviews with external interveners were carried out 
via Skype during 2011. In Nepal interviews were carried out between July and 
November 2011. In both case studies several respondents were re-interviewed on 
multiple occasions when necessary.  
Interview structure 
The interviews were semi-structured and because the structure is both simple and 
flexible the researcher did not take interview sheets with him (except for the pilot 
interviews). Whilst not a fully ethnographic approach (as discussed above), the 
interview structure does bear some resemblance to ethnographic approaches68 (Heyl, 
2001, pp. 370-1). For the local national respondents three topic areas were discussed: 
A) The background of the interviewee and their immediate social network  
B) The relationship between the village/district with other forms and layers of 
the host nation state structure  
C) The actions, legitimacy and impact of interveners (both state and external 
actors) 
The interviews with interveners only addressed topic area C. The interviews were not 
linear and were often structured around how the interviewee was approached. For 
example a few respondents who were economic actors were selected because they 
were known to have local business interests (such as brick kiln owners in Bara and 
Kalakan); those interviews were structured more around the business interests of the 
respondents and addressed issues such as investment, capital, economic growth, 
employment and labour relations as well as the interventions that were going on 
around them. Other interviewees whose backgrounds were different, for example a 
teacher or farmer, were asked different questions about interventions because a 
farmer would not necessarily know about an intervention at a school and equally a 
teacher may not know much about interventions in local water management systems. 
  
                                                     
68 For example the interview process follows the 7 steps outlined by Kvale and cited by 
Heyl (2001, p. 373) which are: “thematizing, designing, interviewing, transcribing, 
analysing, verifying and reporting.” 
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Table 4 Semi-structured interview framework 
Topic area Respondent 
group 
Areas for discussion Trigger Question 
(example only) 
A) The 
background of 
the interviewee 
and their 
immediate social 
network  
Local nationals 
(all) 
The respondent’s 
personal background 
and socio-economic and 
political connections; 
their experiences of the 
‘state’; their view and 
experiences of 
‘interveners’ 
Can you tell me 
when you first 
became aware of 
the state or 
government? 
B) Relationship 
between the 
village/district 
with other forms 
and layers of the 
host nation state 
structure  
Local nationals 
(all) 
When and how does the 
respondent engage with 
the state; how does the 
broader community 
engage with the state 
regarding, for example, 
allocation of water 
resources 
Did you vote in 
the last election – 
what was the 
process like? 
How do you 
resolve disputes 
with the local 
government? 
C) The actions, 
legitimacy and 
impact of 
interveners 
Local nationals 
(all) and 
interveners 
What changes do 
interveners bring – how 
does this get used by 
the community; what is 
the view of the 
community/respondents 
towards the impact of 
the expatriates 
What have 
outsiders done in 
this area? 
How has this 
changed life in the 
community? 
 
The longest interviews were carried out with the local nationals which covered the 
three topic areas. These interviews were carried out over 1 – 3 interview sessions 
each lasting approximately forty-five minutes to one hour. The interviews with 
interveners lasted approximately one hour and generally focused on the area of 
interest to their institution. For example a bi-lateral donor official would be asked 
about the donor’s programming and interpretation of the environment and it would 
not go into the details of conflict in a particular community if the interviewee did not 
have the relevant knowledge – equally a local national respondent wouldn’t know the 
systems of the donors who were running a programme in their area and this was not 
discussed with them. 
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Sample 
In both Afghanistan and Nepal a small pilot was carried out with a handful of 
interviewees to serve a number of purposes: firstly, to test the translation of 
terminology into local languages and the flexible semi-structured form of the 
interviews (as outlined above); secondly, to work with the main interpreters to ensure 
they understood how to support the research and that there was a good working 
relationship between the researcher and interpreters; and thirdly, to collect a small 
sample of data to ensure that the interviews were producing the kinds of data that 
were required for the research. In Afghanistan the pilot interviews were carried out in 
Kabul, and in Nepal seven interviews were carried out in Dhading district, a hill district 
four hours’ drive from Kathmandu. In both cases the pilots led to modifications in the 
translation of interview questions. The pilot was followed by the main research 
interviews. The sampling frame for the research was threefold: firstly, identifying the 
research field sites; secondly, identifying local respondents in the field sites; and 
thirdly, identifying relevant interveners (the selection of the field sites as part of the 
sampling frame is discussed below on pp. 82-97). 
The original sampling design identified five categories of national respondents to be 
interviewed; economic actors; local leaders; district or provincial leaders and national 
leaders and external interveners, though this was modified later. The relationships 
between respondents at a village level were used to identify interviewees at the 
district/provincial level and then in turn at the national level and, finally, interveners. 
The four field sites were sampled in such a way as to provide a comprehensive 
assessment of the way in which those areas function and how this related to the 
broader geographic, social, economic, political and conflict systems in which they sit. 
In the field it was clear that only a few of the respondents conformed to one 
respondent category: for example an elected official in the Parliament is counted as a 
national leader, but they are also local leaders and economic actors; equally economic 
actors are not without agency and some had low level leadership positions, though 
this may not have been the focus of the interview. Therefore the typology should only 
be seen as a guide to the stratification of who was interviewed, rather than an 
absolute categorisation of participants. 
With the exception of district/provincial leaders the typology has been maintained 
during the research. This district/provincial leader category was meant to encompass 
government officials and leaders with district/provincial level positions (possibly a 
provincial council member in Afghanistan or District Development Council member in 
Nepal). In reality this was not a helpful distinction for the reason noted above that 
most respondents had more than one identity and therefore it was not a distinct 
category; instead these respondents were categorised as local leaders (including 
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village, district or provincial positions), national leaders (primarily from national 
legislatures) or interveners. 
The interveners’ category had been intended solely for international respondents and 
had in fact been called External Interveners. Again, in practice, this was not a helpful 
distinction because national leaders in government positions tended not to be from 
the field sites. This mainly applied to Governors (Afghanistan) or Chief District Officers 
(Nepal) but included some lower level government staff such as a government official 
in Kalakan who worked in a clerical position. They were, at times, viewed by local 
respondents (i.e. local residents) as intervening as much as international actors. This 
was particularly pertinent in the Bara field site in Nepal where the state is viewed as 
an imperial Pahadi (Hill) government ruling over the Madeshi people living in the 
plains. This is explored further in Chapter 7, but demonstrates that the host nation 
state can be considered to be an exogenous actor as much as international actors. 
Despite these adjustments the overall concept for the sampling frame has remained 
intact, which was to carry out research in two case study countries (Afghanistan and 
Nepal) in two field sites within each country. In each field site twenty-five respondents 
were to be interviewed with an additional ten interveners being interviewed at a 
national level. This would have given a total of 120 participants or interviews; in the 
end 151 participants were interviewed in 141 interviews; the increased number to 
accommodate the slightly larger sample sizes in the Nepali ‘villages’ (as noted above); 
a few focus groups, female respondents in Nepal and some additional interveners. A 
full list of interviews undertaken including their locations, dates, codes and categories 
can be found in Appendix B. 
Therefore, within the adjusted respondent categories the following types of 
participants were included: 
1. Economic actors (farmers, day labourers, small business owners, teachers, 
health workers) 
2. Local leaders (elders, religious leaders, former elected politicians at the 
district/provincial level) 
3. National leaders (elected politicians in Parliament) 
4. Interveners (International staff working for NGOs, bi-/multi-lateral agencies, 
embassies or government officials in the executive) 
o Interveners who are classed as being part of the field sites were mainly 
government officials working in that district or province, or staff 
operating in that area  
o Interveners who are part of the ‘national level’ interviews had a range 
of connections to either a field site or particular topic, for example 
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monitoring stability. This sub-category includes all of the interviews for 
the national level interviews in both case studies 
In a case study methodology attempting to provide a broad understanding of each 
field site maintaining exactly the same numbers of labourers vs. teachers or religious 
leaders vs. community leaders or men vs. women was not feasible because the sites 
were themselves very different (see Table 5). Additional interviews in the two Nepali 
field sites included two religious leaders interviewed to ensure that the research had 
considered the impact of religious mobilisation in the conflict (a very significant factor 
in both the Afghan field sites). Religious actors played a minor role in the Nepali 
conflict and it was known that the interviews may not yield substantive new 
information, but they were important because the research can now confirm that 
religious mobilisation is not an essential factor in stability (see Chapter 8). The 
interviews may have been superfluous to a research design focusing only on Nepal but 
they were important to ensure comparability between the case studies. 
Further access to female respondents varied substantially across the field sites and 
compared to men there were few female respondents. At a practical level it was 
problematic for a male researcher to interview female respondents in villages in 
Afghanistan and attempting to do so would have put the respondents under 
significant stress and may have damaged relations between the researcher and the 
male leaders of the community. In the Nahr-i Sarraj case study it was possible to 
identify a female leader who was willing to speak to the researcher in her capacity as 
an elected politician.  
In Nepal it was more socially acceptable to interview female respondents, however 
their relevance to the research topic was found to be more limited than male leaders 
and economic actors. Attempts were made to interview female respondents either 
individually or collectively in focus groups but these were not always successful or 
useful. At an individual level not all the female respondents were happy to talk about 
issues which they felt were beyond their knowledge – for example the history of the 
conflict in the village, as illustrated below by one female interviewee who was 
confused by the questions.  
Focus groups with women were also held which involved women in both the Rolpa 
and Bara field sites, however, because of the lack of private meeting space the 
interviews were held in public and would become very large. The women were often 
talking under the gaze of their neighbours or male members of their households who 
stopped by to see what was happening. As a result those focus groups were not free 
from significant biases, although they were very enlightening in triangulating 
information that had been garnered from other sources, or in opening avenues for 
follow-up interviews with individual female participants. Most of the focus groups 
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have been excluded from the main body of analysis for these reasons. Despite 
attempts at including more female respondents the researcher acknowledges these 
social and cultural limitations, which has meant that there are few female participants 
in the research. 
Table 5 Number of participants by case study, field site and by respondent category 
(numbers in brackets indicate the number of female respondents) 
Number of Participants 
Respondent 
category  
Afghanistan 
Kalakan 
Afghanistan 
Nahr-e-
Sarraj 
Afghanistan 
National 
Level 
Nepal  
Rolpa 
Nepal 
Bara 
Nepal 
National 
Level 
Local 
community 
leaders  13 14 (1)  10 (2) 9 (1)  
Local 
community 
economic 
actors 11 5  17 (3) 16 (1)  
National 
leaders 1 1  3 3  
Interveners 4  7 12 (4)  4 (1) 8 12 (2) 
 29 27 (1) 12 (4) 35 (6) 36 (2) 12 (2) 
 Total Number of Participants 151 (15) 
 
This section has explained the overall sampling frame used across the research sites; 
however, in each case study and field site the approaches and access to respondents 
varied as choices were made about how to initiate sampling in an appropriate 
manner. This has led to most of the variation in the table above and the following 
section explains how the sampling frame was initiated in each field site. 
Access - Afghanistan 
In Afghanistan access to both field sites was achieved through the auspices of an 
Afghan NGO called Cooperation for Peace and Unity (CPAU) where the researcher 
worked until the end of the field work in December 2010, which helped to initiate the 
snowball samples.69 For the Kalakan field site the snowball sample was initiated 
through three approaches; firstly, through the field staff of CPAU who helped in the 
final selection of the main village Aqa Sarai; and secondly, through connections the 
                                                     
69 A snowball sample allows the researcher to use existing relationships and 
interviewees to recommend other interviewees and to facilitate introductions. 
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researcher had from a previous research trip to the district in 2004-5;70 thirdly, the 
interpreter was able to facilitate a meeting with a key national leader from Kalakan. 
The researcher was able to make a number of day trips from Kabul to the district and 
relevant villages during the research period and interviews were carried out face to 
face, normally without an interpreter and with some facilitation from CPAU staff. 
Access to the participants in the second field site was significantly more complicated 
and had a three-pronged approach. Initially the research design had intended to 
include Imam Sahib district in Kunduz province, northern Afghanistan; however, 
shortly after returning to Afghanistan to start field work the security situation 
deteriorated rapidly in the district and it was felt to be too dangerous to attempt the 
field work at that time (autumn 2010). As a result, alternative sites were investigated 
which included considering talking to groups who had migrated from other areas of 
the country to Kabul.  
After discussing potential communities, talking to those who may consider 
participating and identifying areas where interviews could take place it was possible to 
identify one group of Internally Displaced People (IDPs) who had recently moved en-
masse to Kabul from a village in Nahr-i Sarraj district in Helmand province. With the 
support of the interpreter the researcher was able to gain permission from the local 
community leader to visit the site where the community was living. However, because 
of the sensitivity of their recent history, and the fact that they knew the researcher 
was in touch with opposition groups, the government and international actors, they 
asked for the name of their village not to be used in the text of the thesis; it is referred 
to throughout simply as Village A. 
The next snowball sampling approach was through the social network of a CPAU staff 
member. CPAU was implementing some projects in Helmand and through existing 
networks it was also possible to identify individuals from the same village as the IDP 
group now living in Kabul as well as participants in the wider district and province who 
were willing to participate in the research through phone interviews. The final 
approach was through the researcher’s existing networks in the province. Interviews 
were carried out in person with fifteen of the twenty-seven interviewees (these were 
all with Pashto speaking Afghans and were carried out with interpreters). Of the 
remaining twelve interviews eight were conducted over the telephone with Afghan 
respondents and four were conducted via Skype with international interveners in 
English. 
                                                     
70 Only one participant has participated in both research projects. The research paper 
from the study of reintegration in Afghanistan is available on request. 
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After the field research was completed the researcher was given the opportunity to 
work in Helmand for the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in early 2012 reviewing 
transition for the Head of Mission. This visit, lasting six weeks, afforded the 
opportunity for the researcher to visit Nahr-i Sarraj district (though not Village A which 
is still contested) and to meet and discuss stabilisation with a number of civilian and 
military officials working in Helmand. Though the information from the Joint 
Transition Review is not directly used in this research the researcher was able to 
identify similarities in the issues vexing officials on the ground and those identified by 
both intervening and local respondents. Importantly the researcher was not able to 
find any factual information that undermined the validity of the research findings.71 
This provides substantial validation and triangulation to the data collected on Village A 
despite the fact that the research design had to be adapted to accommodate the 
restrictions incumbent on the researcher. 
Sampling for the ‘national level’ interviews was slightly different. Sampling occurred 
through peer-nomination, as a form of reputational snowball, to identify and 
interview key respondents (Farquharson, 2005, pp. 345-353) in both case studies. In 
Afghanistan interviews were carried out with twelve respondents in person in English, 
though they included two Afghan respondents. Four of the international respondents 
were female. The researcher knew both the Afghan respondents and two of the ten 
international respondents prior to the research and they were key in facilitating 
access to later interviewees. 
Access - Nepal 
Access in Nepal was no less complex and, as with the Afghan field sites, considerable 
time was spent identifying key interlocutors to initiate the snowball sampling frame, 
particularly because the researcher had comparatively less experience in Nepal. One 
of the reasons for conducting pilot interviews in Dhading was to identify the most 
suitable interlocutors in the Nepali context, which meant that the initiation of the 
snowball sampling frame was slightly different to the approaches used in Afghanistan.  
By inclination it was believed that using an introduction to a community via an NGO 
would seem less threatening than one through the state or a bi-lateral donor mission 
and time was spent talking with NGOs in Kathmandu to identify local partners; this led 
to an introduction to a Nepali NGO network called Alliance for Peace, who introduced 
the researcher to a local NGO in Bara called Jan Jagaran Youth Club or JJYC. Whilst 
they were not active in Haraiya VDC, the field site in Bara, they were able to provide 
introductions to a former employee of an international NGO who lived in Haraiya and 
acted as a facilitator during the research visits. JJYC were then able to facilitate 
                                                     
71 The Joint Transition Review is available on request. 
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contact with other NGOs and government officials and the researcher was also able to 
use the credentials of Cranfield University/Defence Academy to convince government 
officials in Nepal to participate in the research (this proved useful in both Bara and 
Rolpa). Most interviews were carried out in Nepali with an interpreter and six 
interviews were carried out in Bhojpuri for some of the residents of Haraiya VDC, for 
which the facilitator acted as an interpreter. 
In Rolpa a similar approach via an NGO was considered, however, because of the 
degree of Maoist influence on the NGO sector in the district it was felt that a more 
neutral approach could be achieved through a personal introduction to a local leader. 
After some significant efforts a group of IDPs that had been displaced from Rolpa, who 
were now living in Dang district (about 3 hours’ drive from Rolpa district 
headquarters), were identified.72 Though some of the IDPs were interviewed the 
primary benefit was a personal introduction to a leader living in Gajul VDC who 
facilitated contacts with relevant participants in the VDC. A second snowball was 
initiated by engaging the support of a local business owner who was associated with a 
non-Maoist party and was able to help identify individuals who could participate in 
the research. All the interviews were conducted in Nepali with an interpreter. 
The twelve respondents who were classified as participating in the ‘national level’ 
inputs were all interviewed in person in Kathmandu in English using a reputational 
snowball sampling frame. Five were Nepali and seven international; two of the 
international respondents were female. The researcher knew three of the 
international respondents prior to the research. Discussions with two of them had 
informed the research design during a scoping visit to Kathmandu during the summer 
of 2010. 
Navigating language and power in the research design 
Whilst language and power are rich areas for discussion for the purposes of 
understanding the research design, the points below are listed to help illustrate some 
of the fundamental social issues that the researcher had to negotiate.  
Language is a fundamental component of the epistemological narrative associated 
with the research design; it forms the participants’ thoughts but also shapes and 
constrains them within the limitations of that language and their own skill at using the 
language. The same limitations obviously also apply to the author and affect the way 
in which he can understand respondents who speak different languages. Whilst 
Husserl’s phenomenological tradition would assert that it is possible to directly 
                                                     
72 This also helps with the comparability across the field sites, because both Village A 
and Gajul currently have IDPs who have moved out of the villages because of ongoing 
violent conflict or threats of violence. 
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translate concepts from one language to another in part of a language community, 
more modern critiques from East Asian academics have suggested that the use of 
language is itself a process which forms concepts (Daisuke, 2010, pp. 64-6); this is 
significant because the terms ‘peace’ and ‘stability’ are critical to the research topic 
but are in themselves contested. 
Philosophers such as Benjamin and Derrida moved the phenomenological tradition 
forward by suggesting that other languages present different views of the same 
concepts, and in the case of Benjamin the range of meaning ascribed and 
interpretation applied by users of languages means that direct translation is most 
likely futile (Daisuke, 2010, pp. 70-6). Accepting this futility whilst still searching for 
commonalities could be interpreted as accepting an early defeat for this research but 
it is the only viable way of accepting some of the limitations and would be present 
even if the researcher spoke the same languages as all of the respondents and/or all 
the respondents spoke the same language. 
This researcher is particularly aware of the limitations of language and the ability to 
express and convey thoughts from one language to another. So it is important to 
briefly convey the researcher’s linguistic background to shed light on why this is 
significant (which also usefully highlights any biases which may affect the research). 
The researcher’s first degree was in Arabic and Persian, which included learning 
classical and modern written Arabic and learning to speak Syrian dialect as well as 
parts of the dialects in the Nejd (Saudi Arabia) and Iraq. After finishing this degree the 
researcher lived in Japan and was conversant in Japanese and mostly literate by the 
time he left in 2005. Subsequently he spent much of the last eight years working and 
living in Afghanistan speaking Dari (a Persian dialect). This explanation is not meant to 
suggest that the researcher is particularly gifted in languages. Many of the participants 
in the research spoke a number of languages themselves so this is not a particularly 
special skill. However in the course of learning these languages the researcher has 
acquired an appreciation of the complexity of translating a concept from one language 
to another.  
This is particularly important for the research design as it required the translation of 
complex and often socially loaded words such as ‘power’, ‘legitimacy’ or ‘stability’ into 
local languages. The researcher carried out all the interviews, which mitigates some of 
the methodological concerns of research carried out with different language groups 
(which can involve using different researchers who would interpret the research 
design differently as noted by Brannen, 2005, pp. 173-184). However, the fact remains 
that significant time was spent understanding local discussions about legitimacy 
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formation and the concept of ‘stability’ in order to identify locally accepted and 
understood terms as well as formulations for asking questions. 
The word ‘stability’ proved to be particularly complex and some discussion is required 
to situate the approach taken during the field research. Whilst there are relatively 
convenient synonyms in Dari and Pashto (subat) and in Nepal and Bhojpori (istirta)73 
for stability they are not necessarily used in the same manner as English or between 
themselves. Interviewees were also asked what they meant by ‘stability’, which forms 
a key component of the data analysis, but it should be recognised that respondents 
were not always clear themselves about the meaning of the word. In Dari, Pashto and 
Nepali the nearest synonym for ‘stability’ is in fact ‘peace’ – itself a loaded term; for 
those respondents who struggled to use ‘stability’ the word ‘peace’ was introduced.74 
These are subtle but important changes which have been dwelt on further in the 
analysis; however for a few interviewees, particularly those less educated 
respondents, both the concepts of ‘stability’ and ‘peace’ were not helpful. In the 
following example the word ‘peace’ – shanti in Nepali – was confused with a common 
girls’ name: 
Interviewer: Does the word stability mean anything to you? 
Respondent: My son is working as electrician. My husband is farmer. My son 
was in the village during the Dashain. 
I: Do you know what peace is? 
R: My daughter name is not peace (Shanti). I do not have a daughter named 
Shanti.75 
For obvious reasons the interview above was one of several that were not included in 
the research analysis, but it illustrates some of the constraints on the research. 
Given the fact that the interviews were carried out in five languages, including Dari, 
Pashto, Nepali, Bhojpuri and English it was inevitable that the researcher would use 
interpreters to assist with carrying out the interviews. The interpreters worked with 
the researcher for the majority of a case study, so in both Nepal and Afghanistan there 
was one main interpreter with a second on hand if the main interpreter was not 
                                                     
73 It is interesting to note that both subat and istirta are loan words from Arabic and 
Sanskrit respectively. 
74 For example this would change a question about a development project from ‘how 
did you think this school supported stability?’ to ‘how to you think this school 
supported peace?’ 
75 Interview with female respondent, Gajul, October 14th 2011.  
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available. The interpreters were paid to work with the researcher and, with the 
exception of six interviews carried out in Bhojpuri, they were not from the field sites. 
Other interviews, predominantly with international actors, were carried out in English 
though respondents were not necessarily native speakers and care was taken in 
transcribing interviews. 
In addition to the linguistic issues outlined above the researcher was cognisant of the 
power dynamics involved in a foreign researcher investigating local power, politics 
and history. The processes of conflict, insurgency and resistance are in many ways 
expressions of differing views of power formation and distribution, and may involve 
differing avenues to legitimacy formation. One of the complexities of the research is 
that respondents may be on one or more sides of the power dynamics in their society. 
Those inside may see the ongoing legitimacy reproduction in their society as just and 
right. Equally those outside, possibly in positions of resistance, may offer opposing (if 
not opposite) views about legitimacy formation, and may present themselves or their 
ideologies as the process which is just and right. Further, these positions must be 
mediated by a range of groups which are in between opposing forces (for example 
elements of civil society) who are ‘unable’ to engage in the debate or be seen to 
engage in it for fear of being drawn into it. Bearing this in mind the responses of the 
female respondent above may in fact have been defensive rather than resulting from 
a misunderstanding. Similarly in Kalakan an interview with a religious leader was 
terminated shortly after starting because it was clear to the researcher that the 
respondent felt uncomfortable talking to him. It was only the following day that the 
researcher found out that the respondent felt concerned for his safety because he 
feared a repeat of an incident involving the British Resident Cavagniari in the area 
some 130 years previously where a local Mullah was allegedly killed by the British 
Resident. 
These issues do not only affect local respondents, representatives from international 
organisations may be forced to present their organisations’ interpretation of its 
mandate regarding the conflict, which may differ from the individuals’ interpretations 
of the environment. All of these issues are not simply biases which must be identified 
but they are important in understanding why certain individuals and organisations 
make specific choices during a conflict and are used in the analysis in Chapter 9. 
Equally one must be careful not to assume that all respondents are giving accurate, 
truthful or reasonable information regarding the research topic – particularly one as 
mushy as ‘legitimacy’ (Huntington, 1991, p. 46). As Bordieu has outlined, some 
respondents may in fact be too good to be true and present what the interviewer 
wants to hear i.e. false, collusive objectification (Yanos & Hopper, 2008, pp. 229-231). 
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An insurgent or government official’s ‘authentic’ view of legitimacy formation may 
relate well to a theory of legitimacy formation but it may be out of step with the 
realities of power, authority and process in their location by dint of the fact that either 
party may be outside the loop of local reality. A post-modern response to these issues 
suggests that in some ways it does not matter that some interviewees see the 
interview as a performance, or decide that they must present a specific version of 
themselves or their experiences (ibid., 2008, pp. 233-4). However, this does assume 
that their views would have no impact on the rest of their community and that by 
interpreting their information at face value the researcher is acting as a basic 
reflective mirror to their world, neither of which outcome is satisfactory. 
Through the research design a number of steps were taken to address the issue of 
false, collusive objectification, along with additional issues of participants lying and 
misleading the researcher. Yanos & Hopper identified five ways in which researchers 
can address these issues which were incorporated in the research design:76 
1) Active and methodical listening – addressed through the recording of 
interviews to identify areas where respondents have not understood or 
answered questions appropriately; also supported during interviews by 
interpreters (when present) to help identify areas which may be of 
significance. 
2) In-depth knowledge of the circumstances relevant to the respondent – 
addressed through interviewing respondents from one specific area (the field 
sites), many of whom were related or had long-standing relationships; carrying 
out pre-interview discussions and visits with other local people who were not 
interviewed to gain a broader understanding of the context of each site. 
3) Repeated interviews – 10 respondents were interviewed at least twice; 
these were respondents who represented a key component of the conflict 
narrative in a field site. 
4) Attending to ‘clichés behind which each of us lives,’ including the 
interviewer’s own biases; addressed through discussing the usage of 
terminology and the thinking behind the direction of the interviews with 
interpreters beforehand in order to de-brief after each interview and check the 
interpretation of the interview environment and discuss each other’s thoughts. 
5) Willingness to classify interviews as uninformative – several interviews 
were not used in the analysis; this was either because of methodological 
reasons or simply because the data collected was not relevant to the research 
(for example the two interviews mentioned above). 
                                                     
76 Adapted from ibid., 2008, pp. 234-6 
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The case studies and field sites 
This section describes how the case studies and field sites were selected with 
particular consideration to the comparability of the field sites, which is a foundational 
element of the research and supports the analysis in Chapter 8 (a more detailed 
description of the sites themselves can be found in the relevant chapters). Whilst it is 
important to remain cognisant of the limitations of simple case study comparisons it is 
the only viable method of producing a fine grained analysis of what local perceptions 
of stability are and how different factors, including stabilisation activities, affect them. 
However, to improve the comparability of the case studies and field sites, significant 
effort and time was spent on identifying the field sites. This was not to find a ‘perfect 
site’ or one that would prove a preconceived theory, but the sites needed to have 
enough commonality to strengthen comparisons and ensure that they were not 
unduly affected by one particular factor or issue. This approach draws on the rich 
literature comparing case studies in conflict-affected countries and in that vein the 
research design attempts to emulate the successful application of comparisons across 
countries (Weinstein, 2007). The table below shows how the case studies and field 
sites have been constructed so that they provide comparison within each country and 
between field sites. 
Table 6 Comparability within and between case studies and field sites (Source: 
Author, 2012) 
 
Afghanistan – Kalakan and Nahr-i Sarraj 
Afghanistan has been affected by internal conflict since 1979 with the Mujahideen 
uprising against the Soviet invasion. The withdrawal of Soviet forces in 1989 and the 
eventual withdrawal of subsidies to the Najibullah government led to the Mujahideen 
parties taking Kabul in 1992. The ensuing bloody civil war between the parties allowed 
space for the Taliban, supported by Pakistan, to take over the vast majority of the 
country by 1997 (Nojumi, 2002, p. 172). Alongside this national contest the Taliban’s 
relationship with Al-Qaeda and Osama bin Laden was of concern to the international 
community for several years prior to September 11th 2001 (Kuehn & Linschoten, 2012, 
pp. 134-43). The attacks on the United States precipitated Operation Enduring 
Freedom (OEF) which overthrew the Taliban government in December 2001. The 
transitional government that emerged was led by Chairman, now President, Karzai. 
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Estimates vary but over the last thirty years at least hundreds of thousands of Afghans 
have been killed. 
At a national level in Afghanistan it was possible to collect information from within the 
implementing agencies of a number of stabilisation activities including the 
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Headquarters and International Joint 
Command (IJC) in Kabul, the PRT in Helmand and other relevant stakeholders amongst 
the interveners. On the host nation side interviews were carried out with 
representatives of senior Afghan political elites including the Presidential Palace, 
relevant ministries (including Interior and Defence), provincial and district authorities. 
Kalakan district (see Chapter 4) lies on the main road to the north of Kabul city on the 
Shomali plain. Aqa Sarai, the main research village, lies approximately 7 km from the 
main highway to the east. Currently the district is quite secure although it played a key 
role in the Mujahideen period in the 1980s and several prominent leaders in the 
current administration are linked to the Shomali plain and Kalakan itself. Control of 
the district was split between Mujahideen factions and there were parallel state 
structures run by the resistance which continue to dictate current political 
relationships. The district was devastated by the Taliban after their takeover of Kabul 
and attack on the Shura-i Nazar forces of Ahmad Shah Massoud in the north (Snow, 
Dennys & Zaman, 2009, pp. 6-7). The district is quite compact and relies on a mixture 
of passing trade on the main road, links to Kabul for labour and some agriculture for 
its economic survival. There have been many stabilisation activities by the 
government, development agencies and international military forces in the district 
since 2001 which have included participating in the Afghanistan New Beginnings 
Programme (ANBP), an internationally sponsored DDR process and police reform. 
Nahr-i Sarraj district (see Chapter 5) lies in Helmand province, one of the areas which 
has seen the greatest contestation in recent times and is variously described as being 
one of the most violent areas of the country as well as being dominated by the drug 
economy. Lying to the north of Gereshk municipality, the most significant urban 
centre in Helmand and the former provincial capital, Village A demonstrates many of 
these key characteristics. Residents have witnessed several conflicts over the last 
generation and the population has participated in armed groups as well as being the 
victims of extreme violence both at the hands of national forces (armed groups and 
the government), international forces (both the Soviets and ISAF) and local pockets of 
international jihadist fighters. In addition to this the area is a significant site for the 
cultivation, production and smuggling of opium. Since 2001 there have been a number 
of attempts to intervene in the village and wider district, which have included 
governance reforms, development projects and military action. As of summer 2012 it 
remains disputed territory. 
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Nepal – Rolpa and Bara 
Nepal is still grappling with the realities of the CPA signed between the Maoists and 
civilian government in 2006. The insurgency started in the mid-Western hill region in 
1996 and quickly spread to other parts of the country, capitalising on the inability of 
the Kathmandu elites on both the left and right of the political spectrum to engage 
with local grievances (Thapa, 2004, pp. 34-7). The populist measures of the Maoists 
garnered substantial support amongst the rural population and marginalised groups; 
they have however failed to transform this into a stable governance system and a 
secondary conflict, the Madeshi Andolan, started shortly after the CPA was signed 
when Madeshi ethnic groups realised their interests were threatened (Mathema, 
2011, pp. 25-7). Despite agreement on the integration of Maoist combatants, doubts 
remain about the integration of the Peoples’ Liberation Army (PLA) into the Nepal 
Army, and there is an increasing deterioration in formal local governance systems 
across many of Nepal’s rural districts (ICG, 2011, pp. 2-4; Kafle, 2010, pp. 8-10). 
At a national level in Nepal, data collection included interviews with interveners as 
well as relevant Nepalese Government bodies’ and bi- and multi-lateral institutions. 
Stabilisation as a concept is not widely used by parts of the international community 
in Nepal, though it does articulate elements of UK intervention and is understood by 
Nepali officials (HMG, 2011, pp. 13, 25). Despite this, similar approaches and 
programmes have been implemented in Nepal by the international community and 
include DDR and SSR programmes: development initiatives focusing on basic services 
and support for electoral reform. In order to encompass the different aspects of the 
conflict the field sites include a hill district, Rolpa in the mid-Western region, and a 
plains region, Bara in the Central Terai. 
Rolpa district (see Chapter 6) lies in the mid-Western region traditionally neglected by 
the central government, though Gajul VDC, the main village site, has benefitted from 
schools established there since the 1950s. Development activity in the district dates 
back several decades and includes a USAID supported integrated river valley 
development programme for the Rapti River which is fed by the Gajul river (Amatya, 
1989, p. 45). Rolpa was the centre of the Maoist insurgency and was one of the first 
areas to experience the parallel governance structures established by the Maoist 
insurgency. During the conflict and after the signing of the CPA, a German aid agency, 
GTZ (now GIZ), began humanitarian and development operations in the district. In 
addition Rolpa is the site of one of the cantonments of the People’s Liberation Army 
(PLA), which are currently demobilised (though not disarmed or integrated at the time 
of research). There is ongoing political competition between the Maoists, United 
Marxist-Leninists (UML) and the Nepali Congress, and the state structures continue to 
be usurped by parallel structures. Gajul remains a significant VDC in Rolpa with three 
members of the Constituent Assembly originating from the VDC. 
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Bara (see Chapter 7) is a Terai, or plain, district to the south of Kathmandu bordering 
India. Haraiya VDC lies in the central belt of the district just south of the main national 
highway that runs east to west across Nepal. For much of the 20th Century the district 
has been a backwater, economically and politically; its larger western neighbour 
Parsa, which includes the major city of Birgunj, is the main regional economic hub and 
its eastern neighbour, Rautahat, has benefitted from the political connections of a 
former resident and Prime Minister, M.K. Nepal. Bara’s major economic commodity is 
timber, which is both legally and illegally felled, and there is a burgeoning smuggling 
trade in timber and other goods across the border. There has been little development 
in Bara with few paved roads across the district and poor delivery of both education 
and health services, though these have been supported by NGOs including Plan 
International, which has worked in Haraiya VDC for nearly fifteen years. The district 
and Haraiya VDC have been badly affected by both the Maoist insurgency and the 
Madeshi Andolan and it is still considered one of the most insecure districts in Nepal 
by the Nepali government (Kafle, 2010, pp. 8-10). 
Comparability between the case studies and field sites 
Methodologically it is important to demonstrate the comparability of the field sites 
and case studies. The previous brief introductions to the case studies and field sites 
may lead to the assumption that these spaces and conflicts are so unique that they 
can’t be compared. However, there are a number of important connections, in 
particular elements focusing on the interveners, the host nations and issues of time. 
Comparing the ‘intervener’ side across the case studies is clearly feasible. The 
research focuses on bi-lateral and multi-lateral interventions, and there is a strong 
comparative background in military and development research produced by both 
academic and policy institutes (Jackson & Gordon, 2007; Fishstein, 2010; Wilder, 
2010). This is also the element easiest to collect material about, from a range of online 
sources, research reports and papers as well as interviews. 
Comparing host nations, in particular those under extreme pressure such as those 
facing insurgencies and increased international focus, attention and pressure, is more 
challenging. At a macro level there are a number of important similarities between 
Afghanistan and Nepal. They are both landlocked, mountainous, and have, or are 
facing, armed insurgencies with purportedly ideological motivations that have 
external advantages and freedom of movement. They are both in neighbourhoods 
which are not necessarily friendly to small country independence (for Afghanistan the 
lingering impact of the Great Game between the British and Russia, followed by 
US/Russian competition and the emerging powers of Iran and Pakistan; for Nepal, the 
long-term reality of British, then Indian, influence balanced by China). Each country 
also has relatively little experience of colonialism in comparison to many other states. 
Although both Afghanistan and Nepal were invaded by the British they maintained 
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their independence to a large degree throughout most of their history (Chaudary, 
2011, pp. 22-5; Dupree, 1973, pp. 365-413). In addition, both countries have a highly 
fragmented, though small, political elite which often form new factions or splinter 
groups only to re-affirm previous alliances when the political imperative demands it.77 
Further, their highly heterogeneous populations are split along ethnic and linguistic 
lines and intra-group fragmentation occurs because of social and armed conflict.78  
Both have been affected by protracted violent conflict in the form of at least one 
insurgency (Afghanistan for thirty years and Nepal for a decade) and have significant 
horizontal inequalities between groups in terms of access to political power, economic 
resources and development resources (Goodhand, Dennys, & Mansfield, 2011, pp. 
249-54; Social Inclusion Research Fund, 2007, pp. 6-29). Other similarities include the 
distinct differences between mountain and plain regions, the overbearing presence of 
regional neighbours, economies based largely on agriculture and trade with 
substantial black market and illicit economies (though this is more marked in the case 
of Afghanistan), low levels of tax to Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ratios and 
government spending as a part of GDP (Afghanistan, 7.8% and Nepal, 13.2%),79 and 
finally a long standing focus of development spending in the country by Western and 
non-Western governments. 
At one level the comparability of the states is easy to defend, but ensuring 
comparability across the field sites is critical to ensure that the analysis derived from 
the raw data is credible and valid. Clearly, all the field sites described above are 
unique, however they have a number of important similarities which will aid analysis 
and the identification of trends and causal linkages. This means that not only can the 
research claim that there is comparability between Afghanistan and Nepal, but that 
the field sites within those states are comparable on a number of levels. The table 
below outlines eighteen variables which at least two of the field sites, and often all of 
them, have in common. 
  
                                                     
77 On the shifts in the far left Communist parties in Nepal see Thapa, 2004, pp. 24-32; 
for examples of shifts amongst the Afghan jihadist parties see Dorronsoro, 2000, pp. 
148, 161-9. 
78 For a discussion on the Kham Magars and their early mobilisation in support of 
Communist, later Maoist, groups see Sales, 2003, pp. 60-5; amongst the 
Terai/Madeshi groups see Chaudary, 2011. For a description of Afghanistan’s main 
ethnic groups see Dupree, 1973, pp. 57-65. 
79 These figures are for Financial Years 2010/11 and 2007/8 respectively, see World 
Bank, 2011, p. 17 and World Bank, 2010, p. 20. 
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Table 7 Commonalities between the field sites (Source:  Author, 2012) 
Comparing districts and field 
sites 
Afghanistan Nepal 
Kalakan 
(Kabul) 
Nahr-i 
Sarraj 
(Helmand) 
Rolpa  
(Mid-
Western 
Zone) 
Bara  
(Central 
Terai 
Zone) 
Geographic / economic 
Rural community x x x x 
Economy is centred on 
agriculture x x x x 
Presence of light industry x   x 
The district or province 
includes an international 
border  x  x 
Conflict dynamics 
Centre for resistance x x x x 
Experienced parallel 
governance structures x x x x 
Ethnically or tribally mixed x x x x 
Residents have left the 
community during the conflict x x x x 
Some residents are not able to 
return  x x  
International interventions 
Humanitarian x  x  
Development x x x x 
Security (including DDR) x x x  
Governance x x  x 
National intervention 
State presence collapsed 
during the conflict x x x x 
Local services are present 
(education or health) x  x x 
Government security forces are 
deployed in the field site 
(village) x x (at times) x x 
Political 
Voting has taken place in a 
national election  x x x x 
Multiple political parties or 
groups are active x x x x 
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There is however one fundamental variable that is unique in the case studies relating 
to Kalakan. Kalakan is a district that lies within one hour’s drive of Kabul, the capital 
city, and the dynamics of a capital city may affect stability and stabilisation to a 
greater or lesser degree that cannot accurately be accounted for. None of the other 
sites are near a capital city, though both Village A and Haraiya VDC are within a few 
hours travel of substantial urban centres, Gereshk and Birgunj; neither of these cities 
is as large or important as Kabul or Kathmandu.  
In addition, there are of course important differences between Afghanistan and Nepal 
and the sites which must also be recognised. These include: the relatively more 
coherent and functioning state in Nepal which has slightly better tax-to-GDP ratios (as 
noted above), higher average annual income and levels of education, and life 
expectancy.80 The different dynamics of the Islamic insurgent groups in Afghanistan 
whose willingness to inflict substantial numbers of civilian casualties compares with a 
highly regimented, organised and restrained Maoist People’s Liberation Army in 
Nepal;81 different stages of violence, intervention and political legitimacy formation 
have taken place at different times but to some extent are still part of the larger South 
Asia conflict system;82 and finally they have very different social and cultural world 
views, most starkly seen in the differences in the way women are treated in Nepal, 
where they are generally able to work and move more freely.83 
There are two particular differences which need to be noted; firstly, the history of 
state formation and national culture and secondly, religious ideology. These issues are 
introduced here and discussed in more detail under culture and context in Chapter 8.  
                                                     
80 The per capita GDP Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) for Afghanistan and Nepal are 
$964 (2005) and $1,597 (2006) respectively; life expectancy was estimated to be 43.1 
years and 63.69 in the same years in Afghanistan and Nepal (UNDP, 2009, p. 147; 
UNDP, 2007, p. 17).  
81 Jeremy Weinstein has argued that the degree of violence used in rebellion is linked 
to the nature and structure of the groups prosecuting the conflicts (Weinstein, 2007, p. 
258); on the structure of jihadi groups in Afghanistan see Dorronsoro, 2000, pp. 123-
36; on Taliban structures see Coghlan, 2009, p. 141. On Maoist structures for the 
People’s Liberation Army see ICG, 2005, pp. 8-10. 
82 See for example the edited volume by Mishra and Ghosh which addresses both 
Afghanistan and Nepal as well as a host of other conflicts in Pakistan, Sri Lanka, India 
and Bhutan (Mishra & Ghosh, 2003). 
83 See for example the difference in the discourse by and about women in Afghanistan 
and Nepal in Tapper, 1991, pp. 52-8; Rostami-Povey, 2007, pp. 3-13, 41-67; and on 
Nepali women and agricultural labour see Gurung, 1994. 
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With regards to the state, the experiences of two mountainous kingdoms in South 
Asia have some important connections. The form of the state as outlined by the 
Mongol leader, Babur Shah, who conquered Kabul in 1504 and went on to capture 
Delhi in 1526 has continued to shape and influence the wider sub-continent (Dupree, 
1973, pp. 319-21). The precepts outlined in the Babur Nameh on the subsequent 
Afghan Durrani dynasty are largely contiguous. However, the Mughal state has been 
more problematic for the Nepali kingdom. Concerns about the Mughalisation of the 
state in Nepal has led some to comment on the fact that the Nepali state is set up in 
opposition to the modes designated by the Mughal empire, and the clearest 
refutation of Mughal hegemony can be found in the Mulki Ain from 1864 (Whelpton, 
2005, p. 56). Bearing this historical issue in mind is important for the analysis but also 
confirms the fact that these two conflicts, to some extent, remain part of the wider 
South Asian political and conflict processes that have dominated the region for the 
last three centuries. These historical issues present themselves in some of the 
boundaries of action that respondents identify in terms of how they understand the 
success or failure of a variety of interventions and need to be considered as ways in 
which local respondents structure their thinking. 
The differences in social structure, religion and culture also need to be understood if it 
is going to be feasible to isolate recurring dynamics of legitimacy formation, because 
elements are fundamental to the outlook of the populations and their leaders. There 
are, however, striking differences: Afghanistan is almost entirely Muslim but has a 
highly heterogeneous Islamic identity including Sunni, Shia and Ismaili groups which 
use several schools of Islamic Jurisprudence (Sharia) including Hanafi, Jafari and 
Deobandi. These identities are overlaid on tribal and ethnic identities which link many 
groups more strongly to neighbouring countries than to the centre. Nepalis are mostly 
Buddhist and Hindu with a Christian minority.84 Religious motivations for conflict have 
mutated and are subsumed by the range of identity-based conflicts about caste and 
ethnic group demands. These labels, ideologies and motivations for conflict are then 
quite distinct, though not necessarily mutually exclusive and have been considered 
carefully in the analysis.  
This section has explained the case study and field site selection for the field research. 
It has explained the high degree of comparability between the case study countries, 
Afghanistan and Nepal, as well as the choices made in selecting field sites in the case 
study countries. Whilst noting limitations on the degree of comparability the 
preceding discussion presents a robust defence of the level of comparability of the 
                                                     
84 This means that the research has to contend not just with the social structures of 
these religions and sects but also their varied philosophical traditions; an introduction 
to these can be found in Bonevac & Phillips, 2009. 
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data and analysis. The following section introduces how the data will be analysed to 
achieve the research objectives outlined above. 
Data analysis 
The range of data collected for the research has been significant and includes 
qualitative interviews as well quantitative data collected from participants (therefore 
not in the public domain), and secondary quantitative data sources such as economic 
data. The 140 qualitative interviews have been analysed using the Nvivo software 
package which assisted with analysing the data. The verbatim transcripts or notes 
from the interviews were imported into the software with the respondent codes used 
as the ‘source’ file codes within the Nvivo software. A list of coding nodes was then 
used to capture the data from the imported files. These nodes vary across the case 
studies but there were between 22 and 49 nodes for each analysis section (the four 
case studies plus the two sets of national level interviews).85 The nodes included (but 
were not limited to): 
 Governance/elections 
 Justice 
 External intervention with sub-categories for: 
o Development, Diplomacy and Security/Military interventions 
 Internal intervention with sub-categories for: 
o Development, Diplomacy and Security/Military interventions 
 Time periods for the conflict: 
o Afghanistan included pre-1978; 1979-2001; 2001 to present 
o Nepal included pre-1996, 1996-2006 and post-2006 
 Economy 
 IDPs and migration (where relevant) 
 Geographic nodes, for example the Provincial or District capital 
 
Each interview was analysed by coding every part of the interview against one or 
more of the nodes. The screen shots below give examples of the coding from an 
interview with a respondent in Nepal:  
                                                     
85 The number of nodes used for the Afghanistan data analysis were higher than those 
used for the Nepal data analysis primarily because it became clear after the Afghan 
analysis that a number of nodes were overlapping or too focused and needed to be 
re-named as broader categories; for example on politics and elections there were five 
sub-nodes in the Afghan case studies, whereas one was used for the Nepal data. 
Another subset of nodes are completely different and relate to either geography (i.e. 
village, district, province or city names) or parties to the conflict (i.e. Maoist, ISAF, 
Taliban etc.). 
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Figure 3 Screenshot of Interview Coding (Example from an interview from the Rolpa 
case study. Codes on right hand side) 
 
 
Figure 4 Screenshot of Coded Label (Example of Governance and Elections in Bara 
Case Study) 
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Using this approach means that the same data in one interview could be coded in 
multiple nodes and across multiple case studies; for example, when a ‘national level’ 
interviewee refers to a specific issue in one of the field sites this can be coded at the 
‘national level’ node relevant to that piece of data as well as the ‘field site’ node which 
is relevant. The nodes were then re-exported out of Nvivo to Microsoft Word. The 
Word files listed all the data points coded to that node (for example ‘Economy – Bara’) 
and above each piece of data the respondent code referring to the individual 
respondent who provided that piece of data. For each field site and national level 
node a data pack was printed and the reordered data packs were read by the 
researcher. 
More old fashioned methods, using a pen and paper, were used to identify 
connections within nodes and across interviews in the data packs, initially over an 
immersive two day period (each data pack consisted of some 400 pages of data). The 
annotated nodes were used to support the analysis and drafting of the text, which 
primarily draws from the interview data. The structure of the data analysis chapters 
was established once all of the Afghan data had been collated, transcribed and 
analysed. For record keeping purposes an interview list was maintained throughout 
the research to name each interview with the appropriate code, which could also be 
used as a quick reference list during analysis and drafting. 
To ensure that the researcher had not interrogated the data to provide an outcome of 
their choosing the data analysis was made available to two external researchers, one 
Nepali and one Afghan, who reviewed the way the interviews were coded. This helped 
validate the research by ensuring that the data set had not been unduly manipulated 
by the researcher. The chapters based on the data analysis (Chps. 4 - 7) were also sent 
to two other researchers to provide a peer review and ensure a second level of bias 
mitigation.  
Quantitative data has been used to enrich the qualitative data set, whereby the 
researcher would return to the quantitative data once the initial chapters had been 
drafted to see where there were dissonances or supporting evidence for points made 
during the interviews. The analysis was carried out in this order because participants 
were not asked to comment on quantitative data sets they did not have access to. This 
involved the analysis of entire quantitative data sets, such as the Significant Actions 
(SIGACTS) dataset that was made available through WikiLeaks, as well as single point 
quantitative data such as GDP or growth figures. 
Ethics 
Ethical considerations for the research fall into two categories: firstly, those relating to 
respondent consent and privacy, and secondly, those relating to security. 
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Respondents were all given an explanation of the research and the opportunity to 
participate or not which was outlined in English, Dari, Pashto and Nepali. Not all 
respondents were literate and some were interviewed by phone, so an oral 
explanation of the letter was given (see Appendix A, p. 304). For respondents with 
email access the letter was sent to them electronically. In all cases the affiliations of 
the researcher were made clear, the topic areas, how their data and information 
would be handled and the fact that they could withdraw from the interview process at 
any time.  
Respondents were offered anonymity even though some agreed to the use of their 
names voluntarily. Whilst most of the interviewees are not identified, four public 
figures in elected office, who were all interviewed, are identified by name and gave 
consent for their names to be used; apart from these individuals all respondents were 
guaranteed anonymity. Some quotes in the text presented in this thesis have been 
further anonymised because the information may continue to be sensitive. Interviews 
were recorded on an MP3 voice recorder, though some interviewees chose to have 
the recorder turned off for all or part of the interview. When interviews were not 
recorded they were written up by the researcher, with support from the interpreter 
where appropriate, based on notes taken during the interview.  
Interviews generally took place in locations which were familiar to the respondents, 
for example a local house in their village for community respondents or offices for 
government officials or international respondents. In some cases it was more suitable 
or practical to carry out the interview at another location, for example a national 
respondent who had formerly worked in Helmand was interviewed at an office the 
researcher had access to rather than his current employer or home. In those instances 
the location was agreed with the interviewee beforehand and transport was organised 
to ensure that the interview was not witnessed by other people as far as possible.  
Transcripts and interview notes were written in Microsoft Word and were imported to 
Nvivo for analysis. All data was kept on secure, password protected systems. Hard 
copies were also made and stored in a secure location. Interviews were given an 
alphanumeric code, which have also been used in the analysis and writing of the 
thesis.86 These steps will ensure the anonymity of respondents and their long term 
safety needs. If interviewees requested a copy of the transcript in English it was 
supplied to them. 
In terms of security, it is clear that both Nepal and Afghanistan are insecure and many 
of the respondents had been at the forefront of the conflicts of the last generation, 
                                                     
86 So for example LL refers to Local Leader; EA is Economic Actor; NL is National Leader 
and IN is Intervener. 
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and indeed many had been physically injured. Though Afghanistan has been 
significantly more dangerous than Nepal for foreign researchers in recent times the 
field research in Nepal was affected by several security incidents including the use of 
two improvised explosive devices that an armed group had placed in Haraiya VDC. 
Therefore the long-term protection of sources and people who helped the research 
was, and remains, a critical consideration. 
Through a number of mitigation steps the ethical issues that are presented by the 
security risks were addressed. It was important to ensure that the community in 
particular gave permission for the research to go ahead; not just from a practical point 
of view to ensure that the researcher had access to the relevant people, but so that 
misunderstandings about the role of the researcher in that community did not arise, 
and where respondents or other community respondents had concerns these could 
be raised in a formal manner to their local leadership (formal or informal as 
appropriate) so that there were no negative consequences for respondents or for the 
research team (researcher, interpreter and driver). These considerations were one of 
the factors that led to the selection of the snowball sampling frame and the insistence 
on anonymity. 
There were also a number of other additional security constraints that were mitigated 
through the research. The risks are included in Appendix D (p. 314) but, in summary, 
the initial selection of research sites in both Afghanistan and Nepal had to be changed 
because of security concerns. Despite these precautions, in both Afghanistan and 
Nepal, there was localised violence using improvised explosive devices either in or 
near the field sites. Travel in Afghanistan and Nepal was affected by armed conflict, 
demonstrations and political unrest, in the former connected to the aftermath of the 
2010 Parliamentary elections in the context of the ongoing insurgency and, in Nepal, 
the fall of one government and the return of a Maoist-led government in autumn 
2011. 
Assumptions  
With any research there will be assumptions inherent to the design of the study; this 
subsection outlines the most significant assumptions to ensure that the major biases 
inherent in the design are clarified. The critical assumption of the research is the 
hypothesis which drives the methodological approach, that local political legitimacy is 
actually the main driving force behind local stability and, by extension, regional and 
national stability in the context of 21st Century state consolidation. If this were 
falsified there would still be a useful outcome from the project, but the research 
objectives would necessarily be affected as the utility of producing new theoretical 
models and frameworks would be superfluous. 
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Similarly, in assessing an approach (stabilisation) by interveners the research project 
asserts that the ‘project’ is not a useful mode for analysis and that a project-by-project 
appraisal of stabilisation activities would not provide information which would inform 
an understanding of local stability. Again, if this is not the case, that it is necessary to 
have a very high degree of sector specific expertise (for example in health or policing), 
there would be challenges to the research methodology and to the findings. 
Further, on the ground, it was important to be clear that there are significant power 
asymmetries between the researcher and the researched in the context of fragile, 
often violent, societies, which need to be moderated for reasons of both ethics and 
research validity. This is primarily an issue in field sites, rather than for interviews with 
interveners. Therefore an assumption arising from the research was the temptation to 
focus on the ‘Other’ in the quest to find ‘solutions’ for ‘Us’ – especially when the 
researcher, as noted above, is a white male European (Duffield, 2005, p. 145). 
In order to address some of the power asymmetries inherent in investigating power, 
legitimacy and stability in fragile societies, the research design recognises that one of 
the independent variables is international action (and therefore international decision 
making). This is complicated by the fact that the researcher himself is part of these 
processes and his academic department, the Centre for Security Sector Management 
(CSSM), is heavily engaged in Security Sector Reform and stabilisation in a number of 
states trying to recover from, or cope with, ongoing conflicts. It is therefore important 
to ensure critical reflections of intervention whilst being hosted by a department 
engaged in intervention itself. 
Limitations 
Case study research has a number of clear limitations. The first is that it can be 
difficult to generalise findings beyond the sites selected and the particular dynamics 
may skew the analysis to the point where trends only apply in the very specific context 
of these case studies. As argued in the site selection, the comparison between Nepal 
and Afghanistan and the subsequent field site selections have been designed to 
minimise this risk but it will continue to affect the generalisations one can make about 
the findings. Secondly, the researcher’s limitations of being male and not speaking all 
the languages and dialects present in the field sites means that care had to be taken 
during the interviews and in analysis to ensure that the narratives and analysis formed 
from the interviews is an accurate reflection of the respondents’ intended meaning. 
This has been in part mitigated by asking two external individuals, one Nepali and one 
Afghan, to review the coding of the research and provide feedback to the researcher 
about the analysis.  
Thirdly, there was a limitation to the time available for field research which has meant 
that there will always be issues and questions left unexplored. Again, the site selection 
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was made partly based on the existing knowledge and experience of the researcher to 
minimise this risk, but will always remain a limitation of the amount of data that can 
be collected and analysed effectively. Another limitation of the design, partly due to 
time limitations, is the lack or inability to carry out longitudinal methods which would 
deepen the level of analysis. This is, in part, mitigated by the questions focusing on 
past interventions as well as current interventions. However, the lack of longitudinal 
data may hamper some of the analysis regarding the long-term effects of stabilisation 
interventions.  
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Chapter 4 – Indigenous Stabilisation  
Kalakan, Kabul province, Afghanistan  
 
Figure 5 Map of Kabul province WFP 
Prelude 
“Habibullah Khan was a national person,87 a man who wished to be free and have his 
country free. His first goal was to implement Islam in Afghanistan and secondly he 
wanted to share power and a governing system with all people. He was illiterate but 
his vision was not to have a government which was cruel and he never wanted to think 
only about his kingdom and power. In that time Nadir Shah, Zahir Shah’s father, was in 
France and he told him [Nadir Shah], ‘if you come back to Afghanistan I will abandon 
this kingdom to you and I am not eager to be king.’ When Nadir Khan came to 
Afghanistan instead of negotiating with Habibullah Khan he started to fight against 
him and had Habibullah arrested and killed him.  
                                                     
87 Habibullah Khan deposed Amanullah Khan in 1929 and reigned for eight months 
before being deposed himself and subsequently hanged by Nadir Shah, the father of 
Zahir Shah the last monarch of Afghanistan. Habibullah Khan is referred to in some 
literature as Bacha-i Saqao, or the Son of the Water Carrier, though this is considered 
a derogatory name by people from Kalakan. 
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Habibullah’s vision was a national vision and he wanted all people to participate in his 
government’s structure. He wanted to lead this country toward development but after 
his fall many people spread rumours about him. They would say that Habibullah Khan 
was a thief, but he was a good man with a national personality – it depends on how 
impartial we are in judging him. He was not educated and didn’t have a political 
thought. He was son of a farmer and his thoughts were like a farmer’s thoughts.”88 
Kalakan and indigenous stabilisation 
This chapter will discuss processes of stabilisation, both indigenous and exogenous, in 
the district of Kalakan in Kabul province Afghanistan. Kalakan is described by 
respondents as a stable district, to which several factors have contributed; chief 
among them for the respondents is the way the population, ‘the people’, have 
reached a consensus and addressed some of the grievances associated with the 
conflict in the 1980s and 1990s, and a regional approach to political competition for 
the districts in the Koh Daman (foothills). In addition there have been a number of 
exogenous activities by a wide range of actors, including the government, NGOs, 
international military forces and local political actors, which have had differing 
impacts on stability in the district since 2001.  
Kalakan forms part of the Koh Daman or the Shomali plain (northern plain), 
comprising seven districts north of the capital of Kabul.89 In 2001 Mujahideen forces, 
led by the Northern Alliance, including a range of anti-Taliban commanders and 
groups, broke through Taliban defensive lines to the north of Kabul and took the city 
on November 14th 2001, precipitating the fall of the Taliban government in December 
2001. The post-Taliban milieu empowered a number of Northern Alliance 
commanders and leaders in the Transitional and then Interim administrations 
established by Chairman, now President, Karzai. Local and regional political 
competition in the area was intense for much of the last thirty years, and the 
devastation wrought by Taliban forces in the 1990s deeply affected returning 
commanders and local leaders as they jockeyed for position in the post-Taliban boom. 
However, a series of agreements, across Koh Daman and within Kalakan itself, have 
led to the emergence of a new equilibrium in political and social relations engendering 
a level of stability which has not been experienced since the end of the reign of Zahir 
Shah in 1973. 
The importance of Kalakan to debates about stabilisation is the way in which local and 
regional indigenous processes of stabilisation create and shape local stability. The 
exploration and understanding of the agreements between various groups, their 
                                                     
88 NL-1-1 19th October 2010, Kabul. 
89 The seven districts are: Guldara, Istalif, Mir Bacha Kut, Kalakan, Shakardara, Farza 
and Qara Bagh. 
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significance and how they were reached is critical to understanding indigenous views 
of stability and stabilisation processes, which also challenges the ways in which 
exogenous interventions shape some, but not all, factors important to stability in 
Kalakan. Some areas and political leaders use these interventions in order to promote 
stability whereas others do not. 
Twenty-five interviews were carried out in person with twenty-nine respondents for 
this case study between September and December 2010, which focused on two 
villages, Aqa Sarai and Mushwani. These villages lie on opposite sides of an area of 
light industry which produces bricks. Interviews were also conducted in the District 
Centre and its immediate hinterland. The respondents included; government officials, 
elected officials, local economic actors, including shop keepers and owners of brick 
chimneys (batis90), participants and beneficiaries of development programmes 
including the DDR programme, called the Afghanistan New Beginnings Programme 
(ANBP), and the Disbandment of Illegally Armed Groups (DIAG), and rural 
development programmes such as the National Solidarity Programme (NSP). 
Beneficiaries of food or cash for work programmes and humanitarian aid were also 
interviewed. External interveners who were interviewed included military trainers and 
government officials from other areas. Additional information collected by the author 
in previous visits to Kalakan since 2005 has also been used.  
Conflict History 
Kalakan lies on the Shomali plain about thirty kilometres north of Kabul, or an hour’s 
drive along the asphalted road which runs to the Salang tunnel and Northern 
Afghanistan. Kalakan is a relatively small district (about forty square kilometres), 
comprising of twenty-eight villages and over 18,000 individuals.91 All but three of 
Kalakan’s villages are dominated by Tajiks. The field sites included Aqa Sarai, which is 
a majority Tajik village, and Mushwani, which is one of the three Pashtun villages. The 
tribes in the Pashtun villages include Kakar, Suleiman Khel, Sadat and Hazar Meshi 
amongst others.92 The main Highway 1 runs through the district centre, also called 
Kalakan, which is lined with a range of small shops servicing the traffic on the highway. 
The local economy is dominated by three sectors: the service sector for transport 
along the main road; a brick making area consisting of about 40 chimneys employing 
3-4,000 people; and finally, the agricultural sector in which the majority of the 
                                                     
90 There are two types of brick factory in Kalakan producing dried bricks called bati (a 
Pakistani term) and tandoor. The tandoor are older and smaller chimneys but both are 
different from kilns which produce baked bricks.  
91 The UNFPA listing states a population of 18,192 six years prior to the research 
taking place. Local respondents suggested the current population was substantially 
higher (UNFPA, 2004, p. 2). 
92 LL-1-10 20th October 2010, Mushwani. 
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population works.93 A significant but unspecified number of Kalakanis work in Kabul 
and/or for the government.  
The majority of the district lies to the east of the main road, though a few villages lie 
to the west of the road, and the district can be split into three zones: the first zone 
includes the district centre and the villages in its immediate hinterland (including the 
villages to the west of the highway); the second zone includes the outlying villages to 
the east which run to the edge of the foothills themselves and the two sample 
villages, Aqa Sarai and Mushwani, which straddle the main industrial zone of the brick 
factories; this area is approximately half an hour’s drive from the main asphalted road 
along dirt roads; and the third zone, which includes a few smaller villages furthest 
away from the district centre, about an hour’s drive from the main road. 
Kalakan only became a district in the 1990s during the government of Ustad 
Rabbani.94 Prior to that Kalakan came to national prominence in the revolt against 
Amanullah Khan when a local man, Habibullah, raised a force against Amanullah Khan 
in 1929.95 Amanullah had pushed for substantial social reforms in Afghanistan 
including challenging the use of the veil by women and expanding the provision of 
female education (Poullada, 1973, pp. 81-6). This move angered the conservative 
clergy and Amanullah faced rebellions in the east from Ghilzai tribesmen in Khost in 
1927. He felt secure enough to go on a European tour in 1928 but was faced by a 
Shinwari revolt which was compounded by the revolt of Habibullah Khan from Kalakan 
(ibid., 1973, pp. 48-50; Clements, 2003, pp. 28-9).  
The prelude quoted at the beginning of the paper comes from an interview with Haji 
Dawood, the current MP from Kalakan, and is his interpretation of Habibullah Khan’s 
vision for Afghanistan during his reign. The cause of the rebellion, and its success in 
capturing Kabul, lies in the cultural mistakes that Amanullah made during his reign and 
a desire by the religious networks to re-instate shariat or Islamic law (Roy, 1985, pp. 
                                                     
93 At the time of this research (September – December 2010) Kalakan had suffered a 
bad grape harvest, its most significant cash crop, due to a blight. In good seasons 
Kalakani producers are able to make a substantial profit in selling grapes, fresh and 
dried, in Kabul. 
94 LL-1-2 10th October 2010, Aqa Sarai. 
95 In another significant incident a local story, possibly apocryphal, recounts a Jirga 
which was convened to meet the British Resident Cavagnari, in which Cavagnari is 
alleged to have cut a tribesman in two for insubordination securing the pacification of 
the local people in Kalakan. This story was related by an interpreter on 14th October 
2010. Cavagnari negotiated the Treaty of Gandamak in May 1879, which ended the 
first phase of the 2nd Anglo-Afghan War. Cavagnari was appointed as the British 
Representative in Kabul, a post he took up in July that year, but he was killed on 
September 3rd 1879 in Afghanistan after a mutiny (Clements, 2003, p. 45). 
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65-8). Irrespective of the reasons behind the revolt, Habibullah Khan’s forces were 
forced out of Kabul by General Nadir Khan who took the throne and established the 
Musahiban dynasty in 1929, which included Zahir Shah, Afghanistan’s King until 1973 
when he was deposed by his cousin Dawood Khan who became President, who in turn 
was deposed and killed by the Communists in 1978.96 The brief period of Habibullah’s 
reign is significant in Afghan history as it was the first time a non-Pashtun held the 
throne. 
During the following fifty years Kalakan benefitted from the economic growth 
generated in Kabul and continued to be a place where political opponents to the 
regime emerged. One of these opponents, Majid Kalakani, was exiled to Kandahar 
because of his opposition to Zahir Shah before he was deposed in 1973. Majid was 
instrumental in the establishment of Shulay-i Jawad and later established Sazman 
Azadibakhsh-i Mardom-i Afghanistan (SAMA)97 inspired by Maoist thinking, and it is 
claimed by existing members that it was the first group in Kalakan to resist the Russian 
occupation in 1979.98 Majid was detained by KhAD, the intelligence arm of the Afghan 
state and predecessor of the current National Directorate of Security (NDS) in 1980. In 
early 1981 he was killed, reportedly at the Soviet embassy in Kabul. 99 Despite this 
setback SAMA maintained a presence in Kalakan100 until 1982/3 by which point the 
remaining SAMA leadership was either killed or forced into exile.101 Kalakan became a 
battle ground between the remaining Jihadist parties including Jamiat-i Islami, Hizb-i 
Islami (led by Gulbuddin Hekmetyar), Ittihad-i Islami (led by Sayyaf, whose base was 
nearby in Paghman), Harakat-i Islami and Jabh-e Nejat-i Milli Barayi Azad-i Afghanistan 
(led by Mujaddedi).102 
The Communist government, backed by the Soviet army, was not able to ensure that 
the District Governor was able to operate in the area, and while Kalakan was only a 
sub-division, alaaqdari, of the district, it meant there was no formal government 
administration from the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) in the area 
                                                     
96 (ibid., 2003, pp. 64-7). 
97 LL-1-8 19th October 2010, Kabul: SAMA translates as Peoples Liberation 
Organisation of Afghanistan (Dorronsoro, 2000, pp. 213-4). 
98 LL-1-8 19th October 2010, Kabul: a point borne out by the respondents from Aqa 
Sarai who mentioned that Hizb-i Islami and Jamiat forced SAMA out of the area in 
1982/3 once the Jihad was established. For more on SAMA’s activities see Kakar, 1995, 
pp. 107-8, 204, 240-4.  
99 Other sources note that Majid was detained in 1980 and killed in the Soviet 
Embassy (Giradet, 1985, pp. 57, 177-8). 
100 And several other areas of the country including Balkh, Khost, Nimroz and Takhar. 
LL-1-8 19th October 2010, Kabul. 
101 LL-1-8 19th October 2010, Kabul. 
102 The Front of National Resistance for the Liberation of Afghanistan. 
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for most, if not all of, the 1980s.103 This meant that all services, health and education 
primarily, ceased. In the village of Aqa Sarai, where the local community had built a 
school during the reign of Zahir Shah, education services effectively halted as 
madrassa education had not been well established within the village.104 
Administration fell to the local commander of each village, which was normally at the 
level of Sar Group, with different villages falling under the sway of different parties.105 
The allegiances of the Sar Groups were not static and some changed between parties 
as a result of different opportunities or enmities between commanders.106 The 
patchwork of commander relationships meant that within individual villages all 
governance functions were controlled by the commander, often directly, including the 
collection of taxes, adjudications in local conflicts (i.e. justice) and security 
provision.107 This led to the exclusion of opposition groups from within villages, 
including any remaining members or relatives of members of Parcham and Khalq, two 
factions of the PDPA, as well as the aforementioned Maoists from SAMA. This may 
have also contributed to population displacement to Kabul and Pakistan, and to 
ongoing fighting in the area. 
Governance issues became much more problematic when enmities between Sar 
Groups, or their members, became violent.108 Across the twenty-eight villages there 
were many killings, though as a collective memory most respondents agreed there 
were between sixty to seventy killings related to the Jihadi period.109 The killings in 
Kalakan entrenched and worsened conflict between the parties, and fighting would 
erupt often with little or no provocation. In one case between Commanders in two 
                                                     
103 LL-1-1 10th October 2010, Aqa Sarai. 
104 When the school was built the state did not provide the resources for building the 
school but agreed to pay for teachers and materials LL-1-7 19th October 2010, Kabul. 
105 A Sar Group is the head of a unit normally comprising of sixty to ninety men, more 
or less equivalent to a company in Western militaries. Each Sar Group is split into 
Blocks which are normally platoon sized units of ten to twenty personnel. The Sar 
Groups would report to a Commander who was the head of a Firqa. Although 
command and control of the fragmented Jihadi forces was often ad hoc, the two main 
parties in Kalakan, Jamiat-i Islami and Hizb-i Islami were the most well-organised 
amongst the seven main Jihadist parties. 
106 LL-1-1 10th October 2010, Aqa Sarai, this was a common feature of the Jihad and 
civil war periods (Dorronsoro, 2000, pp. 147-9). 
107 LL-1-2 10th October 2010, Aqa Sarai. 
108 LL-1-2 10th October 2010, Aqa Sarai. 
109 LL-1-2 10th October 2010, Aqa Sarai, IN-1-11 25th October 2010, Kalakan, LL-1-5 
17th October 2010, Aqa Sarai, LL-1-12 25th October 2010, Kalakan, LL-1-15 13th 
November 2010, Kalakan and NL-1-1 19th October and 19th November 2010, Kabul. 
These were defined as killings between parties rather than as a result of attacks by or 
against the PDPA and Soviet military forces. 
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villages (including Aqa Sarai) a family member of one of the commanders was killed as 
a result of an argument over the price of raisins. This escalated over time and by 2001 
nine people had been killed as a result of the ongoing blood feud.110 
By effectively taking over the governance system the Jihadi parties replaced the state 
in the local area, but the ongoing in-fighting militated against their ability to ensure 
freedom of movement, the most basic levels of personal security or basic services (like 
emergency health care). The Mujaddedi government, which took over as a result of 
the Islamic Jihad Council in Peshawar in 1992, was perceived as being weak and 
unable to control the commanders despite being based only thirty kilometres away.111 
During the Rabbani government, following Mujaddedi’s brief administration, Kalakan 
became a district in its own right;112 however, this did not improve the situation in 
Kalakan and instability became a feature of life.  
In 1995 the Taliban approached Kabul from the south and fought with forces loyal to 
Jamiat-i Islami, the last major Jihadi group resisting Taliban forces after they swept up 
from southern Afghanistan in 1994 and 1995. Despite an attempt to take the city in 
1995 it was not until 1996 that Ahmad Shah Massoud, the military commander of 
Jamiat, withdrew from the city. Massoud withdrew to the Shomali plain, which leads 
up to the entrance to his stronghold in the Panjshir valley. By this point a number of 
local Hizb-i Islami commanders, including the main commanders in Kalakan, had sided 
with Massoud and decided to resist the Taliban.113 The front lines criss-crossed the 
plain and ran through several villages in Kalakan district.114 Eventually the Taliban 
overcame the resistance in the plain and they swept aside Massoud’s forces which 
retreated to the Panjshir valley where they remained embattled until 2001. 
In the Shomali plain the Taliban initially adopted a conciliatory approach to some of 
the villages, initiating contact with local religious leaders and replicating their methods 
in southern Afghanistan;115 however, the local religious leadership was on the whole 
unwilling to cooperate with the Taliban and within two months the Taliban had 
                                                     
110 LL-1-2 10th October 2010, Aqa Sarai and NL-1-1 19th October 2010, Kabul. 
111 In contrast to the Karzai government which has been able to maintain peace 
between the Jihadist parties in government for the most part, which was noted as a 
strength of the current state IN-1-9 20th October 2010, Kalakan and LL-1-14 13th 
November 2010, Mushwani (Dorronsoro, 2000, pp. 237-40). 
112 LL-1-2 10th October 2010, Aqa Sarai and LL-1-10 20th and 21st October 2010, 
Mushwani.  
113 NL-1-1 13th October 2010, Kabul (Dorronsoro, 2000, pp. 254-6). 
114 IN-1-11 25th October 2010, Kalakan and LL-1-10 20th and 21st October 2010, 
Mushwani (Nojumi, 2002, pp. 155-7). 
115 IN-1-11 25th October 2010, Kalakan and LL-1-12 25th October 2010, Kalakan see 
also Chapter 5 p.133. 
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resorted to increasingly violent tactics to discover who had been commanders or 
combatants fighting for Jamiat-i Islami under Ahmad Shah Massoud, and attempted to 
sideline the local religious and elder leadership who had remained during the 
fighting.116 This failed and the subsequent scorched-earth policy that they adopted 
was amongst the most brutal anywhere in Afghanistan during the entire civil war and 
led to the abandonment of almost the entire valley. 95% of the population left the 
Koh Daman, and in Aqa Sarai a pre-Taliban population of about 300 households was 
reduced to five to ten.117 A similar level of dislocation was faced in Mushwani.118 The 
majority of the refugees in the two villages fled to Pakistan at this point rather than 
attempt to find shelter in Kabul.119 It was not until five years later, in the winter of 
2001, that refugees began to return after the fall of the Taliban in Kabul. 
The return was led by the elders of the communities, some of whom had fought in the 
Jihadist groups, and they initiated the rebuilding of their communities. The returnees 
were supported in Kalakan by NGOs including CARE International, Malteser and 
ACTED, who provided basic materials for building shelter and food supplies to see the 
families through the winter.120 In addition to the returnees a number of individuals 
came after having fought alongside the Northern Alliance as they overthrew the 
Taliban, including Haji Dawood who had been the district commander and was 
affiliated to Hizb-i Islami. Haji Dawood was injured during the fighting in the Shomali 
plain and was not with Northern Alliance forces as they entered Kabul on November 
14th because he had to spend ten days convalescing. He reached Kabul the day after 
the Taliban fell.121 The triumphant nature in which forces from Kalakan, and the wider 
Koh Daman region, had supported the overthrow of the Taliban meant that they were 
able to gain positions of power and influence in the transitional, interim and full 
administrations led by Hamid Karzai. The Jihadi commanders spent some time in the 
armed forces, primarily in the Afghan Militia Force (AMF) as part of Firqa 8, which was 
                                                     
116 IN-1-11 25th October 2010, Kalakan and LL-1-10 20th and 21st October 2010, 
Mushwani. 
117 LL-1-2 10th October 2010, Aqa Sarai: UNHCR records indicate that the district 
population in April 2002 was 700 people of which 193 had returned in the last few 
months (i.e. the elders that returned prior to the start of the UNHCR resettlement 
programme) out of an estimated population in 1990 of 28,117 and expected returnee 
population of 40,000, though both of these figures seem to be over estimates (UNHCR, 
2002, p. 1). 
118 LL-1-10 20th and 21st October 2010, Mushwani. 
119 LL-1-10 20th and 21st October 2010, Mushwani. 
120 LL-1-2 10th October 2010, Aqa Sarai, LL-1-10 20th and 21st October 2010, 
Mushwani and NL-1-1 13th October 2010, Kabul. 
121 NL-1-1 13th October 2010, Kabul. 
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led by Amanullah Guzar, under whom Haji Dawood was posted as a commander of a 
ghund (a regiment),122 drawing substantial forces from Kalakan itself.123 
The regional Jihadi leaders also formed a council, called the Koh Daman Shura, which 
was meant to provide regional level political leadership and ensure the perspective of 
the Shomali plain was acknowledged at the highest levels of government.124 In 
Kalakan the district council was re-established, which for several years was led by an 
opponent of Haji Dawood, Haji Hakim,125 and appointments to the District Governor 
and Chief of Police stayed amongst other Shomalis, often from the districts of 
Shakardara, Farza and Qara Bagh. Though the appointment of a Chief of Police from 
Parwan four years later was a slight departure, it was within the political network of 
Jihadist political leaders because the Chief of Police was himself a mujahid.126 
There continues to be vibrant and ongoing non-violent political competition amongst 
the major political stakeholders in Kalakan, who variously claim historical local 
heritage, Jihadi credentials or reformist ideology as the basis for their political 
platforms.127 The extremes of the political spectrum, those who supported the Maoist 
groups and those that supported the Taliban, have been marginalised. The former 
Taliban district governor, Mullah Abdul Raziq, who was from Mushwani village, is 
apparently now in Farah,128 and the Maoists are no longer able to carry out political 
activities (though their representative stood in the 2010 elections).129 In between 
these two extremes most of the political competition is between the remaining Jihadi 
groups and more traditional elders networks,130 however to a large extent opponents 
of Haji Dawood have been side-lined.  
                                                     
122 A ghund normally lies beneath a firqa and a liwa in the Afghan command structure 
(though this was not always consistent in the AMF). A typical ghund consisted of 900-
1200 personnel; Haji Dawood’s forces were part of Firqa 8 (Brigade 8) which 
numbered 3,179 in 2005, though the number that entered the DDR programme was in 
the region of 2,900 (Dennys, 2005, p. 12 and information held by author). 
123 At a senior level Northern Alliance leaders secured Ministerial level positions 
including Abdullah Abdullah (Ministry of Foreign Affairs), Marshall Fahim (Minister of 
Defence) and Yunis Qanooni (Ministry of Education). 
124 LL-1-8 19th October 2010, Kabul, NL-1-1 19th October and 19th November 2010, 
Kabul. 
125 LL-1-7 19th October 2010, Kabul. 
126 IN-1-2 13th November 2010, Kalakan. 
127 NL-1-1 19th October 2010, Kabul; LL-1-7 19th October 2010, Kabul and LL-1-8 19th 
October 2010, Kabul. 
128 LL-1-2 10th October 2010, Aqa Sarai. 
129 LL-1-8 19th October 2010, Kabul. 
130 LL-1-7 19th October 2010, Kabul and NL-1-1 19th October 2010, Kabul. 
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The international community has implemented hundreds of projects across the 
Shomali plain, including several dozen within Kalakan itself; they have generally 
occurred in three phases: the first was the emergency response led by NGOs such as 
CARE international; secondly, projects were developed to focus on national level 
priorities including formal and informal disarmament programmes run by the United 
Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and NGOs such as the Japan Center for 
Conflict Prevention (JCCP) and the National Solidarity Programme (facilitated by the 
Sanayee Development Organisation, SDO);131 thirdly, the military engaged in hearts 
and minds and stabilisation projects which have variously included digging wells, 
building small infrastructure such as bridges, providing school supplies and 
constructing offices and guard posts for government officials and the local police. 
Indigenous stabilisation activity focused on political legitimacy formation and 
relationship building alongside exogenous support for state interventions and direct 
interventions by non-governmental and military actors which makes Kalakan an 
important focus for the debate on stabilisation. 
Stabilisation interventions 
The following section examines the ways in which both indigenous and exogenous 
actors have attempted to stabilise Kalakan since 2001. It discusses the major elements 
of these interventions from 2001 to 2010, though within that decade the 
interventions can roughly be split into two periods: 2001-2005, a period of emergency 
response, changing state political structures until Parliamentary elections in 2005 and 
the emergence of a coherent political arrangement for the Koh Daman region; and 
2006-2010, which included the period of the first Parliament until the outcome of the 
second Parliamentary elections in 2010, during which time the emergency response 
gave way to development processes which stalled despite rapid private sector growth. 
During both periods projects were implemented intermittently by international 
military forces. 
Political interventions to support stabilisation 
Kalakan has benefitted from regional and local Afghan political leadership which has 
been willing to accommodate some opposition and address grievances from earlier 
conflicts. In Kalakan’s case the appointment of District Governor Talwar in 2001, a 
local Kalakani leader, was an auspicious start given his credentials as an honest, 
hardworking government representative who, importantly, treated the local elders 
with respect.132 The influx of returning Internally Displaced People (IDPs) and refugees 
in 2001-5 meant there was a constant re-jigging of political relationships as the elder 
                                                     
131 LL1-1-10. 
132 LL-1-1 10th October 2010, Aqa Sarai and LL-1-2 10th October 2010, Aqa Sarai. 
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community reasserted itself after two decades of being marginalised.133 Whilst some 
of the elders had a Jihadi background the government was able over time to recognise 
the people’s representatives (selected by villagers), as well as appoint its own 
Maleks.134 In Mushwani and Aqa Sarai these individuals knew each other well, and 
were happy to work together and act as a mutual referral system for issues that arose 
in the villages; these issues would range from conflicts over water distribution and the 
implementation of development projects to more serious security and criminal issues 
referred to the local police.135 
Within this context the stabilisation activities which supported political and 
governance related stability in Kalakan occurred at two levels: the first was within and 
between the villages that comprise Kalakan; and the second across the Koh Daman 
region. The village level stabilisation in relationships was initiated by local elders who 
understood that the outstanding blood feuds and enmities that had arisen as a result 
of the Kalakan killings would ultimately lead to widespread instability. As early as 2003 
and 2004 the elders discussed how to address the conflicts and provide a meaningful 
and lasting resolution. They were assisted in their efforts by District Governor Talwar, 
who had been moved in 2003 to the neighbouring district of Qara Bagh, but who 
retained a substantial degree of standing in the community until his death.136 As 
described in the conflict history above, there were between sixty and seventy cases in 
Kalakan involving almost every village and community in the district and involving 
senior leaders including Haji Dawood.137 The process settled upon by the local elders 
was rooted in Afghan conceptions of justice and involved the two parties being asked 
to forgive each other, through the mediation of elders.138 This process took some 
time, and although most of the work was carried out in about one year, it took two 
years to address all the cases because some of those involved were not from Kalakan 
                                                     
133 Interviews carried out with elders in Kalakan by author in 2005. 
134 The Maleks in this case act as the lowest level of formal governance but are unpaid, 
and they do not have administrative support. This is not necessarily typical because 
subnational governance in Afghanistan is highly heterogeneous. In some areas Maleks 
are not government appointed but derive their status from other factors such as 
landownership, social/tribal position or simply local norms. They may also have 
varying concepts as to what their roles and responsibilities are. For further discussion 
about subnational governance in Afghanistan see the following (Nixon, 2008; World 
Bank, 2007). 
135 LL-1-1 10th October 2010, Aqa Sarai; LL-1-2 18th October 2010, Aqa Sarai; LL-1-5 
17th October 2010, Aqa Sarai; LL-1-10 20th and 21st October 2010, Mushwani. 
136 LL-1-1 10th October 2010, Aqa Sarai and LL-1-2 10th October 2010, Aqa Sarai. 
137 IN-1-11 25th October 2010, Kalakan. 
138 IN-1-11 25th October 2010, Kalakan and LL-1-10 20th and 21st October 2010, 
Mushwani. 
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itself; for example, a delegation had to visit a party to a conflict in Jalalabad, the 
capital of Nangarhar province in Eastern Afghanistan.139  
The reconciliation process was completed by the holding of a peace event in 2006 
which involved the signing of papers stating that both sides forgave one another. All 
the elders, representatives from the cases, the local government and some 
representatives of the Kabul administration attended.140 This in effect closed off the 
legacy of the Kalakan killings and their potential to be a source of instability. This is 
not to say that all issues have been addressed. There were a number of killings 
between Taliban and Northern Alliance belligerents stemming from the period from 
1995 to 2001 that have not been accounted for, but given the current insurgency, 
there seems little opportunity for them to be addressed.141 Despite this limitation, at a 
village and district level it has been possible for the communities, the elders and the 
local administration to develop overlapping, mutually reinforcing relationships, which 
have directly led to the sentiment across the respondents, governmental, security 
related and local civilian elders that stability comes from ‘the people’ – more 
specifically from the people consenting to the government’s administration, which in 
the Afghan context is fostered through the way in which the government interacts 
with the elders.142 
In this instance stability has been self-generated, according to the respondents, and 
they believe it is mutually reinforcing: the government must reach out to the elders 
and treat them fairly, trust them to make some decisions with a degree of autonomy 
and in return the elders will work with the government to the degree that their own 
authority allows in their individual villages.143 As a result, self-reinforcing relationships 
have been formed with elders participating in governance in multiple overlapping 
forms. So, for example, the people’s representative in Aqa Sarai is also the chair of 
                                                     
139 LL-1-12 25th October 2010, Kalakan. 
140 LL-1-2 10th October 2010, Aqa Sarai and LL-1-15 13th November 2010, Kalakan. 
141 LL-1-2 10th October 2010, Aqa Sarai 
142 LL-1-2 10th October 2010, Aqa Sarai; NL-1-1 13th October 2010, Kabul; LL-1-6 18th 
October 2010, Kalakan; IN-1-2 13th November 2010, Kalakan.  
143 Whilst it is beyond the scope of this research, it is worth noting that the social 
structures in Aqa Sarai and Mushwani are slightly different, and that the Pashtun 
population and leadership of Mushwani may provide a more directive type of local 
leadership where it is the decisions of the people’s representative and the Malek that 
are implemented; Aqa Sarai’s elders by comparison seemed to be slightly more open 
to allowing other village leaders autonomy in making decisions. This approach would 
suggest that there are several types of local leadership that can foster a stable 
outcome and not one ideal type, but beyond that conclusion the data does not 
suggest what types may be more or less supportive of stability. 
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their village’s Community Development Council (CDC) as part of the NSP.144 Elders are 
also members of Peace Councils established by an NGO which works on conflict 
resolution and peace education in the district.145 There are dangers with this 
approach, where the elders control too much power within their village, but the 
prescient selection of government appointed Maleks in Aqa Sarai and Mushwani 
means that there are alternative ways of obtaining access to the government – and 
those interviewed who were not connected to the elder structures also stated that 
they would feel comfortable circumventing the elder leadership line to take a petition 
or complaint directly to the relevant government department or the elected member 
of Parliament from Kalakan, Haji Dawood. However, they said they would prefer to 
use the elder system if possible because it is a more traditional way of getting things 
done.146 
The elders in the twenty-eight villages of Kalakan are not the only creators of stability. 
The second source of instability which was addressed by the regional Afghan political 
leadership was a series of agreements addressed through a shura147 relating to the 
way in which Jihadi Islamist parties would transform their violent political conflict into 
non-violent political conflict. The forum for these debates has been the Koh Daman 
Shura, which included many of the Jihadi leaders empowered after the fall of the 
Taliban in 2001, including Amanullah Guzar MP,148 Irfanullah Irfan MP,149 Haji Dawood 
MP150 and Anwar Orya Khel MP.151 This group is in effect the political vanguard of the 
Koh Daman in the current government. The creation of the Koh Daman Shura has led 
                                                     
144 LL-1-2 10th October 2010, Aqa Sarai. 
145 Cooperation for Peace and Unity (CPAU) has worked in Kalakan since 2004. 
146 LL-1-1 10th October 2010, Aqa Sarai and LL-1-2 10th October 2010, Aqa Sarai. 
147 A shura is a consultative group and can be either formal or informal and provide a 
core structure in Afghan governance systems. 
148 Guzar is from Mir Bacha Kut and is the former head of Firqa 8 in the AMF under the 
MoD. Several of his forces moved to the Ministry of Interior (MoI) and were alleged to 
be involved in trafficking of narcotics. Guzar left the MoI and stood for Parliament in 
2005, and is the current head of the Koh Daman Shura (ICG, 2005, p. 7). 
149 Irfan is from Farza, and was elected MP for Kabul, effectively representing Farza, in 
2005. He was not re-elected in 2010.  
150 Haji Dawood is from Kalakan, a former commander of a Ghund in Firqa 8 under 
Amanullah Guzar, and a member of Hizb-i Islami, though has also received support 
from Jamiat-i Islami in the past. He is a political opponent of Guzar given the latter’s 
stance regarding the Northern Alliance leader Yunis Qanooni, the former Speaker of 
Parliament. 
151 LL-1-6 18th October 2010, Kalakan. 
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to a degree of macro stability for Kalakan (just as the international community has 
provided some types of macro stability for the Karzai Administration).152 
The shura itself has been through various stages and at the time of this research may 
not have been particularly active as the result of the attempts by Guzar to control 
it.153 However, it has been a resource that Koh Daman leaders can use reflexively to 
respond to emerging threats and opportunities, or as a way of actively promoting the 
Koh Daman’s broader interests (for example in electrification, see below). Its 
membership varies between thirty and forty people and it has had a changeable 
leadership, though in the last few years this seems to have been passed rather 
competitively between the four MPs mentioned above.154 The shura is then able to 
promote the area in terms of cultural importance, political issues or development 
priorities, for example, the history of Habibullah Kalakani being of close interest to 
Haji Dawood who supports a monthly newspaper Habib-ul Islam, which promotes 
Kalakani and Koh Daman interests through the prism of Habibullah Kalakani.155 They 
can then draw on a range of political, security and private sector leaders from across 
the seven districts to attract additional resources, for example in government budget 
allocations, development projects or out of the funds of the members of the shura 
themselves. It is this group which seems to provide Kalakan with macro stability, in 
the context of internal stability addressed through the actions of the local government 
and elders. 
External intervention in the political arena in support of stabilisation has been minimal 
in Kalakan, except for the structuring principles of the Constitution and electoral 
systems. Therefore local elites and elders have been left to decide how they will vie 
for political power more or less autonomously. There has been some training provided 
to the Afghan National Police (ANP), and most significantly an office and living 
quarters compound has been built under the auspices of the Afghanistan Stabilisation 
Programme (funded by UNDP), which provided some infrastructure for the district 
governor to operate in. Respondents noted that while these things were good, they 
were clear that much of the indigenous stabilisation work which occurred in the early 
phase was carried out in people’s homes, mosques and out in the open, because that 
was what the local government had to work with, so the buildings and equipment 
helped the government do a good job better, rather than improving a bad job.156 
                                                     
152 IN-0-1 7th October 2010, Kabul. 
153 LL-1-7 19th October 2010, Kabul and NL-1-1 19th November 2010, Kabul. 
154 NL-1-1 19th October 2010, Kabul. 
155 A full back catalogue from 2008-2010 is held by the author and NL-1-1 19th 
November 2010, Kabul. 
156 LL-1-1 10th October 2010, Aqa Sarai and LL-1-2 10th October 2010, Aqa Sarai. 
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Importantly, it is only through both local and regional approaches that Kalakan has 
achieved stability. Respondents were careful to note the difference in stability 
experienced by residents of nearby Shakardara and Qara Bagh as being qualitatively 
different, and worse, than stability in Kalakan.157 Much like Kalakan those two districts 
have benefited from the same regional agreements amongst Jihadi leaders and they 
have, in the main, benefited from the same kind of international development funding 
and projects. The material difference for the respondents in Kalakan was the fact that 
those districts had been unable to deal with the legacy of the preceding twenty years’ 
conflict. Respondents said there were still outstanding enmities, and that the local 
political leadership was unable to support processes where the elders and 
communities could achieve some level of reconciliation. These comments were based 
on the fact that after the Kalakan peace conference in 2006 there had been some 
interest in replicating the process in other parts of the Koh Daman. However, as a 
result of poor local leadership and a certain amount of ‘laziness’ amongst the elders 
the initiatives gained no traction and failed. The elders reasoned that you were safe 
enough to walk around twenty-four hours a day in Kalakan and you would be unwise 
to try the same thing in other districts and that this was the result of issues from 
previous conflicts not being dealt with.158  
In summary, actions to support political stabilisation have been largely untouched by 
international intervention, except for the broader structuring of the constitutional and 
electoral processes, which have by and large been accepted by the local leadership 
despite their internal divisions. It is feasible to imagine a situation where the 
structuring components were different and Kalakan would still attain a stable 
outcome.159 The influence of two levels of political stability organised in an ad-hoc, 
locally-driven manner have been crucial to the region; on the one hand they have 
ensured agreement that stability in the region is in the interests of various Jihadi 
                                                     
157 LL-1-12 25th October 2010, Kalakan and NL-1-1 19th October 2010, Kabul: the 
author has worked for several organisations that have operated in various districts in 
the Shomali plain. Flashpoints were noted in Shakardara, Istalif and Qara Bagh for a 
range of inter-personal, economic and political factors. 
158 LL-1-12 25th October 2010, Kalakan. 
159 For example local interpretations of democracy, Islam and the state, were at odds 
with issues commonly of concern to Liberal political philosophy such as gender 
equality and freedom of speech. In their view the importance of the democratic 
system was that they felt they could subordinate it to the more important Islamic 
governance principles espoused during the Jihad. As a result the democratic element 
of governance was not the significant element of stability, the leaders simply worked 
within the democratic system because it was the system. LL-1-1 10th October 2010, 
Aqa Sarai, LL-1-2 10th October 2010, Aqa Sarai, LL-1-8 19th October 2010, Kabul and 
LL-1-15 13th November 2010, Kalakan. 
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actors despite their differences and, secondly, the elders in Kalakan have addressed 
local grievances to ensure stability within the district and encourage ‘the people’ to 
engage with the state. 
Security interventions to support stabilisation 
Security in Kalakan has been relatively benign since the overthrow of the Taliban in 
2001 but there have been a number of stabilisation interventions to bolster security. 
The number of incidents has been low and security according to the respondents has 
been very good.160 This is not to say that there are no security incidents; during one 
interview there was an interruption whilst an elder had to report an incident to the 
local police because someone had set up an illegal checkpoint on the road exiting the 
village. The importance of this incident is that it demonstrates that the community 
was able to access support from the local police force relatively quickly to address a 
threat they felt they could not deal with. 
During a Peace Day celebration in Kabul the Police Commander gave a speech 
thanking the assembled elders, participants and students of the Peace Education 
implemented by CPAU for their support in maintaining security in the district. He 
stated that it was only because of the people’s help that the district was secure and 
that everyone, in effect, was a policeman, i.e. a representative of law and order 
(rather than a representative of the state), which was also reflected by Haji 
Dawood.161 This is not just a heart-warming rendition of how security is maintained in 
Kalakan but instead demonstrates a critical way in which security is supported through 
regular state-society engagements. According to a military trainer working in the 
Shomali plain the Ford Rangers that were supplied to the district Chief of Police were 
not allocated enough fuel and as a result would not be able to carry out sustained 
operations or investigations, meaning that security literally lay in the hands of the 
population and their consent to be governed.162 The security inputs were primarily 
focused on training and equipping the thirty or so ANP, as well as providing them with 
a base from which they could operate – a compound which also housed the District 
Governor, the local judge and District Attorney. A small patrol base was also 
constructed on the hill above Aqa Sarai, though this seemed to cause some 
                                                     
160 Data from ISAF’s SIGACTS dataset lists only thirteen incidents between January 
2007 and May 2010. Most were explosive hazards, i.e. unexploded ordinance, single 
rockets left to detonate and fired towards passing convoys. There was a single event 
of hostile gunfire. Two incidents were of ‘hostile preaching’. Information held by the 
author. 
161 NL-1-1 19th October and 19th November 2010, Kabul. 
162 IN-1-4 17th October 2010, Aqa Sarai: according to Ford (www.ford.com) the Ranger 
has a fuel consumption of twenty-seven miles per gallon, which means the weekly 
eleven litre fuel supply would allow each vehicle to travel just over 100 kilometres. 
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bemusement to the local respondents as they wondered why the outpost was on the 
side of the hill rather than the top.163 
The training was not entirely welcomed by the participants, and the local population 
was unsure about the degree to which training would help improve policing, although 
there was a general opinion present that any input might be useful though their 
inclination was to approve of the training despite not knowing its content or 
impact.164 The trainers themselves, a mixture of US military and Dyncorp, viewed the 
police force as a paramilitary force and focused their training on the elements they 
saw as important in helping the police survive a fire fight.165 This idea seems at odds 
with the views expressed by the District Governor, Police Chief and local respondents 
about how their police should serve the population.166 As a result, the training seems 
to have had little bearing on the relationship between the population and police 
force.167 
The military officers involved in the training were unaware of the activities of other 
military units in the area. This meant that whilst there were consistent patrols by 
international forces across the district, often as mounted patrols, they were deployed 
under different missions, for example the Multi-National Brigade Kabul, which focused 
on civil-military relations and the protection of Kabul International Airport. Others 
conducted training as part of the Combined Security Transition Command – 
Afghanistan (CSTC-A).168 Whilst this may not have been considered significant, the lack 
of coordination was more apparent in terms of CIMIC activities and projects 
(described below). As a result one international military unit would suggest projects, 
but these would often only be assessed based on consultation with the District 
Governor and District Chief of Police and seemed to confirm the view of respondents 
                                                     
163 LL-1-2 10th October 2010, Aqa Sarai, LL-1-10 20th and 21st October 2010, 
Mushwani – some of the respondents had an excellent knowledge of the defensive 
positions in Kalakan as a result of their experiences during the Jihad, and the 
positioning of the patrol base was not considered optimal, though it may have been 
for other reasons not known to the respondents. 
164 IN-1-2 13th November 2010, Kalakan and IN-1-4 17th October 2010, Aqa Sarai. 
165 IN-1-4 17th October 2010, Aqa Sarai. 
166 LL-1-6 18th October 2010, Kalakan and IN-1-2 13th November 2010, Kalakan. 
167 At the time of this research there were ongoing pilot projects focused on 
Community Policing in nearby Qara Bagh which are seeking to address this supported 
by NATO Training Mission – Afghanistan (NTM-A). There were also efforts with 
UNDP’s community policing programme in the Shomali plain. Interview with NTM-A 
Officer, 12-10-10 and ACSF, 2010, pp. 3-7. 
168 IN-1-11 25th October 2010, Kalakan, NTM-A Officer, 12-10-10; information held by 
author from French CIMIC team operational in the Shomali plain in 2006. 
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that projects sponsored by international military forces tended to occur with less local 
consultation. 
The other major internationally sponsored activities on security were the DDR and 
DIAG programmes. Given their weak developmental impacts, and the fact that the 
programmes seem to have only engaged a small proportion of the combatants and 
collected a very small number of weapons it is not clear that the programmes had a 
specific impact on security. At the time of disarmament in 2005, there did seem to be 
some tension around the process and some undue influence of commanders in the 
area, although this never became violent (Dennys, 2005, p. 7); however, the low 
security impact of the disarmament programmes may have been caused by the AMF 
structures based in Kabul city in which Jihadi commanders found themselves, 
therefore there was not necessarily a large armed presence in the Shomali for 
extended periods.169 This meant that the disbandment of the groups would have had 
an economic impact primarily because of lost income to the individuals and families. 
The development input in the ANBP only captured a small proportion of those in the 
AMF, so questions remain about what happened to them. 
Whilst it was not possible to trace every single combatant, the respondents indicated 
that there were three main groups: those that joined the development programme 
(i.e. DDR training programmes) which was the smallest group; those who simply left 
the armed forces and were tired of being armed; several of these individuals were 
noted as now working in Kabul, often on the fringes of the economy as hawkers or 
labourers;170 and finally, there were those who moved into other areas of the Afghan 
National Security Forces (ANSF), some going to the Afghan National Army (ANA), with 
most transferring before the AMF was disbanded (ICG, 2005, p. 7; ICG, 2003, pp. 5,9). 
Respondents believed there were upwards of 100 Kalakanis in various security 
positions in the ANSF, some were based in the ANP in Kalakan itself, while others had 
been attached to other units in the police and army. 171 Importantly, there was no 
suggestion from respondents that the members of the armed forces were drawn from 
one group or set of villages within Kalakan – they were in effect part of the fabric of 
Kalakani society and one of the many ways in which the district was connected to the 
Afghan state. 
In summary, stabilisation activities relating to security largely occurred in a benign 
environment, building on the political stability that was ensured by indigenous actors. 
Exogenous support for police training and improving equipment and state 
                                                     
169 Firqa 8 is listed as an ‘independent unit’ at the MoD in the AMF structure and was 
based in Kabul. Information held by author. 
170 LL-1-10 20th and 21st October 2010, Mushwani. 
171 Author’s estimate. 
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infrastructure is noted with satisfaction, but views amongst the respondents indicate 
that these have had a minor impact on state security capability and no impact on the 
inclination of the state forces to act. DDR and DIAG programming seems to have been 
only weakly associated with improved security, especially given the trajectory of 
personnel from Firqa 8 into the ANP and ANA. Strikingly, the security sector provides 
another way in which the Kalakani population is connected to the state, able to 
capture resources and protect the interests of the district, though this would seem to 
serve as a function of governance rather than security. 
Development interventions to support stabilisation 
Development activities to promote stability in Kalakan have been extensive and 
included: humanitarian aid delivery, traditional development projects through NGOs, 
military stabilisation activities and finally some broad-based economic growth. This 
section tests all four of these interventions against the perceptions of stability 
amongst the respondents. 
Humanitarian 
Humanitarian aid started to flow into the Shomali plain shortly after refugees and IDPs 
started to flood back following the fall of the Taliban government. The degree of 
displacement in the Shomali plain was exceptionally high and in large parts of the 
valley there were few buildings left standing after the scorched earth policy of the 
Taliban during their advance against Massoud’s forces in the 1990s. As a result the 
returnees found that they had little or no shelter and food with which to sustain 
themselves when they returned. Whilst some people may have received returnee 
packages of basic food supplies from the United Nations High Commission for 
Refugees (UNHCR) some of the elders returned before receiving hand-outs and before 
their communities returned in order to see the degree of devastation for themselves 
and protect what remained from looting. 172  
In this context three NGOs – CARE International, Malteser and ACTED – responded by 
providing emergency humanitarian aid in the winter of 2001 in to 2002.173 The aid 
primarily consisted of food and basic shelters (which included tarpaulins) to ensure 
that the returnees were able to see out the winter on their own land. The support 
provided at that time to the respondents in Aqa Sarai and Mushwani was gratefully 
received and several noted that it was critical in paving the way for the elders to 
remain on the land over the winter and prepare the ground for the wider community, 
including dependent women and children.174 As a series of discreet interventions the 
                                                     
172
 LL-1-3 14th October 2010, Aqa Sarai and LL-1-2 10th October 2010, Aqa Sarai. 
173 LL-1-2 10th October 2010, Aqa Sarai, LL-1-3 14th October 2010, Aqa Sarai; LL-1-1 
10th October 2010, Aqa Sarai. 
174 LL-1-2 10th October 2010, Aqa Sarai. 
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humanitarian aid delivery in the region was instrumental in the restoration of 
communities and laid the foundation for stability to emerge out of the political 
processes discussed above. 
Development – NGO and military implementers  
There has also been a substantial programme of building wells and the National 
Solidarity Programme (NSP) was active across the district, implemented by the 
facilitating partner, Sanayee Development Organisation (SDO). Within the case study 
villages of Aqa Sarai and Mushwani, a school was rehabilitated, a clinic built and wells 
have been drilled in both villages. In addition, access roads to both villages were 
improved, and despite the road not being asphalted to date (though it is planned), a 
pedestrian bridge and car fording point were built by the French CIMIC team that 
operated in the region for several years.175 The CIMIC team also funded part of the 
school rehabilitation in Aqa Sarai. 
As well as infrastructure and hard inputs there have also been several programmes 
that have attempted to improve economic opportunities, including a number of cash 
for work programmes176 and training for former combatants. The large number of 
combatants coming from the Shomali plain, who found themselves in the AMF in 
2001, were slated for participation in the Disarmament, Demobilisation and 
Reintegration (DDR) programme; the political and security implications are discussed 
above, here the discussion focuses on the developmental impacts. There were both 
formal and informal disarmament projects, the formal sponsored by the ANBP 
through UNDP and a smaller project run by JCCP which was based in the district 
centre of Kalakan. Both programmes offered participants training in a range of skills, 
including carpentry, tailoring and metal work. The UNDP programme also included 
one-off benefits such as wheat seed and some materials for building shelters, and if 
the participants chose agricultural options they received livestock. Leaving aside the 
varied complaints about the actual implementation,177 the programme was not widely 
                                                     
175 The author was in touch with French CIMIC Liaison officers in 2006 that provided 
information about projects supported in the Shomali. The CIMIC team was based in 
Multi-National Brigade Kabul which became Regional Command-Capital (RC-C) as ISAF 
expanded. 
176 For example one respondent was working on a WFP funded cash-for-work 
programme that was building a road from Kabul to the eastern side of Kalakan. The 
main highway runs along the western side of Kalakan. EA-1-3 14th October 2010, Aqa 
Sarai. 
177 From a technical point of view respondents were not satisfied with the brevity of 
training in metal work, tailoring and carpentry, and the quality of livestock provided 
by UNDP was also criticised. EA-1-1 12th October 2010, Aqa Sarai; also see Dennys, 
2005, pp. 4-5; Rossi & Giustozzi, 2006. 
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seen as supporting stability, despite the fact that it precipitated the transfer of some 
of the leaders (mentioned above) from the AMF to other positions and eventually to 
Parliament. This may have contributed to macro stability but was not closely 
associated by the respondents to stabilisation in the villages. 
The reasons for this conclusion may be two-fold, firstly a recognition that the DDR 
programme did not actually engage with a large number of combatants. There were at 
least sixty to seventy combatants in Aqa Sarai and twenty to thirty in Mushwani led by 
two Sar Groups, however only ten individuals from Aqa Sarai and four from Mushwani 
participated in the disarmament initiatives. In this context, participation in the 
disarmament process became a survival strategy for a small number of former 
combatants but did not actually assist the combatant groups as a whole. Secondly, not 
only was the number of participants low, the level of support was also considered to 
be quite small. This is not only noted in their concerns about the quality of training but 
also because the impact of the disarmament programme in Kalakan and the two case 
study villages was fairly minor. 
A second round of disarmament programming was designed as part of the DIAG 
programme which ran from 2005 until 2011 when it was merged with the Afghanistan 
Peace and Reintegration Programme (APRP).178 Instead of offering incentives to 
individual combatants in the same manner as the DDR programme, DIAG attempted 
to engage entire communities across a district in handing over weapons corporately. 
Kalakan participated in the programme, though the level of weapons handed in was 
paltry. Mushwani for example handed in one weapon.179 
Irrespective of the impact on security from DIAG, as a reward for submitting weapons 
Kalakan was allocated $350,000 in funding for development projects, which according 
to respondents was allocated for the electrification of the district via the electricity 
pylons which had been installed across the Shomali plain to deliver electricity from 
Tajikistan to Kabul.180 At the time of research this project had not been implemented 
despite the high level intervention by Haji Dawood with the Ministry of Energy and 
Water which was tasked with implementing it.181 The frustration due to the lack of 
implementation was significant, but the elders and local leaders were happy to push 
                                                     
178 The annual reports of UNDP regarding DIAG offer illuminating insights into the 
failures of disarmament programming in Afghanistan: UNDP, 2006; UNDP, 2011, p. 21. 
179 There are evidently weapons still stored in the area given the fact that a stash of 
fifty weapons were uncovered and handed over to the police just before the field 
research began. LL-1-10 20th and 21st October 2010, Mushwani. 
180 EA-1-1 12th October 2010, Aqa Sarai and LL-1-10 20th and 21st October 2010, 
Mushwani. 
181 NL-1-1 13th October 2010, Kabul. 
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for progress through the political system and administration of the Afghan 
government, however slow and corrupt that may be.182 
The example of DIAG demonstrates the kinds of issues where the communities 
wanted to see change. The biggest issues were normally described as education, 
electricity and roads,183 all of which enable communities to develop themselves 
economically, and importantly, these were linked by respondents to stability. 
However, with the exception of education, most development projects were focused 
on other areas, and this was a source of frustration for the respondents who knew 
there had been substantial road building in Kabul (and often rebuilding of existing 
roads)184 as well as improved electricity supply. This is also significant in the two case 
study villages which lie at opposite sides of the brick making area of Kalakan. There 
was a very clear link made by participants between economic development and 
stability, and they felt that the lack of support for sectors such as light industry (which 
requires electricity) and transport infrastructure (so they could export their produce) 
was quite negative.185 Their main frustration was the slow pace of development which 
was not allowing them to achieve their personal goals186 – as noted in the earlier 
chapter the notions of progress and improvement seem to be linked to understanding 
present stability. The lack of achievement in this area meant that development was 
largely seen as being ineffective in supporting stability. This is not to say that the 
respondents did not appreciate the projects – on the whole they did – it was an issue 
of their scale and impact.  
The other element which was significant in Kalakan was the fact that respondents did 
not have any particular concerns about who implemented development projects, 
although they were clear that the larger ones (electricity and roads) were generally 
under the purview of the state. As a result, the range of state, NGO, and international 
military interveners was generally not considered to be an issue, rather it was their 
styles of engagement and local participation which differed.187 There was a perception 
amongst the respondents that there was little community involvement or consultation 
in projects implemented by international military forces. They preferred, in principle, 
                                                     
182 LL-1-10 20th and 21st October 2010, Mushwani. 
183 LL-1-2 10th October 2010, Aqa Sarai, IN-1-11 25th October 2010, Kalakan, LL-1-5 
17th October 2010, Aqa Sarai, LL-1-10 20th and 21st October 2010, Mushwani. 
184 The author notes that several roads in and around central Kabul have been 
repaired and re-laid on several occasions. 
185 LL-1-6 18th October 2010, Kalakan. 
186 LL-1-10 20th and 21st October 2010, Mushwani. 
187 LL-1-1 10th October 2010, Aqa Sarai, LL-1-2 10th October 2010, Aqa Sarai, EA-1-1 
12th October 2010, Aqa Sarai, IN-1-11 25th October 2010, Kalakan, LL-1-5 17th 
October 2010, Aqa Sarai. 
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the approach of the NSP, which allowed the community greater flexibility and 
responsibility, but that did not mean they were against a range of implementers 
working in their area.188 
Economic growth 
The final area of discussion is economic growth. Kalakan and the broader region have 
undoubtedly benefitted from the overspill of Kabul’s economic bubble associated with 
the influx of foreign capital and the burgeoning narco-economy, which have both 
fuelled construction and consumption.189 Kalakan’s residents have gradually rebuilt 
their houses in the last decade and expanded and diversified their income streams. 
Some Kalakanis work in government service whilst others have migrated to Kabul for 
work in the private sector. Those remaining in Kalakan have been able to support 
themselves through a mixture of agriculture, paid labour and cash for work on 
development projects providing a degree of livelihood sustainability.190 These are all 
long-term components of Kalakan’s economy and provide the backbone to the 
population’s livelihood.  
However, economic growth and expansion has come through two sectors, localised 
exports of the grape harvest,191 and the production of bricks from batis established in 
the last five years.192 The twenty or so batis supply the Kabul construction trade and 
provide substantial employment with each stack employing several hundred 
people.193 Though many of the bati owners are not from Kalakan a number are, and 
many of the other capital investors are politically associated with the elite of the Koh 
Daman, meaning that capital investors and wage labourers come from the same 
                                                     
188 LL-1-7 19th October 2010, Kabul, LL-1-14 13th November 2010, Mushwani. 
189 Analysis from the World Bank suggests consumption and the licit agricultural sector 
have been the main engines of growth since 2003, with construction playing a smaller 
role, though it is dominant in Kalakan itself (World Bank, 2011, p. 4). The opium 
economy has continued to grow and is currently worth $1.4bn or 9% of GDP (UNODC, 
2011). 
190 EA-1-3 14th October 2010, Aqa Sarai. 
191 Though at the time of research the 2010 harvest had been affected by blight and 
was unlikely to provide significant income; author observation and discussion with 
local respondents. 
192 One of the batis is owned by Haji Dawood Kalakani MP. LL-1-7 19th October 2010, 
Kabul and LL-1-10 20th and 21st October 2010, Mushwani. 
193 Local estimates ranged from 2,000 to 4,000 male employees, given that the 
estimated population is approximately 18,000, half the population are male, and half 
again are of working age (18,000 halved to 9,000 and halved again to 4,500). So the 
level of potential employment in brick making in Kalakan is very high and whilst not all 
employees are from Kalakan respondents believed the majority were. LL-1-14 13th 
November 2010, Mushwani. 
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political system. Above all other development interventions the local respondents saw 
the batis as providing the best form of stability because it was long-term, sustainable 
and largely self-driven.194 
There are two significant findings from the discussion about development 
interventions in support of stability; the first regarding who implements projects and 
the second focusing on which activities seemed to promote stability and which do not. 
Firstly, the range of implementers in Kalakan, from state, to NGO and international 
military, was noted by the respondents and discussed at length. Whilst they prefer the 
consultative and participatory approaches of the NGOs they were not averse to 
accepting projects implemented and paid for by international military forces. The 
CIMIC projects may have had developmental impacts but have been weakly 
associated with stability formation, though they may have provided a low level hearts 
and minds impact. The slow progress in state-delivered projects including road 
construction and electricity supply were resented, but there is no suggestion that this 
would lead the communities to rise up against the state. Despite the lack of 
improvement in infrastructure local entrepreneurs have developed and expanded the 
brick making industry in the district, which provides substantial employment and, local 
pollution aside, was seen as one of the most stabilising elements of Kalakan.  
Secondly, there has been a wealth of humanitarian and development programming in 
Kalakan. The most significant element for stabilisation was humanitarian aid at the 
beginning of the period after the Taliban fell. Subsequent development activities, 
whether related to national programmes such as the NSP or DDR, or more ad-hoc 
programming on behalf of individual NGOs such as CPAU or military CIMIC teams, 
have been an added boon for the district. They are, however, considered by the 
respondents as being insufficient in addressing the long term stability of Kalakan. 
Instead respondents linked proper development to the provision of electricity, roads 
and education in order to support economic growth. Therefore social development 
activities, whether implemented by the military or development NGOs seem to be 
weakly linked to stability and challenge the component of the development 
hypothesis being tested as part of this research, which suggests that stability can be 
attained through social development processes. 
In summary, Kalakan has provided an example of indigenous stabilisation based upon 
local and regional political networks. In this context, exogenous stabilisation activities 
which support stabilisation through political interventions have largely been confined 
to a structuring role through national reforms and have allowed local political 
competition and governance to advance with little external oversight. Security 
interventions have been focused on DDR, and preparing the police to fight a COIN 
                                                     
194 LL-1-14 13th November 2010, Mushwani. 
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campaign through ISAF’s train and equip programme. In addition, military actors have 
been engaged in the development sphere, which has also included a number of state 
and non-governmental programmes and projects. However, development 
interventions need to be seen in the context of the more significant impact of early 
humanitarian interventions and ongoing long-term capital investment and growth. 
Thematic analysis – Kalakan 
This section provides an analysis of Kalakan’s experience of stability and stabilisation 
through the five analytical themes outlined in Chapter 3, which are rooted in the 
independent and dependent variables of the research design. The themes are 
couched in periods of stability across which the area experienced conflict and 
attempts at stabilisation. The themes of culture and context and the modes of 
intervention are drawn from the independent variables of the local political economy, 
the insurgency and the stabilisation interventions. The dependent variables of stability 
and legitimacy are discussed through political legitimacy at local and national levels 
and local conceptions of stability.  
The political economy of Kalakan, with its majority Tajik population who had resisted 
the state on numerous occasions, which had attained the singular achievement of 
placing a non-Pashtun on the throne in Kabul, lends the area a degree of self-belief 
and political consciousness which has continued to spawn national level political and 
military leaders. Its ability to turn significant periods of instability to its advantage in 
the post-2001 period and the close connections that local commanders have to the 
new administration have caused the community to benefit from some engagement by 
the state. This has been bolstered by the transfer of significant numbers of residents 
to the security forces of the newly formed ANA and ANP after their main military 
formation, Firqa 8, was demobilised in 2005. This reassertion of commander influence 
in the post-2001 period has worked with the grain of the Karzai administration which 
has seen a number of significant commanders and warlords achieving high office, and 
has re-established the power of the strongman which emerged during the Jihad in the 
1980s, except in the current period political competition has remained largely non-
violent. 
The localised stability experienced in Kalakan has been significantly structured by both 
local level and national political legitimacy. The higher level political agreements and 
networks which entwine the Koh Daman region link the district to the central 
government through an elected representative in Parliament, Dawood Kalakani.195 
                                                     
195 The electoral system means that Parliamentary candidates stand in provincial level 
constituencies rather than district level ones; therefore whilst provinces may be 
allocated a specific number of seats it is not assured that every district will be 
represented. 
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The combination of the regional political network and the connection to the centre 
presents a strong logic for the enduring stability of the region. However, other districts 
in the region demonstrate varying degrees of stability and Kalakan is seen to be the 
most stable because of the local response to addressing conflict era grievances. 
Kalakan has been through a number of significant destabilising events since 1978, the 
most significant of which were the internecine killings between the Jihadi groups in 
the 1980s and 1990s and the displacement of most of the population in the 1990s by 
the Taliban. These devastating events had seared themselves on the collective 
memory of the communities and their local political leadership, who perceived, 
correctly, that upon their return in 2001 they had to address outstanding grievances 
from the conflict period. This self-generated movement towards what external actors 
would call conflict resolution or transformation is instructive and indicates that former 
periods of extreme instability do not preclude the formation of stability, but are 
insufficient to generate engagement by all communities. This form of conflict 
resolution was not undertaken in other districts in the Koh Daman despite indigenous 
and exogenous attempts to do so. 
In this context of strong local and national political legitimacy the bewildering array of 
exogenous interventions that were undertaken in Kalakan had little connection to 
stability. This includes the majority of the development activities by NGOs and the 
military and the district level security support in police training. Exogenous actions 
relating to politics and the DDR component linked to stabilisation had a structuring 
effect but have largely allowed indigenous processes and political competition to 
arrange power in a way which provides stability (though there is some doubt about 
whether it could be termed democratic in the Western sense). Instead, the exogenous 
interventions that had the most relevance to stability were actions by humanitarian 
agencies in 2001-2 which stabilised the communities on their land. However, there 
was also a significant impact from the wider effects of the Kabul construction boom 
and expansion of the national opium economy which significantly expanded economic 
opportunities leading to long-term economic growth. 
The positive outlook on stability in Kalakan must not lead to assumptions that 
Kalakan’s stability is now secure; it is not, and in discussions about the future stability 
of the area the significance of indigenous stabilisation comes to the fore. There were 
deep concerns amongst some respondents about the future actions of the 
international community, in particular ISAF and the counterrevolution that will occur 
when ISAF forces leave. This is not because the respondents have daily interaction 
with ISAF (with the exception of the police training most Kalakanis do not interact 
with ISAF), but because they believe that ISAF provides, what a respondent in the 
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Karzai administration described as ‘macro stability’.196 There are concerns that when 
ISAF leaves, and more particularly, when the money is turned off, there will be war 
again in the Koh Daman. This was largely seen as coming from an external threat (i.e. 
the Taliban).197 Though there was an underlying current for the potential fighting 
between Jihadi groups who have currently agreed to carry out their political 
disagreements in a non-violent fashion.198 
The logical progression from this is that money flows around the Koh Daman and 
amongst the regional leadership allowing them to improve their positions, without 
resorting to zero-sum politics and undermining other commanders’ or competitors’ 
gains. This raises the concern that when the money stops the Taliban will return.199 
Therefore the noise of intervention – political, security or developmental – does not 
seem to have actually addressed what Kalakanis see as the biggest threat to stability 
which is the intervention itself, because they know it cannot continue forever. What 
the external intervention has allowed for is the space for indigenous processes to take 
root, but whether they can survive the transition of ISAF is yet to be seen.  
Herein lies the paradox of Kalakan’s stability: it was largely led by indigenous actors 
who formed multiple levels of engagement between themselves and the state and, 
despite their political differences and individual grievances, they agreed to pursue 
power and restitution non-violently. However this was only achieved in the shadow, 
or shade, of international intervention. This has provided macro stability to allow 
indigenous stabilisation at a sub-regional and district level. The main threat for 
Kalakan and Koh Daman, as for the rest of Afghanistan, is the removal of that macro 
stability as ISAF transitions out, and the money dries up. Despite improvements in the 
stability of the region over the last decade the threats on the horizon loom large. 
The significance of long term economic opportunities comes to the fore amongst local 
respondents’ conceptions of stability, which were primarily concerned with long-term 
incremental change, enabling them to provide better lives for their children. This 
would seem to suggest that development could be linked to stabilisation, though the 
respondents were hesitant to do so; instead they linked stability to long-term 
economic opportunity, represented within Kalakan by the batis. The second, more 
significant, component of stability was the agreement of ‘the people’ to work with the 
state, and for the state to respect and listen to the population. This is striking on the 
one hand because this is a largely self-generated understanding and on the other 
                                                     
196 IN-0-1 7th October 2010, Kabul. 
197 NL-1-1 19th October 2010, Kabul. 
198 NL-1-1 19th October 2010, Kabul; LL-1-7 19th October 2010, Kabul and LL-1-8 19th 
October 2010, Kabul. 
199 NL-1-1 19th October 2010, Kabul. 
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because several of the interventions on SSR, such as the DDR programme, and 
ongoing police training, were poorly linked to promoting these linkages. Instead they 
tried to degrade the networks of commanders that provide stability in the region 
through disarmament or provide training to the police in paramilitary survival 
strategies rather than population-focused policing, which is what the population were 
interested in.  
In summary, the analytical themes indicate that while discrete humanitarian 
interventions were important in providing a platform for stability to emerge, the 
stability that exists in Kalakan is the result of local conflict resolution processes 
bringing people closer to one another and the state, within the overarching 
framework of a regional political settlement. If this hypothesis is accurate it would 
suggest that other interventions aimed at promoting stability, including many of the 
development activities, and elements of the political and security interventions, are 
less significant. 
Theoretical analysis 
This analysis now allows the theories outlined in Chapter 2 to be tested, which include 
statebuilding, COIN and development. The statebuilding theory200 suggests that both 
political and economic reform processes are required for stability. While it is accurate 
to say that statebuilding as a process of political interventions affects stability and has 
played a structuring role it is not clear that the model espoused by the international 
community, which is that of democratic governance, would be any more stable than 
another political configuration that allowed certain basic freedoms. Exogenous 
political interventions have had only a structuring role rather than an implementing 
one, and local conceptions of democracy, governance and politics do not conform to 
Liberal forms of governance. 
Returning to the prelude at the beginning of the chapter, there are clearly localised 
indigenous political visions which are more relevant to the stability of Kalakan and the 
Koh Daman region than the centrally mandated electoral processes and constitution 
making. The monthly newspaper, Habib-ul Islam, and the establishment of the Koh 
Daman Shura, provide examples of indigenous processes which attempt to unify the 
region as a political bloc. This re-visioning of Afghan society and politics is important 
because it reflects changes that have been seen in practice over the last decade in the 
Shomali plain and it highlights two important facets of Kalakan’s stabilisation. There is 
the importance of a coherent political vision – one that reaches back to the historical 
example of Habibullah Khan in 1929 mentioned in the prelude to this chapter – but 
critically this is supported by a vision of Afghanistan that is free from external 
                                                     
200 See Dobbins, 2007, p. 1 quoted on p. 47. 
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interference. The imposition of democratic governance then is weakly associated with 
this vision which explicitly criticises exogenous interventions. 
While there was no ongoing insurgent activity in Kalakan at the time of research, 
many of the respondents had been insurgents in earlier conflicts and warily watched 
developments in other parts of the country. The importance of COIN theory201 to the 
discussion about Kalakan focuses primarily on the nature and intent of a revolutionary 
form of conflict. The conception of COIN, which underpins the overall ISAF 
deployment in Afghanistan, is one of revolution: to remould a society which can resist 
the overtures of insurgent forces. However, this seems to be weakly associated with 
the two main modes of engagement in the security sphere, which are aimed at 
promoting stability. On the one hand the DDR programme did not provide 
development benefits to many of those engaged in Firqa 8, instead many ended up in 
other parts of the security forces or private economy, which may promote stability but 
is incidental to the programme. On the other hand ongoing training is preparing the 
ANP in Kalakan to fight an insurgency, which may not be relevant to the local security 
concerns of the population. Given the communities’ experiences of Taliban rule it is 
unlikely that they would do anything but violently resist Taliban overtures. As a result 
the application of a COIN model in Kalakan seems irrelevant to stability. 
The sentiment embodied in development theory202 is that both economic and social 
development is required to promote stability. It says little about the significance of 
humanitarian aid, which in the case of Kalakan, seems to have been the most 
significant locally implemented exogenous intervention. By ignoring humanitarian 
action, development theory overstates the importance of some activities and ignores 
others. Furthermore, the implication of the theory is also that development is a 
positive change and that interventions labelled as development would therefore have 
a positive impact. This has not been evident in Kalakan whose stability has not been 
driven by exogenous interventions which have built culverts, wells, schools and clinics 
and have tended to support social development; instead, economic development has 
come from indigenous investment in the brick kilns. Combined humanitarian aid and 
economic growth has stabilised the population, not the social development actions of 
the NGO community and CIMIC teams, and although their interventions may have had 
developmental or hearts and minds impacts they are weakly linked to stabilisation. 
In summary, this analysis suggests that the theories of intervention across 
statebuilding, COIN and development provide weak explanatory value in 
understanding the nature of stabilisation in Kalakan and the way in which respondents 
view and experience stability.  
                                                     
201 See JP3-24, 2009, p. I2 quoted on p. 53. 
202 See USIP, 2009, p. 2.9 quoted on p. 55 
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Conclusion 
Kalakan’s story of indigenous stabilisation demonstrates the comparative weakness of 
exogenous interventions at a sub-district level to promote stability. Whilst the 
interventions were not resisted, and in many cases were welcomed, they were not of 
significant scale to alter substantially the political economy of the district or its 
stability. Exogenous activity in the political sphere was almost non-existent, which 
allowed a relationship of trust to emerge between the local government 
representatives and the local population. 
Importantly, the relationship was based on the state treating the local population 
fairly and with respect; in turn the population or their leaders gave consent for the 
government to function i.e. local political legitimacy. In addition, the previous 
experiences of violent destruction and mass dislocation seem to have reduced the 
appetite of the population and their elders to violently resist the state. The fact that 
there is growing local political legitimacy does not mean the population and the state 
necessarily agree with the current democratic system, nor have they necessarily 
benefitted in the ways which they would like (i.e. electricity and road construction). 
External humanitarian support was stabilising but the majority of exogenous 
developmental activity has had little or no impact on stability because it focused on 
social development. Stability has however been maintained by on-going indigenous 
investment in economic development. 
Kalakan’s experience is instructive for stabilisation interventions because it highlights 
the ways in which internal processes can be as strong, or possibly stronger, than 
exogenous activity in promoting stability; however, it also reveals the primary 
weakness in Kalakan’s stability – that it was brought about through the macro stability 
(i.e. country level) of the international intervention. This allowed Kalakan, its elders 
and regional leaders, to compete non-violently. So despite local stabilisation being 
achieved by indigenous means, exogenous intervention also played a structuring role 
in attaining and maintaining stability. The challenge in the future will be to maintain 
stability in the face of changes to the ISAF deployment until 2014. 
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Chapter 5 – Exogenous Stabilisation 
Nahr-i Sarraj, Helmand province, Afghanistan 
 
Figure 6 Map of Helmand Province WFP 
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Prelude 
“What I want is cooperation from [the] government with us. If there was no foreigner 
in Afghanistan I would never leave my village. Now foreigners are in our country. 
Whenever they fight they shoot everyone including women, children, old people and 
everyone.  
Now foreigners’ presence in our country is just like the story of Hindu. Once there was 
a snake in a Hindu’s house. He told his son to go and find a Muslim to kill this snake. 
We will pay him 2000 if he wants 1000, 5,000 if he wanted 2000 and 10,000 if he 
asked for 5,000, as long as he kills the snake.  
His son went out and saw a Muslim man walking in that area. He told the man that 
there was a snake in their house and his father wanted him to kill the snake. The man 
asked how much will you pay for killing that snake? The boy said my father will pay 
you good money but didn’t tell him the amount. The man went and killed the snake. 
Then he was paid and he left the house. 
When the Muslim man went out, the wife of the owner of that house became angry 
and told her husband that why did you do that? I could kill the snake, you could kill it 
and even our son could do this. Why did you ask a Muslim to do this and paid him? The 
Hindu man said you don’t know about what I did. In fact neither the Muslim nor the 
snake were my friends, so I got a Muslim to kill the snake because whoever was killed 
between them I would be very happy. 
Now the same is happening with the Americans. When they throw bombs on an area 
they don’t care who gets killed in the bombardment. Our own military forces and even 
the Taliban know which people are civilians and they don’t kill the civilians. But the 
Americans do not care who gets killed in their fight, either Taliban or civilians. Even 
they kill our security forces and call it a mistake. 
We all want peace and security in our country. Karzai is also this country’s son and he 
is from Qandahar. We want him to remain President of this country but we want the 
foreigners to leave our country so we can go back to our area and live there like when 
we had a simple life before. We will never forget those places where we have spent 
many years of our life.”203 
Nahr-i Sarraj and exogenous stabilisation  
The case of Village A in Nahr-i Sarraj district highlights the limitations of exogenous 
stabilisation when it is far beyond local political will and the physical capabilities of the 
host nation. Periods of stability have been experienced in Village A and the wider 
district, most recently under the Taliban government until 2001, but those 
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experiences are in marked contrast to the exogenous interventions across the 
political, security and development lines of operation which have had a number of 
intended and unintended consequences. In particular this chapter highlights the 
disconnect between technical governance innovations and systems led by civilian 
reformers at national, provincial and even district levels with military-led village level 
stabilisation activities.  
The post-2001 story of Nahr-i Sarraj can best be described as the ongoing competition 
for the will of the people between three governments: the Government of the Islamic 
Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA), ISAF and the Taliban.204 ISAF believed they were 
acting to support GIRoA but it is a sentiment not shared by many respondents and the 
state itself had little inclination to support stability because it was captured by local 
actors. Therefore ISAF and the government, to some, were like a snake and a scorpion 
fighting,205 whilst others thought ISAF was using the population to fight its own war as 
in the prelude, where ISAF was using one enemy (the Muslim) to kill another (the 
snake).  
From 2001 to 2005 the abusive actions of the Jihadi leaders who took over the state 
apparatus in Helmand opened up opportunities for insurgent leaders to re-group and 
prepare for violent resistance. The perception was that international forces in 
Helmand supported Governor Akhunzada and other Jihadi leaders who persecuted 
their opponents leading the local population to conclude ISAF was supporting an 
abusive regime.206 This was coupled by the national DDR programme, which disarmed 
the AMF in Helmand before the deployment of sufficient ANA forces. To address the 
industrial scale insurgency that took hold from 2006 there was a massive increase in 
the international military deployments to the province, which by 2009 had settled on 
a population-centric COIN concept of operations. In this context stability was seen as a 
critical element to meet the goal of promoting the Afghan state to contain the 
insurgency and drug economy. 
Interviews for this chapter were carried out in Kabul, in person and by phone, with 
respondents in Village A, Nahr-i Sarraj and Lashkar Gah between September and 
December 2010. The respondents included a range of village, district, provincial and 
national political leaders; former and current government officials; local 
                                                     
204 This point is not lost on interveners who stated that at times since 2001 the local 
population have relied more on Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) and ISAF for 
basic services rather than the Afghan government (IN-2-3 9th December 2010, Kabul). 
205 LL-2-4 8th December 2010, Gereshk. 
206 Though in reality this was more mixed: US forces also supported other leaders who 
provided information which led to associates of the Governor being sent to 
Guantanamo Bay (Martin, Forthcoming). 
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representatives of the Taliban; economic actors (such as farmers and salaried staff of 
non-governmental organisations); and external interveners involved in stabilising the 
district at various stages between 2006 and 2010. In total twenty-five interviews were 
carried out with twenty-seven respondents, twenty Afghans and seven external 
actors; with one exception all the Afghan respondents were male, and were from a 
number of tribal groups and sub-groups, including the Barakzai, Noorzai, Ishaqzai and 
Popalzai. Local respondents from Village A specifically asked that the name of their 
village not be used in the thesis. As described in the methodology chapter data 
collection was focused on the period up to the end of 2010. The researcher worked in 
Helmand during spring 2012 and some contextual information has been added though 
it is not directly used in the analysis. 
Conflict history 
Nahr-i Sarraj district lies to the north of the provincial capital, Lashkar Gah, and is 
bisected by Highway 1 which runs through the district capital of Gereshk. The 
provincial capital was moved from Gereshk to Lashkar Gah and the province renamed 
Helmand in 1964 under US pressure as the Helmand Arghandab Valley Authority 
(HAVA) headquarters were there.207 Gereshk has remained the economic hub of the 
province and is economically more important than Lashkar Gah. The district includes a 
number of tribal groups and within Village A alone there are Barakzai, Noorzai, 
Popalzai, Alikozai and Achakzai people, and there are also small communities of 
Hazara and Shia Tajiks in other parts of the district.  
The district is split roughly into three main populated zones: firstly, the district centre, 
which is a municipality, as the economic and administrative hub; secondly, the areas 
on or near the road to Lashkar Gah and areas lying between the Helmand river and 
Nahr-i Bughra canal to the west of Gereshk; and finally, the area straddling the 
Helmand River to the north and north-east along the roads to the districts of Sangin, 
Kajaki and Musa Qala. This chapter focuses on the district centre, Gereshk, and Village 
A, which lies along one of the roads between Highway 1 and Sangin to the north. 
Some of the respondents were from Malgir, which lies in the southern region of Nahr-i 
Sarraj towards Lashkar Gah, however interviews with those respondents focused on 
their current activities in the district centre. 
                                                     
207 Though the main beneficiary areas of Helmand are not the focus of this chapter it is 
worth noting that the US funded development process related to the creation of the 
irrigation system and the resettlement of nomadic groups significantly complicated 
social and tribal relations in Helmand making it more difficult to govern in the long-
term (Martin, 2011, p. 26; Cullather, 2002, pp. 532-7). 
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For much of its history Nahr-i Sarraj has been on the margins between two major 
power centres: Herat in the west and Kandahar in the south of Afghanistan.208 During 
the Jihad and subsequent civil war (1979-1994) the district often experienced 
substantial fighting. As in other areas of Afghanistan there was ongoing and sustained 
competition for resources between elder networks and political tanzims to carry out 
the Jihad against the Russians and Afghan communist forces.209 At least six of the 
seven main Islamist parties had a presence in the district, including Hizb-i Islami, 
Harakat-i Inqilab-i Islami, Ittihad-i Islami, Mahaz-i Milli, Jamiat-i Islami and Jabha-i 
Nejat-i Milli; in Village A four tanzims were present: Hizb-i Islami, Harakat-i Inqilab-i 
Islami, Jamiat-i Islami and Jabha-i Nejat-i Milli.210 Affiliation to parties was not decided 
simply along tribal lines. In Village A, as elsewhere in Afghanistan, commanders and 
their subordinates shifted allegiances for a number of reasons throughout the 
conflict.211 During the Jihad and the period of the Rabbani government (1992-1994) 
governance fragmented and elder-commanders asserted local control whilst a 
substantial proportion of the population fled to Pakistan.212 As a result of social 
dislocation and the deaths of a number of the elders individuals who would not 
normally have been considered for leadership attained power and authority often at 
quite a young age.213 
Services were badly affected, with education transferred from the state-run schools to 
madrassas where they could function. Village A used to have a school, built in the 
period of Zahir Shah,214 and local religious leaders took over teaching responsibilities, 
turning it into a madrassa or using the other madrassas in the village.215 Only two 
                                                     
208 From 1867 the province immediately to the north-west was Farah en-route to 
Herat. 
209 LL-2-1 15th November 2010, Kabul and LL-2-4 8th December 2010, Gereshk. 
Though there were overlapping forms of mobilisation in essence the early resistance 
movements were generated by elders and landowners on the one hand representing 
traditional Afghan leadership and on the other political organisations that either 
became armed entities or developed armed wings to prosecute the Jihad e.g. Jamiat-i 
Islami or Hizb-i Islami (Roy, 1985, pp. 127-134). 
210 LL-2-1 14th and 15th November 2010, Kabul: some of the tanzims also split into 
factions, including Hizb-i Islami, both of whose factions were present in Helmand. 
211 LL-2-1 15th November 2010, Kabul and LL-2-4 8th December 2010, Gereshk; 
Dorronsoro, 2000, pp. 147-9. 
212 LL-2-1 15th November 2010, Kabul: the majority of refugees returned to the district 
during the Taliban period and by 2002 the number of displaced individuals registered 
with UNHCR in Pakistan was 2,458 or less than 3% of the district’s population (Martin, 
2011, p. 43; UNHCR, 2002, p. 1). 
213 LL-2-4 8th December 2010, Gereshk. 
214 LL-2-1 15th November 2010, Kabul. 
215 LL-2-1 14th and 18th November 2010, Kabul. 
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state schools were listed in Nahr-i Sarraj in 2005: one of them in Mirmandow and 
another in Yakhchal which together had a paltry 701 male students.216 The old state 
school in Village A is not listed and the local respondents did not say it was 
functioning; it doesn’t appear on GIS maps from the PRT.217 Village A never had a 
health centre and the remaining health centres in the district effectively ceased to 
function during the conflict. There was some support from independent American or 
Pakistani medical practitioners during the Jihad and civil war but serious cases were 
transferred to the Sherpoor Hospital in Quetta, Pakistan.218  
The district centre of Gereshk relies on its position on the main Highway 1 for goods 
transiting from Pakistan and India to Herat in the north-west and Iran. Village A relies 
on the production of a range of crops including wheat, opium and various vegetables, 
and has access to a number of canal sluice gates from the Helmand River and karez 
(underground water channels) for irrigation. More recently some residents have 
constructed private wells. In the past there had been a collaborative effort from 
residents along the canal, at least up to Sangin, to clean and maintain the irrigation 
system, but it fell into disrepair because of the conflict.219 The significance of the canal 
irrigation system is not that it provides for subsistence agriculture but that it supports 
the lucrative production of opium as a cash crop.  
It is difficult to underestimate the significance of the opium economy in Helmand, 
whose production in 2011 was worth an estimated $600m (Pounds & Dennys, 2012, p. 
27). Opium was a traditional crop in northern Helmand before the Soviet invasion, but 
under the direction of Mullah Nasim it became not only a way of financing the fight 
against the Communist government but an object of conflict between the Mujahideen 
                                                     
216 Education Management Information System, Ministry of Education, 2004 (held by 
author). The population of the district was estimated to be over 166,000 in the 
household listing survey, with the school aged population being approximately 40% of 
the overall population, the potential school population in Nahr-i Sarraj would be 
approximately 66,000 students (UNFPA, 2004, pp. 2, 9). Anecdotal evidence from 
respondents and from UNHCR reporting in 2002 suggests that there were more 
schools operating and up to 6,600 students in school. (UNHCR, 2002, p. 2). The 
discrepancy is most likely a reflection of the continued use of some private schooling 
and gaps in the Ministry’s monitoring system. 
217 Data held by author, and EA-2-2 4th December 2010, Gereshk and EA-2-5 6th 
December 2010, Gereshk: interestingly the Afghan respondents in Village A did not 
discuss education projects in general, not just in Village A, where activity was absent 
from their responses. Instead they focused their discussions on health projects, 
implying possibly that these were more significant to them, or simply that they knew 
about these projects primarily and not others.  
218 LL-2-1 15th November 2010, Kabul. 
219 LL-2-1 14th November 2010, Kabul. 
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parties itself. Opium allowed Mullah Nasim to cultivate links to international 
smuggling networks and he was effectively independent from Harakat-i Inqilab-i 
Islami, the tanzim to which he nominally subscribed, because unlike most 
commanders he did not rely on foreign assistance from the ISI, CIA or Saudi Arabia to 
finance his operations (Martin, 2011, pp. 34-5; Peters, 2009, p. 7). The search for 
independent financing was not simply to gain independence, but to reduce reliance on 
funding from KhAD, the PDPA’s intelligence organisation, who had funded Mullah 
Nasim to fight Hizb-i Islami since 1980 (Martin, Forthcoming).  
Nasim’s nephew is the former Provincial Governor Sher Mohammad Akhunzada, who 
exploited his governance position to continue the family’s attempts to exploit the 
opium economy by, for example, using government property to store some nine tons 
of opium in 2005 which he had stolen from Mualem Mir Wali (Blanchard, 2008, p. 14; 
Martin, Forthcoming). Nahr-i Sarraj’s own production of opium is not on the industrial 
scale found in neighbouring districts but Gereshk’s bazaar is central to Helmand’s 
opium economy because it lies on the main highway connecting Herat and Kandahar 
as well as the roads north from the city, past Village A, and benefits from producers 
and smugglers spending some of their profits in consumption (Dressler J. A., 2009, p. 
25). As well as connections between government officials and the drug economy there 
has been consistent reporting that Taliban commanders have also benefitted from the 
opium trade through levying taxes and providing protection to smuggling convoys 
confirming its significance to the conflict dynamic in Helmand (Peters, 2009, pp. 17-
21). 
Aside from opium-related conflicts, there were an unspecified number of killings 
during the conflict within and between the communities and several occurred in 
Village A. The conflicts were not always addressed at the time, though some, with the 
help of local commanders, religious leaders and elders were addressed through the 
use of Pashtunwali codes of jurisprudence.220 There was some sense in the ‘period of 
the tanzims’ during the 1980s and 1990s that the commanders acted as a kind of 
police force, who would detain suspects for justice to be delivered by the local 
religious leaders or elders at a village level, but there was also an Attorney based at 
Gereshk appointed by local commander Mualem Mir Wali.221 An Alizai commander 
became Sar Ketab (Head Scribe) of Gereshk after Najibullah’s government collapsed in 
1993, and a commander from Hizb-i Islami (Khalis Faction), Sher Mohammad, became 
                                                     
220 This is significant because later Taliban conflict resolution promoted Sharia 
jurisprudence. 
221 LL-2-1 14th November 2010, Kabul and NL-2-1 11th and 15th December 2010, 
Kabul: the Attorney’s name was Mawlawi Mohammad Alem. 
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the Chief of Police.222 However, the tanzims and former government militias could not 
peacefully agree how to govern the area and eventually after several years of conflict 
and in-fighting Rasoul Akhunzada (Nasim’s brother), and his brother Ghaffour, 
managed to provide some stability by providing sufficient security enabling refugees 
to return (Martin, 2011, p. 44; Nojumi, 2002, pp. 135-6; Davis, 1998, p. 44). 
In 1994 the Taliban emerged from neighbouring Kandahar and whilst they had 
managed to secure the peaceful withdrawal of Ghaffour Akhunzada’s forces from 
Lashkar Gah to Musa Qala, their subsequent demand for him to disarm was rebuffed 
and intense fighting ensued. Ghaffour was defeated and fled to Ghor, but he returned 
to Helmand as part of Ismail Khan’s forces from Herat and for a week in March 1995 
succeeded in retaking much of Helmand, including Gereshk. After 2,000 of their men 
were captured, Ismail Khan and Ghaffour returned in August and managed to re-take 
Gereshk again as well as Musa Qala. The ensuing Taliban counter-attack, which 
included the forces of the 93rd Division, at that time led by Rais Baghrani, may have 
been supported by Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) agency and the Pakistan 
military, left Ismail Khan’s forces overextended and ultimately led to the Taliban 
capture of Herat in the autumn of 1995 (Martin, 2011, p. 44; Nojumi, 2002, pp. 145-8; 
Davis, 1998, p. 44). 
The Taliban system of governance co-opted some but not all of the existing local 
leadership; for example they forced out some of the provincial and district level 
commanders including Haji Qadir (Popalzai) and Mualem Mir Wali (Barakzai), formerly 
a militia commander with Hizb-i Islami who switched sides in 1990 to become the 
commander of a government militia called the 93rd Division (Martin, 2011, pp. 38-40). 
In Village A most of the elders were allowed to stay as were some of the low level 
commanders or those out of the fight, and they took a lower profile in local 
governance.223 This left many of the elder-commander relationships intact with the 
additional element of Taliban affiliated representatives from amongst the same 
communities. This is an important example of governance co-option where local 
leaders were largely kept in place and only more senior opponents were forced to 
leave.224 In Village A the Taliban period also precipitated a shift in local power towards 
                                                     
222 LL-2-1 14th November 2010, Kabul and NL-2-1 11th and 15th December 2010, 
Kabul: note this is not Sher Mohammad Akhunzada, who fought with Harakat-i 
Inqilab-i Islami 
223 For example one of the former Sar Groups (Group Head, normally a unit of up to 
thirty combatants) who was aligned to Gulbuddin Hekmetyar’s Hizb-i Islami was 
injured at some point in the conflict and was allowed to remain in the village despite 
being aligned to both an opposing tanzim as well as an opposing tribal group. LL-2-1 
14th and 15th November 2010, Kabul.  
224 LL-2-1 17th November 2010, Kabul. 
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religious leadership. If the Jihadi period can be characterised as producing a shift in 
power to the local commanders (many of whom would not otherwise have become 
leaders),225 the Taliban period shifted power towards another group of previously less 
empowered local leaders, the religious elite.226  
Local respondents tended to look back on the Taliban rule in the 1990s as stable.227 
The improved stability brought the return of a few refugees from Pakistan. UNHCR 
figures indicate they assisted 1,549 families from Helmand to return from 1996-1999; 
however, because of poor economic opportunities and degraded local infrastructure 
(in particular the irrigation systems) some refugees remained in Pakistan (UNHCR, 
2000). Several respondents noted the lack of services, which meant it was necessary 
to access health care in Pakistan, though there were some Arab and Pakistani doctors 
operating locally.228 Despite the lack of jobs, services and prospects, respondents 
referred to the ‘tight security’ or ‘tight government’ during the Taliban period and the 
fact they had freedom of movement.229  
The post-2001 period can be broken into two main stages; the first running from 2001 
to the deployment of UK forces in 2006, and the second running from 2006-2010. 
During the initial period after 2001 there was a rapid change in local leadership. Some 
of the provincial and district Jihadi leaders sided with Jamiat-i Islami, who played a 
central role in the campaign to oust the Taliban, in an effort to bolster their positions. 
The fall of the Taliban in Gereshk and Village A was not precipitated by fighting; rather 
the local Taliban leadership melted away, some across the border to Pakistan, whilst 
many others simply went home.230 The Taliban commander for Gereshk, Mullah 
Mohammad Azam Akhund (Noorzai), called a meeting before leaving the area where 
                                                     
225 In other parts of Helmand the leadership of Mullah Mohd Nabi and Sher Mohd 
Akhunzada’s father may have given greater power to Helmandi religious leaders than 
was generally experienced by religious leaders in other parts of the country. 
226 This view was complicated by the background of those who described it. A 
commander-elder suggested little changed in the position of the religious elite, 
maintaining they had always been central to decision making (LL-2-1 17th November 
2010, Kabul); others more sympathetic to the Taliban suggested they had attained 
new levels authority (LL-2-5 13th December 2010, Nahr-i Sarraj). The fact that the 
elder-commander also suggested that the Taliban take over precipitated the 
departure of some other commanders (including himself), would suggest that the 
takeover did represent a substantial shift, even if the respondent did not wish to 
recognise it.  
227 LL-2-1 15th November 2010, Kabul; also see Martin, 2011, p. 44. 
228 LL-2-1 15th November 2010, Kabul. 
229 LL-2-1 15th November 2010, Kabul. 
230 LL-2-1 15th November 2010, Kabul 
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he redistributed money the Taliban had collected for projects and distributed 
weapons to the elders.231  
The Jihadi leadership of Helmand, including Sher Mohammad Akhunzada (Alizai), Dad 
Mohammed (Alikozai), Abdur Rahman Jan (Noorzai) and Mir Wali (Barakzai) took over 
provincial government positions, respectively the Provincial Governor, Chief of NDS, 
Chief of Police and Head of 93rd Division, a unit within the AMF, which was on the 
MoD payroll.232 There were a few remnants of the Taliban leadership who managed to 
transfer to the new governance system, including the Chief of Policy Haji Mohammad 
Khan, and Mualem Ibrahim. However they ended up being forced into violent 
opposition resulting either in their detention (for Haji Mohammad Khan) or they were 
killed by ISAF (Mualem Ibrahim).233  
Several Afghan respondents spoke of the initial period as one of great expectation 
where the population wanted engagement by the state to better their situation (for 
example improving livelihoods, education or health). What they experienced instead 
was a systematic marginalisation of the former Taliban leadership – rather than 
governance co-option, they faced a governance system enforced by brutality. External 
patronage, through cash payments for intelligence, allowed local political leaders to 
provide false information against their erstwhile enemies in order to have them 
detained or killed and the heavy Western backing of these leaders effectively gave 
them carte blanche to behave in the way they did (Martin, Forthcoming). These were 
significant trends, because the defining experience of the respondents in Village A, of 
all political persuasions, was one of either neglect or abuse.234 Neglect in the fact that 
there was little or no government engagement on the one hand and on the other 
hand those that had connections to the Taliban or were political enemies of the newly 
empowered Jihadi elite faced persecution. In the view of the residents of Village A the 
government was resolutely and consistently not in Nahr-i Sarraj to serve the people. 
By 2004 the picture started to change; for some time the former Taliban leaders felt 
that they had enough freedom of movement to move back into the villages, including 
Village A, and they re-established contact with their supporters.235 The level of 
government interaction fell rapidly after the Presidential election in 2004, where the 
local population were able to go to Gereshk to meet campaigners for President Karzai 
and the Parliamentary election the following year when the local population did not 
                                                     
231 LL-2-1 15th November 2010, Kabul. 
232 Interview IN-2-4 20th July 2011, Copenhagen; NL-2-1 11th and 15th December 
2010, Kabul (Gopal, 2010).  
233 LL-2-4 8th December 2010, Gereshk and Kennedy, 2010.  
234 EA-2-1 3rd December 2010, Kabul and EA-2-3 5th December 2010, Gereshk. 
235 LL-2-1 15th November 2010, Kabul. 
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engage. 236 Three political and security factors may have contributed to this: firstly, 
the parliamentary election was of less political significance to the Karzai 
administration than the Presidential election and the previous Constitutional and 
Emergency Loya Jirgas (2003 and 2002 respectively) when the administration had 
reached out to ‘reliable’ local representatives to secure its position;237 secondly, the 
disbandment of 93rd Division, whose leader Mualem Mir Wali stood for the 
parliamentary elections in 2005, was exploited by Governor Akhunzada to disarm his 
erstwhile enemy and was interpreted by some Taliban combatants as an opportunity 
to increase their activities;238 thirdly, the withdrawal of Afghan forces under the 
military chain of command occurred in the context where only 250 of Helmand’s 
1,900 police did not report to parallel command structures outside the chain of 
command either to former Jihadi commanders or drug barons.239 In effect from 2005 
there was no Afghan security force that could be entrusted with the protection of the 
state and the administration was not interested in protecting what power it did have 
except with regard to opium; this situation was made worse after UK pressure led to 
the removal of Governor Akhunzada, who turned his militia over to the insurgency, 
which helped to precipitate a drawn out COIN campaign by ISAF to reclaim lost 
ground, a pattern repeated by Mualem Mir Wali and other Helmandi political leaders 
(McElroy, 2009; Martin, Forthcoming). 
In summary the conflict history of Nahr-i Sarraj suggests that there were previous 
experiences of stability during the Taliban era which involved a degree of governance 
co-option that allowed the return of some refugees from Pakistan. The post-2001 
environment promoted a governance model based on exclusion and abuse coupled 
with nationally mandated electoral processes which had little support outside the 
municipal areas. The state could not rely on any loyal security forces by the end of 
2005 because all the government forces had parallel informal command lines to 
malign actors (both within and outside government) which provided space for the 
insurgency to grow. In the context of the conflict, development activity had little 
bearing on stability except in the support provided to refugees to return home, and 
                                                     
236 LL-2-1 18th November 2010, Kabul. 
237 LL-2-1 18th November 2010, Kabul. 
238 EA-2-1 3rd December 2010, Kabul: interestingly some specific government officials, 
including Mir Wali, were restricted in their movements from an earlier stage, and Mir 
Wali also moved himself and his family to Kabul after taking up his Parliamentary seat 
in 2005 (LL-2-1 15th and 18th November 2010, Kabul). Others also note that the 
historical leadership of 93rd Division, which included Rais Baghrani, had meant that 
parts of the 93rd Division were coming under the patronage of the Taliban, further 
weakening Mir Wali’s command and control (Martin, Forthcoming). 
239 IN-2-4 20th July 2011, Copenhagen, and Schmidt, 2009, p. 26. 
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economic growth was spurred by the burgeoning opium economy which also 
contributed to violent competition. 
Stabilisation interventions 
The following section outlines the range of activities undertaken to support 
stabilisation in Nahr-i Sarraj and Village A since 2001 by the Afghan state and ISAF with 
a particular focus on activities from 2006-2010. Whilst acknowledging the crossover 
between the subsections it is split between political, security and development 
interventions in order to demonstrate the relative importance and weight of different 
types of activities. 
Political interventions to support stabilisation 
This subsection focuses on district and village level governance interventions relevant 
to Village A, and political power and authority in Nahr-i Sarraj. The data is presented 
by looking at two forms of political governance related intervention, but a brief 
introduction to the relevance and importance of the shura as a body around which 
exogenous stabilisation interventions were structured is provided first to give context. 
Traditionally one of the most significant elements of governance in Afghanistan has 
been the formation of provincial, district and village councils, commonly referred to as 
shuras. These shuras provide a number of functions and can be both formal and 
informal. Examples of informal shuras include village level water shuras, led by the 
local Mir Aw (Lord of Water) or the Koh Daman Shura discussed in the preceding 
chapter, which provides a regional platform for political leaders of that area. Their 
central role in decision making has meant that they have also been seized upon by 
international interveners as ways of structuring Afghan sub-national governance, 
which has been hampered by a lack of coherent government policy (World Bank, 
2007, p. xiii; Nixon, 2008, pp. 55-6). In part this is the result of the perceived need to 
promote ‘good governance’ linked to the statebuilding agenda, but it is also tied to 
the prosecution of the COIN campaign by providing a viable alternative to Taliban 
governance systems that were established from 2004 - 2005. An added frustration, 
from the perspective of interveners, has been the perpetual postponing of district 
level elections and the unwillingness, or inability, of the Karzai administration to 
improve local governance; as a result exogenous governance interventions to support 
shuras were seen to be filling a void.  
In the context of Nahr-i Sarraj and Village A the external interveners concerned with 
stabilisation saw the engagement and establishment of shuras as one of their key 
lessons i.e. that community participation is necessary for a successful local buy-in.240 
                                                     
240 IN-0-1 7th October 2010, Kabul, IN-2-3 9th December 2010, Kabul, IN-2-9 3rd 
December 2010, Washington and IN-2-4 20th July 2011, Copenhagen. Others have 
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This is a lesson that the non-governmental sector learnt some time ago and an area 
where the implementation experience of NGOs has influenced mainstream Liberal 
thinking about statebuilding.241 However, unlike the ad-hoc local arrangements that 
the NGO community has espoused the stabilisation approach has been dominated by 
two competing demands: the first is formal governance promotion which focuses on 
process and local elections implemented at the provincial or district level, and the 
second is informal governance promotion at a village level, which was implemented 
through military teams from Forward Operating Bases (FOBs) and Patrol Bases (PBs). 
External interveners argued that both levels of activity were part of stabilisation, 
though there is no agreement about the relative importance of each approach, with 
those based in the districts favouring working with at times unique district and sub-
district networks; and those working at provincial or national levels favouring more 
rigid, systematic approaches using formal elections.242 
Formal governance approaches to sub-national governance focused on building 
institutions and included the creation of Provincial Councils, District Development 
Assemblies, and the Afghanistan Social Outreach Programme (ASOP) shuras, which in 
Helmand were carried out through District Community Councils (DCC).243 These bodies 
were almost entirely funded by international actors, centrally or locally. Each body 
was created separately and did not have mutually reinforcing mandates, which 
contributed to the idea that there were three governments in Helmand, though there 
were extensive attempts to encourage coordination (Nixon, 2008, pp. iv-v; Martin, 
Forthcoming).  
From 2006 civilian activity focused on working through the Provincial Council and 
other provincial bodies in Lashkar Gah, whilst supporting military teams working at a 
district level at the Gereshk Municipality, District Council or with village councils, as in 
Village A.244 By 2008 there were also civilian district level stabilisation advisers working 
                                                                                                                                                          
questioned whether the civilian and military leadership within the ISAF deployment in 
Helmand have really understood local buy-in or see it as a box ticking exercise. (Martin, 
Forthcoming). 
241 There is a long tradition across the NGO sector which seeks to engage and 
empower local communities; some of the tools they use in the field include 
Participatory Rural Appraisal, which was developed in the 1980s (Chambers, 1994 , pp. 
957-8). 
242 IN-2-9 3rd December 2010, Washington, IN-0-4 28th November 2010, Kabul and 
IN-2-4 20th July 2011, Copenhagen. 
243 It should be noted that the ASOP was a national programme implemented in a 
number of provinces. Though the UK approach to ASOP in Helmand was distinct from 
other provinces predominately led by the US, this chapter does not seek to provide a 
comparison of the two approaches. 
244 IN-2-9 3rd December 2010, Washington. 
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on governance in Nahr-i Sarraj, but the first non-military background deployee was 
not in post until early 2009. The civilian advisers at that time worked with the formal 
structures, and the military with the informal because they had greater physical 
presence outside the district centre.245 By 2010 this broad split in engagement had 
been established, whereby civilian interveners led on governance engagement at both 
provincial and district levels though they also provided advisory support to military 
teams working at a village level.246 
There was a mixed response regarding the extension of formal governance systems 
which started in 2006. All formal governance interventions were coloured by higher 
level national issues connected to the Presidential (2009) and Parliamentary elections 
(2010). Both were marred by corruption in Helmand and there were allegations 
against Mualem Mir Wali in 2010 which were upheld. He was disqualified after 
securing the votes for his second term in the Wolesi Jirga.247 The allegations of 
corruption against the national bodies undermined confidence in Provincial level 
governance systems including the Provincial Council which in any case had no 
significant power and authority (Katzman, 2012, pp. 21-31, 39). Gereshk municipality 
was officially governed by a Mayor but it was difficult to get other stakeholders to 
work with Muhiadeen Alizai, a Tajik Shia, because he was politically isolated and 
vulnerable. His weakness may have contributed to the fact that his son was 
kidnapped, allegedly by the Taliban, and the Chief of Police in Gereshk, Dur Ali, paid 
the ransom to ensure he had leverage over the mayor.248 The Chief of Police is in 
many respects the real power holder in Gereshk, but most appointees only last a few 
months before being moved on, either because they have been outbid for the job or 
because other political factions want to increase their stake in Gereshk’s politics. 
Much of this jockeying for position is connected to the drugs trade rather than the 
need to police the district (Schmidt, 2009, p. 26). 
The failure of national, provincial and municipal governance systems to provide a 
responsive form of governance did not stop the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) 
in Helmand249 from designing new district level governance interventions. In an 
                                                     
245 IN-2-4 20th July 2011, Copenhagen. 
246 A similar split is noted by Gordon, 2011, p. 3. 
247 LL-2-6 13th December 2010, Lashkar Gah and NL-2-1 11th December 2010, Kabul: 
after the research was carried out, Mualem Mir Wali was re-instated in Parliament, 
though only after a strong and vociferous campaign against him and several other 
candidates (van Bijlert, 2011). 
248 IN-2-9 3rd December 2010, Washington and Martin, Forthcoming. 
249 The original PRT in Helmand had been established by the US; the UK PRT was 
established in 2006 and provided civilian leadership to the UK mission, and 
coordinated cross-departmental civilian and military interventions; this chapter does 
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attempt to support military operations in seven districts, local elections were held in 
Nahr-i Sarraj using a limited suffrage of elders who selected representatives to join the 
DCC.250 While there were concerns about the level of representation within the DCC in 
Gereshk, amongst the interveners it was given high priority up the chain of command 
by the PRT who viewed it as a critical component of stabilisation success in Helmand. 
Local respondents from within Gereshk and Village A were deeply sceptical of the 
representativeness of the DCC and the ability of the DCC to wield any influence.251 
Their scepticism was partly because they had witnessed the collapse of the 
Community Development Councils (CDCs) which had been established at village level 
across Helmand under the auspices of the National Solidarity programme (NSP). Some 
interveners believed that the CDCs had a stronger social and legal anchoring in the 
district and while attempts were made in 2009 to locate former CDC members in 
Village A none were found to be present, which corroborated the fact that significant 
elements of the community had left by this point.252  
Given the lack of access by formal governance actors, and doubts over the degree of 
authority that the purported representative of Village A had in the DCC, and the 
ongoing violent contest within Village A itself, military teams also attempted to bolster 
governance through ad-hoc governance interventions, though they were of patchy 
quality and consistency. In 2008 to mid-2009 there was a Military Stabilisation Support 
Team (MSST) in the area operating from a nearby FOB, but they could only meet the 
elders from Village A once a month. On average fifty to one hundred people would 
attend the engagement was somewhat limited,253 however, the discussions in their 
meetings tended to focus on compensation, the regularity of patrolling and potential 
projects, which related primarily to security and development (these are outlined 
below). The governance impact of these events seems in doubt given the reluctance 
of Taliban members to participate (except to spy on the rest of the leaders) and the 
fact that participation in the meetings could result in deadly violence against the 
participants.254  
                                                                                                                                                          
not seek to review the PRT as this has been adequately covered in existing literature 
(Gordon, 2011, pp. 31-4). 
250 Also referred to as the ASOP Shura. 
251 IN-2-3 9th December 2010, Kabul and Walker, April 2010, p. 30. 
252 IN-2-4 20th July 2011, Copenhagen: in some areas there were also concerns that 
the CDCs had become corrupt, though this was not specific to Village A (Personal 
Communication). 
253 EA-2-1 3rd December 2010, Kabul. 
254 EA-2-1 3rd December 2010, Kabul: this was a common occurrence across Helmand; 
Walker (2010, p. 56) notes that several DCC members in Helmand had been 
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Just after the DCC election in Gereshk a Patrol Base (PB) was established in Village A in 
mid-2009 with one dedicated CIMIC member who was mentored by a civilian 
stabilisation advisor based in Camp Price outside Gereshk. That individual, and the 
broader unit of twenty-five to thirty Danish soldiers, had almost daily interactions with 
the local community and identified key leaders in the area, including the water 
manager (Mir Aw) as well as a local teacher. An innovative, low-key and low-
expenditure approach was taken in engaging with the community, which focused 
around building confidence through very small scale development interventions. 
There were signs that elements of Village A’s remaining leadership was able to carve 
out a small space to operate and co-operate with ISAF and there was some 
engagement between the local teacher and Department of Education officials in 
Gereshk but there was little, if any, engagement within Village A by GIRoA officials. 
However, the overall effort was critically undermined by the shutting down of the PB 
eight to ten months after it was established which in all likelihood contributed to the 
disappearance of several individuals who had cooperated with ISAF, and to the halting 
of the development activities.255  
By the end of 2010 a number of salient short-comings were apparent with the range 
of governance interventions that were supposed to be promoting stability: firstly, the 
majority of the activities, whether formal or informal, were not initiated, promoted or 
necessarily supported by GIRoA and in particular by Provincial Governor Mangal – 
whilst the interveners may have correctly understood that accountable governance 
systems were vital for stability the lack of willingness or ability of the Afghan 
counterparts to engage in these processes without substantive hand-holding by 
international actors revealed that there were strategic problems in the external 
interveners’ approach; secondly, the conflict history from 1978 demonstrates that 
there were a number of governance structures, both Jihadi and Taliban, that were 
continuing their conflict, however, the lesson from the period of stability during the 
Taliban government, their ability to co-opt governance structures locally and only 
displace key opposition leaders, seemed to have been lost; for the most part co-
option was not feasible in the new formal governance systems whose electoral 
processes tended to be highly rigid and rule bound.256 
                                                                                                                                                          
threatened with Shabnameh (night letters), and in 2008 the Judge in Gereshk was 
murdered. 
255 IN-2-4 20th July 2011, Copenhagen. 
256 There was an exception to this in Sangin where the DCC was effectively expanded 
to include members from a region poorly represented in the initial DCC election on 
the orders of Provincial Governor Mangal; subsequent DCC elections in Nahr-i Sarraj 
(spring 2012) were believed to have broadened local representation, though not in 
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It was the issue of representation that was at the core of the failure of political 
stabilisation for Village A and was noted by several respondents. These criticisms were 
mainly centred on the fact that the DCCs and other governance bodies established by 
the current administration, or convened by ISAF, did not contain the 'real' elders.257 
The real power holders did not want to participate in sham councils and were 
separate and distant from the decision-making that was agreed at these shuras.258 
There were multiple truths in these observations: the first was that a large number of 
elders, commanders and religious leaders had been killed, not just in this period of 
conflict, but over the last thirty years and there was the sense that current elders are 
not what elders used to be in the mythical past; secondly, there was the very real 
concern that the district level DCC did not contain a broad representation from all 
parts of the district and could not function because of Taliban threats against its 
members;259 thirdly, any council established during the on-going conflict couldn’t be 
representative because there were entire segments of communities who had left the 
region, as in the case of Village A. When and if these groups returned new 
accommodations would have to be made and the rule-bound nature of elections 
provided limited opportunity for those changes. 
Stabilisation governance in Nahr-i Sarraj has suffered from the political structures put 
in place at a national level and the way in which former Governor Sher Muhammad 
Akhunzada, and other leaders such as Mualem Mir Wali and Dad Mohammed (Head 
of the NDS), used the provincial state apparatus to persecute political rivals and the 
local population, which was supported by US forces, and negatively affected all 
engagement by the international community. Exogenous attempts to recover lost 
ground have led to greater representation at a district level, though the breadth of 
that representation is in doubt in both official reviews of shuras as well as in the 
accounts of respondents in the district. More significantly, military-led village level 
attempts at governance were hampered by the extent of violence and displacement in 
                                                                                                                                                          
the case of Village A, which the government in Helmand continues to ignore 
(Observations by author, Helmand Spring, 2012).  
257 A respondent present at meetings held in Village A noted that many of the 
attendees were not elders (EA-2-1 3rd December 2010, Kabul); another argued that 
because some elders now receive a salary (referring to members of the ASOP Council) 
they no longer have the stature of the ‘real’ elders of the previous generation because 
the current elders just use their position to secure resources such as aid for their own 
benefit. EA-2-3 5th December 2010, Gereshk. 
258 LL-2-4 8th December 2010, Gereshk: one intervener noted that the governor 
managed to ‘drum together’ the participants in the election meeting for the ASOP 
shura IN-2-4 20th July 2011, Copenhagen. 
259 EA-2-1 3rd December 2010, Kabul, LL-2-2 21st November 2010, Kabul and Walker, 
2010, p. 32.  
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Village A and the entrenched position of the Taliban in and around the village. 
Ultimately, the failure of Afghan leadership, either from lack of inclination or lack of 
capability, has meant that governance was for the most part exogenously driven and 
by the end of 2010 lacked real purchase in the political environment in the district. 
Exogenous governance activities to support stabilisation failed because there was no 
robust leadership and initiative from the host nation to support the interventions.  
Security interventions to support stabilisation 
This section discusses the strengths and weaknesses of security interventions by 
external interveners in promoting stability through either COIN operations by ISAF and 
through the related establishment, training and mentoring of the ANSF. While security 
activities have proved adept at securing the state in urban and municipal areas it has 
struggled in outlying rural communities. The data suggests there are distinct 
limitations on security organisations – indigenous or exogenous – in promoting 
stability in the absence of coherent political support from the host nation 
government.  
The original coalition deployment to Helmand under Operation Enduring Freedom 
(OEF)260 was relatively small until 2006 and tended to focus around Lashkar Gah and 
bases south of Gereshk in Malgir and on Route 601, which runs between Gereshk and 
Lashkar Gah.261 The US-led deployment was small and undertook limited military or 
CIMIC activities (Thruelsen, 2008, pp. 18-9). Their interactions were primarily focused 
on Mualem Mir Wali, and even within the narrow anti-Taliban pro-Jihadi political base 
of the local administration this was striking and commented on by several 
respondents.262 Therefore the international military presence in Gereshk was light and 
Village A was not troubled with dismounted patrols, though US military vehicles drove 
through the village to and from Sangin on occasion.  
Despite the small footprint the early interactions between the US military and local 
residents were not always positive. On one occasion residents from Village A were 
                                                     
260 OEF is the mission under which most US forces served in Afghanistan until the 
expansion of the ISAF mission outside of Kabul, authorised by the UN Security Council 
Resolution 1510 in September 2003 and the unification of the OEF and ISAF 
commands in 2008. Although ISAF forces did not arrive in Helmand to undertake 
combat operations until January 2006. OEF was originally called Operation Infinite 
Justice but the name was changed, apparently to avoid giving offence to Islamic clerics 
(Brown, 2001). 
261 EA-2-1 3rd December 2010, Kabul. 
262 LL-2-6 13th December 2010, Lashkar Gah and NL-2-1 15th December 2010, Kabul: 
and is in marked contrast to the way in which Afghan governance works where 
consensus and consultation is essential, which often relies on a network of individuals 
(Bray, 2012, pp. 34-8; Martin, Forthcoming).  
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attending Eid prayers with a crowd of approximately 20,000 people in Gereshk.263 
Soldiers filmed the event which, according to Village A residents, was not acceptable 
to the crowd, who attacked several US military vehicles. Some of the respondents’ 
neighbours were arrested by Mir Wali’s forces who were providing security. The 
following day the elders went to Mir Wali, petitioned for their release, and were 
questioned by the US commander who was told that his forces did not have 
permission to film the event.264 The new Afghan government leaders also used the 
auspices of Coalition Forces to provide information to the US military to detain and 
sideline potential and actual political opponents. It was clear to the respondents from 
Gereshk and Village A that this was done deliberately, though at this stage they do not 
blame US forces for the detentions (as they later blamed ISAF for civilian casualties). 
Instead they blamed the Afghan political elite in Helmand for persecuting them so that 
“when Coalition Forces were beating the people, the people thought the government 
was beating them.”265  
The situation changed during and after 2004 precipitated by three trends; firstly, the 
local administration continued to utilise government and international security forces 
to persecute individuals who were affiliated with the previous Taliban government 
which inflamed resistance; secondly, the DDR process removed a significant element 
of the Afghan security forces which provided stability; and thirdly, Taliban members 
gradually started to return as they realised that there was a significant amount of 
freedom of movement to engage in armed revolt because of the light presence of 
both Afghan and international forces. As a result the movements of government 
officials were restricted and the area that they could visit gradually shrunk until they 
were essentially no longer safe returning to their home villages, for example to Malgir 
to the south of Gereshk.266 By this point the Taliban had effectively taken control of 
Village A, were providing basic security and supporting the rule of law; it is in this 
context that UK deployment occurred.  
The stabilisation of security in Nahr-i Sarraj, and Village A specifically, was 
exceptionally violent. From January 2007 to May 2010 there were some 4,500 
significant events in Nahr-i Sarraj, and around Village A and the associated Forward 
Operating Base (FOB) there were some 300 events, leading to a substantial level of 
                                                     
263 Residents of Village A also stated that their Friday mosque was actually in Gereshk, 
despite there being several mosques within Village A. This weekly meeting in Gereshk 
served as a traditional way of interacting with other local villages and tribal networks. 
LL-2-1 15th and 18th November 2010, Kabul. 
264 LL-2-1 15th November 2010, Kabul. 
265 EA-2-1 3rd December 2010, Kabul. 
266 EA-2-5 6th December 2010, Gereshk, EA-2-3 5th December 2010, Gereshk. 
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destruction within Village A itself.267 Nearby development projects (see below) 
including bridges, mosques and clinics, that the residents of Village A had used, were 
destroyed, damaged or shut down.268 A number of civilians were killed in the area. 
Irrespective of the reality of who actually caused the deaths they were blamed almost 
entirely on ISAF.269 The first major battles around Village A started in 2006 when UK 
forces met fierce resistance. Incursions to Village A were costly and ISAF and the 
Afghan government had no control of the area. The repeated incursions and lack of 
progress in northern Nahr-i Sarraj, also known as the Upper Gereshk Valley, 
culminated in a number of large clearance operations, some directly involving Village 
A, including: Operation Silicon (May 2007), Operation Palk Wahel (Sept 2007), 
Operation Panchai Palang (Panther’s Claw – June 2009), Operation Omid Do (Hope 2 – 
Jul 2010), Operation Omid Seh (Hope 3 – Aug 2010) and Operation Omid Char (Hope 4 
– Oct 2010).270 The operations led to a series of FOBs and PBs being set up on both 
sides of the Helmand river and whilst these were increasingly partnered with ANSF, 
they were not successful in subduing the insurgency in the Upper Gereshk Valley 
which remained virulently strong.271 
Attempts to enhance Afghan security engagement in the province began as early as 
2004 but only gathered pace after UK forces deployed in 2006 and a detachment from 
the ANA’s 205th Corps was deployed to Helmand from Kandahar in support of 
Operation Herrick, the name of UK operations in Helmand.272 However the glaring 
oversight in international intervention meant that as 93rd Division had been disarmed 
in 2005 there was a significant lag before the relief deployment (205th Corps) arrived 
in 2006 and even then they were not in substantial numbers.273 The initial 
deployments were clearly insufficient and by 2010 the ANA tashkeel for Helmand had 
                                                     
267 Within the vicinity of Village A and the FOB there were seventy-five direct fire 
incidents, sixty-seven IED explosions and 135 IEDs found or disposed of (along with a 
smaller number of indirect fire, threats and hoaxes). Information from ISAF and 
SIGACTS (dataset held by author). 
268 EA-2-2 4th December 2010, Gereshk. 
269 See quote at the beginning of the chapter; LL-2-2 21st November 2010, Kabul and 
LL-2-1 15th November 2010, Kabul; it should be recognised that the United Nations 
Assistance Mission to Afghanistan’s (UNAMA) monitoring of civilian casualties at the 
time suggests that the insurgents caused 75% of civilian fatalities (UNAMA, 2011, p. 1). 
270 Hennessey, 2009, pp. 178-204; Hall & Stringer, 2007; ISAF, 2009; UK MoD, 2010; 
PJHQ, 2010; ukforcesafghanistan, 2010. 
271 At the time of writing there were ongoing operations attempting to dislodge 
insurgents from areas close to Village A. 
272 Pullen, 2004; Radin, 2011, pp. 3-5.  
273 McElroy, 2009; Hafvenstein, 2007, p. 507. 
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been substantially increased.274 The Afghan ANA elements in Helmand and 
neighbouring Nimroz province that had been rebadged as the 215th Corps were 
estimated to have reached 10,000 personnel in 2010,275 with a planned increase to 
12,000 by June that year. The 3rd and 6th Infantry Battalions of the 3rd Brigade of 215th 
Corps were based in Gereshk.276  
Alongside increases in ANSF numbers, the ISAF deployment increased from 3,300 UK 
forces in 2006, to 30,000 personnel from the US, UK, Danish and Estonian armed 
forces in 2010. The Danish battle group was in command of Nahr-i Sarraj,277 
numbering up to 750 personnel at its peak, and was supported by a UK deployment in 
the district (Danish MoFA/MoD, 2011, p. 6). Military operations carried out from 2009 
used a population-centric COIN approach with a strategy based on a model of Clear-
Hold-Build across several of Helmand’s districts which, as noted, led to a rapid 
increase in the number of permanent FOBs and PBs across the district.278  
Near Village A a building that would contain the FOB was captured in late 2007. This 
clearly changed the security dynamic in which the previous rounds of incursions were 
replaced with a permanent ISAF presence; however, in Village A this was largely an 
international effort despite attempts to partner with ANA forces more broadly in 
Helmand (Dressler J., 2011, p. 24). As mentioned above, a PB was established at least 
once within Village A in 2009-10.279 From early 2008 to early 2010 respondents noted 
only seeing the ANA deployed in the area three times. Each deployment was about 
fifty personnel but would only last for a week to ten days. As a result, the military 
                                                     
274 Until 2009 the ANP tashkil for Helmand was 2,161, which was recommended to be 
increased by nearly 200% to 6,061 (Chilton, Schiewek, & Bremmers, 2009, pp. 90, 100). 
275 The 205th Corps which covered southern Afghanistan was split when ISAF 
separated the Southern Command into Regional Command South and Regional 
Command South-West (RC-SW). 
276 Radin, 2011, p. 5. There is likely to be a significant difference between reported 
force strengths and what was actually fielded in terms of personnel due to high rates 
of absenteeism amongst both the ANP and ANA (Giustozzi, 2007, pp. 48-54). The 
figures provided are the author’s estimates from various sources. These figures 
exclude any militias that may have been operating under contract with ISAF forces 
either as force protection or in operational support roles. 
277 The sub-provincial Areas of Operation for battle groups in Helmand did not always 
match Afghan district boundaries and changed over time, for example, during Spring 
2012 Nahr-i Sarraj was split into Northern and Southern commands, the southern 
command also covered northern parts of Nad-i Ali district.  
278 For a discussion on the operations from 2009-11 in Helmand see Dressler J., 2011, 
pp. 10-24. 
279 IN-2-4 20th July 2011, Copenhagen. 
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deployment in the village primarily consisted of international military, specifically 
Danish forces.280 
Patrols continued to be a dangerous prospect with ambushes orchestrated by Taliban 
forces. Taliban fighters could operate very close to the FOB and PB and would hide 
messages in the cracked mud walls for other fighters. Whilst the combatants in Village 
A were believed to be Afghan, in nearby villages there were foreign fighters 
operating.281 The presence of the nearby FOB and the PB in the middle of Village A 
also meant there was sustained fighting, which lead to the destruction of property and 
casualties amongst the population. One of the main forms of contact that the local 
population had was through the claiming of damages against the joint UK and Danish 
CIMIC Teams deployed in the FOB.282 Despite the cost of establishing the ISAF 
presence the PB was shut down in early 2010, which may have led some residents 
who had cooperated with ISAF being directly targeted by insurgents.283 
In addition, the broader increased deployment of ISAF forces from 2009 on the road 
north of Gereshk, initially severely restricted the freedom of movement for the local 
population as well as Taliban combatants. Economic actors, including farmers, 
managed to establish a series of pedestrian routes from Gereshk to Village A and 
some, who had been displaced by fighting in the village, would return every few days 
to tend their crops. Only those who had no resources stayed behind in the village.284 
The increased conflict negatively affected freedom of movement, access to economic 
livelihoods, education, agricultural maintenance (canal cleaning), though this did not 
affect health vaccinations which in the climate in Nahr-i Sarraj were viewed as a 
necessary resource by all sides of the conflict, and non-governmental providers 
managed to establish security guarantees from all sides to continue their activities.285  
Whilst Village A experienced a substantial amount of violence, the security threat 
decreased within Gereshk municipality as a result of larger deployments of ISAF and 
ANSF which improved freedom of movement sufficiently to allow Provincial Council 
members to drive south of Gereshk to Lashkar Gah.286 Government employees were 
provided with a purpose built compound in which some also lived. These were not 
insubstantial improvements and changes brought about by police training were noted 
                                                     
280 EA-2-1 3rd December 2010, Kabul and IN-2-4 20th July 2011, Copenhagen. 
281 LL-2-1 15th November 2010, Kabul and LL-2-6 13th December 2010, Lashkar Gah: 
there were also believed to be British nationals fighting in the area, though none were 
reported in Village A. IN-2-4 20th July 2011, Copenhagen. 
282 EA-2-1 3rd December 2010, Kabul. 
283 IN-2-4 20th July 2011, Copenhagen. 
284 EA-2-3 5th December 2010, Gereshk. 
285 LL-2-3 8th December 2010, Gereshk. 
286 LL-2-7 14th December 2010, Gereshk and LL-2-6 13th December 2010, Lashkar Gah. 
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as being part of that change.287 Respondents expressed a preference for the new ANA, 
as opposed to the reformed ANP, which was known to have a number of informal 
parallel lines of command.288 These gains were however very fragile. One respondent 
said “there is 100% stability in Gereshk compared to before. There used to be suicide 
bombings and attacks and now they have stopped,” but he went on to state: “I will 
never go far from my office because of security … I can’t go to the villages.”289  
As interviews were being carried out it emerged that ISAF was in the process of 
establishing an arbakai to support their security operations known officially as the 
Afghan Local Police. In many respects this may be logical given the reality that any 
gaps that emerge during the drawdown of the 30,000 international forces will need to 
be filled by ANSF who will not have sufficient numbers to be deployed at all the sites 
used by ISAF.290 However there were substantial concerns amongst local political 
leaders about the formation of the arbakai, which was said to include former 
members of 93rd Division, the disbanded AMF unit formerly led by Mir Wali.291 
Irrespective of the composition of the force the Taliban viewed the members of the 
new arbakai with scorn, alleging they were all drug addicts.292 
Security stabilisation since 2006 did improve the security and stability of Gereshk 
municipality; this was however contrasted with the degree to which successive 
military operations, mentoring deployments and ANSF expansion were unable to 
improve security and stability in Village A. Herein lies one of the paradoxes of 
stabilisation. The stabilisation of Gereshk municipality was the result of larger ISAF 
deployments and a larger and better trained ANSF presence in territory already held 
by the state. The attempted stabilisation of Village A after 2006 was exceptionally 
violent, increasing displacement of the population to a larger extent than may have 
been experienced during the Russian invasion and Jihad in territory lost by the state 
since 2001. Using the respondents’ general view of stability as being linked to peace 
and the ‘tight security’ that they experienced during the Taliban period it is not clear 
from the data that stabilisation can be enforced solely by kinetic and stabilisation-
orientated military operations. 
                                                     
287 LL-2-7 14th December 2010, Gereshk. 
288 LL-2-2 21st November 2010, Kabul. 
289 LL-2-7 14th December 2010, Gereshk. 
290 This might represent some learning from the experience where AMF were 
disbanded in 2004-6 before adequate ANSF could replace them. 
291 HRW, 2011, pp. 1-7; PTRO, 2011, pp. 1-4; and author observations in spring 2012. 
One of the ALP units switched back to the Taliban in 2012 (Martin, Forthcoming). 
292 LL-2-5 13th December 2010, Nahr-i Sarraj. 
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Development interventions to support stabilisation 
This section discusses development activities in two periods from 2001-2006 and 2006 
onwards. The first era of development tended to have little stabilisation intent though 
it can be argued that it was supposed to provide a peace dividend or incentive for the 
population to support the state. During this period projects implemented through the 
US deployment tended to focus on services, mainly health as well as some education, 
though neither service was instituted in Village A as most of the projects were 
clustered around the district centre or the home villages of senior political figures in 
the province.  
The Afghan government was also active and projects approved through CDCs under 
the NSP were implemented. Though often viewed positively at a national level the 
programme was not necessarily effective in the case study area. For example the 
implementation of a generator project in Gereshk municipality was not appreciated by 
the local population as they could not maintain the generator because of the cost of 
fuel.293 In Village A there was a CDC though no projects were implemented. It did not 
survive the increase in violence from 2006 and its members were scattered, with 
some presumed killed.294 In Village A there was also an NGO that managed to 
implement some well construction and the local population rehabilitated the canals 
and three bridges around the village.295 Local respondents argued that the projects 
implemented until 2006 were not considered to be very relevant in terms of 
stability.296 While they form part of the story of intervention it is largely a negative 
one because much of the infrastructure built during that period was destroyed as the 
fighting intensified after 2006.297 
Despite local concerns about the military deployment prior to 2006, military 
involvement in projects was not considered to be particularly controversial; however, 
the subsequent destruction of clinics in nearby Mirmandow and Malgir, and the fact 
that the remaining Basic Health Clinic in Shurakay subsequently had to operate from a 
private house caused some consternation amongst Afghan respondents. As one 
interviewee stated “the projects can help stability, only if both sides agree on the 
project and the NGO that gets the project implements it honestly. Some of the 
projects create problems for the people as well, because some of the projects people 
have died.”298 Recognising this issue one of the interveners stated that the placement 
                                                     
293 EA-2-1 3rd December 2010, Kabul and LL-2-4 8th December 2010, Gereshk. 
294 IN-2-4 20th July 2011, Copenhagen. 
295 LL-2-5 13th December 2010, Nahr-i Sarraj. 
296 EA-2-1 3rd December 2010, Kabul and EA-2-5 6th December 2010, Gereshk. 
297 EA-2-3 4th December 2010, Gereshk and EA-2-5 6th December 2010, Gereshk. 
298 EA-2-5 6th December 2010, Gereshk: another stated that the NSP had caused 
disunity, suggesting that the poor representativeness of local shuras was not simply an 
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of projects, in this example wells in Malgir, was extremely important because it sends 
a political message about who is supported and who is not and can create jealousies 
between groups, worsening stability rather than improving it.299 However if the local 
respondents do not equate projects with stability unless they are seen to be 
implemented in an a political manner it is not evident that development projects 
orientated towards the political aims of stabilisation can support stability.  
The second period (2006-2010) of development activity was more tightly focused on 
stabilisation. In keeping with the dynamic identified in the section on political 
activities supporting stabilisation, there were two distinct lines of intervention 
reflecting the competition between the approach to support Afghan institutions to 
deliver programmes, which was primarily confined to the district centre, and the 
alternative approach supported by the military in the FOBs and PBs.300  
In the first form interveners attempted to use formal shuras, including the Provincial 
Development Council, District Development Assemblies, and DCCs to identify, design, 
approve and oversee the implementation of projects; in theory building upon the 
governance work discussed above. These included small scale irrigation and canal 
cleaning projects to larger scale projects such as building a new Provincial Council 
building in Lashkar Gah. This approach was chosen because interveners argued that 
for projects to be sustainable they had to link up to a national system; so, if a school 
was going to be built it had to be in the Ministry of Education plan and have a budget 
for staff and resources.301 Within this category ten priority projects were drawn up in 
conjunction with the Mayor of Gereshk in 2008, to be supported and implemented by 
UK military forces.302 This approach was limited in the extent to which the governance 
institutions were representative – as noted in the previous section they were not 
necessarily seen as containing the real power holders by some community members. 
                                                                                                                                                          
issue affecting exogenous state actors but also the NGO community. EA-2-3 5th 
December 2010, Gereshk. 
299 IN-2-9 3rd December 2010, Washington. 
300 There is a third strand which was not directly relevant to Village A and was 
excluded from the analysis, but other literature has suggested that it was also not 
relevant to stability, which was USAID’s development spending through NGOs and 
private sector development agencies. It should be noted that the US approach led to 
huge variability in spending levels and was almost entirely focused on counter-
narcotics. For example in FY2010 USAID spent nearly $22m in Nahr-i Sarraj alone, 
$20m of which was spent on the alternative livelihoods programme. Spending on all 
other programmes by USAID in the district remained between $1.6m and $2m for 
Financial Years 2009/2010 and the first three quarters of FY2011. Data held by author 
and Pounds & Dennys, 2012, pp. 27-8. 
301 IN-2-3 9th December 2010, Kabul. 
302 IN-2-9 3rd December 2010, Washington. 
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It simply was not possible to ask councils or individuals such as the mayor to support 
projects in areas where they had no influence, even if it were possible to get the 
council members to look beyond their own localism, cronyism and corruption.303 
Therefore this approach had limited, if any, effect in areas like Village A, which were 
beyond the writ of the government. 
In the second strand MSST or CIMIC officers304 met with local communities, including 
in Village A, to agree local projects. These were, however, not always successful, with 
some projects rejected or abandoned because of poor security and the concomitant 
threat to beneficiaries if they participated in the projects. For example the Danish 
CIMIC team offered to pay for a generator to be brought to Village A but the project 
was not agreed because none of the local community members would agree to be the 
maintenance worker for the generator; they did not feel secure enough to be able to 
maintain the generator after it had been delivered.305 Despite the constraints there 
were success stories: larger projects, including the construction of a bridge to the 
south of Village A and the digging of new wells were approved, though some of the 
participants in the meetings suggested they would rather have had peace and security 
than the projects.306 Smaller initiatives were also implemented including the repair of 
a wall in one of the mosques in the village and the extension of Department of 
Education support for an informal school, which had fifteen to twenty male students 
in 2009.307 These were significant engagements and indicated that there were some 
local leaders willing to engage with the international military forces and their district 
government officials (the teacher was involved in discussions with the Department of 
Education about the method of salary payments and supply of books and certificates 
                                                     
303 IN-2-9 3rd December 2010, Washington: as a postscript this model was further 
extended in 2012 through promoting a provincial budget pilot scheme involving four 
line ministries and linking DCC decision making to the selection of development 
projects (by those four line ministries and other government bodies). 
304 The UK Forces used MSST, the Danish forces continued to use the term CIMIC, 
though the activities undertaken were broadly overlapping. The main US vehicle for 
carrying out this strand of activity was called the Commanders Emergency Response 
Programme (CERP) which spent $84m in Helmand. In the first three quarters of 
FY2011 spending in Village A was found to be negligible (CERP spending in Nahr-i 
Sarraj included $850,000 in the first 6 months of FY2012) , primarily because it was in 
a Danish and UK Area of Operations, which had less funding available. Information 
held by author. 
305 EA-2-1 3rd December 2010, Kabul. 
306 EA-2-1 3rd December 2010, Kabul. 
307 IN-2-4 20th July 2011, Copenhagen. 
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for students).308 These glimmers of progress were however short-lived and the closure 
of the PB halted all activities.  
At both levels the relevance of the projects implemented from 2006-2010 to stability 
is unclear. One of the rationales for some of the priority projects in Gereshk 
Municipality was simply to get things moving rather than stability.309 This may have 
had governance spin-offs but it is unclear whether doing something was better than 
doing nothing when it comes to stability, especially when the recipients and their 
leaders vociferously complained about the quality of the projects and corruption.310 
Out in the villages, the ‘getting something done’ mentality was also present, but 
activities may have been aimed winning the consent of the population for the 
presence of ISAF rather than stability. In Village A the CIMIC team offered to renovate 
several mosques, which they had noticed had either been damaged or fallen into 
disrepair.311 In and of itself this may not have been a bad thing, but the activities’ 
connection to stability was not evident.312  
Reviewing the development actions undertaken to support stabilisation two issues 
stand out from the interviews: the first is that by and large respondents did not think 
that the projects had any real connection with stability – referring back to the last 
time the area had stability, one respondent noted that the Taliban did not provide 
many services, but it was still stable;313 secondly, the actual implementation of the 
projects seemed to have the potential for a net destabilising function. Development 
practitioners will recognise that development is a change process, and a change 
process is by its very nature destabilising and in the context of Nahr-i Sarraj and 
Village A, destabilisation was life-threatening. The destabilisation stemmed from local 
corruption, unequal representation and poor delivery of the projects, and was directly 
connected to the violent environment in which the projects were implemented. This is 
important because the destabilisation occurred not just because of the poor execution 
of one project but an overarching set of projects which were poorly implemented. 
In summary, Village A and Nahr-i Sarraj present an extreme version of exogenous 
stabilisation interventions. The stabilisation interventions in the field site have been 
divided by the tension over the requirement to intervene rapidly in hostile 
environments led by ISAF, and those that support working through the host nations’ 
                                                     
308 IN-2-4 20th July 2011, Copenhagen. 
309 IN-2-9 3rd December 2010, Washington. 
310 IN-2-9 3rd December 2010, Washington. 
311 EA-2-1 3rd December 2010, Kabul; IN-2-4 20th July 2011, Copenhagen. 
312 For similar examples elsewhere in Afghanistan see Fishstein & Wilder, 2012, pp. 54-
64. 
313 LL-2-1 15th November 2010, Kabul. 
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systems to promote some form of social contract and state centred stability. This 
tension is evident throughout the political, security and development interventions 
which challenge assumptions about the potential of exogenous stabilisation processes 
to effect stability.  
Thematic Analysis – Nahr-i Sarraj 
This section will provide an analysis of the corporate impact of activities undertaken 
across the political, security and development lines of operation in order to promote 
stability in Village A and Nahr-i Sarraj. It will utilise the five analytical themes identified 
in Chapter 3, including the period of time across which the conflicts occurred, the 
culture and context, the modes of stabilisation intervention (linked to the 
independent variables), political legitimacy and conceptions of stability derived from 
the dependent variables. 
The conflict of the last generation inevitably altered the context in Nahr-i Sarraj. It was 
governed by a changing array of commanders with traditional, Jihadist and/or 
religious credentials who were increasingly reliant upon opium production and 
smuggling to pay for their power base, which was rooted ultimately in the use of 
force. The shift in the pattern of governance and state formation meant that the state 
was largely irrelevant for much of this period and the population used both traditional 
codes of governance, such as Pashtunwali, as well as more modern evolutions such as 
the period of Taliban governance inspired by Deobandi teaching and ideology. The 
shifts in power and authority, and the previous experiences of conflict, still structure 
the context in Helmand; commanders who resisted the Taliban in the 1990s re-
captured the state and used it to continue their civil war by other means, which 
precipitated the virulent insurgency experienced since 2006. 
Irrespective of what GIRoA and ISAF did from 2006 the inescapable logic of the 
intervention, in the eyes of local respondents, was that the foreign interveners and 
GIRoA were responsible for the largest share of destabilisation, first because of GIRoA 
abuses prior to 2006 and subsequently because of ISAF’s adoption of an aggressive 
force posture. This was a negative starting point, and the localised gains made from 
exogenous intervention must be couched in the context of an exceptionally poor 
environment. Looking further back, earlier periods of stability had been achieved, 
though not necessarily because of development, which if anything can be seen to be 
both destabilising in the short-term and in the long-term in Helmand. In the short-
term participation in development projects was fatal for some local people; in the 
long-term it also altered local social structures and power in areas affected by USAID’s 
HAVA programme and, in particular, created a significant number of land conflicts. 
Furthermore, the exogenous nature of funding meant that the local population did 
not necessarily attribute the expansion of services with the emergence of a social 
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contract between the population and the state.314 The ongoing generational aspect of 
delivering projects by non-Afghan state bodies, starting with the HAVA, has weakened 
the idea that those services can be used to form a social contract. Building on this 
shaky foundation, development activities to support stability have been caught in the 
dilemma of supporting slow and often corrupt governance structures to deliver 
services (and the social contract), and the pressures for swift implementation by 
military forces, which also contributed to corruption in contracting.315 
This dichotomy runs through all interventions to support stabilisation where 
significant and incompatible trade-offs were made between supporting the formal 
state through civilian-led governance reforms, and development spending with 
substantial military support to train and mentor the ANSF in areas held by the 
government on the one hand, and on the other activities carried out across all lines of 
operation by ISAF beyond the writ and will of GIRoA. Where security has been 
provided (confined largely to the municipal area of Gereshk) political and 
development activities were initiated, though the degree to which they supported 
stability was questioned by local respondents, in part because of corruption. In the 
rural areas north of Gereshk the ability for GIRoA to engage was extremely limited, 
largely because senior government figures promoted an abusive form of governance 
which contributed to the start of the insurgency. GIRoA did not demonstrate the will 
or capability to engage the area, which includes Village A and yet significant 
international effort was expended in engaging with the population, promoting 
governance, implementing development projects and supporting security. None of 
these activities ultimately succeeded in promoting stability in Village A, largely 
because they were implemented so far in advance of the central government’s and 
the Provincial Governor’s political will and capacity. 
Local conceptions of stability focused primarily on the nature and form of the 
governance system and particularly the ability of a governance system to flex and 
adapt in response to changes in local political power and to be guardians of order and 
the rules of the game. Respondents preferred processes of governance co-option (as 
                                                     
314 This was clear from the earlier attempts of development through USAID’s HAVA 
programme (Cullather, 2002, pp. 532-6); also EA-2-1 3rd December 2010, Kabul stated 
that the clinics were supported by Ibn Sina and then ADHS, an Afghan NGO, and that 
the state is only one of three actors (NGOs and Coalition Forces being the other two) 
that have built schools in the district. Another part of Helmand which demonstrates a 
similar dynamic is the northern districts which have electricity supplied from the 
Kajaki Dam but have largely remained immune to exogenous intervention and state 
attempts at exerting control (Personal Communication and observations in Helmand 
Spring 2012). 
315 EA-2-4 5th December 2010, Nad-i Ali and IN-2-4 20th July 2011, Copenhagen 
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experienced during the Taliban regime) rather than fighting, with one stating that 
“stability can be brought when the people can agree and be happy with the 
government and those that oppose the government should negotiate with them, find 
the reason and solve the problem.”316 This suggests two elements of stabilisation 
address the paradox above: stability comes from amongst the people but, more 
importantly, the way to bring over the opposition was to talk to them, reminiscent of 
the way in which the Taliban approached Village A in the 1990s; and only to force a 
fraction of the leadership to leave rather than pursue lower leaders as the current 
administration has done. 
A second important conception of stability was that many of the Afghan respondents 
did not believe that ISAF was actually interested in stability. The respondents made a 
substantive differentiation between the two competing Afghan actors: the Taliban 
and GIRoA which they understood and engaged with (though not necessarily like or 
agree with) and the incomprehensible foreigners who were attempting to promote an 
undefined outcome (stability). This is important to recognise because all of the 
interventions described in this chapter were coloured in this manner, which 
substantially weakened the ability of the international actors to promote stability 
because ISAF believed a) they are working in support of GIRoA which was contrary to 
the perception of the Afghan actors and b) that the international actors were able to 
engage with a broad cross-section of the significant political groups within the district. 
The data suggests that both of these assumptions are in doubt. 
At its heart the failure of stabilisation in Village A is the direct result of a lack of 
political legitimacy at both local and national levels. The significance of national level 
stability to Helmand lies in the failure of the Bonn Agreement in 2001 and the practice 
of the Karzai administration to allow the persecution of political rivals at a local level. 
This critically undermined support for the Karzai administration which until 2004/5 
had been relatively strong in Helmand. The President’s unwillingness to reign in 
malign actors within his own administration and address the weakness of the 
nationally designed political systems for elections that entrenched Helmandi political 
leaders who were perceived to be illegitimate gave oxygen to the nascent insurgency. 
This was made even worse by the manifest corruption of the 2009 and 2010 
Presidential and Parliamentary elections which sapped the legitimacy of the state.  
As a result of this national weakness, and the abusive nature of the initial GIRoA 
administration in Helmand under Governor Akhunzada, which failed to co-opt former 
governance systems in an inclusive manner, much of the work de facto fell to the 
international community. The response to which was not to allow a predatory 
government and governance system to fail, but to support it, reform it and promote it 
                                                     
316 EA-2-5 6th December 2010, Gereshk. 
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often through Provincial Governor Mangal. That decision contributed to the 
entrenched resistance amongst the broader population and the conflation of ISAF and 
the international community with supporting an abusive regime. The incoherent and 
unsalvageable national political dynamic where Senator Akhunzada would undermine 
Governor Mangal critically undermined progress until the weight of the full military 
surge was felt on the ground. However the underlying political environment has not 
changed and remains the chief threat to stability in Helmand in the medium to long-
term. 
In summary, this section has argued that the political environment at both national 
and local levels relating to Helmand and Village A specifically trumped any attempts at 
exogenous stabilisation, in large part because of a complete lack of political interest in 
promoting stability by the host nation, which has effectively allowed the exogenous 
actor (ISAF) to prosecute a complex stabilisation operation in a manner which has had 
some local gains but is ultimately unlikely to be sustainable and has not delivered 
stability in Village A. 
Theoretical analysis 
This section will test the analysis from the field site against the theories identified in 
Chapter 3. The evidence from Village A indicates that the statebuilding, COIN and 
development theories have some significant limitations in explaining processes of 
stabilisation. The statebuilding theory317 suggests that military force can be employed 
to promote political and economic reform to stabilise the state; however, the lack of 
political backing from both Kabul and Helmand’s political elite suggests that they were 
not interested in the kinds of reform envisaged by the external interveners. Instead, 
Afghan political elites have focused on a narrow set of interests, which included 
prosecuting their previous political conflicts using the state apparatus and security 
forces, and maintaining control of the opium economy. In this context, with a host 
nation system that is so disinterested in building the kind of Western state promoted 
through exogenous technical reforms, it is unclear what benefit exogenous 
statebuilding efforts would have on Helmand’s stability. 
Equally, the failure of COIN318 in Helmand lies in precisely the same political problems, 
because COIN theory correctly identifies that the conflict was political in nature. If the 
host nation is not politically supportive of a military campaign, gains that can be made 
at extensive cost to the military are lost because they will not be capitalised upon by 
the state. All other activities undertaken to support COIN are therefore largely 
irrelevant despite the fact that, at a local level, they may be technically appropriate. 
The one area of practice which was critically weak in the field site was the way in 
                                                     
317 See Dobbins et al, 2007, p. 1 quoted on p. 47. 
318 See JP3-24, 2009, p. I2 quoted on p. 53. 
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which the PB in Village A was opened, then closed, then scheduled to be re-opened 
again. This more than likely contributed to individuals who supported ISAF being killed 
and undermined long-term support for the state. 
Finally, development319 activities to support stabilisation seemed to be largely 
irrelevant to processes of stability and stabilisation in Nahr-i Sarraj. Previous 
experiences of stability during the Taliban period occurred with little or no 
development activity and it has primarily been through the significant expansion of 
the opium economy that living standards increased in the region. This situation 
however has not supported stability because it has become a political prize over which 
most of the conflict in Helmand was fought. The development activities that were 
implemented were far too small to be of significance against the scale of the opium 
economy, and in any case much of the development infrastructure built in the early 
period from 2001-5 was damaged by the conflict.  
In summary, the field site in Nahr-i Sarraj provides a significant critique of the 
application of statebuilding and COIN when they are unable to elicit sufficient political 
backing from the host nations’ elite in the capital or area of operations. This critically 
undermined much of the intervention and divorces the actions that were undertaken 
from the theoretical base that had supported them. Without achieving political 
backing it was clear that the stabilisation of the area was impossible and yet the 
external interveners continued to expend effort to make up for the political shortfall. 
In this context the idea that development supported stability was largely negated by 
the irrelevant position development actions found themselves in: social and economic 
development was not tied to state formation because the major driver of the 
economy, opium, could not be sanctioned by the state. 
Conclusion 
Nahr-i Sarraj has been a site of political and military contest for much of the last 
generation. The long-term impact of the HAVA coupled with the burgeoning opium 
economy has given Helmand an economic significance unparalleled in Afghanistan. 
Stabilisation efforts since 2001 have ranged from light-touch development and 
military actions prior to 2006 to expansive COIN operations in a complex multi-
national intervention. Neither of the approaches has succeeded in securing stability in 
Village A. The stabilisation approach was one of choosing approaches and activities 
that the interveners liked, and the ones they saw as important, rather than the ones 
that would be effective. As one respondent described it “we misunderstand the 
                                                     
319 See USIP, 2009, p. 2.9 quoted on p. 55. 
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drivers of conflict and we deliberately choose some of the others because of our own 
bias.”320  
Not forgetting the reality that respondents in the district for the most part did not 
view ISAF and GIRoA as actually working together (with the possible exception of 
government officials) it is not surprising that exogenous stabilisation was ineffective. 
Political flexibility which could have supported stability was denied at the sub-national 
level because the strategic framework (such as the ISAF concept of COIN) and national 
processes (such as the elections) were fixed and presented certain rigid limits on 
engagement. The changing and evolving situation of Nahr-i Sarraj and Village A 
suggested that greater flexibility was required in order to address issues of 
representation and political legitimacy if exogenous stabilisation were able to support 
a local political settlement. 
The respondents from Nahr-i Sarraj were on the whole quite negative about the 
overall impact of international actors’ efforts to create stability, if to them this meant 
peace and security. Exogenous stabilisation was constrained by three factors in this 
case study: 1) the lack of inclination amongst the national government and 
governance actors to support stability over time; 2) the reality that in all three areas – 
politics, security and development – the external actors drove the agenda; and 3) that 
during the period of 2001-2006 the small international presence was seen to be 
supporting an illegitimate local administration which persecuted political rivals. The 
international approach to intervention did not evolve when it expanded in 2006 to 
suit this dawning reality – the configuration of the Afghan state was seen as 
illegitimate and by supporting it the international community was also illegitimate. 
The recourse should have been to alter the configuration of the Afghan state, which 
was unachievable in the constraints of the Afghan constitution and ISAF mandate.  
                                                     
320 IN-2-2 7th December 2010, Kabul. 
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Chapter 6 – Insurgent Stabilisation 
Gajul VDC, Rolpa district, Nepal  
 
Figure 7 Map of Rolpa district, Nepal OCHA 
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Prelude 
“Gajul VDC was at the forefront in terms of development in Rolpa district. The primary 
school was built in 1951. In Kathmandu, the school was first established in 1947. 
Khadananda Subedi … had played an important role in establishing the school in the 
village. He was elected as an MP in the 1958 election. He was an intellectual person. 
Afterwards he published several books. Because of his political power the 
establishment of the school in Gajul was possible.  
The majority of the population of Gajul are Chettris followed by the Magar community. 
Brahmins are very few there, but they are educated … at some point there were eight 
people who had completed a Bachelors degree from Rolpa, out of which six were from 
Gajul. Now, the situation has considerably changed, people have become more aware. 
The power balance has also changed. Youth are increasingly migrating to the Middle 
East and India in search of jobs. In Gajul, most people are employed in government 
services … because of education.  
The geography of Gajul is unique. The top of the hill is comprised of a forest area and 
water sources. The bottom of the hill is agriculture fields. In between the area of Gajul 
is a human settlement. The agricultural lands in Gajul are irrigable during winter 
season because of the water sources in the top of the hill ... and the people of Gajul are 
able to grow food the whole year … which you do not find in other places in Rolpa.”321 
Rolpa and insurgent stabilisation 
Rolpa district lies in the mid-western hills of Nepal and is credited with incubating the 
Maoist insurgency and providing the main ‘base area’ for Maoist forces during their 10 
year struggle against the Nepali state (Sharma, 2004, pp. 42-3). Resistance against the 
state has a rich history in the area and in many respects the insurgency, which was 
officially launched by the Maoists with attacks on police posts in February 1996, was 
the continuation of a struggle that had been simmering for at least sixteen years.322 
The long gestation of Maoist influence, both in terms of ideology but also 
opportunities for cadres to form long-lasting and strong relationships, provided the 
Maoist movement, and in particular Maoists cadres from Rolpa, with a particularly 
strong sense of devotion to their cause. In many respects this set the precedent for 
the long-term mobilisation of forces and resources by Maoists cadres.323 However, it 
masks two vital elements which become clear at the village level: firstly, that the 
competition over local leadership which emerged first with the Panchayat elections in 
                                                     
321 NL-3-3 25th October 2011, Kathmandu. 
322 NL-3-1 26th July 2011, Kathmandu. 
323 This has been noted by Sneiderman & Turin (2004, pp. 86-100) who discuss Maoist 
engagement with a village in Dolakha district, and Ogura (2007, pp. 476-8) who 
discusses Rolpa district. It was also noted in the Bara case study in Chapter 7. 
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1979 and continued through to the Democracy movement of 1990/91 and the launch 
of the Maoist insurgency in the mid-1990s was very localised. In the case of Gajul VDC 
the insurgency was so localised that all of the major leaders across the political parties 
were in fact related.324  
The social revolution of the Maoists in Gajul was in many respects nothing more than 
an internecine fight between leaders who were related. Whilst combatants and some 
Maoist sympathisers supported the Maoist cause a significant proportion of the 
population had little interest in the conflict and made significant attempts to avoid 
being drawn into it. The second key element to the village level dynamics was the 
extensive activities carried out by Maoist cadres to bolster their position in the 
community and broader district. This was in pursuit of the creation of the Magarant 
Autonomous State. The activities that were undertaken were strikingly similar to 
stabilisation activities that would be promoted by external (international) interveners 
and included substantial social mobilisation, development projects, justice delivery 
and governance reform. Ultimately the Maoists were successful in the conflict, but a 
number of their activities were less than successful in bolstering their support base, 
indicating that limitations on the success of stabilisation are not confined to external 
actors and but also affect indigenous insurgent groups. 
A total of thirty-four interviews were carried out with thirty-five respondents between 
July and November 2011. In addition to interviews conducted in Gajul VDC and Liwang 
district headquarters they were also carried out with respondents displaced from 
Gajul in Dang district, with former government officials in Nawalparasi district and 
with political leaders in Kathmandu. Within Gajul respondents included landowners, 
small business owners, as well as farmers and landless semi-skilled labourers, and 
included representatives of Brahmin, Chettri, Magar, Thapa and Dalit groups. 
Interviews in Liwang focused on district level political leaders across the political 
spectrum, government officials and NGOs. 
Conflict History 
This section provides a detailed introduction to Rolpa and Gajul and the socio-cultural 
context through which the area was governed since the 16th Century. The section 
describes the key cleavages that emerged during the conflict and the ways in which 
the various parties attempted to exert control and stabilise Gajul and Rolpa more 
broadly. These elements are expanded in the following sections focusing on 
stabilisation activities in terms of politics, security and development. 
Rolpa district lies in the mid-western hills and it is only since the CPA in 2006 that the 
district has been accessible by road all year round. Rolpa was created out of Pyuthan 
                                                     
324 This group is referred to as the Subedi-Thapa network.  
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district during the governance reforms of King Mahendra in 1962 and lies to the north 
of Dang district, an area of plains defined as the ‘Inner Terai’.325 The area now known 
as Rolpa was governed by two kingdoms from the 16th Century, which were formed as 
the population in the plains pushed into the hill regions. The Sen dynasty in Gajul 
lasted from the mid-15th to mid-18th centuries when it was defeated by the King of 
Gorkha, Prithvi Narayan Shah, who unified Nepal in 1770. The Kingdom had been 
established after Thapa migrants, who had settled in the region, petitioned the King of 
Jajarkot to send one of his sons to become King of Gajul. 326 The Kingdom was small, 
covering an area which is now split into about 5 VDCs but which includes several 
watersheds. The Sen dynasty was not simply extractive and also invested in some road 
construction (using local ‘voluntary labour’) and a canal to irrigate a part of the 
VDC.327  
The King’s Durbar, on a bluff overlooking most of the VDC, which can only be 
approached from one direction, was destroyed by Naryan Shah’s forces in 1770; 
however, a shrine has been re-built where it stood and the VDC office and post office 
have been established there, along with the police post that was established at the 
beginning of the insurgency in 1997.328 Since the conflict, which saw the police post 
abandoned and the VDC removed by Maoist forces, the de-facto centre of the VDC 
has shifted to a chautari329 in Ward-1, which is also the location of the health post and 
the only higher secondary school. The chautari now also has the Sunil Marg road 
passing by it and fifteen shops have been established in the last couple of years. Prior 
to that there were only three shops in Ward-1.  
Gajul itself is relatively heterogeneous in comparison to other VDCs in Rolpa which are 
largely dominated by Magars.330 Whilst not a focus of this case study the original areas 
of resistance to the government came from Magar dominated VDCs, in particular 
Thawang VDC to the north of Gajul. Because of the strength of Maoist influence in 
those VDCs it is exceptionally difficult to identify individuals who would be willing to 
                                                     
325 LL-3-7 15th October 2011, Gajul, the reforms increased the number of districts 
from 32 to 75.  
326 Jajarkot district also lies in the mid-western hill region and lies to the north-west of 
Rukum. British accounts indicate that there was a link between the Jajarkot and Gajul 
kingdoms, possibly as part of a confederation of Rajas, though the locations, names 
and nature of relationship differ in the various accounts in Hamilton, 1819, pp. 237-
286; Shaha, 2003, pp. 49-50; Magar, Undated, p. 11. 
327 EA-3-12 15th October 2011, Gajul. 
328 EA-3-12 15th October 2011, Gajul. 
329 A traditional meeting place often constructed of stone underneath a tree. 
330 Pradhan (1991, pp. 35-9) gives a useful background to the structure of Magar 
society and how they emerged as a people group in the region referred to as the 
Magarant. 
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talk about the nature of the conflict except when it glorifies the UCPN(M) or the 
People’s Liberation Army (PLA). Therefore, one of the selection criteria used in 
identifying Gajul was that it should have a mixed political body, which in the case of 
Gajul also includes a range of castes. Gajul itself is primarily Chettri (Thapa) 331 though 
there are sub-divisions which are mostly Magar (Wards-7, 8 and 9) and Dalit (Ward-5). 
Brahmins (Subedi) make up the smallest group332 and there are also members of the 
Mahara group. As is common in other parts of Nepal Chettris and Brahmins hold most 
of the positions of power which were maintained during and after the conflict (Social 
Inclusion Research Fund, 2007, pp. 17-9). The population is almost entirely Hindu with 
no Buddhist adherents present, although there may be a few Christians in the VDC.333  
The Sen dynasty itself is currently not significant in the leadership of the VDC,334 which 
is split between one extended Brahmin/Chettri family. Most of the relations in the 
Subedi–Thapa network are supported by marriage, though one important relationship 
relied on an informal ceremony, called mit, between two female members of leading 
families. Importantly members of the Subedi-Thapa network have become significant, 
at times leading, members of different political parties including the Nepali Congress 
and the UCPN(M).335 Traditionally the area, as with most of Nepal, was administered 
by local landowning families, referred to as Mukhiya, who would in effect be given 
licence to administer the VDC on behalf of the administration sitting in the district 
capital (Chauhan, 1989, pp. 125-7).  
Gajul VDC lies one and a half hour’s drive in a good vehicle from Liwang, Rolpa’s 
district headquarters. It is possible to walk from Liwang to the main centre of Gajul 
VDC (Ward-1) in three to five hours. Some parts of Gajul, notably Ward-7, are closer to 
Liwang and can be reached in about an hour and a half by foot. The VDC itself is 
centred on the Gajul Khola (or Gajul river), which is formed at the confluence of two 
small mountain streams at the northern end of the valley and then flows southwards 
to the Rapti River. The valley is very steep and ranges from approximately 1,000m at 
the bottom to around 2,300m to the tops of the ridges surrounding the valley. The 
area below 1,800m is used for agriculture. Above this the mountains are mostly too 
steep for agriculture or grazing animals. Habitations are strung out in the middle of 
the hills across the watershed and whilst there are some 4,610 inhabitants of Gajul 
                                                     
331 Subedi is normally used by Brahmin families, however in Gajul Chettri families also 
use the name. Author observation. 
332 1% according to one Brahmin respondent: NL-3-3 25th October 2011, Kathmandu. 
333 EA-3-12 15th October 2011, Gajul. 
334 There are some in the VDC who feel that the Sen family members still act as if they 
are Kings of the VDC. LL-3-9 18th October 2011, Liwang. 
335 LL-3-7 15th October 2011, Gajul.  
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VDC336 they are spread out over a substantial area which can take several hours to 
walk across. 
The VDC is overwhelmingly agricultural and traditionally land owning, and was 
dominated by a few families, who had extended relationships throughout the VDC and 
across ethnic groups. One family was  identified as having owned about 100 Rupani.337 
Currently the largest remaining landowner is believed to have some fifty-five Rupani 
of land, and was the only respondent to count their land in area size rather than the 
number of months’ food his land provides. Most respondents could only produce 
enough food for three to six months of the year, despite some parts of the VDC being 
able to double crop because of irrigated water supply, though it is not generally 
available to the Magar and Dalit populations. The agricultural year runs from May to 
October and November to April with a rice crop during the summer monsoon and a 
wheat crop during the winter.  
The population supplement their income in three ways: non-cash barter of surplus 
production that cannot be sold, by taking on daily labour work, and finally substantial 
labour movement out of the VDC, mainly to India.338 Many poorer households also 
form informal cooperatives which allow them access to iron work and water mills for 
processing agricultural products either for free or barter. There are few commercial 
enterprises in the VDC and some parts of the community have little engagement with 
the cash economy, relying on barter to sustain their families. The private sector 
activities that exist include at least five small saw mills which use locally cut trees, up 
to twenty grocery shops (each the size of a small cabin) which sell knick knacks and 
provisions. There is one restaurant which opened five months before the research was 
carried out. Several of the commercial enterprises had only recently been started.339 
                                                     
336 This is based on an extrapolation from the Gajul VDC data from Census 2001 and 
the Rolpa district data from the Census 2011 (district level data has not yet been 
released for Census 2011). In 2001 4,263 individuals were identified in 778 
Households (average household size was 5.4, slightly higher than the 5.12 listed in the 
2011 Census for Rolpa). By 2011 the Rolpa’s overall district population growth was 
8.13% giving an estimated population of Gajul of 4,610 (Government of Nepal, 
Undated; Government of Nepal, 2011).  
337 This is approximately 5 hectares, the important issue is that not only is this far 
larger than one family would need to support itself, it is many times greater than the 
average land holding. 
338 Remittances and income from extended family members form a key part of the 
livelihood strategies. The Nepal Living Standards Survey III states that remittances 
account for 25-30% of Nepal’s GDP (World Bank, 2012). 
339 Author’s observations. 
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Since the unification of Nepal, Gajul has in effect been governed in-absentia by a state 
that was neither particularly interested in, nor had the capability to, engage with the 
region. The Rana system had supported elites ruling the countryside (which meant the 
Sen family in Gajul) who had a strong role in conflict resolution and, when available, 
the distribution of the scant development resources.340 When the Rana regime was 
removed in favour of the democratic experiment of the 1950s a leader from Gajul, 
Khadananda Subedi, won a seat in the new Parliament in 1958 before it was dissolved 
in 1960.341 Previously he had established a school in Gajul as early as 1951, which was 
a change that would be transformative for the village and district as a whole;342 
however, it was the sons (and a few daughters) of the elites that primarily benefitted; 
indeed, some respondents noted that the introduction of education had been one of 
the main catalysts of the conflict.343 
The Panchayat era that followed from 1960 to 1990 removed the Mukhiya and Jimwal 
representatives which meant in Gajul that the Sen family were displaced by a series of 
leaders from amongst the same social network.344 Former MP Subedi was returned as 
the Panchayat leader followed by other relatives including Rekh Bahadur Subedi, Kim 
Bahadur Thapa, Gunj Bahadur Thapa and Obhi Lal Subedi.345 This interrelated group 
formed the basis of the Subedi-Thapa network (i.e. a Brahmin-Chettri network).346 
Whilst the position was supposed to be selected by the government, its capture by 
one network meant that the position of Panchayat leader essentially became 
                                                     
340 For further discussion on the Rana reforms with regard to justice see Höfer ,2005, 
pp. 177-81. 
341 LL-3-7 15th October 2011, Gajul, NL-3-3 25th October 2011, Kathmandu. 
342 NL-3-3 25th October 2011, Kathmandu. 
343 EA-3-2 10th October 2011, Gorahi: also Ogura (2007, pp. 490-1) suggested that 
teachers in Rolpa and Rukum were pivotal in the spread of communist ideology. Other 
authors have suggested that programmes such as the Rapti Zone Rural Area 
Development Project, a $50m USAID funded 15 year programme, which was 
implemented in the lower Rapti watershed that is fed by the Gajul Khola, was partly 
responsible for causing the insurgency (Mainali, 2003, pp. 125-8). 
344 These are generic names and not specific to Rolpa and denote individuals, normally 
land-owners, who were charged with representing the state and collecting taxes at a 
village level (Joshi & Mason, 2009, p. 10).  
345 It is significant that many respondents continued to refer to the Panchayat leaders 
as Mukiya denoting that the new Panchayat leadership effectively continued to be 
drawn from amongst the landlords.  
346 The selection for the position was not based on caste, though residents could not 
remember any Dalit Mukhiya in Rolpa; rather it depended on who were the most 
powerful groups in that VDC. Magar dominated VDCs would have a Magar Mukhiya; in 
Gajul they came from the same Subedi-Thapa (Brahmin-Chettri) network. EA-3-2 10th 
October 2011, Gorahi and NL-3-3 25th October 2011, Kathmandu. 
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hereditary and, according to some residents, this fostered poor governance and 
corruption.347 Gajul’s importance in Rolpa was confirmed in 1981 when Rekh Bahadur 
Subedi, was selected as Minister for Land Reform, a post which he held for one year 
becoming the second leader from Gajul to achieve national office. Traditional roles in 
conflict resolution and tax collection continued in the hands of the Panchayat though 
they were at times resisted by other groups who felt decision making was biased.348  
Given the Nepali states’ low level of resources development spending was 
correspondingly low,349 and the Panchayat system often used ‘voluntary labour’ to 
deliver development inputs, which often involved the seasonal clearing of landslides 
from roads or the creation of new roads and bridges, including the road connection 
from Liwang to Bhaluwang in Dang district.350 While currently unmaintained, some of 
the foot-bridges built during this period are still in use.351 However the unpaid labour 
was significantly resented by the population, though this form of labour mobilisation 
would return during the Maoist insurgency.352 
After the first school was built in Ward-1 it was followed by the establishment of other 
schools,353 a police post, the VDC office, a health post and in 1981 UNICEF was able to 
implement a drinking water project.354 The schools flourished and the population of 
Gajul benefited from greater literacy; however, in the context where there were few 
opportunities to exercise their new found knowledge, the emerging leaders in the 
village began to resist the Panchayat system.355 All of the current Constituent 
Assembly (CA) members and several other leading Maoists from Gajul studied in the 
                                                     
347 EA-3-2 10th October 2011, Gorahi. 
348 Criminal cases (including rape and murder) were referred to formal justice 
structures in Liwang; civil issues (minor infractions or violence, divorce or issues 
around water for example) were settled within the communities. LL-3-1 12th October 
2011, Liwang, LL-3-3 13th October 2011, Gajul, LL-3-4 14th October 2011, Gajul, EA-3-
3 11th and 19th October 2011, Gorahi. 
349 The VDC budget reportedly ranged from 15,000 to 50,000 NRS. 
350 NL-3-2 14th October 2011, Gajul. 
351 Author’s observations; at least three foot bridges in use in the VDC were built 
during this period. 
352 LL-3-3 13th October 2011, Gajul. 
353 EA-3-9 14th October 2011, Gajul, the primary school in Ward-9 was established in 
1974; the school in Ward-1 is now a higher secondary school. 
354 The system was refurbished through an ADB funded project in 1995-6. EA-3-2 10th 
October 2011, Gorahi, LL-3-3 13th October 2011, Gajul and EA-3-10 15th October 
2011, Gajul.  
355 EA-3-2 10th October 2011, Gorahi. 
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schools in Gajul during the Panchayat period under the tutelage and leadership of the 
Subedi-Thapa network.356 
There had been long-term and ongoing tensions between the population and the 
state’s local representatives across Rolpa since at least the 1970s.357 Leaders from 
Rolpa and Gajul specifically were involved in non-violent protests against the state. 
The political resistance attracted supporters across caste lines, and though there was 
clearly competition between the underground pro-democracy parties, they were 
unified in their resistance against the Panchayat system.358 This was to change 
significantly with the elections in 1991 when the Nepali Congress won the national 
vote. However, in Rolpa the Nepali Congress lost out to the People’s Front, and in 
Gajul the People’s Front359 leader Jakkhu Prasad Subedi won.360 As a result the divide 
entrenched competition between national Nepali Congress leaders who were 
increasingly identified (rightly or wrongly) as continuing the abusive practices of the 
Panchayat regime.361 
The order of what happened next is disputed by respondents, but the incomplete 
democratic reforms of the 1990s362 and the splitting of the Subedi-Thapa network into 
different parties effectively set the conditions for the conflict echoing ‘the logic’ of 
civil war relating to violence, denunciation and control (Kalyvas, 2006, pp. 328-9). As a 
result, in the eyes of some respondents, democracy itself was the cause of the 
conflict.363 What started the cycle of claim and counter-claim has been forgotten and 
is confused with both local and national political shifts in the immediate aftermath of 
                                                     
356 EA-3-2 10th October 2011, Gorahi. 
357 NL-3-1 26th July 2011, Kathmandu. 
358 This was not restricted to Gajul or Rolpa but was a fault-line running up to national 
level politics in Kathmandu (Nickson, 2003, pp. 8-20). 
359 Note the People’s Front refers to the United People’s Front of Nepal which later 
formed the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) by the start of open conflict in 
February 1996. CPN(M) was renamed United-CPN(M) in 2009. For clarity, People’s 
Front is used to refer to Maoist activity prior to the conflict in 1996 and UCPN(M) 
refers to the Maoists after that point. For more detailed discussion see Mitra, 2004, 
pp. 306-9. 
360 Jhakku Prasad Subedi is now an elected member of the CA who stood against 
former Prime Minister M.K. Nepal in a Kathmandu constituency. NL-3-3 25th and 30th 
October 2011, Kathmandu and EA-3-3 11th October 2011, Gorahi; also see Whelpton, 
2005, pp. 120-1. 
361 EA-3-2 10th October 2011, Gorahi, EA-3-6 12th October 2011, Liwang. 
362 LL-3-8 17th October 2011, Liwang. 
363 LL-3-7 15th October 2011, Gajul. 
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the election; 364 however, it is clear that the People’s Front cadres started targeting 
National Congress leaders in Rolpa and National Congress Leaders filed cases against 
People’s Front cadres in the courts. The People’s Front admitted to killing several NC 
cadres and alleged many of their members were injured or killed as well.365 The cases 
lodged against the People’s Front were referred to as ‘false cases’ as the NC claims 
rarely identified the perpetrators, because People’s Front cadres would, in echoes of 
tactics during the insurgency, disguise their identities and use out of area cadres to 
administer punishments.366 The incidents, accusations and recriminations eventually 
led to the state initiating Operation Romeo in November 1995, a police operation to 
capture or kill People’s Front leaders, carried out in Rolpa and several other districts. 
The mishandling of the operation and related civilian casualties proved to be a boon 
for the People’s Front who rapidly garnered support as a result.367  
Whatever the reality, it confirmed in the eyes of the People’s Front that the state, 
particularly the police and the head of the executive branch, the Chief District Officers 
(CDOs),368 were being used by their political opponents to crush them. The dynamics 
of the state being used by the political elite to undermine opponents was not 
dissimilar to the approaches used by the Rana and Panchayat leaders before the 
emergence of multi-party democracy in other areas of Rolpa, for example Thawang 
VDC had seen violent suppression of dissent as early as 1980.369 The People’s Front, 
who had nine MPs in Parliament, decided that they had to violently resist the state in 
order to achieve their aims rather than hope to achieve them through non-violent 
participation in the political mainstream. Of particular concern to the Maoists was the 
fact that despite contesting and winning seats (both nationally and locally) in Rolpa 
their planned development activities (which were nominated through the VDC 
system) were being undermined by what they interpreted as an NC conspiracy in 
                                                     
364 LL-3-4 14th October 2011, Gajul. One account describes the conflict between the 
People’s Front and Nepali Congress as being a replaying of conflicts between former 
Panchas and their political opponents (Ogura, 2007, pp. 491-6). 
365 The exact number is disputed. Some Maoists claim they had killed nine NC cadres 
before the conflict, other non-aligned respondents suggested the People’s Front killed 
four people and that the Nepal Police had killed three People’s Front cadres. LL-3-4 
14th October 2011, Gajul and LL-3-8 17th October 2011, Liwang. 
366 NL-3-1 26th July 2011, Kathmandu. 
367 LL-3-8 17th October 2011, Liwang and Hachhethu, 2004, pp. 61-2. 
368 LL-3-3 13th October 2011, Gajul, this dynamic was probably further heightened by 
the fact that one CDO who was particularly strong in pursuing the false cases, Abdul 
Raheez Khan, was a Muslim and not only a representative of a distant and oppressive 
state but also a member of a social group with no standing in Rolpa. 
369 NL-3-1 26th July 2011, Kathmandu also Chauhan, 1989, p. 143 and Ogura, 2007, p. 
478. 
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central government. For the Maoists this contributed to the existential threat they 
faced by an antagonistic central government which undermined one of their key 
objectives, that development should be extended to the population.370  
In response the Maoist strategy was to establish the ‘People’s government’, 371 which 
was locally called the Magarant Autonomous State,372 encompassing much of Rolpa 
and neighbouring Rukum. Gajul itself was designated by the central leadership as a 
conflict area in Rolpa, which was essentially a band of VDCs surrounding the district 
headquarters, Liwang, though this designation was disputed by some Maoist 
cadres.373 The formation of the state took substantial time and initially the focus was 
on removing the Village Development Committee (VDC) offices and police posts. In 
Gajul a police post was established including about sixty officers in 1997. The policy of 
the Nepal Police (NP) that officers should not serve in their home areas meant that 
the forces deployed there had no ties to the local community and leaders of all sides 
and some former police officers complained of their abusive behaviour towards the 
population.374 The police were regularly ambushed and bombs were planted by 
Maoists in Gajul VDC, though these seem to have been relatively ineffective in 
dislodging the police post. The turning point came 5 years into the conflict in 2001 
when Maoist forces attacked Holleri kidnapping dozens of police officers (Holleri was 
one of the sites attacked on the first day of the insurgency) an incident which sparked 
the retrenchment of all police posts in Rolpa back to Liwang and from this point 
onwards the Royal Nepal Army (now Nepal Army) took the lead in the fight against the 
insurgents.375 
Irregular patrolling of the VDC from the army base on a nearby pass continued until 
the end of the conflict. Patrolling was more regular in the parts of Gajul closer to the 
base,376 and the army effectively ceased patrolling some parts of the VDC after a 
civilian casualty incident where the Nepal Army killed eight or nine civilians during a 
                                                     
370 LL-3-8 17th October 2011, Liwang, NL-3-3 25th October 2011, Kathmandu and NL-
3-1 26th July 2011, Kathmandu. 
371 As described later it would be several years before the Nepal government could be 
said to have a strategy to address this threat. 
372 NL-3-1 26th July 2011, Kathmandu: during the conflict the size of the Magarant 
Autonomous State was not fully defined; it seemed to focus on Rolpa and Rukum; 
however other Magar groups like the Magarant Liberation Front articulated a vision of 
the Magarant including 12 of Nepal’s districts (Lecomte-Tilouine, 2004, pp. 118-127).  
373 NL-3-1 26th July 2011, Kathmandu and LL-3-8 17th October 2011, Liwang. 
374 EA-3-1 18th August 2011, Nawalparasi, LL-3-7 15th October 2011, Gajul and LL-3-8 
17th October 2011, Liwang. 
375 LL-3-3 13th October 2011, Gajul and Sharma, 2004, p. 44. 
376 LL-3-4 14th October 2011, Gajul and EA-3-10 15th October 2011, Gajul. 
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contact with Maoist insurgents in Ward-9 on the northern edge of Gajul VDC.377 
During the conflict residents claimed that government security forces killed twenty 
people from Gajul; the number killed by the Maoists is unclear though it includes at 
least three security officers from Gajul killed in action in other parts of Nepal.378 After 
2002 the Government of Nepal effectively ceded control of Gajul, along with the vast 
majority of Rolpa, to the Maoists. The Maoists deepened and expanded their activities 
and continued to carry out a number of ‘stabilisation’ activities from this point until 
2006 and the signing of the CPA. These activities, along with the attempted counter-
stabilisation activities of the Nepali government are discussed in the following 
sections.  
Stabilisation interventions 
The following sections discuss the stabilisation activities undertaken by Maoists and 
Nepali government forces in the period from 1996-2006. Unlike the other case 
studies, the focus here is primarily on the insurgent’s stabilisation strategy, activities 
and approaches because they were significantly more important in explaining the 
dynamics of stability in Gajul. In this context the attempts by the Nepali government 
are discussed in the way that they unsuccessfully attempted to stabilise the 
environment in their favour. The subsequent analysis draws together the issues 
highlighted across the political, security and development sections and presents the 
argument for insurgent stabilisation. 
Political interventions to support stabilisation 
The creation of a functioning governance system was the key component of the 
Maoist success in Rolpa more generally as well as in Gajul. Maoist approaches to the 
establishment of their governance systems were codified by a consistent command 
and control mechanism which incorporated both the political and military wings, the 
party UCPN(M), and the PLA. Both arms worked in concert, with strong political 
direction given to the PLA by the party, though in terms of actual implementation of 
the will of the party the PLA was often at the forefront of both civilian as well as 
military activities. Individuals could transfer between the wings, but were generally 
identified as being with one or the other rather than holding positions in both parts of 
the Maoist machinery at the same time.379 
                                                     
377 LL-3-3 13th October 2011, Gajul and EA-3-9 14th October 2011, Gajul. 
378 LL-3-4 14th October 2011, Gajul.  
379 The exception to that rule were the Political Commissars. As one report noted “the 
leadership of every fighting unit from company to division level is shared between a 
military commander and a political commissar, which the Maoists claim ensures 
political control over the army. The commissar ranks higher and is in charge of the 
party committee formed within each military unit” (ICG, 2005, p. 9). In Gajul the 
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The Maoist approach to governance was clearly inspired by their Communist ideology 
and, in Gajul this included indoctrination programmes (locally called cultural 
programmes), the imposition of price controls, the use of forced labour, the provision 
of justice and external development projects.380 These were impressive achievements, 
and in the context of a rural economy in mountainous terrain were all the more 
remarkable for the fact that local residents of all political affiliations attested to the 
strength of Maoist governance control.381 This subsection focuses on how they 
governed and delivered justice, rather than what they did in terms of security and 
development which is covered below. 
The Maoists established a number of People’s Governments during the conflict, of 
which the Magarant Autonomous State was the first. 382 The first President of the 
region, Santosh Bura Magar, governed the region, including Gajul, during the 
conflict.383 There were also district and VDC level representatives384 though they were 
not always present in the region they governed because, despite their governance 
achievements, the Maoists did not have complete security control of the region 
(discussed below). These representatives administered the areas under Maoist 
control, which at times also included confiscating development funding from 
government officials who attempted to execute VDC level budgets and land from 
wealthy residents. 385  
The primary function of the state was to represent the Maoist party and PLA and to 
collect taxes from the population. The level of taxation was set by the central 
Politburo, which would assign amounts required from the district representative. The 
district representative then had to instruct VDC level officials and PLA cadres to raise 
the income required. From the taxation raised in Rolpa 60% of revenue was given to 
the central party for the prosecution of the conflict, and 40% remained with the 
                                                                                                                                                          
highest ranking official in this role was K.B. ‘Sunil’ Thapa, the Political Commissar of 
the PLA’s 5th Division; K.B. Thapa was killed late in the conflict. To underscore the 
close relationships of political leaders in Gajul, ‘Sunil’ Thapa was the cousin of the 
political opponent of a Maoist CA member from Gajul Jhakku Prasad Subedi. LL-3-8 
17th October 2011, Liwang and NL-3-3 25th October 2011, Kathmandu. 
380 In other areas the Maoists were also running ‘People’s Schools’ and at least one 
‘People’s Hospital’ which apparently had some non-Nepali staff working in it. LL-3-8 
17th October 2011, Liwang. 
381 LL-3-3 13th October 2011, Gajul, LL-3-8 17th October 2011, Liwang, LL-3-7 15th 
October 2011, Gajul, EA-3-10 15th October 2011, Gajul. 
382 NL-3-1 26th July 2011, Kathmandu. 
383 NL-3-1 26th July 2011, Kathmandu. 
384 LL-3-8 17th October 2011, Liwang. 
385 LL-3-7 15th October 2011, Gajul, NL-3-2 14th October 2011, Gajul, EA-3-2 10th 
October 2011, Gorahi. 
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district administration.386 Taxation was raised from a number of sources and included 
income generated from ‘donations’ from government officials which formed an 
important part of the Maoist war economy in Gajul. Civil servants working in the 
health and education sectors provided anything between one day’s salary to 10% of 
their monthly salary each month to the insurgents (some sixty to seventy residents of 
Gajul are teachers).387  
A second stream of income came from abductions and intimidation of relatives of 
security officials and current and former local political opposition leaders. In fact 
almost all political leaders in Gajul who were not Maoist were abducted at some point 
during the conflict.388 The curious fact, in Gajul at least, was that almost all of the 
abductions ended with the individual returning to their family and staying in the 
village.389 The Maoists took a different tone with relatives of security officials who 
were almost all forced to leave Gajul, though even when the security officials and 
their families had moved they were not necessarily free from danger.390 
As well as an extractive tax system the Maoists also established a functioning, 
hierarchical and swift court system.391 This was not simply a displacement of the 
formal state system at the district level, by forcibly removing the former Mukhiyas and 
political opposition who had continued to be involved in informal justice provision, it 
was also the revocation of elements of the informal system. The new Maoist system 
was seen to be responsive and the Maoists won local support partially through the 
extension of justice systems that were seen to undo some of the unjust decision 
making that had occurred under the Panchayat and multi-party systems.392 In Gajul 
itself it was not necessary to have a fully functioning ‘People’s Court’,393 instead there 
were advocates (who were local residents) who could adjudicate on cases, effectively 
                                                     
386 LL-3-3 13th October 2011, Gajul and LL-3-8 17th October 2011, Liwang. 
387 LL-3-7 15th October 2011, Gajul, EA-3-9 14th October 2011, Gajul and EA-3-10 15th 
October 2011, Gajul. 
388 LL-3-5 15th October 2011, Gajul, LL-3-7 15th October 2011, Gajul, NL-3-2 14th 
October 2011, Gajul. 
389 There was one exception to this: NL-3-2 14th October 2011, Gajul. 
390 EA-3-2 10th October 2011, Gorahi. 
391 The formal designations were: ‘People’s Court’ in the VDCs; ‘District People’s Court’ 
for the District and ‘State People’s Court’ for cases heard by the court of the Magarant 
Autonomous State. NL-3-1 26th July 2011, Kathmandu. 
392 LL-3-3 13th October 2011, Gajul and EA-3-3 11th October 2011, Gorahi: some of 
the cases addressed had apparently been unresolved for more than twenty years. 
393 Some respondents said that the court in Gajul was mobile and seemed to be 
staffed by a few local people in ad-hoc locations; others said there was a court but 
that they had not seen it personally, suggesting it was located in a more inaccessible 
part of the VDC. LL-3-3 13th October 2011, Gajul and LL-3-7 15th October 2011, Gajul. 
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taking the place of the Mukhiyas.394 If a case required a more senior official to pass 
judgement it could be referred to Maoist courts functioning in more secure areas, for 
example Thawang and Nuwagaon VDCs.395 In these locations the Maoists felt secure 
enough to run prisons and detain guilty defendants or to use hard labour as 
punishment.396 Despite their success and degree of control the Maoist approach did 
not insist that all conflicts had to go through the court, instead the local population, 
either out of fear or simply habit, continued to address some conflicts within their 
communities with no reference to the Maoists, meaning some vestiges of former 
Mukhiya influence did remain and they returned after the conflict.397  
The Maoist approach contrasts with the capabilities (both legal and physical) of the 
Nepal Police (NP) to prosecute Maoist cadres for counter-insurgent activities. There 
were a number of instances where Maoist cadres were rounded up and, according to 
government officials and local opposition leaders, were simply shot because of lack of 
evidence, whereas others were released after a mandatory six month period and 
immediately re-arrested.398 These grievances were the latest in a line of alleged 
abuses by the government against the Maoists and continued to bolster both their 
support base as well as undermine the broader population’s trust in the security 
services.399 It was not until the appointment of Rajendra Singh Bhandari as Deputy 
Superintendent of Police (DSP) for Rolpa that the approach shifted to a community 
policing, or population centric, model, though this was only instituted in 2002 by 
which time the police had largely pulled back and were no longer in the communities 
to police them and the army had initiated a COIN campaign.400 
                                                     
394 The identity of who the advocates were is still protected by Maoist members and 
local respondents were unwilling to identify them. LL-3-3 13th October 2011, Gajul. 
395 Gajul itself lay just outside the ‘base area’ for the Maoists. Some have suggested 
this is because the Northern belt of Rolpa is predominately Magar (as in Magarant) 
whilst those to the south are more mixed. NL-3-3 25th and 30th October 2011, 
Kathmandu and IN-3-3 23rd October 2011, Kathmandu. 
396 Interestingly the ‘People’s Court’ did not allow capital punishment. Forced labour 
included “working in building roads and bridges, carrying goods, caring for the sick and 
injured people and cooking food.” NL-3-1 26th July 2011, Kathmandu, EA-3-5 12th 
October 2011, Liwang and EA-3-10 15th October 2011, Gajul. 
397 EA-3-10 15th October 2011, Gajul, EA-3-11 15th October 2011, Gajul and EA-3-12 
15th October 2011, Gajul. 
398 EA-3-1 18th August 2011, Nawalparasi and LL-3-7 15th October 2011, Gajul. 
399 A point made to senior political leaders by residents from Gajul. LL-3-7 15th 
October 2011, Gajul. 
400 EA-3-1 18th August 2011, Nawalparasi: this also involved the distribution of 
materials such as volleyballs and footballs in schools aimed at boosting support for the 
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However it should not be assumed that the rhetoric of the Maoist party had broad 
engagement with all social groups. The Maoists were selective and specifically 
targeted and undermined potential threats, such as the local religious leaders, whilst 
they ignored groups without political power, such as the Dalits. In Gajul the temple’s 
priest was seen as a threat because of his potential as a Nepali Congress supporter as 
well as his religious identity.401 The inward looking nature of his religious activities 
(running the puja and carrying out other basic religious rites) were not transformed 
through the conflict into any outward activities to mobilise adherents against the 
Maoists.402 However the Maoist focus on stopping or undermining social practices 
which were deemed to maintain the class and caste division seems to have been 
carried out to undermine potential sources of resistance.  
Other groups, such as the sizeable Dalit community living in Gajul Ward-5, were of 
minor significance to Gajul’s political dynamic and were largely ignored throughout 
the conflict. It is interesting to note that 63% (twelve households) of those displaced 
from Gajul were Brahmins/Chettris who were primarily associated with the state or 
political opposition; 26% (five households) were Janjaati (likely to be Magars or 
Mahara) and only 5% (or two households) of the displaced were Dalits.403 The Dalits 
were not relevant to political competition because they are so poorly represented 
                                                                                                                                                          
police, a classic hearts and mind approach, and one which is being emulated by the 
Nepal Army in the post conflict context. Also IN-3-2 18th October 2011, Liwang. 
401 LL-3-6 15th October 2011, Gajul: the temple had received a small stipend of 3-
4,000 NPR from the Nepali state which was arranged by Rekh Bahadur Subedi through 
the Nepal Guthi Corporation. Upon becoming Prime Minister, Prachanda stopped all 
payments by the Corporation to temples. 
402 LL-3-6 15th October 2011, Gajul, LL-3-5 15th October 2011, Gajul, LL-3-3 13th 
October 2011, Gajul and LL-3-7 15th October 2011, Gajul; a similar dynamic was 
observed in Bara. 
403 A total of 139 individuals from nineteen households were displaced from Gajul, 
representing some 3.2% of the population. INSEC data held by author and 
(Government of Nepal, Undated). In terms of other VDCs in Rolpa Gajul is ranked 5th 
by displacement of individuals and 8th by displacement of households (out of fifty-two 
VDCs). Whilst the absolute numbers may seem small, for the Nepali civil war they 
were significant and don’t include the number of individuals who simply left the area 
to avoid the conflict. EA-3-2 10th October 2011, Gorahi, LL-3-7 15th October 2011, 
Gajul and Analysis of INSEC List of Internally Displaced Person during Insurgency, 
original data in Nepali, held by author. One set of activities that may have promoted 
stability in other VDCs was the Local Peace Committees (LPC) which supported 
displaced families to move back to their land; most of those displaced from Gajul have 
not returned and while there may be support for the LPC initiative at a district and 
national level it was not clear what impact it had at a VDC level. LL-3-2 12th October 
2011, Liwang and IN-3-5 10th November 2011, Kathmandu. 
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amongst Nepal’s state, political party structures and the local Subedi-Thapa 
network.404 Even at the time of this research (2011) there was little engagement by 
the political parties to mobilise support amongst the main Dalit community in Ward-5, 
which suggests their continuing marginalisation.405 
In the early phase of the conflict the government attempted to shore up its presence 
by expanding the police detachment and attempted to spend state development 
funding on projects. Both streams of activity ultimately failed, but are discussed 
below. However attempts at stabilisation in governance were heavy handed and, not 
simply a complete failure, but were probably counter-productive. At one point the 
police illegally detained a local political leader from the Nepali Congress in order to 
pressure him to stand for the local elections in 1998 because the seat was likely to be 
uncontested without his participation. This approach was orchestrated by the police’s 
higher command when the regional police commander came up from Nepalgunj to 
argue for the leader to stand in the election. The leader refused and was subsequently 
abducted by the Maoists (not for the first time) to pressure him not to stand for an 
election he already didn’t want to stand in.406 
The failure to put in play a governance challenge to the Maoist insurgency was the 
result of central level indecision about how to counter the insurgency.407 Whilst Rolpa 
was visited by high level government delegations, including Prime Minister G.P. 
Koirala during which respondents directly suggested practical ways in which to 
undermine the insurgency, the government failed to articulate, let alone act on, a 
coherent vision of governance stabilisation and consolidation.408 The lack of coherent 
vision also contributed to the muted political backing that the Government of Nepal 
received from India, the US and UK. Though they all feared Nepal might become a 
“failed” state they focused their support in the security and development spheres in a 
manner which was not sufficient enough for the state to respond robustly to the 
Maoist insurgency (Dahal, 2005, p. 16). In many respects the low degree of violence in 
the Nepali civil war was as much about the relative absence of arms and capital as it 
was the inability for elites to fathom a way to convincingly counter the Maoist 
message that the state was not interested in the needs of the population. 
The message of state neglect and the related class struggle between the rich and poor 
underscores Maoist conceptions of the conflict.409 However these messages did not, 
                                                     
404 This is a historic legacy of the Rana regime’s policies (Chauhan, 1989, pp. 125-6). 
405 EA-3-14 16th October 2011, Gajul. 
406 LL-3-5 15th October 2011, Gajul. 
407 For example see Hachhethu (2004, pp. 59-66) for further discussion. 
408 LL-3-7 15th October 2011, Gajul. 
409 LL-3-3 13th October 2011, Gajul and LL-3-8 17th October 2011, Liwang. 
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and have not, led to a substantive change in the way Nepal actually functions.410 One 
external intervener noted that despite all the various attempts at social control and 
governance many of the practices that the Maoists had banned have now returned in 
Gajul and Rolpa.411 More broadly, other interveners were simply sceptical that the 
conflict had done anything to change things for the poor in whose name the conflict 
was waged.412 And as one local resident noted: “I faced all the regimes … I saw the 
Rana period, the Panchayat era, multiparty democracy, Maoist insurgency and the 
Republican era in the country. What I experience is that there are no benefits to the 
people! Every time the leaders have benefitted. There are no major changes for the 
people.”413 
The story of political stabilisation in Gajul is the collapse of one imposed state and the 
creation, and imposition, of another. Both attempted to utilise approaches identified 
as stabilisation and yet only one was successful, the Maoists. The instructive lessons 
for stabilisation approaches from Gajul indicate that it is in fact not necessary to gain 
the consent or engagement of all parts of the community to enforce control – and 
indeed it is control which is the critical element of stability – a factor which is further 
demonstrated in the following sections. 
Security interventions to support stabilisation 
Security control was contested for the majority of the conflict in Gajul. Gajul lay just 
outside the ‘base area’ of the Maoist’s Magarant Autonomous State and whilst all the 
trappings of Maoist governance and development were present, security control 
remained elusive for the PLA. This is in part because of Gajul’s proximity to Liwang, 
which it borders,414 and its proximity to a Nepal Army base on the highest pass on the 
road from Dang to Liwang. This, together with an army detachment in Liwang itself 
meant patrolling by security forces was frequent.415 
With a few exceptions, the overall approach of the PLA seems to have been to avoid 
direct contact with security forces which confirmed that they did not feel they had 
sufficient control of the region to move to their third phase (as outlined in fact by Mao 
and also used by Prachanda) and confront the Nepal Army.416 Prior to the army’s 
                                                     
410 There is a useful discussion about this in ICG, 2010, pp. 45-6, also see Lecomte-
Tilouine, 2004, p. 123. 
411 IN-3-3 23rd October 2011, Kathmandu. 
412 EA-3-11 15th October 2011, Gajul. 
413 EA-3-3 11th October 2011, Gorahi. 
414 Though the border is defined by a ridge rising above 2000m which ensures it is only 
accessible by foot. 
415 EA-3-10 15th October 2011, Gajul. 
416 For further detail about the strategic stages and Maoist plans see Sharma, 2004, pp. 
51-4 and Ogura, 2008, pp. 13-21. In fact one Maoist leader suggested that there were 
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engagement in the conflict PLA engagements with the NP were primarily in the form 
of bombings and ambushes.417 This was not continued against the better armed and 
larger patrols of the army except in one instance (discussed below). In which case it is 
valid to question whether the Maoists did in fact attempt to stabilise the security 
situation in their favour or simply recognised the weakness of their position. Even if 
this is accurate the PLA continued to carry out at least weekly patrols and 
demonstrated to the population that Gajul was “fully controlled” by the Maoists 
except when the Nepal Army was patrolling.418 
This sense of control was also evident in the battle for mobilisation which was clearly 
won by the Maoists. The PLA extensively recruited in Gajul, and attempted to enlist 
one fighting aged person from each household in Gajul.419 However, this led to large 
numbers of men leaving Gajul during the conflict simply to avoid mobilisation.420 State 
forces on the other hand could count on only 3 police officers from Gajul (who were 
posted to other areas of Nepal) and a handful of military personnel. Almost all of their 
families were forced to flee Gajul during the conflict,421 effectively cleansing the VDC 
of support for state security actors and making the deployments of non-local Nepalis 
seem all the more foreign. 
Another aspect of the conflict which indicates that the Maoists settled in to a secure 
governance mode with a rather more fluid approach to security was their use of 
violence. Despite the fact that the PLA members who were fighting in Gajul were not 
from the area they were highly restrained in their treatment of the population, 
including Maoist opponents who they kidnapped.422 They seem to have been 
instructed by senior political leaders, including several from Gajul, not to harm other 
political opponents in Gajul.423 This apparent restraint is attributed by some of the 
                                                                                                                                                          
frequent contacts between the intelligence agents on both sides regarding patrolling, 
the inference being that both sides made substantial efforts to reduce the level of 
violence. LL-3-8 17th October 2011, Liwang. 
417 This is the overriding impression from civilians as well as combatants in Gajul. 
However, secondary sources also suggest that the PLA did attack the police post in 
Gajul on April 30th 2000. Dataset of security incidents in Nepal held by author. 
418 EA-3-7 13th October 2011, Gajul. 
419 LL-3-7 15th October 2011, Gajul. 
420 EA-3-13 16th October 2011, Gajul. 
421 EA-3-2 10th October 2011, Gorahi. 
422
 LL-3-7 16th October 2011, Gajul 
423 There is the possibility that K.B. Thapa, a senior PLA commander (the Political 
Commissar of Division 5 which afforded him both political and military legitimacy) 
from Gajul, who was killed late in the conflict, also acted in a restraining manner on 
local cadres; however, the argument still holds as K.B. Thapa himself came from the 
Subedi-Thapa network that produced all the political leaders in Gajul, it is simply that 
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abductors and abductees to the fact that they were in fact all from the Subedi-Thapa 
network and they were aware of other social and local political ramifications if the 
Maoists had started to kill political opponents.424 This did not stop the Maoist cadres 
extorting money from the abductees, who because of their leadership status, were 
often required to pay substantial sums of money.425 
More than anything done by the Maoists, what seems to have shifted the initiative in 
terms of security towards the PLA were the missteps of the Nepali security forces.426 
There had been high hopes, for some, that the establishment of the police post in 
Gajul VDC at the beginning of the insurgency would bring security, but instead it did 
the opposite.427 This was not just because the Maoists were bombing and occasionally 
ambushing patrols, but because of the abusive nature of the police, including the 
summary executions in Liwang428 and other forms of ill-treatment meted out by the 
police in Gajul.429 This catalysed those sitting on the fence to either support the 
Maoists or simply withdraw their support from the government.430 In many respects 
this is a replay of the effects of Operation Romeo in November 1995 which also 
bolstered Maoist support. 
Until 1998 police patrols consisted of ten to twelve officers, but when the post was 
strengthened patrols would consist of more than fifty personnel. However in 2001 the 
abduction of dozens of NP officers in Holleri VDC in Rolpa led to the withdrawal of all 
VDC level police posts in Rolpa which were folded back in to Liwang.431 Allegedly the 
PLA’s next targets included the Gajul police post but it was withdrawn before the 
                                                                                                                                                          
he ended up in the PLA rather than the party structure. Other researchers have also 
been told of violence being used to settle personal enmities under the guise of the 
Maoist insurgency in Rolpa (Ogura, 2007, p. 486). 
424 LL-3-7 15th October 2011, Gajul.  
425 Figures from local leaders who were threatened or abducted indicated they were 
forced to pay sums from 10,000 to 2.5 lakh NRS a substantial figure. LL-3-5 15th 
October 2011, Gajul, EA-3-12 15th October 2011, Gajul and LL-3-7 15th October 2011, 
Gajul. By way of comparison, one of the families who was forced to leave the area 
because of Maoist intimidation sold all their land holdings for between 2-3 lakhs. EA-
3-2 10th October 2011, Gorahi.  
426 In fact looking back over the conflict the perceived and actual abuses by state 
security forces helped recruitment to the Maoists even before the conflict and date 
from at least the Operation Romeo . LL-3-8 17th October 2011, Liwang. 
427 EA-3-2 10th October 2011, Gorahi. 
428 EA-3-1 18th August 2011, Nawalparasi. 
429 This included detaining and beating an alleged weapons maker. EA-3-14 16th 
October 2011, Gajul, LL-3-7 15th October 2011, Gajul and EA-3-11 15th October 2011, 
Gajul. 
430 EA-3-12 15th October 2011, Gajul. 
431 LL-3-8 17th October 2011, Liwang. 
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attack could be launched.432 The police post in Gajul had been placed in the same 
location as the VDC office on the promontory which was also the site of the Gajul 
Kingdom’s Durbar.433 The VDC building was razed to the ground along with the 
security post once it was vacated by the NP.434 
Once the police post was withdrawn the army took over responsibility for operations 
under a unified command implementing a COIN campaign. The army’s approach to 
COIN was directly influenced by the foreign training that senior military officers had 
received from the US and UK with regard to COIN.435 The senior military command 
provided direction to the Nepalese Army’s campaign, however on the ground they 
seemed to be limited in their scope or ambition. In Gajul the army would patrol with 
well over a hundred personnel though it did not establish any combat or patrol posts 
meaning that they were not present at all times re-assuring the population of their 
security.436 An additional odd feature of the army patrolling was that some 
respondents alleged that the army used to make local residents carry baggage for 
them. A similar complaint was made about the PLA and partly as a result of the 
treatment of the population by both the Nepali and the Maoist security forces the two 
parties lost credibility and support.437 The army was also, allegedly, not above taking 
resources from the population in a similar manner to the police (and Maoists), which 
again did not endear them to the population.438  
The increasing size of the patrols meant there was an increasing likelihood that there 
would be violent confrontation and, inevitably, that there would be casualties. There 
were several incidents in Gajul but one was a defining moment in the contest for 
security control. The incident on March 25th 2002 resulted in the deaths of eight to 
                                                     
432 LL-3-3 13th October 2011, Gajul. 
433 EA-3-12 15th October 2011, Gajul. 
434 LL-3-6 15th October 2011, Gajul. 
435 IN-5-0 8th August 2011, Kathmandu: also see Nepalese Army (Undated). External 
support was not limited to the education of the Army General Staff, but included “the 
British government … provided two MI-17 helicopters and $20m military and 
development aid to Nepal. It has also agreed to supply the RNA [Royal Nepal Army] 
with two spy aircraft and the Eye-lander. The Indian government has offered two 
night vision helicopters … America has put Nepal on the list of "US foreign policy 
challenges," provided $17m military and $40m development aid and 8,000 new M-I6 
assault rifles. The media have reported that more than 50 soldiers of the US Pacific 
Command are involved in "Joint Combined Operations" with the RNA soldiers. Nepal 
and the US also signed an Anti-Terrorism Assistance (ATA) under which the latter 
assists in training, consultation and equipment” (Dahal, 2005, p. 16).  
436 EA-3-12 15th October 2011, Gajul and LL-3-4 14th October 2011, Gajul.  
437 EA-3-12 15th October 2011, Gajul. 
438 EA-3-5 12th October 2011, Liwang. 
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nine Nepali civilians, several of whom were not only not Maoist, but pro-Nepali 
Congress, and this was a turning point, not just for the army but also for the Maoists. 
The Maoists opened fire from a position near the top of a hill on the Nepal Army 
forces below them in Ward-9 and during the ensuing cross-fire the civilians were 
killed, all of whom were allegedly shot by the Nepal Army.439 The army ceased 
patrolling in that area of Gajul after the incident but because the residents blamed the 
PLA for initiating the contact the PLA were also effectively stopped from entering the 
area. 
It was not until late on in the conflict that the police and army attempted to rectify 
their behaviour and to build support amongst the population. DSP Bhandari promoted 
the idea of ‘community policing’ which was subsumed as part of the COIN strategy 
from 2002 and supported initiatives to distribute footballs and volleyballs to 
villages.440 Though no evidence was found in Gajul, in other areas the army was 
beginning to support governance outreach (a governance caravan),441 and they were 
also being trained in human rights and international humanitarian law, though the 
degree to which this training, which was applied late in the conflict, had on the 
prosecution of the campaign was doubted by some (Dixit, 2003, pp. 306-7).442 The 
other major innovation by the central government was the unified command which 
gave the army control of NP and Armed Police Force (APF) assets,443 though the 
degree to which this helped the army in the deployments in Gajul is unclear. 
Furthermore, the central government announced the Integrated Security and 
Development (ISDP) programme in 1999 to bring together security and development 
initiatives. 444 In Liwang the ISDP was greeted by local leaders as having the potential 
to harness some new found political will from the centre to address the conflict, 
however, fundamental problems with implementing it outside of Liwang district 
headquarters and the precarious security situation even inside the town meant that 
the budget, some four to five crore NRS, was spent almost entirely on security, rather 
than the intended plan to have security and development spending support one 
                                                     
439 EA-3-9 14th October 2011, Gajul. 
440 EA-3-1 18th August 2011, Nawalparasi. 
441 IN-5-11 26th October 2011, Kathmandu. 
442 IN-3-2 18th October 2011, Liwang. 
443 The APF was formed in January 2001 as a paramilitary force (Dixit, 2003, p. 301). 
444 This is sometimes referred to as the Integrated Internal Security and Development 
Programme (IISDP) (Sharma, 2004, pp. 44-5) and grew out of a programme originally 
initiated in 1999 (Hachhethu, 2004, p. 69). The Government of Nepal attempted to 
gain international funding for the programme, but the primary pilot area in Gorkha 
was seen as a failure to the donor community, though the programme continued 
under the sole funding of the government (Seddon & Hussein, 2002, pp. 32-3). 
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another. So for example the flag-ship project in Rolpa was to build a barbed wire fence 
around Liwang, in effect to garrison it and close the town every night.445  
The project was seen to be very effective according to its backers, because there was 
only one fatality inside Liwang (related to the conflict) after the wire fence had been 
installed.446 Another way to look at this was that the Maoists had little or no intention 
of taking Liwang which also served as a rest and recuperation site for Maoist cadres 
who were able to infiltrate the town.447 Other projects included upgrading the district 
police station and building a large municipal building that is now partially rented out 
to shops. Predictably, with large amounts of money spent in ways not envisioned by 
the programmes’ designers and restricted by the security environment there were 
also allegations that substantial amounts of the funds were lost in corruption.448 
In summary, security provision in Gajul during the conflict was effectively left to the 
PLA through a mixture of the neglect, abuse, incompetence and unwillingness of the 
state security providers to enforce the unclear political direction given from 
Kathmandu. However, despite significant governance control, the Maoists failed to 
provide security stability and the Maoists never sought to fully entrench themselves 
and defend the ground of Gajul which acted as a fluid border zone between the state 
forces and the Maoist ‘base area’. Security in Liwang was maintained, not through the 
application of COIN, but rather by dint of the fact it was an administrative centre that 
the government could control and the Maoists chose not to make a serious attempt to 
take it. 
Development interventions to support stabilisation 
Maoist engagement in development activities was patchy throughout the conflict and 
only later became a clearly articulated set of activities. Initially the Maoists were pre-
occupied with securing control of the region and what infrastructure they built was 
small scale and used to promote the manoeuvrability of their forces rather than for 
development. For example wooden bridges were constructed in several areas, though 
many of these have been washed away, and chautaris (public meeting places) were 
built to facilitate Maoist cultural programmes.449 As the Maoist development 
programme evolved it became clear that they sought to promote their class revolution 
in the social arena through a three pronged approach; firstly, addressing practices 
they saw as being socially discriminatory or harmful (child marriage and drinking 
alcohol); secondly, price control and the establishment of communes to support 
                                                     
445 EA-3-6 12th October 2011, Liwang and IN-3-3 23rd October 2011, Kathmandu. 
446 EA-3-6 12th October 2011, Liwang. 
447 LL-3-9 18th October 2011, Liwang. 
448 EA-3-6 12th October 2011, Liwang. 
449 NL-3-1 19th September 2011, Kathmandu. 
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production; and thirdly, the construction of roads in a deliberate move to promote 
economic development.450 
The first element of social revolution in Maoist terms was social mobilisation, which 
had been used by Maoist cadres in Rolpa for some time prior to the conflict to 
mobilise communities and leaders to indoctrinate them into communist, and 
specifically the Nepali Maoist, ideology. This included substantial focus on social 
equality, for example addressing discrimination based on ethnicity or gender which is 
not dis-similar to the ideas espoused by some members of the NGO community in 
Nepal.451 Of particular focus in Gajul was the drinking of alcohol that was traded along 
the main highway to Liwang about one hour’s walk from Gajul-1, which was effectively 
banned by the Maoists during the conflict.452 Since the end of the conflict there have 
been concerns that the social revolution espoused by the Maoists has in fact been 
lost. The early gains against alcoholism, child marriage and discrimination seemed to 
have been lost and these practices continue in parts of Gajul and Rolpa more 
generally. Rather than been transformed by the conflict they simply faded in to the 
background to re-emerge later much as, for example, the role of the former Mukhiyas 
in justice provision shrank during the conflict but was later revived.453 
The second element of development activities were the attempts at price control and 
the establishment of communes.454 The price control was at least popular for those 
buying services,455 but it helped to bleed the area of liquidity as investment ceased 
                                                     
450 The fact they allowed education and health services to continue are largely 
discounted as being driven by the Maoists. These services were paid for by the Nepal 
central government in Kathmandu and in the case of health services the primary 
reason they wanted to maintain access to clinics and health professionals was to treat 
their own cadres. EA-3-6 12th October 2011, Liwang and NL-3-3 30th October 2011, 
Kathmandu. 
451 IN-5-7 27th September 2011, Kathmandu; it is also interesting to note that the 
Maoists were reportedly very sensitive to GTZ’s practice of social mobilisation, which 
had to be scaled back because the Maoists did not want a competitor in social 
mobilisation. IN-3-5 10th November 2011, Kathmandu. GTZ is Germany’s 
development agency and has changed its name to the Gesellschaft für Internationale 
Zusammenarbeit (GIZ), but was referred to by respondents by its former abbreviation. 
452 IN-3-3 23rd October 2011, Kathmandu. 
453 IN-3-3 23rd October 2011, Kathmandu and EA-3-3 11th October 2011, Gorahi. 
454 The communes were established outside Gajul and are not a primary focus of the 
study, though most have failed, in part because the Maoists did not really put their 
“gut” into making them work. LL-3-8 17th October 2011, Liwang and IN-3-5 10th 
November 2011, Kathmandu. 
455 However those living in Liwang suffered supply problems and a blockade at one 
point caused rampant localised inflation and Liwang did not benefit from the price 
The search for stability through stabilisation: Case studies from Afghanistan and Nepal 
189 
and the VDC and wider region were left with few financial incentives to invest the 
capital they had preserved during the conflict.456 Furthermore the aggressive 
recruitment into the PLA had led a significant proportion of the economically active 
male population to migrate, primarily to India, to avoid the conflict altogether. The 
reduction in liquidity almost certainly pushed more elements of Gajul out of the cash 
economy to a greater reliance on non-cash systems of exchange and was anti-
developmental. While part of the drop in economic growth can be attributed to 
elements of the population leaving the region or simply holding on to capital, another 
element of economic pressure was that of the Maoists themselves and the way they 
prosecuted the conflict. The Maoists were known for forcing families to provide food 
and shelter to cadres whilst they were on patrol.457 This inevitably put stress on 
household food production which in Gajul was already insufficient to feed most 
families for an entire year and was an important grievance mentioned by 
respondents. The combination of these policies led to the abject failure of the 
Maoists’ economic model which is only fully visible now where the stability currently 
enjoyed in Gajul has encouraged a number of entrepreneurs to build small-scale 
timber yards and expand market shops.458 
The third element of the Maoists development approach was the use of forced labour 
to build roads in Rolpa.459 These had a dual purpose; to support military action, but 
also had clear economic development impacts for the communities living on the road. 
The intriguing element of the Maoist mobilisation of labour from 2002 is that they felt 
secure enough to mobilise labour in Gajul and demand the workers supply their own 
food to sustain them whilst building a road which manifestly was not going to benefit 
Gajul; the road runs through VDCs in western Rolpa up to a day’s walk away.460 
                                                                                                                                                          
controls. IN-3-5 10th November 2011, Kathmandu. Price control was abandoned by 
the Maoists shortly after the end of the conflict. 
456 IN-3-5 10th November 2011, Kathmandu. 
457 EA-3-13 16th October 2011, Gajul. 
458 Author’s observations, though not all interviewed for the research it was clear from 
conversations with shop keepers and small business owners that economic 
investment by the local population had only occurred in recent years, i.e. at least two 
years after the end of the conflict. 
459 It should be noted that ‘voluntary labour’ has been used in development since the 
Sen Kingdom was established, and was certainly used during both the Rana and 
Panchayat periods to construct roads in to Rolpa. LL-3-5 15th October 2011, Gajul EA-
3-10 15th October 2011, Gajul, EA-3-13 16th October 2011, Gajul. The Maoists 
publicly announced the road as a development project (Samacharpatra, 2004). 
460 EA-3-10 15th October 2011, Gajul and LL-3-5 15th October 2011, Gajul. The VDCs 
Gajul workers went to Irigaon, Jungaar, Teela and Gharti Gaon VDCs. Another way of 
viewing this choice was that, at a pragmatic level, the PLA and Maoists cadres could 
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Despite this, the scale of mobilisation was exceptionally high. During one period Gajul 
supplied 200 of the 500 workers on the project, an astonishing burden for a VDC 
consisting of some 800 households when a large number of working aged males had 
left the area.461 
Indeed the excessive and repeated use of ‘voluntary labour,’ which no one could 
refuse and resulted in a number of injuries and fatalities amongst workers,462 led the 
leaders of Gajul, both pro and anti-Maoist, to refuse to participate for a third year in 
the road construction unless the road was going to pass through Gajul itself. 463 The 
road in Gajul that was eventually worked on is now called the Sunil Marg, or Sunil’s 
road, in memory of K.B. ‘Sunil’ Thapa, the son of Gajul who rose to be Commissar of 
the PLA’s 5th Division. This appears to be one of the first examples where the Maoist 
leadership responded to the demands of the local population to provide a service, but 
it did not occur until 2005. 
The long-term failure of the social change and economic reform agenda was coupled 
with resentment amongst communities that they were being forced to provide 
voluntary labour in a replay of methods dating back to the Sen dynasty. These failures, 
however, had not stopped the Maoists from preaching the good news of development 
which would result from the struggle.464 In addition to their own failure to generate 
development the Maoists also resisted attempts of most NGOs,465 bi-lateral donors 
and even the Nepal chapter of the Federation of the Red Cross, to operate outside of 
Liwang.466 Indeed in Gajul these agencies were not present at all from 2000 to at least 
2004.467 The self-generated pressure to deliver some development benefits and the 
failure of their own social development model (the communes, price fixing and road 
construction) has been interpreted as the Maoists’ primary motivation to allow 
                                                                                                                                                          
not be openly active in Gajul for too long because of the frequent patrolling by the 
police and army, so they focused on development implementation in areas where 
they felt more secure. NL-3-1 19th September 2011, Kathmandu. 
461 LL-3-6 15th October 2011, Gajul. 
462 IN-3-5 10th November 2011, Kathmandu. 
463 EA-3-10 15th October 2011, Gajul and LL-3-6 15th October 2011, Gajul. 
464 IN-3-5 10th November 2011, Kathmandu. 
465 The only exception to this was the Nepali NGO, INSEC, which was involved in 
monitoring human rights abuses. The Maoists had a vested interest in ensuring that 
INSEC had reasonable access because it could use an independent source to verify its 
claims of state security force brutality. 
466 The latter may be because of the connection between local opposition political 
leaders and the Red Cross Federation. LL-3-7 15th October 2011, Gajul.  
467 This was partially because they alleged NGOs were part of US plots to undermine 
them after the US publicly supported the monarchy against the Maoists. NL-3-3 30th 
October 2011, Kathmandu.  
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development agencies, initially GTZ, to operate outside of Liwang after 2004.468 This is 
also supported by residents who viewed the Maoists use of development activities as 
a “technique to rule over the people.”469 
As the conflict began to wind down a few externally funded projects began to be 
implemented in Gajul, these included projects supported by the Asia Foundation on 
conflict resolution and GTZ on agricultural activities. GTZ also refurbished all of the 
schools in Gajul after the conflict.470 However, the degree to which the projects 
supported stability in the last phase of the conflict and the post-conflict period is 
contested by the residents. Those on the victor’s side see them as the just rewards for 
a conflict well fought and won;471 for those who sought to avoid the conflict or who 
opposed the insurgency the fact that the projects have returned is simply a 
resumption of the gradual development Gajul was benefitting from previously and 
thought they had little or no link to stability.472 
Finally, state sponsored development effectively stopped during the conflict after 
there had been a gradual expansion of services, including drinking water, irrigation, 
schools and clinics since the 1950s. Before the implementation of projects stopped 
during the insurgency the money was either taken by officials, VDC representatives or 
Maoist cadres.473 Attempts were made by some teachers to use education funding to 
provide basic school materials, though these were often unsuccessful.474 Allegations 
of corruption suggested that the expenditure of development budgets was corrupt 
even prior to the conflict and that the conflict simply presented new opportunities for 
greater corruption.475 This is not to say that the government did not attempt new 
initiatives to spend development funding, and indeed it initiated the ISDP. However 
the ‘basket fund’ as it was locally known was spent almost entirely on security 
expenditures, as discussed above.476 
The development stabilisation activities, by both the Maoists and government, 
manifestly failed to promote stability in Gajul, despite, at times, massive mobilisation 
of labour and continued access to basic services. Importantly, with the exception of 
                                                     
468 IN-3-5 10th November 2011, Kathmandu. 
469 LL-3-7 15th October 2011, Gajul. 
470 EA-3-9 14th October 2011, Gajul and LL-3-7 15th October 2011, Gajul. 
471 LL-3-3 13th October 2011, Gajul and LL-3-8 17th October 2011, Liwang. 
472 NL-3-2 14th October 2011, Gajul and LL-3-7 15th October 2011, Gajul. 
473 There were various allegations of corruption of development spending during the 
conflict, but what all sides seem to agree on is that very little state sponsored 
development was carried out in Gajul during the conflict. 
474 EA-3-10 15th October 2011, Gajul. 
475 EA-3-5 12th October 2011, Liwang. 
476 EA-3-6 12th October 2011, Liwang. 
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the Maoist leaders,477 local residents and opposition political leaders do not think the 
development projects actually supported stability.478 Furthermore the long-term 
sustainment of the social and economic changes espoused by the Maoists’ creation of 
the Magarant Autonomous State have largely been washed away in the post-conflict 
era.479 This insight is vitally important to understanding what was considered to bring 
stability to the VDC before, during and after the conflict – it is clear that it was not 
because of development. 
In summary, the case of Gajul and Rolpa suggests that insurgent stabilisation faces 
many of the same challenges presented to exogenous and indigenous state actors in 
promoting stability. Chief amongst them is the requirement to provide enough 
security for a state to be nurtured and to grow, which the Maoists achieved in Gajul. 
However, the broader social and developmental revolution that the Maoists 
promoted was not well supported by their developmental interventions and they 
failed to find purchase in local society except by use of force, and have subsequently 
been reversed. 
Thematic Analysis – Rolpa 
This section provides an analysis of Gajul’s experience of stability and stabilisation 
through the five analytical themes 1) periods of stability; 2) culture and context; 3) 
mode of intervention; 4) political legitimacy and; 5) conceptions of stability. It then 
concludes by testing this analysis against the three theories outlined in Chapter 2, 
which articulate the theories of statebuilding, COIN and development. 
Gajul had experienced several hundred years of stability prior to the emergence of the 
conflict in the 1980s, though this was largely as a result of benign neglect by the 
central state that devolved authority to local landlords with occasional enforcement. 
The democratic experiments allowed tensions that had built up over generations to be 
expressed, but as the reforms did not promote the legitimacy of the state, violent 
resistance was orchestrated by the Maoists. Looking back over Gajul’s history what is 
striking is that the earlier rule of the landed class has not been replaced by democratic 
governance but rather the appearance of new Maoist ‘lords’ who enforced stability 
during the conflict. If previous periods of stability indicate anything it is that stability 
was largely derived from the ability of the state to enforce their will sporadically and 
to control the population, but this does not necessarily allow the state to evolve. 
Maoist attempts to stabilise the area were numerous and carried out over a 
significant period and in many senses pre-date the conflict. Local governance was 
                                                     
477 LL-3-8 17th October 2011, Liwang. 
478 LL-3-7 15th October 2011, Gajul.  
479 IN-3-3 23rd October 2011, Kathmandu. 
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secured after long processes of mobilisation and the ability to rely on an effective 
state - the Magarant Autonomous State. Their political, judicial and military structures 
maintained a coherent message to the population – even if large parts of the 
population simply went along with it to protect their lives. This political stability was, 
however, primarily ensured through the extensive use of violence, threats and 
intimidation leading some to conclude that the stability enforced during the conflict 
was a kind of dead stability.480 However the Maoists chose not to attempt complete 
security dominance and maintained an asymmetric posture throughout the conflict 
allowing short breaks in the Maoists’ imposed stability during which the patrols by 
Nepali state forces occurred. 
These were both successful strategies, but the Maoists were significantly less 
successful in using development as a stabilising tool. Whilst Maoist leaders clung to 
the idea that the insurgency was about the class revolution and that development 
projects supported stability,481 the development activities in Gajul and Rolpa more 
generally had little relevance to stability because the period as a whole was one of un-
development,482 and many beneficiaries of the development projects, both past and 
present, did not associate the projects with stability.483 Rather they point to the much 
more direct impact of politics – both local and national which were the real drivers of 
stability.484 While the processes of insurgent stabilisation and anaemic state attempts 
to retake lost territory indicate that the processes that form local stability were not 
significantly connected to development, the rhetoric of development may have be 
helpful as a consent winning activity.  
The insurgency exposed the reality that the Nepali state, despite its professed 
evolution to democracy, remained distant from the population and served the 
interests of the ruling elites. The underlying lack of legitimacy and the inability of the 
central state polity to comprehend a counterrevolution to the threat posed by the 
Maoists meant that for the most part support for the Nepali state simply vanished in 
the face of a low technology and low intensity insurgency. However is unfair to 
characterise the Maoists as representing all groups within Rolpa or Gajul, indeed the 
localised nature of the conflict at the village level seems on closer inspection to be a 
vehicle for specific networks, in this case the Subedi-Thapas, to continue their internal 
                                                     
480 LL-3-7 15th October 2011, Gajul, also referred to the Panchayat era as a kind of 
dead peace; Maoists referred to the Panchayat era as one of dead peace. NL-3-1 26th 
July 2011, Kathmandu. 
481 LL-3-8 17th October 2011, Liwang, NL-3-3 30th October 2011, Kathmandu went as 
far to say that “stability means development.” 
482 IN-3-5 10th November 2011, Kathmandu. 
483 EA-3-5 12th October 2011, Liwang. 
484 EA-3-6 12th October 2011, Liwang, LL-3-2 12th October 2011, Liwang. 
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power struggles under the guise of a higher level conflict over the nature of the state. 
While the lack of national political legitimacy may have given succour to the 
insurgency it was the unresolved local political contest which gave direction to the 
Maoists in Gajul. 
This dynamic in the conflict whereby national politics was a structuring element of 
local conflict is reinforced by local conceptions of stability. As noted above, for the 
political leadership contesting control of the area stability was a significant aim, and 
various tools were employed to achieve it – most successfully the political innovations 
of the Maoists. As one Maoist leader noted: “politics is the ox of the ox cart. The ox 
will drive the cart. If the ox finds the right way, the cart will follow. If the ox goes the 
wrong way, then the cart will go the wrong way. Until and unless there is political 
stability in the country, every other thing will be unstable. The important thing is 
politics which will drive the whole system.”485 However, amongst other respondents 
stability was not necessarily of great concern, much as the wider conflict was not of 
concern because they had little stake in it. As a result significant sections of the 
community were trying to avoid the conflict because they were focused on protecting 
and feeding their families and made choices as required to ensure those aims.486 
Stability for these respondents was almost irrelevant, indicating that actions to 
address the stability of a whole population to resolve political conflicts may also be 
largely irrelevant. If this is correct, development cannot be a tool for stability for 
either insurgents or the state.487  
Finally, respondents of all stripes indicated that there is now stability, or at least 
peace, but it relies on the same processes that brought peace prior to the conflict i.e. 
a dysfunctional central state with the imposition of authority which in the current 
period contains the remnants of the Maoist parallel governance structure and 
patronage and is therefore not necessarily stable. At the time of this research there 
was no VDC office or police station in Gajul and it had returned in some respects to a 
pre-Panchayat system of control by local lords – instead now they were not feudal 
lords but Maoist lords who had broken from the feudal system to back a change in 
government precisely because they had been marginalised in the conflict between the 
local political leaders of the Subedi-Thapa network. This is not to say that the conflict 
had simply returned Gajul to its ante-conflict state as some respondents have 
suggested;488 there had been some changes. In particular, the social impacts of the 
conflict changed gender roles because of the migration of groups out of Gajul 
                                                     
485 NL-3-3 30th October 2011, Kathmandu. 
486 EA-3-2 10th October 2011, Gorahi. 
487 Or lead to political consensus as one respondent noted. EA-3-12 15th October 2011, 
Gajul. 
488 EA-3-11 15th October 2011, Gajul. 
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empowered women to take on more prominent roles.489 Within the current situation 
however the seeds of a renewed conflict exist, though it is possible that the seeming 
‘dysfunction’ of the state and the parties is simply a rite of passage that Nepal must go 
through. Whilst there are threats by some Maoists to resume violence490 it is 
legitimate to ask whether a degree of instability is required in the context of Nepal.491 
In summary, while Gajul exhibited stability for a substantial period prior to the 
conflict, the local political leadership was unable to accommodate political 
competition because of a failure of the national democratic reforms in the 1990s. This 
cleavage was supported by robust mobilisation and preparation for the insurgency in 
the area which meant that the establishment of the Magarant Autonomous State and 
extensive, but selective, use of violence and coercion gave the Maoists governance 
control in the area. Their attempts at social and developmental revolution were less 
successful and had little connection to local conceptions of stability and, when viewed 
over the long term, development may in fact be understood to be a destabilising 
intervention because education establishments fostered the new generation of 
leaders who prosecuted the conflict. 
Theoretical analysis 
This sub-section analyses the theoretical implications of insurgent stabilisation for the 
theories of statebuilding, COIN and Development. In common with exogenous 
governance reform processes, the technocratic approach to statebuilding492 to 
address instability and the insurgency by the Nepali state failed. However it seems 
unlikely that greater technical capability would have made the state a more attractive 
proposition for the bulk of the population which attempted to avoid the conflict. This 
is primarily because the statebuilding agenda espoused by the Nepalese political elite, 
in particular the monarchy, did nothing to present a counterrevolution, and collapsed 
because it was irrelevant. This suggests that had more exogenous support been 
provided by force, as the statebuilding theory suggests, it would have failed. 
The poor execution of COIN493 activities, whether through the ISDP or unified 
command of the security forces, was the direct result of poor political direction from 
the centre in Kathmandu. It is not clear if this is a refutation of COIN theory or simply 
the inability of the Nepali political elite to conceive of a counterrevolution to the 
threat posed by the Maoist insurgency, thereby preventing the Nepal security forces 
                                                     
489 EA-3-5 12th October 2011, Liwang. 
490 EA-3-6 12th October 2011, Liwang and LL-3-9 18th October 2011, Liwang. 
491 Also noted by ICG, 2010, pp. 40-1. 
492 See Dobbins et al, 2007, p. 1 quoted on p. 47. 
493 See JP3-24, 2009, p. I2 quoted on p. 53. 
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from pursing COIN effectively. The case study does however confirm the threat posed 
by a well-orchestrated politically energised insurgency to the state. 
Finally, this case study directly challenges the hypothesis that social development494 
can be stabilising over the long term. The early introduction of education in the area 
was critical to the evolution of political disputes within the Subedi-Thapa network who 
were the primary belligerents in the conflict in Gajul. Further the clumsy use of 
development by both the government and the insurgents indicates that the 
limitations on development to support stabilisation are not limited to exogenous 
actors but also affect the potential impact of development activities implemented by 
indigenous actors. 
In summary Gajul provides a challenge to the theories of statebuilding, COIN and 
development. The technical processes of statebuilding and COIN were attempted but 
failed largely because of incoherent political direction from the centre to present 
government action as a form of counterrevolution to Maoist ideology. Most critically it 
suggests that the link between development and stability may be overstated and that 
in the long-term development can be destabilising. 
Conclusion 
Gajul has dealt with multiple destabilising processes in the last sixty years, which 
included increased development and political awareness of elite networks as well as 
the evolution of the democratic system which governed Nepal. These pressures 
created fissures which allowed local level conflicts to claim the mantle of national 
level conflicts as elements of the Subedi-Thapa network split across Nepal’s political 
parties. While the creation of the Magarant Autonomous State and the pushing back 
of the Nepali state from the region was successful it was deeply destabilising for the 
population and economic production dropped, segments of the population either 
voluntarily left or were forced out, development initiatives ceased and political 
pluralism was stopped. Security control was not assured by either side, though this 
imbalance was deliberately maintained by the asymmetrical manner in which the 
Maoists attempted to enforce control.  
However the story of Gajul is not one of destabilisation, but one of insurgent 
stabilisation through which the Maoists attempted to promote stability by employing 
the same activities that are used by intervening and host nation states in other 
contexts. The insurgents faced many of the same problems associated with stability 
that plague exogenous interventions and therefore it highlights the inability of any 
group to promote stability in the context of a contested political and security space. 
Gajul also suggests that there may be a hierarchy of issues that support stability with 
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politics, governance and security being distinct and more significant than 
development. Development may in fact may be destabilising in the long-term. It also 
confirms that ultimately violence in civil wars is highly localised and in the case of 
Gajul was structured by the relationships of one extended family network; this 
challenges conceptions of population-centric conceptions of stability when the locus 
of the conflict was contained within a relatively small group of individuals. 
Finally, this chapter challenges the theories of statebuilding, COIN and development 
which provide incomplete explanations for why the Maoists were able to enforce a 
dead stability in the face of a poorly executed comprehensive campaign by the 
government. Ultimately the failure of the state in Gajul had less to do with the actions 
of the executive (though their abuses were notable) but rather the inability of national 
level political leaders to articulate a counterrevolution to the insurgent threat. 
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Chapter 7 – Failed Self-Stabilisation 
Haraiya VDC, Bara District, Nepal 
 
Figure 8 Map of Bara district, Nepal OCHA 
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Prelude 
“There are 601 members in the Constitution Assembly. They are either elected directly 
or elected proportionately. During the election, they had a mandate for concluding the 
peace process and promulgating the constitution within two years…[but]…leeches are 
always seeking animals or people when they are hungry. Once a leech has found a 
human being, it will [continue] suck[ing until it has] a full stomach. Afterwards, it will 
fall down and cannot move anywhere. Neither will it seek the human being anymore. It 
will be like a dead thing. These 601 Constitution Assembly members are also like 
leeches. They were living and eating with people until they got elected. They assured 
[everyone] that they would do this or that for the votes. People voted [for] them to 
resolve the problems of the people and country. The Constitution Assembly members 
had the responsibility to conclude the peace process and promulgate the constitution 
within 2 years. At the moment, they are like fallen leeches. They are extensively 
enjoying the state apparatus like huge earnings and riding in high-tech vehicles. They 
are putting a deaf ear to the peace process and constitution making. They are fighting 
for the chairs [in Cabinet]. They are never willing to go back to the villages and meet 
the people…they [have] forgot[ten] their assurances to people.” LL-4-1 26th August 
2011, Haraiya. 
Bara and failed self stabilisation 
This chapter focuses on processes of self-stabilisation that occurred in Haraiya VDC in 
Bara district, Nepal, during and after the Maoist insurgency. The chapter suggests that 
the greatest determinants of local stability lie in the relationship and relative stability 
of local and national political settlements rather than security or development 
interventions. The Maoist insurgency arrived in Bara in 2000 and the PLA and People’s 
Government attempted to assert authority in the district and Haraiya VDC, though 
ultimately only succeeded in pushing the government back rather than establishing 
coherent Maoist governance, security and development activities on the model of the 
Magarant Autonomous State.  
As a result villages were left open to the predation of criminal gangs who often used 
the Indian border as an escape route as well as Maoist, police and army operations, as 
the belligerents fought for control of the region. Throughout this period there were 
attempts at stabilisation by Maoist forces and the Government of Nepal in Haraiya, 
which all failed to bring stability. In the case of Haraiya VDC this led to a spontaneous 
attempt to self-stabilise the area which had a limited impact in the main market area 
of the VDC, but the majority of Haraiya’s population was left in a power vacuum. 
The conflict did not stop with the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement 
(CPA). The Madeshi Andolan in 2007 and killings of Maoist cadres in the wider Terai 
region brought a new wave of instability. This case study suggests that none of the 
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political, security or development interventions provide explanatory evidence for the 
limited stabilisation that was achieved in the VDC; instead the data suggests that 
processes beyond the control of Haraiya dictated the extent of stability that was 
experienced by the population. This example of failed self-stabilisation in Haraiya 
offers some important lessons about stability, and challenges the assumption that 
development can in some way prevent de-stabilisation.  
The chapter particularly explores the relevance of development projects to stability 
during the period from 2000-2009 as well as the actions of a community self-defence 
group whose interests in stability transcended the interests of the conflicting parties 
and had strong linkages to illicit timber trade. This is significant because the Maoists 
not only failed to deliver security but subsequently failed to maintain control over 
their erstwhile Madeshi allies who they had attempted to co-opt into the 
insurgency.495 The conflict then became a low-level, multi-faceted campaign of terror 
from a plethora of armed groups that attempted to exploit the political and security 
vacuum.  
Interviews for this chapter were carried out in Haraiya VDC, Kalaiya – the 
headquarters of Bara district, and in Kathmandu. In total thirty-four interviews were 
carried out with thirty-six participants between August and October 2011 in English, 
Nepali and Bhojpori, a dialect of Nepali spoken in Haraiya. Respondents came from a 
range of ethnic backgrounds including Dalit, Pahadi, Madeshi, Muslim and Tharu 
communities in the VDC. The respondents included political leaders, government 
officials, NGO staff, local farmers and daily wage labourers. 
Conflict history 
This section provides an introduction to Bara and Haraiya VDC, looking at the social, 
cultural and governance systems present in the region. It goes on to provide an 
outline of the conflict dynamics and history of the region since the 1990s, which 
highlight the key themes explored in the stabilisation sections later in the chapter. 
Bara district lies in the Central Terai and is bordered by India to the south. Parsa 
district with the large border city of Birgunj is approximately a forty-five minute drive 
west from Kalaiya the district headquarters. To the east lies Rautahat district, the birth 
place of former Prime Minister M.K. Nepal, and to the north lie the foothills of 
Makwanpur district, which mark the beginning of Nepal’s hill territory. Kalaiya is a 
small town and not on the main highways that run through Bara. Trade in the district 
is centred at Simara to the west, which has a small airport and lies at the junction of 
the Tribhuvan Rajpath from Birgunj to Kathmandu and the Mahendra highway, the 
                                                     
495 In Madeshi eyes because the Maoists were not willing to give the Madeshi the 
power they had been promised. 
The search for stability through stabilisation: Case studies from Afghanistan and Nepal 
201 
main east-west link across Nepal. The Mahendra highway cuts across the northern 
third of Bara; there are higher concentrations of Pahadi settlers in the northern third 
of the district and progressively more Madeshi and Tharu communities in the centre 
and south towards the Indian border. At the eastern side of the district another 
medium sized municipality, Colbi, lies on the highway. Kalaiya is therefore 
economically and physically isolated and provides weak authority for the ninety-eight 
VDCs in Bara. 
Haraiya VDC lies one hour and forty-five minutes by car from Kalaiya, but is also 
accessible by foot in two hours or by bicycle in one hour on routes that run through 
fields. The VDC is approximately ten kilometres in length and about two to three 
kilometres wide, though on maps it is shown in the shape of an ‘H’; as with other VDCs 
in Nepal it consists of nine wards. The centre of the VDC lies ten kilometres to the 
south of the main highway, though the road to the highway is only seasonally passable 
by motor vehicles and runs through Sal forest, which provides a significant extractable 
natural resource. Most local production in the VDC is agriculture; mainly rice, millet 
and maize. There is some local light industry in the form of brick kilns. To the south of 
Haraiya lies Bariyarpur VDC and immediately surrounding Haraiya is Karaiya VDC, 
which lies to the south, north and east in separate blocs around Haraiya. Across the 
highway to the north lies Nijgadh VDC.  
Over recent centuries Bara’s population has migrated in waves to the district to take 
advantage of the availability of land as the forests have been cleared.496 Bara’s 
population has grown from 559,135 in 2001 to 701,037 in 2011, an annual increase of 
2.26% or 25.38% over the decade; (Government of Nepal, 2011) extrapolating for 
Haraiya VDC this would mean the population of the VDC in 2011 was approximately 
5,346.497 While Haraiya’s population cannot be reduced to simple ethnic and caste 
identities it is instructive to describe the main ethnic features of the population. The 
Tharu communities, along with the Madeshi and Dalits, are the original inhabitants of 
the area, and all three communities share housing styles.498 Most Tharu interviewed 
were linked to NC, but other respondents noted splits in the Tharu vote between the 
Communist Party of Nepal – United Marxist Leninist (CPN-UML), NC and UCPN-M. 
                                                     
496 LL-4-5 25th August 2011, Haraiya. 
497 Extrapolated by adding Bara’s decadal population growth (25.38%) to the number 
of people who were recorded in Haraiya in the 2001 census – 4,264 individuals in 800 
households – this gives an average household size of 5.33, lower than the average 
noted for Bara overall in 2011 or 6.11 (Government of Nepal, Undated; Government 
of Nepal, 2011). 
498 Muslim community members modify some of their buildings, for instance removing 
all references to the local Naga cult in keeping with their religious beliefs. 
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Many of the Tharu leaders were also involved in the Panchayat era of political 
leadership at a VDC level and in many respects are the traditional leaders of the VDC. 
The Madeshi are caste Hindus from the plains with strong cultural and social ties to 
India. In Haraiya the Madeshi live across the central and southern wards and often 
own larger plots of land.499 They migrated to the area after the Tharu, but they have 
been living in the VDC for several generations. In Haraiya VDC the Madeshi 
communities are economically stratified and have benefitted from both licit and illicit 
border trade in the region; several land-owning Madeshi were also leaders in the 
Panchayat system. As a group they are economically significant and control a 
significant proportion of the market trade in Madhuwan, which is the central village 
within Haraiya VDC.500 In Haraiya many of the senior Madeshi leaders are linked to 
CPN-UML but clearly have strong relationships with UCPN-M (including its Pahadi 
leaders) and NC. They have been the main political leaders of the VDC since the start 
of multi-party democracy. 
The Muslim community also live the central and southern wards, and though they 
arrived after the Tharu, Madeshi and Dalits, many have been living in Haraiya VDC for 
2-3 generations. They have some land but many provide skilled labour in the local 
market, such as tailoring, and they are an integral part of the local economy though 
they are not necessarily the wealthiest members. The community has at least one 
mosque and one madrassa, and is not politically significant. In terms of Nepal’s caste 
hierarchy the Madeshi, Tharu and Muslims have all been excluded from positions of 
power and authority and have long standing grievances regarding their exclusion from 
state power (Guneratne, 2002, p. 75).  
The Pahadi are the most recent immigrants to the area, and are the most socially and 
economically distinct; most Pahadi settlers live in the Naya Basti (New Town) area,501 
which lies in the northern part of the VDC in the forest hinterland. They have brought 
with them and still maintain their traditional housing styles and cultivation of maize. 
The Naya Basti ward is two kilometres north of the central ward, Madhuwan, where 
the main VDC office is situated. The Pahadi were given plots of land that they often 
cleared themselves in the 1970s during the Panchayat period as part of government 
                                                     
499 Some respondents identified the Madeshi as the main landlords in Haraiya, though 
land holdings were of a modest size of two to three bigha (one bigha is equivalent to 
approximately five hectares); large landlords do still exist and reportedly one landlord 
in Bara owns some 3,000 bigha. IN-4-7 21st October 2011, Kathmandu and EA-4-2 
23rd August 2011, Haraiya. 
500 Madhuwan is also known as Ward-4 or Haraiya-4. 
501 Also known as Ward-6 or Haraiya-6. 
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resettlement activities to encourage settlement in the forest regions.502 The plots of 
land were roughly half the size of the Madeshi and Tharu respondents, meaning there 
are significant concerns about inequality between the groups. However there may be 
as much inequality within the Madeshi and Pahadi social groups.503  
Overall the Tharu, Madeshi, Pahadi and Muslim communities, whilst they are 
internally stratified, have reasonably high levels of economic wealth in terms of land 
and livestock ownership. The relatively strong economic position of these groups does 
not apply to the Dalits (referred to as Madeshi Dalits locally as opposed to Pahadi, or 
Hill, Dalits), who own no land, and when they had access to land it was without secure 
tenure. Dalit girls in particular were noted for having lower attendance rates in local 
schools both historically and currently.504 Dalits were working primarily as waged or 
bonded labour on local fields for the land owning families within the other 
communities. The political representation of the Dalits was split between the Maoists, 
NC and UML despite strong attempts by the Maoists to gain their support during the 
insurgency. 
As a result, class rather than ethnicity has dominated patterns of governance where 
local leaders have largely been drawn from the elites within each ethnic group, i.e. 
Tharu, Madeshi, Pahadi and Muslim respondents had all been members of the 
Panchayat at some point; wards with greater numbers of one particular group tended 
to have Panchayat leaders from that community.505 Some Panchayat leaders went into 
electoral politics, but the lapsing of the elected officials’ mandates after the 1999 
electoral terms finished meant that some former (non-elected) Panchayat leaders 
reassumed roles of authority in the VDC from 2003.506 Until the Madeshi Andolan 
(discussed below) respondents were clear that there was little or no tension between 
                                                     
502 The ‘Sal’ forests of the Terai were instrumental in bankrolling the Panchayat’s 
plebiscite on the continuation of the regime in 1979. The timber was sold to India for 
the construction of the railways, a process which dates back originally to the 1920s. 
The resettlement programme was funded by international donors according to local 
respondents but they did not know who had provided the funding. LL-4-5 25th August 
2011, Haraiya, LL-4-7 26th August 2011, Haraiya and Dev, Karna, Adhikari, & 
Springate-Baginski, 2006, pp. 12, 44. 
503 There are both very wealthy and very poor landless Madeshi and Pahadis. The 
overriding features of socio-economic power are connected to the amount of land 
that they can buy (or be given) and how long they have been in the region. 
504 EA-4-1 23rd August 2011, Haraiya and LL-4-2 24th August 2011, Haraiya. 
505 LL-4-2 24th August 2011, Haraiya: interestingly in 2011 analysts believe that caste 
and ethnicity were becoming greater determinants of political power and voting 
patterns as a result of the ethnicity based politics associated with the Madeshi 
Andolan. IN-4-7 21st October 2011, Kathmandu. 
506 LL-4-5 25th August 2011, Haraiya. 
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the social groups. As a result the Maoists did not attempt broad mobilisation along 
ethnic lines, however several respondents clearly thought the Maoists were a Pahadi 
phenomenon.507 Instead they attempted to marginalise and target the wealthier 
individuals in the Madeshi and Tharu social groups and mobilise poorer individuals 
within those groups as well as a broad attempt to mobilise the Dalit community. 
Haraiya VDC has had substantial input from international development agencies in 
addition to development spending through government budgets and the local VDC 
office. Schools were first established in the VDC approximately 40 years ago and there 
are now eleven primary schools and two secondary schools, there is also a central 
health post and several sub-posts throughout the VDC.508 The development agencies 
have also dug a large number of potable water wells though there is only limited 
availability of pumps and wells for irrigation, which is still largely reliant on the 
monsoon rains for the summer crop, and melt-water for the autumn-winter crop.  
Development activities in Haraiya first started to accelerate at the beginning of multi-
party democracy in the 1990s when the UML central government allocated every VDC 
three lakhs NRS for development under the ‘Building Your Village Yourself’ scheme.509 
In Haraiya the decade to 2000 was spent building infrastructure such as bridges and 
roads which spurred local employment in the construction sector.510 In addition other 
agencies, most notably Plan International, their local partner organisation, and also 
the Nepal Federation of the Red Cross, continued to implement community 
development projects throughout the VDC. Their projects covered a wide range of 
activities including education, health, drinking water supply and provision of saplings. 
Development projects through Plan and the Red Cross continued throughout the 
conflict, but were badly affected by intimidation and demands for donations by the 
Maoists. Despite being affected by the conflict the projects continued and Plan in 
particular managed to negotiate space to operate until 2011 when they phased out 
activities because of insecurity associated with the armed groups that sprang up after 
the CPA and Madeshi Andolan. 
There is one semi-gravelled road running the length of the VDC, there are no major 
bridges, but the Maoists claimed they had built a footbridge over a small river about 
                                                     
507 EA-4-1 23rd August 2011, Haraiya and EA-4-11 28th August 2011, Kalaiya. 
508 EA-4-1 23rd August 2011, Haraiya and LL-4-2 24th August 2011, Haraiya. 
509 LL-4-1 23rd August 2011, Haraiya: in current prices three lakhs NRS is approx. 
$3,400; it was this programme which initiated the concept of the ‘all-party mechanism’ 
to monitor development spending that has proved to be controversial when it was 
revived after the end of the insurgency (Whelpton, 2005, p. 193). 
510 LL-4-1 23rd August 2011, Haraiya. 
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half a kilometre to the east of the highway near the forest.511 The Sal forest is 
Haraiya’s most lucrative resource. In the mid-1990s Sal in Nepal’s Terai districts was 
estimated to be worth some $6bn, and has been exploited by both the state and 
illegal loggers (Paudel, Keeling, & Khanal, 2006, p. 2). The Sal forest in the Terai, 
including to the north of Haraiya VDC, was extensively cleared during the 1970s as 
part of a resettlement programme and to provide hard currency for the Panchayat 
regime to pay for a plebiscite regarding the future of the regime (Whelpton, 2005, p. 
144). The illegal timber trade is controlled by local networks with links to district and 
regional supply chains in other parts of Nepal and India.512 There are also three brick 
kilns in the VDC which provide employment to approximately 900 people, though this 
includes migrant labour from India and other VDCs in Bara. Local engagement in 
production was estimated to be around 300 people.513 There is a twice weekly market 
in the village, selling mainly locally produced crops, fish from rivers or local fish farms, 
and some local pottery. There are also permanent shops and butchers as well as local 
tailors and basic electrical supply shops.  
There are government offices of the agriculture, forestry and health departments, 
though these are spread out, the forestry office is in Naya Basti closest to the forest, 
the agriculture office is in one of the southern wards, and health centre is in 
Madhuwan, or central Haraiya. The VDC office and police post are also in Madhuwan. 
The police post was established in 1971 upon the request of the population because 
of continued robberies by what local residents referred to as dacoits.514 The VDC 
office and police post were previously co-located but since the re-establishment of the 
post in the run-up to the Constituent Assembly (CA) elections in 2008 they are now in 
different locations. 
Maoist mobilisation in Bara started in 1995 with members of CPN-Masal and former 
members of CPN-UML forming the nucleus of leadership within Bara as well as 
Haraiya.515 Though the number of individuals involved was very small, initially less 
than ten people, the group had high hopes of capitalising on the disenfranchisement 
of the Madeshi, Tharu and Dalit groups, despite the fact that all of the significant 
leaders of the newly formed Maoists in Bara were Pahadi. Whilst there were Maoist 
leaders from non-Pahadi backgrounds the association of the Maoists with the Pahadi 
in Haraiya in their core area of Naya Basti dogged their attempts at mobilising support 
                                                     
511 NL-4-3 16th August 2011, Kathmandu and LL-4-5 25th August 2011, Haraiya. 
512 There are allegations that senior political figures from Bara, including CA member 
Shiva Chandra Prasad Kushwaha, were linked to timber smuggling.  
513 Author estimate based on respondents suggesting each kiln had about 300 workers 
with a third of those were drawn from Haraiya EA-4-3 24th August 2011, Haraiya. 
514 EA-4-1 23rd August 2011, Haraiya. 
515 LL-4-1 23rd August 2011, Haraiya and LL-4-5 25th August 2011, Haraiya. 
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amongst other groups.516 For the Maoists in Bara, Haraiya was considered strategic 
territory because the forest allowed them a terrain they could operate in with greater 
safety and freedom of movement; the location of Naya Basti being predominately 
Pahadi and right next to the edge of the forest meant there was a synergy between 
their successful attempts at mobilisation amongst the Pahadi and the terrain required 
to sustain the insurgency.517  
In preparation for and during their campaign the Maoists sustained themselves 
through taxation of wealthy local individuals, the shopkeepers in the bazaar, 
government officials and NGOs who were all paying money in response to threats 
from the Maoist cadres.518 The effectiveness of the mobilisation and skill with which 
the Maoists were using weapons led many to suggest that the Maoists in Haraiya (and 
Bara more generally) had simply co-opted criminal gangs to do their dirty work; this 
afforded the criminals support and an organisation they were able to turn to and the 
Maoists gained the skills of experts in violence.519 However the link to criminality was 
only partial and the continued patrolling by both Maoist and Nepali government 
forces threatened a much more substantial commercial network involved in logging 
and the illegal smuggling of timber.520 This network also had patronage from political 
groups, namely UML, whose local leaders were concerned Maoist action would 
threaten their income. UML had, and continues to have, a strong support base within 
the VDC, having won the 1991 and 1994 local elections;521 the 1999 and 2008 
elections were won by Nepal Congress, the other major political bloc in the VDC.522 
Violent action by the Maoists did not begin in the area until 2000 as the Maoists and 
Nepali government security forces (including the Police, Armed Police Force and 
                                                     
516 EA-4-1 23rd August 2011, Haraiya. 
517 The Maoists blamed their lack of penetration in Bara’s southern VDCs on three 
factors: the lack of suitable terrain, the presence of big landlords and the actions of 
the Indian border security forces. Curiously they did not factor in the Nepali state or 
security forces into this analysis, suggesting they did not see the Nepali state as their 
most limiting factor. NL-4-3 16th August 2011, Kathmandu.  
518 EA-4-1 23rd August 2011, Haraiya and LL-4-1 24th August 2011, Haraiya. 
519 LL-4-1 24th August 2011, Haraiya. 
520 EA-4-11 28th August 2011, Kalaiya.  
521 LL-4-1 23rd August 2011, Haraiya & EA-4-1 23rd August 2011, Haraiya: at the time 
of this research the CPN-UML leaders were also the President and Vice-President of 
the VDC. EA-4-2 23rd August 2011, Haraiya. 
522 Haraiya itself lies in the 5th Constituent Assembly electoral ward in Bara. Whilst the 
VDC is split between UML and NC, NC control the Constituent Assembly seat. UML’s 
support in the district has been put under significant pressure after five of the directly 
elected seats in Bara went to Madeshi parties (3) or the Maoists (2). (OCHA Nepal, 
2008) LL-4-7 26th August 2011, Haraiya. 
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Army) vied for control of Haraiya VDC.523 The Maoist’s expansion of the insurgency 
into the Terai was based on coalition building (or in some cases the forming of new 
sister organisations) with primarily ethnically based political groups. In the Terai this 
was centred on the Madheshi Rastriya Mukhti Morcha (Madeshi National Liberation 
Front or MNLF) who later split from the Maoists and now advocate the creation of a 
Madeshi homeland and condone the targeting of Pahadi settlers. These ethnic 
demands by the Madeshis expressed through the Madeshi Andolan in 2007, and 
subsequent acceptance of some of their demands by the Nepali government, 
increased the spectre of further ethnically based violence as the Tharu political 
leaders in the Terai reject the Madeshi identity they were ascribed by the government 
in 2009 (Mathema, 2011, pp. 62-9, 72-8). 
Despite this long-term failure the immediate advantage of the MNLF to the Maoists in 
the Terai was their ability to co-opt a number of groups under their umbrella to 
prosecute the conflict against the state.524 The Maoists were able to push the police 
out of Haraiya and they bombed the VDC office twice.525 Despite the fact that the 
head of the VDC was relocated to Kalaiya the VDC Office Secretary, who is from 
Haraiya, remained in post working from his house throughout the insurgency. Coupled 
with the functioning health and education posts the Nepali government managed to 
maintain a toe-hold in Haraiya throughout the conflict. This also extended to attempts 
at spending government funding, despite the threats and Maoist bombings.526 
The inconclusive contest left a vacuum where neither state forces nor Maoists could 
exercise full control. The vacuum was exploited by criminal groups but this instability 
threatened the interests of local leaders who wanted to sustain both their licit and 
illicit livelihoods. In response the community itself organised a self-defence group to 
maintain security. This is discussed in detail below, but the group maintained physical 
security from and between both the Maoist and government forces for a period of 
about two years when the insurgency was at its height in the early 2000s which 
formed a critical element of the conflict story in Haraiya VDC.527 
In the period after the CPA, when Nepal was avowedly in a ‘post-conflict’ phase, Bara 
was rocked by the actions of a number of armed groups, several of whom had 
splintered from the fragile alliance of groups supporting the Maoists in the Terai 
                                                     
523 LL-4-2 24th August 2011, Haraiya.  
524 However, even before the conflict ended some groups, such as the Terai Liberation 
Front had already split from the Maoists (ICG, 2005, p. 5). 
525 The second of the bombings was as late as February 2004. 
526 EA-4-2 23rd August 2011, Haraiya. 
527 LL-4-1 24th August 2011, Haraiya, EA-4-4 24th August 2011, Haraiya and LL-4-2 
24th August 2011, Haraiya.  
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(Mathema, 2011, pp. 62-7). Bara was badly affected by the Madeshi Andolan, which 
saw dozens of people killed in the district in 2007.528 The peace dividend had failed to 
head off the new conflict and as discussed below was blamed, in part, for sparking the 
renewed conflict. The Madeshi Andolan was ended relatively quickly; however, the 
splintering of armed groups continued and led to significant use of threats, 
intimidation, beatings and bombings targeted against local leaders and government 
officials.529 The security situation deteriorated to the point where Bara was included 
as one of eight districts of concern to the central government and the Special Security 
Plan was launched in 2009 to address these groups and expand security provision 
(Kafle, 2010, p. 10). Over time this did improve stability, despite the fact that 
members of the armed groups, often collectively referred to as Janatantrik,530 
remained active in both rural and urban areas, including Haraiya.531 The groups also 
utilised the porous border with India for protection, and respondents mentioned 
several times that the main security threat comes from groups operating across the 
border or from the south of the district towards the border.532 
Despite this new conflict the self-defence group did not reform; instead the 
community lobbied for the Nepal Police post to be re-established in the run up to the 
2008 CA elections indicating a change in state-community relations which provides 
insights into stabilisation. The marginalised Maoist presence remained in its originally 
weak position and political power was shifted back to former Panchayat leaders while 
Party competition resumed between CPN-UML and NC. However, governance systems 
have been compromised by the substantial increase in development spending which 
has, in the eyes of respondents, contributed to the ‘leech’ like behaviour of the 
                                                     
528 IN-4-7 21st October 2011, Kathmandu and Mathema, 2011, pp. 25-31. 
529 LL-4-2 24th August 2011, Haraiya and IN-4-5 29th August 2011, Kalaiya. 
530 There are several armed groups that use the word Janatantrik as part of their name, 
but the most well know is Janatantrik Terai Mukti Morcha (JTMM), led by Jaya Krishna 
Goit, a former leader of the MNLF (Mathema, 2011, pp. 66-7). JTMM-Goit was active 
in Bara and may have been behind an attack on a respondent (LL-4-10 28th August 
2011, Kalaiya). However there are several other armed groups functioning in Bara, and 
those with a political agenda (as opposed to purely criminal) include: Akhil Terai Mukti 
Morcha, Kirant Janbadi Workers Party and Tharuhat Swayatta Rajya Parishad (Kafle, 
2010, p. 9). 
531 LL-4-2 24th August 2011, Haraiya and LL-4-13. 
532 EA-4-13 29th August 2011, Kalaiya: the significance of the Indian border is not 
simply that it provides protection for criminal groups; India remains dominant in the 
region in many cultural, economic and social senses meaning the Terai is more 
connected to the India of the Gangetic plain than it is to Kathmandu; as an illustration 
of this, until the 1960s the India Rupee was the primary currency in the Terai. For 
discussion see Gaige, 2009, pp. 43-4. 
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political class in Kathmandu, which is having secondary effects in Bara and Haraiya and 
threatening the stability that has emerged, discussed below.  
Stabilisation activities 
This section will describe how the different actors – Maoist, government, the self-
defence group and development agencies – have all sought stability through their 
actions. There is a particular focus on the period from 2000 to 2009 which marks the 
beginning of Maoist operations in Haraiya and ends with the implementation of the 
Special Security Plan to address the armed groups that had sprung up in the power 
vacuum in the Terai after the CPA and Madeshi Andolan. 
Political interventions to support stabilisation 
This subsection describes the political interventions to support stability by describing 
the governance and justice systems that the Maoists and the government supported 
during the insurgency. As neither side could ultimately secure their political vision 
former systems of governance including the Panchayat leaders, the very systems the 
Maoists were meant to be overthrowing, re-established themselves to provide basic 
governance. Governance in Haraiya remained unstable in the post-insurgency conflict 
as the mechanisms were ‘reformed’ and additional funding was pushed through the 
bureaucratic and electoral systems which contributed to an increasing separation 
between the population and the state. 
The commencement of Maoist operations in Haraiya in 2000 led to the withdrawal of 
a senior VDC government official in the same year. Despite the risks a key VDC official, 
the office secretary, stayed at his post because he was a resident of Haraiya and, after 
the VDC was bombed for a second time in 2004, he operated the VDC from his home 
until 2010.533 The Maoists had threatened him, but because they never exerted 
security control (see below) they were not able to stop the VDC functioning. Instead 
the VDC attempted to muddle along, gaining approvals and funding for projects 
throughout the conflict. This failure of security control would critically undermine the 
Maoists’ claims that they controlled the region and undermined the administration of 
their own People’s Government. 
The Maoists established the Madeshi Autonomous Region in which Bara was the first 
district in the Terai to announce the establishment of the People’s Government (Basu, 
2004, p. 30). This included establishing the other major component of their 
governance system, the People’s Court. The court was active locally, and in at least 
one instance convened a session at a chautari built by the Maoists in the Naya Basti 
area of Haraiya.534 The People’s Court was appreciated by some members of the 
                                                     
533 EA-4-1 23rd August 2011, Haraiya. 
534 LL-4-1 24th August 2011, Haraiya. 
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community because it was able to resolve several cases that had been festering for 
twenty to thirty years which had not been addressed by either the previous Panchayat 
or elected representatives.535 However, the court was either not present very often in 
Haraiya or what people were referring to as the People’s Court in Haraiya (i.e. at VDC 
level) was in fact a visit from the district level People’s Court.536 
The failure of the Maoist government was all the more surprising given the years of 
mobilisation that had gone before the commencement of violence and the extensive 
attempts at revenue collection from a range of sources.537 The lack of traction 
amongst the key target groups in the population, the Dalits and lower classes of the 
other ethnic groups, meant that the Maoists in Bara were labelled as being a Pahadi 
phenomenon. This was not helped by the fact that their base area was the Pahadi 
dominated Naya Basti. Despite this the Maoists struggled on, safe in the knowledge at 
least that they had denied the area coherent government control even if they could 
not govern it effectively themselves. 
As governance systems, including local decision making, budget execution, tax 
collection and justice provision, degraded a combination of elected officials (from the 
1999 election), former elected officials and Panchayat era leaders re-asserted control 
in most of the wards in Haraiya. This meant that the VDC Office Secretary, for 
example, was able to engage with the wards to keep some funding flowing and 
maintain a link to the District Headquarters.538 The re-emergence of Panchayat 
leaders and other elites,539 particularly after the electoral mandates of those who won 
seats from the 1999 election expired, meant that leaders that had significant 
                                                     
535 LL-4-1 24th August 2011, Haraiya. 
536 EA-4-6 25th August 2011, Haraiya and LL-4-5 25th August 2011, Haraiya. 
537 As discussed below the Maoists had mobilised approximately thirty individuals 
from Haraiya to join the PLA; however, within Haraiya itself active Maoist cadres 
rarely reached more than twenty to thirty people and they would normally operate in 
groups of five to seven. LL-4-1 24th August 2011, Haraiya and LL-4-3 24th August 2011, 
Haraiya. 
538 This low level presence was not often noticed by political leaders working from the 
district headquarters in Kalaiya, who noted that there was no state presence in the 
VDCs (LL-4-9 28th August 2011, Kalaiya) and that the activities of first the Maoists 
then the Madeshi Andolan had destroyed other parties support bases. LL-4-10 28th 
August 2011, Kalaiya. 
539 Part of the expansion of informal justice decision makers may have occurred 
because of the large number of social groups requiring their own leaders. Further, it 
should be noted that conflicts which occurred within the Muslim community applied a 
form of Sharia law; cases involving more than one social group would use an unnamed 
but consensual understanding of local justice to reach decisions. LL-4-3 24th August 
2011, Haraiya. 
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experience in informal justice were returned (at times reluctantly) to active duty.540 
This meant for example that the Maoists had to engage with local community leaders 
on a more even footing than they would have done in areas where they had greater 
control with a more robust People’s Government and People’s Court system.541 
However they still had coercive ability, as this example, described by a Panchayat 
leader shows: 
R: “It was rice seedling planting season. The water was not sufficient at that 
time. Every villager wanted to irrigate their paddy field first. In one instance, 
two villagers were fighting for the proper distribution of the water on their 
land. The Maoists came with weapons and intervened in the fighting between 
them. They held one of the villagers and took him away with them. The next 
day early in the morning we held a Panchayati [meeting] with the Maoist. The 
man who was arrested was released with the decision of the Panchayati … 
[but] the decision went in favour of the Maoists because they had weapons.” 
The locally generated efforts at informal justice mechanisms maintained themselves 
quite robustly and shaped the penetration of the People’s Court; indeed, they have 
continued past the end of the conflict where there were still no locally elected 
representatives.542 The formal governance system in Kalaiya, where there is a court 
house and judges, declined in importance during the conflict because of Maoist 
pressure on the population not to engage the formal courts system; in all likelihood at 
an aggregate level across Bara this led to more people using the informal systems, as 
in Haraiya, rather than using the Maoist People’s Court exclusively. After the 
insurgency ended the number of cases in the courts increased substantially as cases 
that were not resolved or registered during the insurgency emerged.543  
The fact that there were three competing systems: the informal Panchayati system, 
the formal courts and the People’s Court, meant that plaintiffs could shop around for 
the outcome they wanted.544 In the context where one of the systems was armed, 
conflicts also escalated into violence, though in Haraiya no one was killed as a result of 
this kind of confrontation.545 The accepted role of the Panchayats in expanding their 
                                                     
540 LL-4-2 24th August 2011, Haraiya, LL-4-3 24th August 2011, Haraiya: in common 
with many rural areas the main focus of the informal structures were to address land 
and water issues, in particular water distribution during April and May. Another 
respondent noted that the Panchayats also dealt with some social issues like alcohol 
consumption. LL-4-7 26th August 2011, Haraiya. 
541 This was denied by some Maoist leaders. LL-4-5 25th August 2011, Haraiya. 
542 EA-4-4 24th August 2011, Haraiya. 
543 EA-4-12 28th August 2011, Kalaiya. 
544 EA-4-12 28th August 2011, Kalaiya and LL-4-3 24th August 2011, Haraiya. 
545 LL-4-3 24th August 2011, Haraiya. 
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activities to the acquiescence of the elected political leaders is also remarkable 
because some of the Panchayat leaders are alleged to have attempted to shut down 
the growing democracy movement in Haraiya in the 1980s.546 This meant that prior to 
the conflict the Panchayat leaders and some of the elected politicians, particularly 
from UML, previously had difficult relationships. 
After the CA election in 2008, governance had still not stabilised despite the 
apparently reduced threat from armed groups. The VDC building started operating 
again in 2010 (though it had not been refurbished since the bombings), the staff were 
present and VDC meetings were held. There was a broad engagement with the main 
decision makers representing all the wards, ethnic groups and political parties;547 
however, many respondents described the current governance system as unstable 
and the worst they had seen pointing at two causes: the ‘all-party system’ for decision 
making and the massive expansion in government development spending.548  
The all-party system, initially established in the 1990s, but revived after the end of the 
insurgency, was meant to ensure that all parties had a stake in decision making at 
district and VDC levels in the absence of local elections whilst the new Constitution 
was agreed in Kathmandu. Related to that international donors and the Nepali 
government had substantially increased direct spending by local government at both 
the district and VDC level to affect a peace dividend. This resulted in a situation where 
instead of one elected representative being accountable to their electorate,549 there is 
now an amorphous bloc of leaders (at district level in Bara there are twenty-two 
parties in the all-party mechanism) who were given the opportunity to spend a 
substantial amount of money. The system resulted in a massive increase in corruption 
with some projects reporting that 40% or more of funds were being lost,550 and a 
sharp fall in support for governance by the Nepali state.551 The increased corruption 
                                                     
546 LL-4-1 23rd August 2011, Haraiya and LL-4-3 24th August 2011, Haraiya. 
547 Minutes of Haraiya VDC meeting held on December 30th 2010, held by author. 
548 IN-4-7 21st October 2011, Kathmandu. 
549 This was the experience in Haraiya, whose previous elected VDC Presidents were 
highly praised. EA-4-1 23rd August 2011, Haraiya. 
550 IN-4-3 28th August 2011, Kalaiya: this refers specifically to the Local Government 
and Community Development Programme (LGCDP) Local; other respondents with 
knowledge of local development budgets suggested losses were in the region of 25-
60% either through cash being stolen or overcharging of materials. EA-4-2 23rd August 
2011, Haraiya. 
551 EA-4-4 24th August 2011, Haraiya noted that corruption starts at the top and that 
those who had been fighting against the state had moved to Kathmandu to join the 
government for their own benefit, which also contributed to the rapid collapse of the 
People’s Government in Bara. A similar sentiment was expressed by LL-4-1 26th 
August 2011, Haraiya, quoted in full at the beginning of the chapter and LL-4-5 25th 
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has not simply affected spending in terms of development projects, but may also be 
undermining the informal Panchayat justice system and corrupting decision making. 
The continued degradation in the trust in local institutions could have long-term 
consequences;552 however, it cannot simply be inferred from this that elections are 
the answer – the CA elections themselves were noted for being destabilising. Indeed it 
was fear of violence during the CA election that led the community to ask for the re-
establishment of the police post in 2008.553  
The governance story in Haraiya over the last decade suggests that without 
substantial numbers of Maoist cadres to enforce their will, the Maoists had to limit 
their ambitions for the People’s Government in Haraiya and their influence in Bara 
more generally. The local responses to the limited Maoist attempts at gaining 
influence suggest there were bigger, more substantial, networks that had little 
ideological interest in the conflict and simply wanted to maintain governance in their 
own interests, primarily the provision of local justice. This meant that the community 
effectively sidestepped an element of the conflict and allowed the Nepali government 
presence to shrivel, though they did not allow it to die off completely. This may have 
been effective for the local population, but not necessarily for the state. 
Security interventions to support stabilisation 
This subsection looks at the ways in which security, provided by the Maoists, the 
government or the local self-defence group, affected stability within Haraiya VDC. It 
suggests that the initial security gains made by the Maoists could not be sustained or 
consolidated once the police were re-deployed to Kalaiya; instead the state security 
forces were able to mount operations in the local area which led to the killing or 
capturing of Maoist cadres. Despite this the government did not feel strong enough to 
re-establish the post until the community asked for the re-instatement of the police 
post at the time of the CA elections in 2008. Instead a security vacuum was created 
whereby neither side had full control. Local leaders with business interests organised 
their own self-defence group to provide protection from the state, the PLA and from 
criminal groups in the area of Madhuwan’s market, the main hub of Haraiya VDC. 
Other wards in the VDC were less fortunate, were left to the predations of criminal 
gangs, and had to provide food and shelter to the Maoists. 
The absolute numbers of mobilised Maoist fighters from Bara are difficult to verify but 
responses indicate that Haraiya probably provided a substantial proportion of the 
cadres from Bara district; estimates suggest that there were between fifty to one 
                                                                                                                                                          
August 2011, Haraiya, LL-4-7 26th August 2011, Haraiya, IN-4-5 29th August 2011, 
Kalaiya, EA-4-6 25th August 2011, Haraiya. 
552 EA-4-12 28th August 2011, Kalaiya. 
553 EA-4-2 23rd August 2011, Haraiya and EA-4-8 25th August 2011, Haraiya. 
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hundred Maoist combatants from Bara,554 of which somewhere around thirty came 
from Haraiya though only five were in the cantonments at the time of the field 
research.555 However, because of the ‘east-west’ policy of the Maoists, most fighters 
from Haraiya did not fight within the VDC.556 Maoist forces in the field during the 
conflict probably did not consist of more than twenty to thirty individuals working in 
teams of five to seven.557 The low numbers of active Maoist combatants and political 
leaders led to a greater overlap between military (PLA) and civilian (People’s 
Government) roles, and also helped explain why the relatively few casualties which 
resulted from security operations had a disproportionate impact on the long-term 
viability of the Maoists in Haraiya.558 Weapons systems were modest and included 
Nalkatuwa pistols, air rifles, muzzle loading riffles and some .303 Enfield rifles.559 
In 2002, the Maoists attacked the police post, and on the day of the attack 
forewarned traders in the market.560 During the attack, which involved at least one 
bomb, two policemen were killed. Subsequently the police were withdrawn from the 
post and re-deployed in Kalaiya.561 The response of the Nepali government to Maoist 
activity was to launch national operations against the Maoists including both Kilo 
Sierra 2 and 3;562 whilst these were national operations elements of them were 
carried out in Bara leading to the capture and killing of three Maoists from Haraiya.563 
It is notable that the deaths of so few Maoists had a substantial impact on the long-
term position of the Maoists in Haraiya, who can now count on very few supporters 
within Haraiya.564 
The type of violence applied by the Maoists was quite specific, and consisted of the 
discreet targeting of government institutions such as the police and VDC, but they 
refused to attack other political parties in Bara at the VDC level.565 At a district level 
                                                     
554 NL-4-3 16th August 2011, Kathmandu. 
555 EA-4-1 23rd August 2011, Haraiya.  
556 NL-4-3 16th August 2011, Kathmandu. 
557 LL-4-1 24th August 2011, Haraiya and LL-4-3 24th August 2011, Haraiya. 
558 Four Maoists from Haraiya were killed during the conflict. NL-4-3 16th August 2011, 
Kathmandu. 
559 EA-4-1 23rd August 2011, Haraiya. 
560 LL-4-7 26th August 2011, Haraiya. 
561 This had the knock on effect that Kalaiya became heavily policed. EA-4-10 28th 
August 2011, Kalaiya. 
562 EA-4-1 23rd August 2011, Haraiya. 
563 NL-4-3 16th August 2011, Kathmandu. 
564 LL-4-1 23rd August 2011, Haraiya; one other significant Maoist leader who 
participated in the PLA has since gone underground himself, hiding from the Maoists, 
and is reportedly in Kathmandu.  
565 NL-4-3 16th August 2011, Kathmandu. 
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the PLA were willing to threaten NC leaders who now remain under threat of 
assassination from armed groups rather than the Maoists.566 The Maoists took a 
pragmatic view of other parties, including those emerging in the Madeshi polity, 
because their aims, namely the removal of the monarchy and institution of a republic, 
converged with those of the Maoists, particularly after King Gyanendra had abolished 
Parliament in 2002 and seized state power in 2005.567 The Maoists’ willingness to 
forge alliances in the Terai was founded on their professed support for the Madeshi 
cause. Some groups was such as JTMM-Goit spun off from the Maoists because they 
felt that they had reneged on their support of for the Madeshi and helps to explain 
why, when the Maoists have been in power, they have been unable to fully curtail the 
armed groups (Mathema, 2011, pp. 28-30).  
In order to generate revenue the Maoists regularly extorted money. Respondents in 
Haraiya were clear they did not often engage the police to deal with these issues.568 
This was only partially explained by threats made by the Maoists that there would be 
retaliations against anyone who went to the police. Instead respondents preferred to 
address the threats within the community, which suggested that they were in many 
respects already separated from the police and state, who they thought would not be 
interested or able to address the threats, or in the worst case, would leak the names 
of those who had informed the police of Maoist activity.569  
Government operations to try and capture Maoists often involved searches of houses 
and on more than one occasion the police used mass-arrests to round up suspected 
Maoist supporters. The nature of the conflict, where the Maoists would co-opt labour 
to support their military activities,570 and stay in houses across the communities, 
naturally attracted the attention of the security forces that would often search houses 
repeatedly.571 The fact that these operations would alienate parts of the population 
did not seem to have been of great concern to the security forces, even if it pushed 
more people towards the Maoists or reduced the level of support from other leaders 
when, for example, they would accidentally detain Nepali Congress leaders.572 
                                                     
566 LL-4-7 26th August 2011, Haraiya and LL-4-10 28th August 2011, Kalaiya. 
567 LL-4-7 26th August 2011, Haraiya and LL-4-9 28th August 2011, Kalaiya. 
568 EA-4-1 23rd August 2011, Haraiya. 
569 EA-4-3 24th August 2011, Haraiya and EA-4-1 23rd August 2011, Haraiya: another 
respondent suggested that they had reported threats to the police in Kalaiya but the 
police had not investigated it, and if they had they would have been able to address 
the insurgency much more effectively. EA-4-13 29th August 2011, Kalaiya. 
570 EA-4-4 24th August 2011, Haraiya. 
571 LL-4-4 24th August 2011, Haraiya and EA-4-6 25th August 2011, Haraiya. 
572 EA-4-7 25th August 2011, Haraiya, LL-4-5 25th August 2011, Haraiya and EA-4-6 
25th August 2011, Haraiya. 
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In response to the security vacuum the local population formed a self-defence group 
in 2003 which actively ran until 2004, under the ostensible leadership of a local 
political leader who also had business interests.573 There are a range of views about 
why the group was established, which are worth discussing in detail. For the local 
leaders and market traders the self-defence group provided a way to protect 
themselves against the Maoists who had either looted a number of shops themselves 
or paid criminal gangs to do it for them.574 For these sections of the community the 
self-defence group provided just enough security to allow trading to continue and 
physically protected the market area and timber interests of some of the leaders in 
Haraiya.575 This is not a small feat in the midst of an armed insurgency, especially 
when, by common agreement, they were only armed with khukris and sticks.576 
For others, most notably civilians living in other wards in Haraiya that did not have a 
self-defence group, they looked upon the group as being relatively benign, though 
ineffective in protecting others from Maoist threats and criminal groups.577 For 
observers in Kalaiya the group was purely a reflection of the business interests of the 
leaders and a way for them to protect their timber activities.578 External actors viewed 
this as one of several examples of the state sponsoring armed groups against the 
insurgency.579 For their part the Maoists switched between denying the group’s 
existence to dismissing it as being in league with the police informing on Maoist 
activities. In any case they claimed it never involved more than five to six people.580 
                                                     
573 LL-4-1 24th August 2011, Haraiya: there was a central government policy of 
supporting militias which had been fielded by 2003, the Haraiya VDC self-defence 
group was not formally part of the initiative though it had tacit approval from the 
state. For further discussion on the government’s programme see ICG, 2004, pp. 1-3. 
574 LL-4-1 24th August 2011, Haraiya and EA-4-9 25th August 2011, Haraiya: the 
distinctions between the Maoists who apparently used criminals as part of their forces 
and the self-defence group whose members were also involved in criminal smuggling 
of timber indicates that the face value of actions in the conflict were not as they first 
seemed. 
575 There is also the suggestion that the self-defence group reacted against Maoist 
attempts to curtail alcohol consumption (EA-4-6 25th August 2011, Haraiya) and other 
members of the self-defence group were keen to emphasise that they did not 
necessarily disagree with the ideology of the Maoists, just the armed resistance to the 
state. EA-4-9 25th August 2011, Haraiya. 
576 LL-4-1 24th August 2011, Haraiya. 
577 EA-4-9 25th August 2011, Haraiya. 
578 EA-4-11 28th August 2011, Kalaiya. 
579 IN-4-7 21st October 2011, Kathmandu. 
580 NL-4-3 16th August 2011, Kathmandu. 
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Irrespective of this contested narrative the group established contact with both the 
PLA and the police in Kalaiya to inform them that the group would be operating,581 
clearly demonstrating the lack of control that either group had. This allowed the two 
warring parties to continue their conflict outside the zone of control established by 
the self-defence group. The Maoists were banned from operating in Madhuwan 
(though they were allowed access if they were unarmed) and the police were told that 
the group would provide information on the Maoists.582 Despite this collusion the 
Maoists did not blame the self-defence group for the killings of their cadres in police 
operations, indicating the information the group gave to the police may have been of 
poor quality.583 At a practical level local leaders suggested there were up to eighty-one 
members split into groups of nine. One of the reasons they claimed they were not 
afraid of the Maoists is that whilst the Maoists were armed with guns, the less well 
armed self-defence group would be able to engage the Maoists at close range because 
of the antiquated weapons used by the PLA, which included muzzle loading rifles.584 
Maoist leaders, not surprisingly, downplayed the significance of the self-defence 
group, claiming that it did not affect their operations.585  
The effectiveness of the group in maintaining some form of local cohesion and 
physical security helps explain why there was relatively little displacement from the 
village during the conflict. Some families had migrated from Haraiya to Kalaiya prior to 
the violence starting due to growing Maoist activities,586 but only five to seven people 
were believed to have fled during the conflict because of Maoist threats and pressure 
and the vast majority of the former political leadership stayed in the VDC throughout 
the conflict.587 However, two police officers who were from Haraiya were killed in the 
VDC whilst they were on leave at home.588 Despite these incidents outwards migration 
did not increase substantially during the conflict, indicating a reasonable level of 
stability. As a result a picture emerges where the population effectively stood aside 
and refused to choose sides; neither supporting the state nor the Maoists as long as 
                                                     
581 LL-4-1 23rd, 24th and 26th August 2011, Haraiya and EA-4-6 25th August 2011, 
Haraiya. 
582 EA-4-9 25th August 2011, Haraiya and LL-4-1 24th August 2011, Haraiya. 
583 NL-4-3 16th August 2011, Kathmandu and LL-4-5 25th August 2011, Haraiya. 
584 LL-4-1 24th August 2011, Haraiya and EA-4-9 25th August 2011, Haraiya. 
585 LL-4-5 25th August 2011, Haraiya. 
586 EA-4-10 28th August 2011, Kalaiya. 
587 LL-4-1 24th August 2011, Haraiya. 
588 LL-4-1 24th August 2011, Haraiya. 
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their livelihoods were not threatened and therefore the self-defence group was simply 
an expression of limited self-preservation.589 
During the more recent conflict against the less politically orientated armed groups 
the police have begun the take a different stance. The community demand for the re-
establishment of the police post in 2008 and the launching of the Special Security Plan 
in 2009 led to additional police resources being deployed in Bara generally and 
Haraiya specifically. The Maoist insurgency had also transformed the police who 
began to rectify the mistakes of their heavy handed policing approach, which has led 
to greater support from the population. For example, a kiln owner in Haraiya utilised 
both informal Panchayat leaders coupled with police pressure to regain access to his 
kiln after a neighbour blocked the access road.590 Other respondents, including the 
police themselves, pointed to changes in the way the police operate now which was 
more responsive to the local community.591 However, there were clearly limits to this.  
During the field research ‘Janatantrik’592 placed IEDs outside a primary school and a 
chautari to the north and east of Madhuwan respectively. These IEDs had no fuses but 
were clearly live (one of them was moved and exploded). They were intended to 
intimidate people to pay donations to the group; as one respondent put it the armed 
groups: “plant the bomb and start calling”.593 The police investigation of the bombings 
was scant and they believed there was nothing that could be done to stop the 
bombings.594 The group had also threatened other local leaders but some of the 
residents had contacted leaders of ‘Janatantrik’ from Haraiya to apply pressure to 
stop the threats, demonstrating a strong will to resist the current armed groups which 
was not present when the Maoists were the ones threatening the population.595 More 
broadly in Bara armed groups were blamed for the deaths of fourteen to fifteen 
people in 2010, and a further four to five people were killed in the first eight months 
                                                     
589 The lack of support for the state may stem from a historical grievance amongst the 
population that the Nepali state was in effect a colonialist state vis-à-vis the people of 
the Terai because so few of the local population achieved positions of power within 
the executive or political leadership. See for example Social Inclusion Research Fund, 
2007, pp. 17-29; Gaige, 2009, pp. 197-205.  
590 EA-4-3 24th August 2011, Haraiya. 
591 EA-4-12 28th August 2011, Kalaiya. 
592 Respondents referred to the groups as Janatantrik, though this is part of the name 
of the most well-known armed group, Janatantrik Mukhti Morcha (JTMM) Goit 
faction; the respondents were unclear if they believed that the armed group was in 
fact linked to JTMM. For a more detailed discussed on JTMM’s factions and 
background see Mathema, 2011, pp. 62-8. 
593 EA-4-11 28th August 2011, Kalaiya. 
594 IN-4-1 26th August 2011, Haraiya. 
595 LL-4-2 24th August 2011, Haraiya. 
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of 2011.596 There remains the risk that the improvements in more proactive policing 
may be lost and the communities return to relying on informal mechanisms to address 
local threats. This may not be negative for the local population if they believe they can 
face the threats themselves; it does however weaken the state and mean that if the 
armed groups improved their techniques or modified their messages to become more 
politicised and anti-state the population may decide again to step aside and not 
support the state.597 
If there is a stabilisation outcome in security for Haraiya from the last decade it is that 
no single entity, Maoist, government or local force, had sufficient control of the 
environment to provide stability for the broader population. Some groups were 
privileged and able to access protection from either the Maoists in Naya Basti or the 
self-defence group in Madhuwan, but the punitive searches and operations by the 
state during the conflict attest to the ongoing contestation of security control. Other 
activities, development and governance by both the state and Maoists were stymied 
because neither side had overall control and therefore the outcome was one of 
security instability. 
Development interventions to support stabilisation 
This subsection assesses the impact of development projects on the stability of 
Haraiya over the period of the conflict and concludes that development does not 
present strong explanatory evidence to suggest why one group (the Pahadi) were 
more easily mobilised in the conflict than the more disadvantaged groups (the 
Madeshi Dalits). Nor does development seem to have been factored into local 
decision making to establish the self-defence group, nor the expansion of informal 
governance systems as described in the previous section. Instead development seems 
to have been something of a passive bystander during much of the conflict. 
Prior to the conflict, Haraiya was noted as being one of the more developed rural 
VDCs in Bara.598 In theory, at least, the development spending released in the 1990s 
should have targeted the most disenfranchised, the Dalits. However it is clear that the 
Dalits continued to have low levels of school participation and access to clean drinking 
water, and that many continued to work as daily labourers on the fields of the 
wealthier classes of the other ethnic groups in Haraiya.599 Their relatively 
                                                     
596 EA-4-11 28th August 2011, Kalaiya. 
597 A security specialist argued that the current technical capability of the armed 
group’s IEDs were akin to the first generation of Maoist capability at the beginning of 
the insurgency. IN-4-4 28th August 2011, Kalaiya. 
598 EA-4-1 23rd August 2011, Haraiya. 
599 EA-4-4 24th August 2011, Haraiya, EA-4-1 23rd August 2011, Haraiya and LL-4-2 
24th August 2011, Haraiya. 
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disadvantaged position should have made them ripe for mobilisation to the class-
based ideology of the Maoists, but instead the Maoists only found significant support 
from the relatively affluent Pahadi settlers. 
Once the violent conflict started in Haraiya the Maoists had a highly evolved sense of 
which activities were considered to be developmental and those that were considered 
to be oppressive. They took great pains to close down the executive branches of the 
Nepali state, and those collecting revenues (such as the forestry office) which they 
achieved with relative ease. However, they did not target schools or clinics, in part 
because these services were integral to the Maoists’ ideology but also because they 
were widely used and appreciated by the population. Shutting down the schools or 
clinics would have been counter-productive to the Maoist cause, and even now armed 
groups that threaten these services are contacted through proxies by local leaders to 
inform them that those services are important to the population and should be left 
alone.600 This of course didn’t stop the Maoists from collecting revenues from 
teachers’ salaries,601 and they attempted to exert authority over the schools by 
daubing them in pro-Maoist slogans, but they were careful not to interrupt the 
functioning of the schools themselves. 602  
There was one non-government actor that the Maoists specifically sought to shut 
down, a micro-credit bank called Nirdhan. They targeted the bank because of its 
alleged practice of charging usurious interest which was considered to be one of the 
mechanisms through which the poor masses were suppressed by the rich landlords. 
Despite the shutdown, the missed credit opportunities that could have been provided 
through the bank do not feature amongst the respondents’ concerns about the impact 
of the Maoists in Haraiya.603 Other actors in the development sector included Plan 
International and the Nepal Federation of the Red Cross who had been engaged in 
Haraiya for some time before the conflict. These agencies worked across a broad 
swath of development sectors including water and sanitation, education, health and 
agriculture, or by providing improved seedlings.604 They also pushed for development 
projects to be targeted at disadvantaged groups including girls, female headed 
                                                     
600 LL-4-2 24th August 2011, Haraiya. 
601 LL-4-9 28th August 2011, Kalaiya. 
602 LL-4-2 24th August 2011, Haraiya. 
603 EA-4-11 28th August 2011, Kalaiya: Nirdhan Bank has been operating since 1998, 
and one of the reasons that its removal may have had little impact was that it had not 
been active for a significant time before it was removed. Nirdhan’s operation in Bara is 
its largest in Nepal and it currently has eight branches in the district (Poudel, 2010, pp. 
12-13; Nirdhan Utthan Bank Limited, Undated).  
604 LL-4-4 24th August 2011, Haraiya, EA-4-6 25th August 2011, Haraiya. 
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households and the Dalit community.605 Whilst the Maoists allowed these projects to 
go ahead they also saw the development agencies as a source of income,606 with some 
paying several thousand Nepali rupees in donations.607 Over time Plan gradually 
reduced its activities during the conflict, an unintended consequence of Maoist action 
which also lost them support in Haraiya.608 Plan eventually phased out of Haraiya in 
2011 because of renewed threats from armed groups asking for donations.609 
One development subsector that highlights the conflicting relevance of development 
to stability is in the provision of wells to improve access to a potable water supply. In 
Haraiya public wells have been provided by Plan, the Red Cross and the Ministry of 
Water Resources and a number of wells have also been built using private 
investment.610 Those built with private money can only be built by wealthier families 
and disadvantaged groups mainly access pubic wells provided in a targeted fashion by 
the development agencies. However, to assume that the provision of potable water 
makes the area more stable seems to stretch the impact of the development 
intervention beyond its original intention (to provide clean drinking water). Several of 
the pumps have fallen into disrepair because they were not maintained and local 
respondents were not particularly concerned about trying to get them repaired. They 
were nice to have but not essential in their eyes, and if someone wanted to build 
them a well they would not stand in their way – it is after all something for nothing.611 
The stabilising effect of the wells was not apparent to the beneficiaries, who saw the 
overriding impact of Maoist initiated instability as negating any potential positive 
impact of the wells. Though it is possible that by having access to basic services (such 
                                                     
605 EA-4-1 23rd August 2011, Haraiya. 
606 Maoist attempts to collect donations from NGOs were widespread during the 
conflict and led donors, UN and bi-lateral development agencies to sign up to the 
Basic Operating Guidelines (BOGs) in an attempt to assert their independence from 
the conflict and refuse to pay donations. The guidelines were “adopted in 2003, the 
BOGs are the main mechanism the UN, donors and I/NGOs have for protecting 
operating space. They are based on established and accepted humanitarian principles 
and international legal standards. They protect the interest of the conflict-affected 
population and the safety and security of UN, Donor and INGO staff” (United Nations, 
2011). 
607 EA-4-6 25th August 2011, Haraiya, EA-4-1 23rd August 2011, Haraiya and LL-4-5 
25th August 2011, Haraiya: it is not fully clear whether the donations that were paid 
were taken from project budgets or whether staff decided to give part of their salaries. 
608 EA-4-6 25th August 2011, Haraiya. 
609 IN-5-7 27th September 2011, Kathmandu. 
610 EA-4-8 25th August 2011, Haraiya. 
611 EA-4-7 25th August 2011, Haraiya and EA-4-8 25th August 2011, Haraiya. 
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as water, education and health) population movement during the conflict may have 
been kept low.612  
The difficulties in spending development funding through the VDC mechanism meant 
that government-led development during the conflict was carried out at a very low 
level.613 This however meant there was a surplus of funding in the district, particularly 
as security forces folded back into the district headquarters, boosting the security 
presence there. The District Development Council (DDC) was able to function in 
Kalaiya and deliver development projects including the gravelling of roads.614 This 
meant there was a highly securitised form of development around the district 
headquarters, though the ongoing attacks by the Maoists including a bombing 
campaign, suggested that neither the increased security deployment nor the 
development projects mitigated the violence substantially.615 
The Maoists themselves had a weak record on development in Haraiya. The Maoists 
claimed to have carried out projects in thirty of Bara’s VDCs during the ceasefires 
between the Maoists and the Nepal government in 2003 and 2005/6.616 The projects 
were very small scale (i.e. small wooden bridges) reflecting the relatively poor fiscal 
position that the Madeshi Autonomous Region People’s Government faced in Bara, 
and in some cases the population in Haraiya refused to recognise that ‘Maoist 
projects’ had actually been implemented by the Maoists themselves.617 Additionally 
the projects were often related to the freedom of movement, such as bridges, which 
served the dual purpose of being useful for the PLA as well as being of incidental 
benefit to the population, so they cannot be understood solely as development 
projects. 
The most well-known Maoist project in Haraiya was the building of a chautari, or 
resting place, on the northern edge of Naya Basti as the forest begins to thicken.618 In 
many respects the choice of the chautari is illustrative of the weak position of the 
                                                     
612 LL-4-4 24th August 2011, Haraiya. 
613 EA-4-1 23rd August 2011, Haraiya. 
614 LL-4-9 28th August 2011, Kalaiya. 
615 EA-4-11 28th August 2011, Kalaiya. 
616 NL-4-3 16th August 2011, Kathmandu. 
617 NL-4-3 16th August 2011, Kathmandu & LL-4-5 25th August 2011, Haraiya: the 
main example disputed in Haraiya was a small wooden bridge not far from the 
chautari that was built by the Maoists. One respondent claimed that the money for 
the bridge came from donations from the local population and was not organised by 
the Maoists. EA-4-6 25th August 2011, Haraiya. 
618 LL-4-1 24th August 2011, Haraiya. 
The search for stability through stabilisation: Case studies from Afghanistan and Nepal 
223 
Maoists in Haraiya;619 it is a small wooden structure seating about 10 people, 
providing shelter from the rain or sun. It functioned as a resting and meeting place for 
the Maoists themselves, and at times their ‘court’.620 Even during the conflict senior 
government officials (such as the Superintendent of Police) felt comfortable travelling 
at least as far as the chautari, demonstrating a lack of Maoist control.621 Other than 
the chautari the Maoists struggled to mobilise labour for their cause, and what labour 
was co-opted focused on providing military support, for example asking villagers to 
plant bombs on behalf of the Maoists.622 
Questions remain whether the Maoist attempts to side-line government-led 
development and promote their own actually changed the conflict. The Maoists were 
convinced that the projects influenced some people to join them, though this was not 
found to be the case in Haraiya.623 There was in fact frustration with the Maoists for 
interrupting development activities, both state and non-governmental, which would 
have harmed their support amongst the population.624 There was also no evidence 
that the development projects, which were implemented during the conflict, stopped 
the local population from joining the Maoists. Finally, lack of development did not 
seem to promote mobilisation amongst the Dalits, the most disadvantaged social 
group, who were and remain sceptical of the Maoist party, and the Maoists could not 
exert governance control. 
Since the end of the Maoist insurgency the VDC budget was increased from an 
average of three lakhs to sixteen lakhs per year.625 Despite the large increase in 
spending respondents vociferously complained about corruption and the 
ineffectiveness of projects when compared to those implemented prior to the 
insurgency.626 Accounting for inflation and the population increase over the last 
decade an increase in spending between 1999 and 2010 from three lakhs to sixteen 
lakhs NPR implies a real increase of two-thirds;627 however, with large proportions of 
                                                     
619 EA-4-6 25th August 2011, Haraiya also suggested that the Maoists had intended to 
build a road in Haraiya but that they “did not have the power (government) and the 
budget” to do so. 
620 LL-4-1 23rd, 24th and 26th August 2011, Haraiya.  
621 EA-4-6 25th August 2011, Haraiya. 
622 EA-4-4 24th August 2011, Haraiya. 
623 NL-4-3 16th August 2011, Kathmandu. 
624 EA-4-1 23rd August 2011, Haraiya. 
625 EA-4-1 23rd August 2011, Haraiya and Minutes of Haraiya VDC meeting held on 
December 30th 2010, held by author. 
626 EA-4-2 23rd August 2011, Haraiya, EA-4-1 23rd August 2011, Haraiya. 
627 Author estimates based on inflation in Nepal averaging 10% between 1999-2010; 
with inflation only the budget should have increased to 7.8 lakhs NRS, allowing for an 
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funding being lost through corruption the real impact of the increased spending has, 
according to respondents at several levels (including those implementing the 
projects), been negligible.628 
Aside from development spending it is instructive to repeat the significance of the 
major element of Haraiya’s economy, the timber trade. There was tension between 
the self-defence group and the local and district level Maoist leadership over control 
of the timber trade, competition which had not stopped at the time of research and 
which had led to the death of at least one Nepali journalist during the conflict who 
was investigating Maoist links to the smuggling trade.629 In terms of economic value, 
relevance to the main political actors and significance to local livelihoods and wealth 
creation, the timber trade, both licit and illicit, provides a much stronger economic 
incentive for the most powerful groups in Haraiya to engage one another than the 
development projects, which were of comparatively modest scale and impact. 
During the conflict the business networks that sustained Madhuwan’s market and the 
illicit timber smuggling activities in the forest in the north of the VDC were 
instrumental in forming the self-defence group discussed above. However, it is striking 
that their interests were largely related to livelihoods, commercial enterprise and 
security, rather than the pursuit of an ideological position. As described in the 
governance section the community in Haraiya effectively refused to support either the 
Maoists or the state in their struggle for dominance. All sides utilised Maoist and state 
institutions when physically safe to do so and when in their interests (for example 
ensuring some development spending got through or by using the People’s Court to 
address unresolved conflicts). Once physical security had been assured, it was the 
market that asserted itself, in many respects the most free of ‘free markets’ one in 
which there were almost no boundaries except in the selective use of violence, though 
that is not to say it was stable. After the conflict the community leaders who backed 
the self-defence group managed to protect their economic interests in the market in 
Madhuwan as well as their logging activities even though the government’s forestry 
office returned to the area.630  
More recently local businessmen have also started to invest their capital in the local 
economy. The establishment of three kilns in Haraiya since 2008, i.e. after the 
                                                                                                                                                          
increase in spending to keep pace with the population increase (of 25% over 10 years) 
development spending should have reached 9.75 lakhs NRS. 
628 IN-4-3 28th August 2011, Kalaiya, EA-4-1 23rd August 2011, Haraiya. 
629 EA-4-12 28th August 2011, Kalaiya (IANS, 2007; Kathmandu Post, 2012; Bhandari, 
2011). 
630 EA-4-11 28th August 2011, Kalaiya, NL-4-3 16th August and 19th September 2011, 
Kathmandu and author observations. 
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insurgency and Madeshi Andolan, has meant that there is sufficient security for 
businesses to take risks by investing in new enterprises. These have little to do with 
the development projects that have been carried out in Haraiya in the last generation, 
except for the building of the road (which was carried out by the government in the 
1990s and is necessary for vehicles to access the kilns).631 The kilns are now the largest 
employers of local labour in Haraiya, but are fuelled primarily by demand outside the 
district (though some sales are made to both Kalaiya and Haraiya).632 
Notwithstanding the health and education impacts of development projects,633 whilst 
development spending by both the government and international agencies has been 
substantial, it did not have a significant impact on improving stability though it most 
likely helped maintain the population in Haraiya. With the exception of the road built 
before the conflict development has not provided significant new opportunities for 
the local population (who are now engaged in low-skilled labour) and the abuses of 
the development spending may be contributing to disenfranchisement with the Nepali 
state. Instead it is the private sector, now investing because the environment is safer, 
which has emerged as the chief way of maintaining stability locally.634 
In summary, stabilisation interventions in Bara demonstrate that there are significant 
limitations in localised self-stabilisation if it is not backed by broader support from 
both political leaders and the executive. Equally, the Maoists suffered from a lack of 
security support which undermined their attempts at imposing the People’s 
Government and both sides failed to provide security or political leadership in the 
region. Therefore the field site of Haraiya presents a useful way of understanding the 
significant limitations of development in supporting stability when it is implemented 
by exogenous actors. 
Thematic Analysis – Bara 
This section provides an analysis of the activities undertaken in Bara and Haraiya VDC 
to achieve stability and stabilisation through the five analytical themes outlined in 
Chapter 3 and connected to the independent and dependent variables; 1) periods of 
stability; 2) culture and context; 3) mode of intervention; 4) political legitimacy and; 5) 
conceptions of stability. The section concludes by testing this analysis against the 
intervention theories discussed in Chapter 2 which articulate the theories of 
statebuilding, COIN and development. 
                                                     
631 The road improvements were linked by some respondents to stability; this is 
discussed further in Chapter 8. EA-4-1 23rd August 2011, Haraiya and EA-4-2 23rd 
August 2011, Haraiya. 
632 EA-4-3 24th August 2011, Haraiya. 
633 NL-4-3 16th August 2011, Kathmandu. 
634 EA-4-10 28th August 2011, Kalaiya. 
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Political interventions by both sides failed to dominate the region and both the Nepali 
state and People’s Government existed side by side in an uneasy and violent co-
existence. In many respects over the last generation Haraiya experienced weak 
stability, not because of the insurgency per se, but because of the repeated waves of 
migration, clearing of the Sal forest and burgeoning criminal groups in the Terai, who 
used the ungoverned space between India and Nepal to their advantage. Bara was 
never politically important enough for the state to robustly protect, nor was Bara well 
represented amongst the national governments of the last generation and had few 
patrons to call on to ensure that the government paid it any significant attention. 
Despite this uneasy stability there was ongoing development, services were expanded 
and NGOs were able to operate, though this was largely disconnected from the 
primary economic driver in the area, which lay in the licit and illicit timber trade.  
The Maoists were ultimately unable to challenge the dominant underlying social 
structures prevalent in Bara and Haraiya VDC. Whilst the Maoists did try to administer 
the area, they failed, and neither side dominated Haraiya during the conflict meaning 
it was left to traditional systems, in this case the Panchayat leaders, to reform and 
provide basic governance to the population. This had significant implications for the 
post-conflict period because not only could the Maoists not challenge traditional 
systems they proved unable to control the Madeshi parties and groups they co-opted 
into their struggle against the Nepali state. The Maoist insurgency led to an increase in 
ethnicisation of politics in the Terai as Madeshi parties pursued their political 
aspirations for federal autonomy that had not been prevalent before or during the 
conflict, presenting the Nepali state with a new range of destabilising factors. 
The fluid security situation had previously been backed by a relatively rigid political 
system under the Panchayat regime, which ensured stability, and the primary threat 
had come from criminal groups. After the conflict the dynamic shifted whereby a fluid 
and unstable political dynamic was supported by a more robust security presence but 
this was manifestly less stable and secure for the population who were threatened by 
resurgent armed groups. This indicates that political systems which are not 
representative but confer some level of legitimacy on the central state are more 
stable than a weak democratic system supported by a robust security deployment. 
The structures of the state were maintained at great risk to the VDC staff but were 
insufficient to provide state authority despite the supporting presence of the schools 
and health clinics. The Maoists similarly, were never able to access the means 
necessary to enforce their will on the population and secure the governance of the 
People’s Government and the People’s Court, despite drawing on the leading role 
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Maoists from Haraiya played in the party at a district level and in the PLA.635 This 
uneasy balance allows the case study to shed light on the potential impacts of 
development interventions to support stabilisation. 
The development interventions of the state and NGOs prior to the conflict were not 
able to prevent substantial attempts by the Maoists to mobilise support, however 
their primary limitation in Haraiya was their association with the Pahadi settlers rather 
than poverty and exclusion. However, development spending by the state did not 
encourage the residents of Haraiya to support the state despite the fact they resented 
the fact that the Maoists had stopped the VDC from functioning properly. The 
exogenous NGO activities were appreciated but were not linked by respondents to 
stability. While Haraiya may be one of the more developed VDCs in Bara this did not 
stop it from being one of VDCs most affected by the conflict, nor has this necessarily 
aided its recovery after the insurgency; the main economic driver in Haraiya is the 
timber trade as well as the locally driven direct investment in brick kilns driven by the 
construction boom in the urban centres. 
Ultimately the development interventions failed to promote stability because there 
was insufficient security provided by either the Nepali state or the PLA. Instead a local 
self-defence group stepped in and provided limited security to central Haraiya VDC. 
This case confirms that the essentially political nature of insurgencies necessitated 
significant security provision for the population but this challenges the thesis that 
development, before, during or after a conflict, has a significant stabilising impact, 
particularly when it is implemented by non-state actors.  
The implication that stabilisation is chiefly determined by political actions is reinforced 
by the evidence that it was a lack of political stability in the centre that contributed to 
local instability. Within Bara the mainstream NC and CPN-UML political leaders were 
increasingly sidelined as the Maoists, with Madeshi support, attempted to re-shape 
the political landscape. As mentioned above it was the Maoists’ lack of control of their 
Madeshi allies that led to the Madeshi Andolan.636 The second element of national 
stabilisation occurred after the Madeshi Andolan when the state chose, through the 
Special Security Plan, to enforce the rule of law (to a degree) which addressed the 
threat posed by the armed groups that flourished after 2008. This resolve was backed 
by a more robust (though incomplete) political settlement meaning the executive has 
                                                     
635 NL-4-3 16th August and 19th September 2011, Kathmandu and LL-4-5 25th August 
2011, Haraiya. 
636 Some analysts note that the Maoists in some respects may have regretted 
promoting the federalist agenda which triggered the violent reaction of the Madeshi 
parties to the post-insurgency political agreements, in particular the interim 
Constitution. IN-4-7 21st October 2011, Kathmandu. 
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been able to exercise its authority – at times brutally – to re-establish state control.637 
This was complemented at a local level in Haraiya VDC where the community reached 
out to the state to provide security.638 
The symbiotic relationship between national and local political stability is reinforced 
by the fears voiced by respondents about future instability stemming from political 
indecision in Kathmandu rather than locally. Referring back to the prelude at the 
beginning of the chapter, respondents viewed their political leaders in Kathmandu as 
leeches because of the fragmenting nature of the political parties (particularly the 
Madeshi parties) and the inability to conclude the peace process as the main risk to 
stability.639  
In summary, the field site in Bara presented a number of analytical challenges 
regarding stability. Having been an area prone to instability for much of the 20th 
Century the area was able to enjoy substantial developmental investments. These 
investments, by the state and NGOs, seem to provide little explanation for the nature 
and form of the insurgency and the relative failure of both the state and the Maoists 
to provide coherent political leadership and local security. Instead the instability 
experienced during and after the insurgency stemmed from a lack of political will to 
enforce the rule of law. This was clearly seen as a critical need of the population but 
localised self-stabilisation was unable to transcend the course of the conflict caused 
by a crisis of political legitimacy. 
Theoretical analysis 
This subsection provides an analysis of the statebuilding, COIN and development 
theories that are being tested through this thesis. The statebuilding640 agenda 
provides only a partial explanation for the failure of the state in Haraiya. The state was 
not technically very capable prior to the conflict but had clearly been able to operate, 
deliver programmes and engage with the local political leadership; however, the state 
chose not to robustly defend the area despite the fact that the localised threat by the 
Maoists was relatively weak and not widely supported by the population. Rather than 
                                                     
637 It is instructive that all of the district and national political leaders across the 
parties were now, at least verbally, backing the state to provide security (NL-4-1 9th 
August 2011, Kathmandu, NL-4-3 16th August and 19th September 2011, Kathmandu, 
LL-4-10 28th August 2011, Kalaiya), further bolstered by stronger Indian security 
forces on the border which reduced scope for armed groups to use the border as a 
means of escape from Nepali security forces. IN-4-7 21st October 2011, Kathmandu. 
638 IN-4-1 26th August 2011, Haraiya. 
639 LL-4-10 28th August 2011, Kalaiya; NL-4-1 9th August 2011, Kathmandu; NL-4-3 
16th August 2011, Kathmandu; IN-4-2, IN-4-3, IN-4-4 28th August 2011, Kalaiya and 
IN-4-5 29th August 2011, Kalaiya 
640 See Dobbins et al, 2007, p. 1 quoted on p. 47. 
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a technocratic failure, it would seem that the collapse of the state in Haraiya during 
the insurgency came about due to an unwillingness to reach a central political 
consensus to provide robust, well-protected, governance. In the post-conflict period 
the dynamic has shifted with the Maoists in government concerned with protecting 
the state from armed groups; they have sought to strengthen local governance 
through a focus on security.641 
Whilst COIN642 correctly identifies the significance of the political dynamic of 
insurgencies it does not provide a viable way forward when the state is unable to 
provide an alternative political narrative to that of the insurgents. In a vacuum of 
political leadership the use of irregular forces, a common element of COIN, was not 
helpful for the state. The self-defence group was tacitly approved by the government 
as a policy to bolster security, but was ineffective in providing robust intelligence or 
security beyond the small market hub of Haraiya VDC and did not prevent Maoist 
activities. Without political control and direction the experience of the self-defence 
group challenges the idea that locally constituted forces can focus on anything other 
than their own narrow self-interest. 
Finally, whilst the statebuilding and COIN theories are challenged by the lack of 
coherent political will demonstrated by the Nepali state in this case study (evidenced 
by the fact they abandoned the villages despite the weak challenge of the Maoists); 
the most significant critique of theories of intervention is focused on the 
development643 thesis which seems to provide little explanatory evidence for the lack 
of stability in Haraiya. The continued provision of health and education services 
throughout the conflict may have supported the population in deciding not to leave, 
but this could equally be explained by the selective use of violence by the Maoists 
which meant that much of the population did not feel directly threatened because 
they were in part protected by the self-defence group. Post-conflict development 
spending may be increasing instability rather than providing a peace dividend as the 
respondents have become disenfranchised with a manifestly corrupt ‘all-party’ 
mechanism suggesting that mismanagement of development could be detrimental to 
the state. 
In summary, the nature of self-stabilisation in Haraiya was insufficient to promote 
stability in the absence of a coherent political message from the central government 
undermining the application of statebuilding and COIN theory. This fatally weakened 
the state in Haraiya, which retained a presence only because of the efforts of a 
handful of individuals, and their efforts were stymied because of the poor security 
                                                     
641 LL-4-9 28th August 2011, Kalaiya. 
642 See JP3-24, 2009, p. I2 quoted on p. 53. 
643 See USIP, 2009, p. 2.9 quoted on p. 55. 
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environment. In particular, development has provided little evidence to support 
processes of stabilisation and de-stabilisation in Haraiya in the last decade which have 
been dominated by the political contest and fallout from the Maoist insurgency.  
Conclusion 
In conclusion, Haraiya VDC and Bara district more broadly provides a number of 
challenges to conceptions about how states and other exogenous actors can promote 
stability. The security vacuum during the conflict led local leaders to form a self-
defence group that provided basic security for the market area of Madhuwan but left 
much of the VDC caught between Maoist activities, security force operations and the 
predations of criminal groups. Equally the Maoists failed to mobilise groups who 
should have been predisposed to their message of class struggle and were effectively 
confined to a Pahadi enclave to the north of Haraiya. Despite the relatively low threat 
from the Maoists in the area the state effectively failed to respond with a coherent 
political response, relying instead on punitive patrolling and raids by security forces. 
Development activities were extensive, prior, during and after the conflict but did not 
explain the low levels of Maoist mobilisation amongst disadvantaged groups and did 
not seem to stop the conflict from escalating. Maoist attempts at using development 
to expand their appeal were small scale and marginal to the conflict. The exogenous 
nature of the majority of development implementation during the conflict was 
divorced from local conceptions of stability and whilst there may have been 
developmental benefits they were incidental to the political and security contest 
between the state and Maoists. Over the medium term it seems that it has been the 
timber trade, both licit and illicit, and the new investment in the brick kilns that has 
sustained a modicum of stability in the VDC.  
Stability has remained largely elusive since the Maoist insurgency affected the area in 
2000. The violence during the conflict, the incomplete national peace process 
resulting from the CPA, the Madeshi Andolan and subsequent fragmenting security 
environment have inhibited the basic attainment of physical security. The case of 
Haraiya challenges technocratic and development conceptions of stability formation 
and roots stability in the nature of the national and local political settlements, which 
have a stronger influence on local stability than any of the actions of the belligerents, 
the failed self-stabilisation by the community or the development actors. Ultimately 
stability won’t be achieved until higher level political agreement, which allows the 
state and the community to collectively address the threats to stability in a more 
comprehensive manner, is achieved.  
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Chapter 8 – The stability paradigm 
Introduction 
Having outlined the processes of stability and stabilisation in the four field sites, this 
chapter seeks to provide a comparative analysis of the field sites to interrogate the 
research questions: ’what is stability?’ and ‘what activities support stability?’ which 
were outlined in Chapter 3 and which underpin the hypothesis: “stability is driven by 
local political settlements and produced by local political legitimacy formation which 
can be supported by interventions.” As well as using the field site data this chapter 
also uses data from interviews with national and international interveners carried out 
in Kabul and Kathmandu. The analysis demonstrates that the narrow prisms 
underpinning the intervention logic in politics, security and development do not 
necessarily address stability. The chapter concludes that the stability paradigm is 
distinct and presents a conception of stability that challenges the research hypothesis, 
which is revised and then tested in Chapter 9 against theories of statebuilding, COIN 
and development. 
The analysis is presented according to the five themes outlined in Chapter 3 and used 
in each of the case study chapters to structure the thematic analysis: the themes are 
1) periods of stability; 2) culture and context; 3) mode of intervention; 4) political 
legitimacy and; 5) conceptions of stability. The selection of these themes is important 
and requires some introduction; in doing so it is useful to repeat the figure of variables 
on p.66, to which the themes are linked: 
Independent variables 
Insurgency Local political economy Stabilisation 
intervention 
Dependent variables 
Legitimacy Stability 
Time periods 
Pre-conflict During-conflict Current period 
Figure 9 Independent and dependent variables in the research design 
The first theme, periods of stability, examines why certain periods were identified as 
stable by respondents to see how stability has been formed or undermined before 
and during conflicts as well as in the current period, allowing for the identification of 
factors which made the field sites stable. The second theme, culture and context, 
focuses on two of the independent variables: insurgency and local political economy. 
This section considers the relevance of ideology to insurgencies, the nature of state 
formation, the dependent nature of the case studies, and whether the field sites or 
broader case studies have characteristics which limit the extrapolation of data to 
other areas. The third theme, the mode of intervention, focuses on the different types 
of interventions in the field sites, following the same outline as the preceding four 
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chapters, and looks at political, security and development interventions in an attempt 
to identify shared patterns of impact on stability and legitimacy; this is the 
stabilisation intervention independent variable. The final two themes address the 
dependent variables of legitimacy and stability. The fourth theme, political legitimacy, 
connects the field sites to their broader case studies in order to interrogate the data in 
terms of where stability and political legitimacy are formed and which external factors 
account for localised stability, and this explores how the various layers of power and 
influence demonstrated in the field sites shape both stability and legitimacy. The final 
theme, conceptions of stability, presents a comparison of data from local respondents 
and interveners (both national and foreign) about how they consider stability is 
formed. This discussion situates the analysis in the preceding themes to answer the 
two research questions: ‘what is stability?’ and ‘what activities support stability?’ In 
providing answers to these questions at the end of the chapter the analysis is then 
used to test and refine the research hypothesis. 
Periods of stability 
This section addresses previous periods of stability experienced by the respondents 
and the factors they ascribed to maintaining that stability. What this section will not 
do is address the concepts of ‘pre-conflict’ or ‘post-conflict’, in part because these 
categories have little meaning in the field sites. Whilst both Kalakan and Rolpa are 
currently seen as stable, respondents in both sites highlighted their very significant 
concerns about future instability and conflict looming on the horizon.644 Haraiya is 
meant to be enjoying a peace dividend after the signing of the CPA but Bara was one 
of eight districts identified as being highly insecure by the Nepali state (Kafle, 2010, p. 
9) and Village A in Afghanistan is still the subject of ongoing operations and violence. 
In many respects this confirms that the concepts of conflict and peace are arbitrary 
and in fact the lived experience of most people is a moveable continuum in which 
conflicts increase or decrease in intensity but never go away (Sambanis, 2004, p. 819). 
In the same way past periods of stability should not be viewed in isolation but rather 
as periods that transition between more or less unstable periods, raising the questions 
of whether stability is unachievable and whether, at a strategic level, stability should 
be abandoned as an objective. 
This is significant because one of the striking critiques of any intervention in Helmand 
is that they are subject to ongoing and long-term processes of social and political 
change, and stabilisation is a modifier to those processes rather than a determinant of 
them – so for example long term trends in politics (i.e. the exclusionary approach 
supported by former Governor Sher Mohammad Akhunzada), in development (i.e. 
                                                     
644 NL-3-3 30th October 2011, Kathmandu; LL-3-8 17th October 2011, Liwang; NL-1-1 
19th November 2010, Kalakan. 
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that services are contracted out to NGOs and funded by foreigners and don’t promote 
a social contract) and security (that violent retribution will go unpunished) are 
important features of the landscape which shape what can be effective as part of 
stabilisation. A further issue is that the early years of the intervention from 2001-2006 
pre-determined the later potential activities and overall outcome of the following 
years. For example, the years of government neglect and abuse, corruption in 
development and ceding of territory to the insurgency altered the landscape in such a 
way that any intervention was likely to be distrusted. Local conflict history matters. 
Accepting that all the field sites exist in fluid environments and that prior 
interventions constrain later action it is instructive to reflect on what periods the 
respondents identified as being stable and what factors they ascribed to that stability. 
It may be simplistic to say that the periods prior to the conflict were more stable, but 
there was a general consensus across the field sites that pre-1978 (in Afghanistan) and 
pre-1996 (in Nepal) were stable times.645 Whilst there may be a tendency to view the 
past through rose-tinted glasses the level of nuance and commonality across the four 
field sites regarding the nature of past stability is important in understanding it.  
The first common element was the link between stability and security. Though 
respondents gave varied responses in identifying when the conflicts started, and when 
instability started to increase, there was a clear connection between violent conflict 
and instability, which does not mean that the experience of violence excludes 
stability, because on closer inspection there were periods of stability identified during 
the conflicts as well as before them. Residents in Village A identified Taliban rule as 
being stable646 and a localised stability was maintained, for some, in Madhuwan 
village within Haraiya VDC, by the self-defence group.647 Again in both of these cases it 
was the enforced restitution of security that led to increased perceptions of local 
stability. This leads to the simple conclusion that the central factor in local stability is 
security, and indeed in several interviews in both Nepal and Afghanistan the 
conception of tight control or close security was employed by respondents to 
demonstrate what they saw as the most fundamental component of stability. As one 
respondent stated: “Stability means living in tight security, without fear, [so that] kids 
can go to school, those who have jobs can do their jobs with no problems and the 
                                                     
645 EA-4-1 23rd August 2011, Haraiya, EA-3-2 10th October 2011, Gorahi, LL-3-2 12th 
October 2011, Liwang. 
646 LL-2-1 15th November 2010, Kabul; LL-2-5 13th December 2010, Nahr-i Sarraj and 
NL-2-1 11th December 2010, Kabul; who represent a range of ‘pro’ and ‘anti’ Taliban 
groups. 
647 LL-4-7 26th August 2011, Haraiya. 
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people are mentally relaxed. This is stability.”648 For some respondents in Nepal 
stability meant the absence of violence: “there [are] no threats, fear and casualties, 
so, there is stability here.”649  
However, security alone appears to be insufficient because the enforcement of 
security requires a system to apply it; as other respondents in Bara noted the stability 
experienced before the Maoists was rooted in the fact that, “government rules and 
regulations were strict at that time. Also, rule of law was much stronger.”650 And in 
Afghanistan respondents pointed to the broader fact that, “after the Russian (sic) 
invasion the social order was annihilated,” implying that stability is the culmination of 
the rules being observed and occasionally enforced by security forces.651  
A second key factor, therefore, is an entity to enforce a set of rules. The respondent in 
Nahr-i Sarraj quoted above also linked stability to nazm, (order) which adds the idea 
of order to the quotes above; stabilisation is about bringing order out of disorder,652 
bringing coherence out of the chaos. As discussed below the approach of the Taliban 
and the Maoists was essentially to enforce control. However, unrecognised by 
insurgents, too much security can lead to a dead peace, as experienced by some in 
Gajul living under the People’s Government.653 This is an important point to highlight 
because whilst there was a strong link to security, and its enforcement, there was 
within those discussions negative connotations with stability, which leads to a third 
factor: that control by an organised group is not always accepted by the entire 
population. For example respondents in Bara considered the Panchayat period to be 
one where, “there was peace in the society despite widespread fear among the 
people.”654 Other respondents were also critical of the idea that stability was anything 
more than enforcement of the status quo, which in itself may not be of value.655 This 
was also recognised by Taliban respondents in the current conflict who argued that 
there is no difference between stability and security, who thought that stability is a 
                                                     
648 LL-2-6 13th December 2010, Lashkar Gah: in Nepal a similar opinion was voiced by 
IN-4-4 28th August 2011, Kalaiya. 
649 LL-4-3 24th August 2011, Haraiya. 
650 EA-4-1 23rd August 2011, Haraiya, EA-4-3 24th August 2011, Haraiya: Police 
administration was “not strict” during the insurgency. 
651 LL-1-6 18th October 2010, Kalakan. 
652 LL-2-6 13th December 2010, Lashkar Gah. 
653 LL-3-7 15th October 2011, Gajul. 
654 LL-4-1 23rd August 2011, Haraiya; NL-3-1 26th July 2011, Kathmandu noted the 
same from the perspective of Rolpa. 
655 EA-4-10 28th August 2011, Kalaiya. 
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second-rate goal, which is not the same as peace, implying peace may be the ultimate 
source of stability.656  
Peace is more encompassing, more durable and more desirable for many than 
stability. While they were linked by most respondents they were not the same thing; 
however, the implication is that were peace to be secured then stability would be a 
foregone conclusion. This is not the same as saying that the signing of the peace 
agreement, the CPA, in Nepal ensured stability – it manifestly did not,657 for the very 
clear reason that the political designers of that deal did not deliver on the promises 
they made, a theme which is developed further below. This is where the connection is 
made between local stability and the broader conflicts. It is possible to enforce local 
stability, as has been demonstrated in Gajul, Village A and in Haraiya, but it is not 
possible to insulate those areas from national level political instability.  
In summary, stability can be both a positive and a negative state, but a key side-effect 
of stability is a reduced level of violence, which provides some form of order. However 
stability will only ever be localised when there is a broader political environment in 
which local stability can be fostered. Past experiences of stability point to a complex 
eco-system whereby it may be possible to insulate specific areas from instability, but it 
will be impossible to protect them from all threats, or maintain that stability in the 
long-term without higher level political processes. These political processes do not 
have to be inclusive; past stability experiences indicate that a combination of closed 
elite systems employing, at times, brutal force can be effective in promoting stability. 
This was the ante-conflict environment of all four field sites discussed. The conflicts 
and associated exogenous interventions have, however, transformed and shaped the 
dynamics of the sites so that stability has become fluid. This does not mean stability 
should be abandoned as an objective, but situates it as a second rate outcome where 
peace is yet to be achieved. This analysis provides a platform to interrogate the 
independent variables (the insurgencies, local political economy and stabilisation 
interventions) and dependent variables (legitimacy and stability) through culture and 
context, the modes of intervention, political legitimacy and conceptions of stability. 
Culture and context 
This subsection addresses two of the independent variables: the political economy of 
the field sites and broader case studies and the nature of the threat, i.e. the 
insurgencies, that affected all of the sites. This discussion builds on the analysis in the 
                                                     
656 LL-2-5 13th December 2010, Nahr-i Sarraj. 
657 And in fact Nepali respondents were vehemently critical of the lack of progress 
regarding the CPA; see NL-3-3 30th October 2011, Kathmandu and LL-4-1 26th August 
2011, Haraiya (the prelude at the beginning of Chapter 7) amongst many other 
respondents. 
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preceding section that looked at historical experiences of stability by arguing that local 
political economy shapes what forms of intervention are feasible and which are not; it 
also provides an understanding of the importance of ideology to the political struggle 
of the insurgencies, the nature of state formation, and the dependency of these states 
upon the international system based upon their historical position as peripheral states 
in the narrative of South Asia and provides some limits on how the data can be 
extrapolated to other areas. 
Ideology and insurgencies 
In all four sites the last generation has seen a series of changes in the nature of 
political power, influence and control at a local level, driven in part by central level 
processes of reform which were often avowedly democratic. In Kalakan and Nahr-i 
Sarraj there was a shift of power from the traditional landed elites to commander 
networks during the 1980s and 1990s, which were displaced by the strengthening of 
the religious leadership’s position under the Taliban government. The post-2001 
dynamic has largely re-instated the Jihadi commanders in positions of power at the 
expense of the religious elite and the continued marginalisation of the landed elite. 
This helps explain the significance of religious belief and identity to the conflict in 
Afghanistan which is largely absent from the Nepal case study.658 However, if the 
Taliban’s position is viewed as being ideological rather than simply religious, then the 
Maoist’s ideology can be considered on a par with the Taliban’s religious fervour.659 
In Nepal the role of religious actors in the conflict was negligible despite religious 
institutions being the subject of Maoist attention, not least because of the unique 
place that Nepal’s monarchs occupied in reigning over the world’s only Hindu state. 
The Maoists were particularly incensed at the way in which religious actors at times 
used religious doctrine to maintain social and cultural orthodoxies that the Maoists 
saw as exploitative (Lecomte-Tilouine, 2004, p. 123). Though in both cases what may 
be seen as an obvious general analysis of the social context of the conflict it belies a 
degree of complexity which renders simplistic assumptions about whether the 
                                                     
658 Indeed religious actors have played a key role in mobilisation for conflicts in 
Afghanistan dating back at least to the Anglo-Afghan wars (Robson, 1986, p. 170; 
Edwards D. B., 1996, pp. 191-2). In addition the Jihadi period was dominated by 
religious rhetoric which was used to justify and structure resistance, and this was 
largely corrupted by the degeneration into civil war in the 1990s. For more detailed 
descriptions of the way in which Islam was traditionally used in conflict mobilisation 
and has changed over the past generation see Rubin, 2002, pp. 38-40; Edwards D. B., 
2002, pp. 195, 295-8; Linschoten & Kuehn, 2012, pp. 130-3. 
659 For more general discussion on the connections between religious ideology and its 
impact on politics see Grzymala-Busse, 2012, pp. 426-33. 
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presence of a strong ideological belief may increase or decrease stability (Shah, 2004, 
p. 192; Roy, 1985, p. 33).  
In the context of Afghanistan much of the violence has been construed in Islamic 
terms, and the use of videos and SMS messages and the overriding Islamic nature of 
leadership can lead to an assumption that all components of the conflict are in some 
way religiously motivated.660 Whilst it is correct that in both Kalakan and Village A 
religious leaders amongst the Taliban were at the forefront of local leadership, this did 
not last and in the case of Kalakan was certainly not accepted,661 and whilst it may 
have led to local leadership changes in Village A,662 more broadly in Helmand, the 
Taliban re-enforced the latent stability that had emerged in the early 1990s under 
local commanders (Martin, 2011, pp. 44-5). For Nepal the lack of engagement by 
religious elites and leaders in the conflict is as much a sign of how they were 
marginalised during the conflict,663 as it is the extent to which the Maoists attempted 
to displace religious ideology with their own orthodoxy, or the displacement of 
‘Hinduisation’ with ‘Maoisation’ (Lecomte-Tilouine, 2004, p. 123). It has been noted 
that the Maoists at times portrayed themselves to be the natural successors to the 
Gorkha Shah dynasty that ruled the Hindu kingdom, and which may have had Magar 
origins (Lecomte-Tilouine, 2009, pp. 218-9). This appropriation of Hindu dynastic 
imagery from the hills also helps explain why the Maoists encountered difficulties in 
mobilising non-Pahadi groups in Bara. 
As a result the presence of a religious belief having a particular impact on stability 
should be ruled out, however it does seem accurate to assert that the mobilising 
nature of ideologies, both religious and secular, are important elements of both 
conflicts and connect well with the political nature of insurgencies as understood in 
COIN theory, with the ideology being a key part of the motivationary logic for 
combatants and leaders. In the ongoing conflict in Afghanistan, concepts of Jihad are 
important in developing the overarching conflict narrative, but seem to be only one 
factor amongst several that contribute to the mobilisation of combatants and the 
endemic instability witnessed in the last generation. In both the Kalakan and Nahr-i 
Sarraj case studies religious motivations for conflicts may have been viable for 
creating violent resistance movements, but they were unable to reduce or curtail 
those same groups when the focus of the resistance (the Soviets in this example) was 
removed (See pp. 107, 137). Similarly in Nepal, Maoist ideology asserted a violent 
revolutionary reaction to perceived and actual transgressions against individuals and 
                                                     
660 Linschoten & Kuehn, 2012, pp. 16-26, has a useful discussion on the role of Islam 
within the Taliban.  
661 IN-1-4 17th October 2010, Aqa Sarai. 
662 LL-2-1 15th November 2010, Kabul. 
663 EA-3-12 15th October 2011, Gajul and LL-4-8 26th August 2011, Haraiya. 
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communities. At a local level this does not necessarily explain the use of violence in 
either the Rolpa or Bara field sites, and in the case of Bara does not seem to have 
promoted the cohesion of the Maoist movement and allied groups since the 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA).  
In summary, these ideologies structure the use of violence, the nature of the 
insurgent organisations, and the strength and resonance of the ideologies, which 
seems to have been critically misunderstood by the states in their attempts (or lack 
thereof) to provide a coherent counterrevolution. This is as relevant for the failure of 
the PDPA in Afghanistan in the 1980s as it is for the Karzai administration today or the 
governments in Nepal during the Maoist insurgency. Importantly these ideologies are 
a reflection of the political milieu within these states and cannot be seen as separate 
from the varying experiences of state formation that have occurred within them and 
their deep connections to their societies is in marked contrast to the narrow support 
base that the democratic and autocratic systems had in Afghanistan and Nepal.  
Nature of state formation 
The nature of state formation forms a second critical component of the context of 
these case studies, which both exhibit strong local traditional governance systems. In 
neither space has state formation been completed in the Westphalian sense, with 
control over all of their territory, a monopoly on the use of violence and the ability to 
administer the region through broad taxation. This does not mean that the people are 
ungoverned and the fact that they have not experienced Westphalian forms of 
statehood does not preclude stability in earlier periods. Stability is not dependent on 
the Westphalian state model. 
The nature of state formation has been different in each field site which reflects the 
heterogeneous nature of the state and their specific dynamics. In Kalakan, state 
formation since 2001 has been predicated on overlapping political agreements 
between local leaders and regional political actors. However, as Chapter 4 argued, this 
was augmented not by exogenous governance support but rather through the 
presence of significant numbers of residents in the security forces of the newly 
formed ANA and ANP, as the DDR programme removed the primary security 
organisation in the area, Firqa 8, in 2005. These connections to formal systems were 
also affected by the influence of commander networks which maintain both local level 
cohesion as well as linkages to the central administration. 
A similar dynamic can be seen in Gajul where the state, or at least a state, has been 
present for several hundred years because of the Sen Dynasty. Whilst the state 
administered Gajul during the 20th Century through local landlords it was able to 
position itself as a leading centre in Rolpa district. Through the extension of 
development, primarily education, the state became the single largest employer in the 
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VDC and generated a significant number of senior political figures. The individual 
teachers were not displaced during the conflict but the former landed lords of Gajul 
were replaced by new Maoist ‘lords’ who enforced stability during the conflict. In 
effect the state continued to devolve local decision-making through the all-party 
mechanism and the strength of Maoist parallel structures formed the Maoist leaders 
into a semi-feudal group whose main aim in the conflict was the rebalancing of power 
within the Subedi-Thapa network. 
A different dynamic can be seen in the other field sites, where state formation has 
been much weaker. In Nahr-i Sarraj the last form of successful state formation did not, 
in fact could not, rely on widespread employment of the population by the state, 
because the Taliban administration was relatively poor.664 Instead state formation in 
Helmand was shaped by the competition between the landed elite (or khans), 
religious elite and Jihadi commanders over the last generation, which in turn have 
been driven by two other elements: the expansion of viable irrigated land from the 
1950s and the associated resettlement of tribal and nomadic groups, and the massive 
expansion of the native opium economy by the belligerents as they vied for power and 
influence from the 1980s. 
In Village A, and Nahr-i Sarraj more generally, the state has not been a significant 
patron because the nature of funding from the HAVA meant foreign influence 
stretched local political will and capacity, and the opium economy allowed local actors 
to act independently of supposedly superior authorities (whether that was the state 
or a tanzim). The state in this context has simply been a bystander as the population 
used traditional governance systems which came under the sway of various local 
patrons, be they khans, Jihadi commanders or the Taliban. The shifts in power and 
authority, and the previous experiences of conflict, still structure the context in 
Helmand; commanders who resisted the Taliban in the 1990s re-captured the state 
and used it to continue their civil war by other means, which precipitated the virulent 
insurgency experienced since 2006.  
The experience of Bara was much closer to that of Nahr-i Sarraj in Afghanistan than 
Gajul in Nepal. The state largely ignored the region and exercised little if any authority 
until the 1970s, and even then it was patchy and not necessarily supported broadly by 
the population. The democratic revolution and the Maoist insurgency have not 
significantly changed the dynamic of the area which now has just enough state 
presence to ensure that the rents from the timber trade are not completely lost to 
local smuggling networks. Bara generally and Haraiya specifically were never politically 
important enough for the state to robustly protect, nor well represented enough 
                                                     
664 One of the respondents in fact left the Taliban administration because of lack of 
pay. LL-2-7 14th December 2010, Gereshk. 
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amongst the national governments of the last generation to ensure that the 
government paid it any significant attention. In this context the expansion of 
development actors has not contributed to statebuilding, because they act outside the 
remit of the state. This analysis would seem to question the logic of any development 
activities being associated with statebuilding in either Bara or Helmand given the fact 
it has not done so in the past. It also highlights the final critical element of the political 
economy of the field sites and case studies, which is that they are in fact 
dependencies, not on their own state, but on neighbouring states and the broader 
international system. 
Dependent states 
The previous subsections have highlighted the significance of ideology to politically 
orientated insurgencies and the differing nature of state formation within and 
between the field sites which was evident through the data presented in the 
preceding chapters. This third subsection will discuss the way in which, at both local 
and national levels, the field sites and case studies (Afghanistan and Nepal) are rentier 
communities at the periphery of global and regional South Asian state formation and 
stability, a fact that can only be fully appreciated when making comparisons across all 
the sites. 
At a state level Afghanistan and Nepal are both fiscally dependent on large external 
flows of investment and finance simply to keep the current attempt at the 
Westphalian state functioning. They have been rentier states since the encroachment 
of the British Empire and codification of the international state system in the 19th 
Century, which established their modern day territorial boundaries and initiated the 
process of patronage and dependency that has flourished to this day. British rule in 
the subcontinent was belligerent with regard to the territories of Nepal and 
Afghanistan. The East India Company successfully fought a war against Nepal in 1814-
1815 annexing a third of Nepal’s territory, including Sikkim, Darjeeling, Sirumur and 
Garhwal, and, as part of the negotiations, the British offered to recruit ‘Gorkhas’ to 
the British army, a tradition which continues to this day.665  
Between 1838 and 1919 Britain managed to fight three wars with Afghanistan, 
decisively losing two and the third can barely said to have been a victory.666 This did 
not prevent the use of subsidies and political pressure throughout the 19th Century, 
which culminated in the Durrand Line, demarcating the current boundaries between 
Afghanistan and British India (modern day Pakistan) in 1893 (Ganguly & Howenstein, 
                                                     
665 Some commentators have noted that the victory was pyrrhic due to the excessive 
cost and significant tactical defeats the British forces faced (Banskota, 1994, pp. 20-3). 
666 There are many histories of the Afghan wars. One of the earliest consolidated 
English accounts to cover all three conflicts is Dupree, 1973, pp. 369-401; 403-15. 
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2009, p. 127; Dupree, 1973, pp. 425-7). In both states Britain attempted to control 
territory and banish potential destabilising forces to the hills beyond. Despite the 
British army often fairing badly (at least in Afghanistan) they had at least contained 
the perceived threats from the Afghan and Nepali territories (ibid., 1973, p. 425; 
Banskota, 1994, p. 22).  
In the 20th Century both states sought to remain independent of regional neighbours, 
for Afghanistan, Russia and Pakistan; and for Nepal, India and China. They did so by 
playing their neighbours off against one another when the opportunities arose (or 
when they were forced to). There are many examples of this phenomenon but to 
name just two: the closure of the Afghan border by Pakistan on imports and exports 
from 1961-1963 pushed Afghanistan towards a closer relationship with the USSR 
(Omrani, 2009, pp. 189-90; Misdaq, 2006, pp. 298-9); secondly, Indian attempts to 
leverage influence with Nepal’s political class through supporting development 
projects (Whelpton, 2005, pp. 130-3). Since 2003 India has sponsored some 450 small 
and large scale projects often focused on education, health and roads, as part of its 
economic cooperation with Nepal, though concerns have been raised about how the 
aid has been targeted and whether it has been used to further India’s political 
interests (Pande, 2011; Embassy of India, Kathmandu, 2012; Kshetry, 2012). Current 
overtures being made by the Nepali government to China should be seen in the 
context of a need to rebalance the overbearing nature of Indian influence.667 These 
interventions by (il-)Liberal states are instructive and suggest that realpolitik trumps 
some of the idealism associated with the Liberal tradition in ways which can 
undermine some aspirations.  
Along with the direct influence of neighbours both states have become dependent on 
the international system, often at the same time as becoming dependencies on their 
regional neighbours. In the case of Afghanistan this is primarily in terms of bi-lateral 
aid. Between 1958-1968 and in the 1970s 40% of state expenditure was financed by 
other states, though this was focused on development spending, by the end of the 
1980s the Soviet Union’s foreign aid exceeded government development expenditure 
by 60%, meaning they were financing the basic functioning of the state (Rubin, 2002, 
pp. 65, 161-3). Since 2001 foreign aid has at times dwarfed Afghanistan’s entire GDP, 
although not all of it is spent in-country. External aid is financing a substantive 
proportion of the Afghan government including the recurrent costs of the ANSF and 
the rentier nature of the Afghan state is likely to continue in to the 2020s (World 
Bank, 2012, pp. iv-vi, x-xii). 
                                                     
667 The example of the $3bn Chinese investment in Lumbini, the reputed birthplace of 
Buddha, is a case in point (The Economist, 2011). 
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Similarly in Nepal bi-lateral aid often provided over half of all government 
development spending from the 1950s (though not recurrent expenditure) and in the 
late 1980s peaked at 80% of development spending or 40% of the government’s 
entire budget (Whelpton, 2005, p. 128). While bi-lateral aid is significant in Nepal a 
second form of dependency is the vast scale of remittances from Nepalis working 
overseas, which was equivalent to 23% of GDP in 2009, effectively only supporting 
consumption (World Bank, 2010, p. 12; Central Bureau of Statistics, 2011). 
Understanding the degree of influence of other states is complicated by the fact that 
some states provide both significant bi-lateral aid as well as remittances. For example, 
while Britain is officially the largest bi-lateral aid donor668 to Nepal this is dwarfed by 
spending on its Gurkha pensions (which form part of Nepal’s remittances) meaning 
the UK provides 8% of Nepal’s entire GDP.669 As a result in a very practical sense the 
modern states of Afghanistan and Nepal are fictions of the international system rather 
than independent sovereign states. 
While there is clearly a significant amount of international engagement at a state 
level, the field sites also demonstrate significant direct engagement between the 
communities and neighbouring states. Indeed this engagement with other states is in 
many ways more common than engagement with their own state. For example, large 
numbers of Gajul’s residents moved to India to avoid conscription670 and at varying 
times significant numbers of Aqa Sara’s and Village A’s residents have lived and 
worked in Pakistan as refugees.671 Haraiya continues to be plagued by ‘armed groups’ 
that use the border as a form of shelter.672 As well as the impact on the nature of the 
state there are also long-term, ongoing and overlapping social, cultural and economic 
relations between Nepalis living in the Terai with their brethren in Northern India 
(Gaige, 2009); and Afghanistan has provided rulers in India even prior to the Mughal 
empire (Bellaw, 1891, pp. 197-204) and the Pashtuns remain the world’s largest tribal 
group, split by the Durrand Line (Spain, 1962, pp. 21-7). 
The logical progression of this argument is that the limited degree to which either 
state can be said to be independent means that they cannot be stable in their own 
right; in addition they do not have the freedom of action which European states had in 
their own state formation processes, reinforcing the discussion in Chapter 2 that the 
                                                     
668 Respondents believed that India is in fact that largest donor but it is not clear if the 
reporting on their expenditure is transparent. IN-5-8 23rd October 2011, Kathmandu 
& IN-5-4 15th August 2011, Kathmandu. 
669 IN-5-4 15th August 2011, Kathmandu: UK estimates were based on direct spending 
by of £86.5m by UK agencies, plus remittances from serving Gurkha soldiers. 
670 EA-3-13 16th October 2011, Gajul. 
671 LL-1-2 10th October 2010, Aqa Sarai & LL-2-1 15th November 2010, Kabul. 
672 IN-4-1 26th August 2011, Haraiya. 
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nature and potential of statebuilding, or consolidation, must be markedly different 
than that experienced during the period of European state formation in order to be 
effective. 
This subsection also allows the research to assert the ways in which the findings can 
be extrapolated to some other contexts. Whilst the historical dynamic of conquest, 
subjugation and state formation in South Asia is obviously unique, the experiences of 
Afghanistan and Nepal represent varied examples of Islamic, Hindu and Maoist state 
formation and building and have employed governance systems ranging from 
monarchies to theocracies to republics in the context of robust and heterogeneous 
informal governance systems. Here is the nub of this element of the discussion: the 
overriding conclusion is not one where these conflicts are simply part of the South 
Asian narrative of state formation. Instead, they represent the story of small nations 
being supported and interfered with by a combination of regional neighbours and the 
international community. This is a situation which could apply to a number of states in 
various parts of Africa, the Middle East and South-East Asia, as well as these South-
Asian examples. A number of states could fall into this group,673 which is returned to 
in the conclusion.  
However, there are also limitations and it is important to re-state the significant 
characteristics of the four field sites that were chosen after a thorough investigation 
of a number of variables, because the selection limits the scope of extrapolating the 
data in important ways: firstly, all the field sites are primarily rural with economic 
bases dominated by agriculture; secondly, none of the field sites has an extensive 
range of government or private sector services. Haraiya is the most well-connected 
field site with several government offices being present, followed by Kalakan, which 
retains services plus a police post. Gajul only has service sectors present (health and 
education) and Village A has no government engagement at all (and experienced very 
little in the past). All the communities are of mixed ethnic and social groups. Though 
Kalakan has a preponderance of Tajiks there are still Pashtun communities present, 
and the other three field sites are a mix of ethnic, caste or tribal groups. Finally, they 
all have been subject to insurgent violence and successful and failed attempts by 
insurgents, governments and international actors to attain control. 
The data collected allows extrapolation to other heterogeneous rural agricultural 
economies which have low levels of government services that are at risk of being 
                                                     
673 Including many of the “fragile and conflict-affected” states that have endorsed the 
recently proposed New Deal on Statebuilding including; Afghanistan, Burundi, Central 
African Republic, Chad, Democratic Republic of Congo, Guinea Bissau, Guinea, Haiti, 
Liberia, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Sudan, Timor-Leste, Togo. See 
HLF-4, 2012b. 
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affected by insurgencies; this is important to re-state because it clarifies the kinds of 
instability that the data can be used to discuss; namely contests between politically 
orientated resistance groups and their states and the roles that international actors 
could take in those conflicts. This means that the data cannot be used to discuss urban 
stability, or recovery from the destabilising impact of other non-political factors, such 
as natural disasters. 
This section has argued that the nature of the ideologies underpinning recent 
insurgencies in Afghanistan and Nepal have presented narratives to which the states 
have been unable to respond. In a large part this is because of the historical nature of 
state formation at both the national and local levels, which means that the pursuit of 
the Westphalian state is illusory. Importantly, the Westphalian state in these contexts 
has not necessarily failed because of internal inadequacy or lack of effort; there have 
been significant transfers of wealth and programming to attempt these reforms, 
which have failed primarily because the states are dependent on regional structures 
and the international system, and subsequently have been robbed of their 
sovereignty. This also allows the research to assert that these dynamics are common 
to a number of states and territories, strengthening the extrapolation of the findings 
beyond the case study areas. 
Mode of intervention 
The following section summarises the impact of interventions across the field sites in 
the three modes described in the preceding chapters. This builds on the conclusion to 
the previous section whereby previous experiences of stability were associated with 
politically restrictive but effectively secured environments to ones where both the 
conflicts and interventions have attempted to re-shape and re-form the societies and 
states. The interventions are connected with competing theories of state formation, 
those of the Maoists, Islamists and those supporting Liberal peacebuilding, which are 
discussed again in the following chapter. 
Political interventions to support stabilisation 
Of the three modes of intervention, political interventions appear to be the most 
nebulous, largely because they are carried out in forms recognised as ‘governance’, a 
catch-all term often used by interveners; but also because the breadth and depth of 
local informal politics and governance systems must be understood if the impact of 
interventions is to be understood. The four field sites present significant variation in 
local systems of governance as well as the experience of political interventions, and 
therefore it is helpful to briefly re-state the salient elements in the stories of each site.  
Kalakan, the example of indigenous stabilisation, was largely allowed to govern itself 
forming part of a political bloc that supported the new Afghan government post-2001 
as traditional and commander networks re-asserted themselves after the collapse of 
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the Taliban. It has had little significant or intrusive political intervention except for the 
structuring of the broader national governance system and provision of infrastructure, 
which has supported governance effectiveness, but which had done little to support 
local governance legitimacy in the eyes of respondents in Aqa Sarai village. At the 
other end of the spectrum Nahr-i Sarraj demonstrated the inability of exogenous 
technical interventions in forging or coordinating a local political support base in 
which governance could thrive; instead violent competition took over while the 
Afghan state refused to expend political capital on extending governance to the parts 
of the district which included Village A. 
Rolpa exhibited insurgent stabilisation, which highlighted both the weaknesses of the 
state’s attempts at political stabilisation in the absence of the capability or will to 
deliver results in Liwang, the district headquarters, as well as the inability of the 
Maoist state to develop legitimacy and long-term stability in Gajul VDC without 
enforcing it, despite it lying within the zone of control of the insurgency. Bara also 
exhibited the first trait identified in Rolpa regarding the formal state, but in the 
context where the Maoists were unable to enforce their will, which therefore 
highlighted the limitations of self-stabilisation where a local self-defence group 
protected one small sub-village in Haraiya while traditional governance systems were 
reactivated. Events in Bara also suggest that badly designed political interventions, 
including the all-party mechanism, may be destabilising. 
Whether or not a governance intervention succeeded in promoting stability is 
connected to the degree to which it was supported by the rules of the game within 
which the political leaders and wider society were supposed to act. This foregrounds 
one of the points made in the preceding section whereby stability is a function of an 
actor’s ability to enforce the rules. Therefore the examples which have promoted 
stability through political intervention are those where the rules can, to an extent, be 
enforced. This includes the period of Maoist control of Gajul in Rolpa (2000-2006), 
Taliban control of Helmand (1995-2001) and the experience of governance restoration 
in Kalakan (2001-2010).674 It is important to note that these experiences highlight that 
there is more than one path to stability, and that stability was often imposed rather 
than fostered, again resonating with earlier 20th Century experiences of stability in 
both Afghanistan and Nepal. 
On the other hand the examples amongst the field sites of the failure of political 
interventions point to the conclusion that the inability to successfully enforce the 
rules undermines technical governance intervention. This would include Maoist and 
Nepali government competition in Bara (1996-2006) as well as the inability to 
                                                     
674 The period of Taliban control of Kalakan is excluded here because whilst it was 
stable, it also led to the removal of 95% of the population. 
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implement the CPA effectively (2006-2011); the ISAF intervention in Nahr-i Sarraj 
connected to Village A (2006-12) as well as earlier examples from Kalakan of the 
infighting amongst the Jihadist parties in the 1980s and 1990s. The conclusion from 
political interventions and attempts at stabilisation would indicate that a co-requisite 
in applying the rules of the game is the monopoly of the use of force, which is a 
fundamental building bloc of state formation, but insufficient on its own to attain long 
term legitimacy and stability (see below). 
Security interventions to support stabilisation 
Looking across the field sites in terms of security interventions there are two salient 
points about the way in which security interventions supported stability: the first is 
that it was possible to simply enforce stability through security; and the second was 
that the application of force required significant political will. The most extreme 
example is the scorched earth tactic of the Taliban in Kalakan in the 1990s, which 
enforced a dead stability because the vast majority of the population left; however, in 
the field sites this was not a frequent occurrence; instead there has more often been a 
contest of wills to enforce security control. 
At one end of the spectrum of political will lies the case of Gajul in Rolpa where the 
Maoists had a greater political will to enforce security in order to exercise their form 
of governance, though this was not as secure as some other areas of Rolpa due to the 
proximity of a large Nepal Army base. The de facto security control of the Maoists 
ensured that they imposed stability, and this was manifested in a full range of 
political, economic, developmental and social changes, which the Maoists attempted 
to impart in Gajul during the conflict. For their part the Nepal security forces did not 
have the capability to withstand the complex Maoist approach, but more importantly 
they did not have the political backing to use force or other governance and 
development actions to take the Maoists on in a sustained engagement. 
This feature of the relationship between force and will is even more apparent in Bara, 
where the minimal size of the Maoist forces and the lack of support they had amongst 
large segments of the population should have made it relatively easy for the Nepali 
state to resist robustly; instead the state continued to lack the political will to sustain 
security forces and defeat the Maoists in a meaningful manner at the same time as 
the Maoists lacked both the security capability and political will to impose themselves 
on Bara. It was left to the community to fend for itself with only limited success 
through the self-defence group. 
At the other end of the spectrum, the weakness of security stabilisation without 
political will is again clearly visible in the case of Village A in Nahr-i Sarraj, where an 
external force provided some of the most sophisticated military capabilities on the 
planet, but was still unable to provide stability. This is primarily because ISAF acted in 
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the security sphere far beyond the interests and will of the Afghan state, and applied 
itself across security (as the primary activity), political and development lines in Village 
A, an approach mirrored by the Maoists in Gajul, which should have made it 
successful; however, where the Maoists and ISAF differed is that the actions of the 
PLA and the People’s Government were synchronised and those of ISAF and the 
Afghan government were not. With hindsight it is possible that had the Afghan 
government wanted to engage Village A in a political settlement the actions of ISAF 
may have paid off, but they didn’t have the political backing of the Afghan 
government and expended blood and treasure in a fruitless search for stability in the 
Upper Gereshk Valley. These three examples highlight the absolute limits of security in 
providing stability without the political will to sustain engagement.  
However this is an unsatisfactory conclusion and it is only when considering Kalakan 
since 2001 that a third component of security stabilisation becomes apparent. As 
discussed in Chapter 4 it is the combination of local and national political interests and 
the restitution of the communities through humanitarian aid that can ensure stability. 
The security component of stabilisation was then purely the technical and national 
processes of DDR and the formation of the ANP which now provides security in the 
district. As noted the deployment was small and poorly equipped and, as Afghan 
security forces have found elsewhere in the country, would be likely to struggle if a 
serious threat became apparent. So, whilst security may be necessary to attain 
stability it is clear that it is insufficient to maintain it unless the Maoist model of 
enforced stability is followed. In fact it seems that security should take an increasingly 
small role in stability as other spheres, notably political accommodation, governance 
and development (in that order) increase and become the dominant re-producers of 
stability. 
Development interventions to support stabilisation 
If the political and security modes of intervention present relatively clear impacts from 
interventions on stability, the development mode presents a much more opaque and 
mixed picture. The opacity lies in the varying motivations and methods of delivering 
‘development’ and indeed what constitutes a development intervention itself. The 
research has considered all non-governance, non-security funded activities 
undertaken in the field sites but must make clear the difference between the range of 
actions in order to facilitate comparison; this is broken down into humanitarian, social 
development, economic development, and ‘hot stabilisation’ interventions that were 
outlined in Chapter 2. The development sphere has the most misunderstood and 
misconstrued notions of what promotes stability. 
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Humanitarian675 activities have been attempted or undertaken in Kalakan, Nahr-i 
Sarraj and Rolpa in the course of their conflicts. Those in Kalakan were the most 
extensive and were implemented by CARE International, Malteser and ACTED after 
2001 and ending in the mid-2000s. In Nahr-i Sarraj the experience was during the mid 
to late 1990s when aid agencies in Pakistan facilitated the return of refugees to 
Afghanistan. Both of these examples were related to refugee returns and the 
provision of a bare minimum of assistance, which often involved a small cash payment 
and some basic forms of shelter and food and were considered to be significant in the 
stabilisation of their communities. Rolpa’s experience is slightly different in that it was 
the only location where a humanitarian actor, the Federation of the Red Cross 
Society,676 was deliberately stopped from operating in Gajul during the conflict, 
although there was support to IDP returnees by the Local Peace Committees after the 
conflict.677  
These case studies suggest two conclusions: firstly, that humanitarian action can have 
a significant impact on stability, in particular when focusing on returning communities 
to the ante-conflict condition, i.e. that the population returns to their land and 
property and are given just enough to help them re-establish their livelihoods; 
secondly, all three occurred during periods of emerging political interventions – in 
Kalakan after 2001, in Nahr-i Sarraj in the 1990s and in Gajul after 2006 – signalling 
that stabilisation can be achieved at multiple simultaneous levels and is not 
operationally linear. These were not necessarily the end-points of the conflict (which 
as noted above may, in fact, not be ending at all but evolving), but they were windows 
of opportunity where there was enough stability for returns to be facilitated. 
                                                     
675 The critical component of humanitarian principles is “the right to receive 
humanitarian assistance, and to offer it, is a fundamental humanitarian principle 
which should be enjoyed by all citizens of all countries …the prime motivation of our 
response to disaster is to alleviate human suffering amongst those least able to 
withstand the stress caused by disaster. When we give humanitarian aid it is not a 
partisan or political act and should not be viewed as such” (IFRC & ICRC, 1994). 
Amongst the organisations active in the field sites CARE International, Malteser and 
the IFRC all supported this code of conduct (CARE International, Undated; Malteser 
International, Undated). ACTED and the UN agencies support a related code overseen 
by OCHA (OCHA, 2010, p. 1; ACTED, 2010). 
676 The author recognises that the Federation of the Red Cross/Crescent Societies are 
a “humanitarian and development network,” however the activities attempted in 
Gajul were humanitarian (regarding the protection of civilians, conflict monitoring and 
attempted supply of humanitarian supplies – i.e. basic food packages), which is 
distinct from the development activities implemented by the same organisation in 
Haraiya, including the provision of potable drinking water for disadvantaged groups. 
For more information see IFRC, Undated. 
677 LL-3-2 12th October 2011, Liwang. 
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In the same spaces, though not necessarily at the same time, ‘social development’ and 
‘economic development’678 actors were operating in all four of the case studies. 679 
There have been government development programmes, the National Solidarity 
Programme (NSP) in Afghanistan, and long-term spending through VDCs in Nepal 
which have built development infrastructure and, with the exception of Village A, all 
the sites have had access to health and education services. In addition non-
governmental agencies have also implemented programmes, including CARE, JCCP, 
CPAU and the WFP in Kalakan, UNICEF and the ADB in Gajul and Plan International 
with the Federation of the Red Cross in Haraiya. These are not insubstantial 
interventions both by the state, multi-lateral agencies, and non-government 
organisations, and the range of programmes has been broad covering rural 
livelihoods, water and sanitation, irrigation, education, health, conflict resolution, 
infrastructure (bridges and roads) as well as cash and food for work.  
When considering the impact of all this activity on stability, it is important to critically 
evaluate the impact of projects on the stability of an area and be open about the way 
in which development changes communities. This is particularly important when 
considering the long-term changes that development can bring, and in the case of 
Gajul and Village A, development seems to have been a key foundation upon which 
the political-military struggle for Rolpa and Nahr-i Sarraj was executed. The fact that 
Gajul was amongst the first VDCs in Rolpa to develop school services has allowed it to 
attain a dominant position in political life in the district.680 So whilst education may be 
a social good, it also allowed opportunities that have challenged the status quo, and 
challenged stability, because it was the long-term processes of education that 
fostered political leaders who aspired to change and to re-mould society. That 
aspiration then became violent when the political system in Nepal would not accept 
the changes the Maoists desired. In Helmand the long-term impact of the HAVA 
irrigation and resettlement programme was to provide the opportunity for 
commanders to expand indigenous production of opium in order to prosecute their 
conflict, which has irrevocably altered political and economic environment. 
Whilst on the one hand certain sectors of development may be destabilising in the 
long-term, on the other hand some local respondents were dismissive of most 
development programming in terms of its impact on stability. Not only were most 
respondents sceptical of development interventions aimed at affecting stability they 
were also critical of their impact on development, not least because there were 
                                                     
678 See USIP, 2009, p. 2.9 quoted on p.55. 
679 Note social and economic development are considered separate subsectors 
because of their differing impacts, though they are discussed together because many 
of the implementing agencies were active in both spheres. 
680 Which may only be challenged by Thawang the epicentre of the Maoist movement. 
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examples of broken development infrastructure in both Aqa Sarai (Kalakan) and 
Haraiya (Bara). Whilst development activity was generally appreciated by the local 
respondents it was seen as ‘something for nothing’, to paraphrase one of the 
respondents from Haraiya; if foreigners want to come and build things for free, then 
why not?681 More importantly the development interventions, with the exception of 
road building, were also insignificant in comparison to the privately generated 
investment in light industry (brick kilns in both Kalakan and Haraiya) which provided 
employment, liquidity and long-term opportunities. Similarly the economic growth 
witnessed in Gajul was linked only to the road construction and not to the other 
development projects that were implemented in the village. Finally, economic 
livelihoods in Village A and Haraiya do not rely on state or development agency input, 
but rather on the burgeoning illicit economic activity centred on opium and timber 
respectively.682 
These examples allow for several observations: firstly, social development was an 
agent of change and therefore a priori a destabilising factor – projects may provide 
social goods, but ultimately they change social relations and capital, which will 
inevitably create instability. Secondly, ascribing impacts on stability through 
development projects seems to overstate the effects of development programming. 
For the most part they were one-off interventions, too broad and too diffuse to have 
an aggregate positive impact on stability if the notions of stability identified in the 
data are correct. In this regard the data is supported by Zoe Marriage who identified 
that development actors are adept at reinforcing their own narratives of the impact of 
their activities (see Marriage, 2006). The only exception to these observations would 
be the construction of roads, not as an end in themselves but because of the 
possibilities they create for economic development; however, this is nonetheless likely 
to be destabilising for some. 
Thirdly, the nature of development delivery, often by non-state or international 
military actors disconnects the intervention from one of the aims of stabilisation 
activities which is to support the legitimacy of the state, thereby precluding their 
impact on long-term stability. Finally, development is dwarfed in importance by long-
term transformative changes that were brought about through investment, capital 
formation, employment and illicit extractive industries which can, if sustained, provide 
long-term livelihood stability to the field sites. 
                                                     
681 EA-4-6 25th August 2011, Haraiya and EA-4-7 25th August 2011, Haraiya. 
682 There was sufficient work near Village A for one opium producer to attract 100 
labourers from Khogiayani in Nangarhar province, Eastern Afghanistan EA-2-1 3rd 
December 2010, Kabul and IN-2-4 20th July 2011, Copenhagen. 
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The final area of development has been called ‘hot stabilisation’ a term adopted from 
the Stabilisation Unit in the UK, applied here both to attempts by ISAF to use 
development to promote stability in Village A and the Maoists’ pursuit of 
development in Gajul, and Bara to a lesser extent, during the insurgencies. In this sub-
component of development the picture of utilising development type activities for the 
pursuit of stability seems particularly tenuous. In Village A, development activities 
were carried out (alongside governance and security interventions) far beyond the 
writ or will of the Afghan state by international actors. Aside from the restitution of 
damaged infrastructure,683 which would come closer to the humanitarian concept of 
returning a community to a ante-conflict state, the development actions were not just 
irrelevant to the community and stability but probably caused the deaths of local 
nationals seen to be cooperating with international forces who were acting far outside 
the ability of the Afghan government to provide the governance structure and the 
monopoly of violence necessary to sustain development. 
Limitations on the impact of development were not limited to exogenous or state 
actors. In Gajul the Maoists failed to utilise development to bolster stability and 
indeed may have sparked a backlash against their own imposition of ‘voluntary labour’ 
upon the local population. The focus on roads as a means to development may be 
valid, but this was only achieved through the use of forced labour in a manner 
reminiscent of the abusive practices of former Nepali governance systems. The 
Maoists then re-enforced resentment against their cause. This did not matter whilst 
they maintained a degree of violent control (enforced stability) over the population 
but meant their long-term support in Gajul was damaged. There has also been some 
hope that contracted out development services can support stability (see footnote 
300 on p.156) but the example of Bara indicates that a political development activities 
which retained a separation between the implementing agencies and the belligerents 
in the conflict do not promote stability or reduce conflict. 
The overriding conclusion from the different forms of ‘development’ employed across 
the field sites in the last generation is that it provides limited explanatory value as to 
why the field sites were stable or unstable at various points. A political social and 
economic development as practiced in Bara was continued throughout the conflict 
but failed to have any connection to or restraint on it; more overtly political 
development interventions in both Nahr-i Sarraj and Rolpa (ISAF and the Maoists) and 
‘hot stabilisation’, failed not only to achieve the development outcomes, but failed to 
deliver stability and may have backfired on both implementers. Instead, where 
                                                     
683 Which for the military implementers would be considered a ‘hearts and minds’ or 
Quick Impact Project (QIP) activity rather than a stabilisation activity. 
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development does seem to have had an impact it is through humanitarian aid which 
has returned the communities to an ante-conflict condition. 
In summary the independent variables which includes the local political economy, the 
insurgencies and the stabilisation interventions suggest a number of significant issues 
for exogenous action. Firstly, that the nature of the context clearly structures and 
limits what is feasible and what actions can have an impact, meaning that stabilisation 
approaches cannot be applied in a rigid manner. Secondly, that the political nature of 
insurgencies (the particular threat to stability discussed in this thesis) must invoke a 
political response from the host nation. Furthermore, across the lines of operation, it 
is clear that there are definite hierarchies of importance. Security comes first, and 
facilitates political intervention which in turn legitimises security and returns the 
discussion to the concept that stability in the past was about the enforcement of the 
rules of the game.  
However, stability can be both positive and negative, and security should play a 
decreasingly significant role if sustained stabilisation is to be achieved. Development, 
in its various guises, provides little support to stability, except where it returns a 
community to a condition that existed ante-conflict. Development itself is a change 
process and should more accurately be considered a source of destabilisation rather 
than one of stabilisation. However important each component is in relative terms they 
are only successfully carried out through the application of political will, which 
dictates the sustainability and effectiveness of interventions regardless of the actual 
capability of the institutions involved, and it is this central insight which is discussed in 
more detail in the following section. 
Political legitimacy  
The formation and maintenance of political legitimacy is critical to the experience of 
stability at a local level, which this section will discuss in three ways: firstly, the way in 
which political legitimacy is affected by national politics and allows stability to be 
fostered or not; secondly, the influence of neighbouring states; and thirdly, the 
connections between local areas and national power. All of these affect and shape the 
will to act identified in the previous section as the critical component which allows any 
intervention to be carried out effectively. 
The national systems of the case studies have changed significantly in recent history. 
Afghanistan and Nepal began the 20th Century as absolute monarchies governed 
through locally appointed autocratic rulers, Khans in Afghanistan and the Mukhiya, 
Jimwal and Zamindars in Nepal. Both states attempted various approaches to reform 
and suffered various forms of intervention by other states during the 20th Century. In 
brief, Afghanistan’s reforms started in the 1920s under Amanullah Khan, and 
continued throughout the 20th Century as first the monarchy, then a republic and 
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then an Islamic government attempted to govern the country. Since 2001 the country 
has been an Islamic Republic. Nepal’s reforms began in earnest during the 1950s 
under Tribhuvan Shah, and continued to shift between the control of the monarchy 
and hybrid constitutional-monarchy systems in the 1950s and 1990s before becoming 
a republic in 2008. In both cases the processes of changing systems has been highly 
disruptive and destabilising, largely because these moments of change represent 
periods when the rules of the game can be altered. These moments cannot ensure 
that all local pressures are absorbed into the new system, as the examples from the 
field sites below indicate, but they do allow for the system to be re-organised and for 
new modes of national and local control and stability to emerge. 
The conflicts in both Afghanistan and Nepal presented the political elites with 
significant challenges which they were often unwilling to address. In the context of 
Gajul, during the Maoist insurgency local leaders were unable to convince the Prime 
Minister, G.P. Koirala, to address some of the key grievances highlighted by the 
Maoists.684 In Bara, despite evident support for the state in Haraiya, the community 
could not influence the Nepal Police to stay in their post once central decisions had 
been taken to re-trench forces to the district headquarters in Kalaiya, precipitating the 
local community to organise its self-defence group.685 Nahr-i Sarraj only achieved 
stability in the 1990s after its leaders subordinated their position within the Taliban 
hierarchy,686 which eventually led to a number of Helmandis rising through the ranks 
of the Taliban leadership, but not in sufficiently significant numbers to stop local 
uprisings after the recruitment of young Helmandis to fight the Taliban’s war in the 
north (Martin, 2011, pp. 44-5). In these examples national political hierarchies shaped 
local decision making, and in the case of Nepal a lack of state support led local leaders 
to remove their support for the state. 
These changes were not only defined by indigenous processes of change or reform 
but were at times inspired or directed by external actors, who also affected local 
stability and the rules of the game. The border closures enforced by Pakistan on 
Afghanistan in 1961-1963, and India on Nepal in 1989 are clear examples; both events 
led to a change in government in the smaller neighbour.687 Within the field sites this is 
                                                     
684 LL-3-7 15th October 2011, Gajul.  
685 LL-4-1 24th August 2011, Haraiya and EA-4-9 25th August 2011, Haraiya. 
686 LL-2-1 17th November 2010, Kabul. 
687 The closure of the Afghan border by Pakistan from 1961-1963 on imports and 
exports affected Afghan foreign earnings, jeopardised US development programmes, 
threatened state revenues and pushed Afghanistan towards a closer relationship with 
the USSR (Omrani, 2009, pp. 189-90; US DoS, Undated; Misdaq, 2006, pp. 298-9). The 
Indian closure of the Nepali border precipitated the collapse of the Panchayat regime 
and the incomplete democratic revolution of 1990 (Whelpton, 2005, pp. 113, 153). 
The search for stability through stabilisation: Case studies from Afghanistan and Nepal 
254 
visible through the way external military support from Pakistan was a critical factor in 
the prosecution of the Jihad in the 1980s688 as well as the Taliban’s success, including 
their battles in Nahr-i Sarraj and fighting in the Shomali plain, against what became 
the Northern Alliance (Martin, 2011, p. 44).689  
Elements within India are alleged to have supported or turned a blind eye to the 
Maoist cause in Nepal.690 The relevance of India is also critical to the provision of 
security, evident in the current period when significant efforts by the Indian 
government to increase their own control of the border in conjunction with the 
Special Security Plan in Nepal and political engagement at the top of government, has 
undermined one of the greatest risks to stability in Bara – the proliferation of armed 
groups.691 However the effects of exogenous activities were not only evident in the 
security arena. In both Afghanistan and Nepal there have been governance related 
changes to improve development delivery at a local level which in some regards have 
backfired.  
In both Gajul and Bara the creation of the all-party mechanism for approving 
development spending has contributed to a massive increase in corruption and a 
concomitant increase in anger and frustration with the state amongst local 
respondents (see citations above). In Nepal, governance was further undermined by 
the influence of India on Constituent Assembly members through the use of extensive 
direct development spending.692 In Afghanistan the levels of international spending 
have replicated the dynamic of a rentier state at both macro and micro levels, 
whereby the international community has become a substantial patron.693 This 
                                                     
688 One of the respondents noted that not all Afghan commanders viewed Pakistani 
support as beneficial, with one from Kalakan allegedly claiming in the 1980s that 
taking support from Pakistan would ruin the country. LL-1-8 19th October 2010, Kabul. 
Mullah Nasim, the uncle of former provincial Governor She Mohammad Akhunzada, 
deliberately utilised opium earnings to avoid reliance on external funding (Martin, 
2011, pp. 34-5; Peters, 2009, p. 7).  
689 Not forgetting that the other regional power, India, was supplying arms to the 
leading figures in the Northern Alliance to resist the Taliban (Ganguly & Howenstein, 
2009, p. 127). 
690 IN-5-2 11th August 2011, Kathmandu and IN-5-8 23rd October 2011, Kathmandu. 
691 NL-4-3 16th August 2011, Kathmandu highlighted the capability of the Indian 
security forces during the insurgency against the backdrop of low levels of Nepalese 
government intervention and IN-4-7 21st October 2011, Kathmandu. 
692 LL-4-9 28th August 2011, Kalaiya. 
693 This phenomenon is not new to Afghanistan, where foreign aid created a rentier 
state as far back as the 19th century, with British payments to Afghan kings, US and 
Soviet aid projects in the 1960s and 70s, Soviet support for the PDPA and most 
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delegitimises state institutions but is further complicated by the strength of influence 
that other stateshave at a local level, where they have attempted to stabilise the field 
sites. For example the CIMIC activities carried out by Multi-National Brigade Kabul in 
Kalakan, or the ‘hot stabilisation’ activities by the MSST and civil affairs deployments 
in Village A, and GTZs developmental projects in Gajul.694 
Another important dynamic is that between local and national leaders and how 
precarious local stability is with regard to changes in national stability. While on the 
one hand the local areas are part of the political milieu, through which their 
community and the broader country are governed, their position is at the bottom of 
the hierarchy, meaning they often have little or no control over how higher levels of 
political authority are structured. Unless they themselves are able to secure 
representation in a national body they do not know how to act. To illustrate this it is 
worth reflecting on the backgrounds of the ‘national leader’ respondents and their 
roles in stability. The field sites with strong national representation include Kalakan, 
which is represented by Daoud Kalakani MP, one of four MPs representing seven small 
districts north of Kabul; and Gajul, which has three representatives in the Constituent 
Assembly.695 In both sites their heritage in national leadership is significant: Kalakan 
produced the only non-Pashtun King of Afghanistan (Habibullah Khan), and the leader 
of an anti-monarchy and later anti-Soviet group, Sazman Azad-i Bakhsh-i Mardom-i 
Afghanistan (SAMA) which was subsequently wiped out during the conflict. Gajul was 
the site of an ancient kingdom and in the 20th Century a native of Gajul was elected to 
Nepal’s first parliament in the 1950s. A local Panchayat leader became a Minister in 
the 1980s.  
In contrast Bara and Village A have no such pretentions to illustrious leadership. 
Though both have produced leaders in the conflict most of them have been killed and 
they were only locally significant. Instead the national leaders who have responsibility 
for those areas come from other areas of the district, which have at times been in 
competition with the field sites: for example Mualem Mir Wali MP, a Barakzai leader 
whose engagement in the Upper Gereshk Valley has been chequered over the last 
twenty years, and CA member for Bara, Shiva Chandra Prasad Kushwaha,696 whose 
connections to Haraiya are coloured by his business interests. However having 
                                                                                                                                                          
recently Western support for the Karzai administration (Rubin, 2002, pp. 47, 62-73; 
Suhrke, 2006, pp. 6-9). 
694 Note these examples specifically exclude exogenous funding for NGOs, which have 
attempted to maintain neutrality. 
695 Jhakku Subedi was elected through standing against former Prime Minister M.K. 
Nepal in a Kathmandu constituency; J.B. Mahara and Khoma Subedi were elected 
through the Proportional Representation allocation for Rolpa district. 
696 Elected through the First Past the Post (FPTP) allocation for Bara district. 
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national level representation does not make an area more or less stable, in fact it may 
predispose an area to instability.697 What it does allow for is the forging of political will 
and the redirection of resources to that area, which has been critical to the 
stabilisation of Kalakan and Gajul since 2001 and 2006 respectively, but they 
succeeded in those examples primarily because it was combined with local political 
support.  
As noted above in the modes of intervention, resources and capability do not facilitate 
stability alone; they are only a function of the degree of political will and capital that is 
expended to achieve stability. Having national level representation allows the 
confluence of political will and allocation of resources to achieve stability; again, this is 
insufficient on its own: political leaders are not necessarily re-distributive, as noted in 
the prelude for Bara which describes national political leaders as leeches. They are 
also not necessarily going to engage all segments of the population and may attempt 
to achieve stability simply through force as in Nahr-i Sarraj. While there will be 
resources that national leaders can direct to their home constituencies the national 
leaders are themselves not free agents and are constrained in their actions by other 
leaders. What’s more the resources they can appropriate are not limitless as 
evidenced by the vagaries of the all-party mechanism in Nepal.  
In summary local political legitimacy is insufficient without the ability to draw down 
on national political will and resources; together they can provide resources to 
stabilise an area, but the absence of local or national political legitimacy will mean no 
resources can flow to the area and it will either be a dead stability imposed by force 
(as in Bara before the 1990s) or highly unstable as in Nahr-i Sarraj since 2001. Having 
identified the political leadership as being the critical conduit for stability activities it is 
necessary to compare between the interveners and the local respondents to answer 
the question, ‘what is stability’ and ‘what interventions support stability’? 
Conceptions of stability  
This section focuses on the dependent variable of stability and provides the final 
analytical theme for the stability paradigm by comparing the interveners’ conceptions 
of what forms and maintains stability (i.e. what activities are stabilising) against the 
lived experience of the local respondents. It concludes that the different lenses of 
stabilisation which were identified in Chapter 2 as contributing to a confused 
discourse regarding stability are in fact present in the countries where activities are 
undertaken to stabilise the environment. Interveners’ conceptions are driven by their 
professional background and interest rather than through an interrogation of what is 
                                                     
697 The MP from Gajul in the 1950s encouraged the proliferation of schools, which 
have contributed to Gajul being part of the vanguard of political conflict in Rolpa and 
hence its destabilisation as argued in the previous section. 
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or what is not stabilising. At the same time, local respondents give confused and 
mixed messages about interventions and stability, in part because of expectations that 
they may materially benefit from interventions; however, behind their interests lies an 
understanding of stability that binds together the analysis in the preceding four 
sections. 
Interveners and stability 
The national and international interveners who participated in the research ranged 
from Generals to low level police officers and some were local nationals who were 
officials in state institutions.698 A range of foreigners were also involved in official, 
advisory and programmatic roles across military, governmental and non-
governmental organisations.699 Interveners had a tendency to argue that their activity 
had an impact on stability irrespective of whether they had any evidence. So for 
example, interveners would claim that projects supported stability irrespective of the 
sector they were working on or at what level they were working.700 The important 
point from the respondents who followed this line of argument is that they included 
two NGO representatives from both local and national organisations, one official from 
a UN agency, three respondents from bi-lateral donors and two from a private 
development agency. They worked in the field and in the capitals in a civilian 
environment. Also, not all of them were foreigners; two local nationals shared this 
view.  
It is striking that the conflation of action and stability appeared in such varied contexts 
and conflicts. There were dissenting voices amongst the NGO community but these 
generally came from the humanitarian side of the development spectrum or from 
elements within the UN system who challenged the concepts of stability and 
stabilisation entirely.701 This nuance is important and ironic because it is the 
humanitarian component of ‘development’ interventions that had the most significant 
impact on stability in the field sites. 
                                                     
698 As noted in Chapter 7, some respondents in Nepal saw the state as being a colonial 
enterprise and are considered as interveners. 
699 It is important to make clear this does not include the national leaders, who were 
all political figures, and whose views on stability and stabilisation were quite distinct 
from the range of views amongst the interveners. 
700 IN-2-1 5th December 2010, Kandahar, IN-0-5 28th November 2010, Kabul, IN-3-5 
10th November 2011, Kathmandu and EA-4-1 23rd August 2011, Haraiya; IN-0-1 7th 
October 2010, IN-5-6 27th September 2011, Kathmandu. (Zoe Marriage noted a 
similar issue within the aid community, Marriage, 2006) 
701 IN-0-8 2nd December 2010, Kabul, IN-2-10 4th December 2010, Kabul, IN-5-3 12th 
August 2011, Kathmandu and IN-2-2 7th December 2010, Kabul. 
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Other subgroups of interveners also identified their actions with stability over and 
above those of other sectors or lines of operation, so those working on governance 
fore-grounded the importance of their work; or civilians working on ‘hot stabilisation’ 
in a military environment asserted the role their activities played in stabilisation.702 
However, these assertions were less clear amongst military respondents. Whilst one 
senior officer in Afghanistan and one in Nepal saw the security line as being pre-
eminent,703 others were hesitant to ascribe sole responsibility to military action and 
instead they broadened responsibility for stability to a very wide range of actors and 
sectors.704 These respondents, ranking from Captains to Generals who served in both 
Nepal and Afghanistan, linked stability to governance, poverty, rule of law, the 
attitudes of neighbouring states – many of the issues outlined above. As one 
respondent in Afghanistan put it in Afghanistan, “the sort of general vague, slightly 
woolly notions of stabilisation and the sort of components of stabilisation I think are 
not new.”705 It is then legitimate to ask, as mentioned in the literature review, 
whether stabilisation is just a re-labelling of existing modes of intervention? (Barakat, 
Deely, & Zyck, 2010, pp. S298-9).  
However this seems unlikely given what the military respondents did not admit. They 
all refused to acknowledge the role of political primacy in the establishment of 
stability because they thought stability was a technical process. For the interveners, 
both military and civilian, and whether focused on security, technical governance or 
development approaches, stability is the result of a technical process to achieve a 
particular environment. In part this may be derived from the misconception that long 
lasting stability can be imposed in the current era, something that ISAF, the Taliban 
and the Maoists all failed to achieve as they struggled to stabilise territory under their 
influence. This conclusion suggests there is a deep division between the way in which 
interveners conceive of their ability to promote stability and the experiences of 
stabilisation in the four field sites, and the way local respondents in those sites 
conceived of stability themselves. 
Local national respondents and stability  
This subsection describes how local respondents viewed stability in each of the field 
sites and argues that stability formation and maintenance is structured according to a 
threefold process which includes the provision of physical security (either through 
                                                     
702 IN-0-4 28th November 2010, Kabul, IN-2-9 3rd December 2010, Washington and 
IN-2-4 20th July 2011, Copenhagen. 
703 IN-0-1 7th October 2010, Kabul and IN-5-0 8th August 2011, Kathmandu. 
704 IN-0-7 29th November 2010, Kabul, IN-0-1 7th October 2010, Kabul, IN-4-4 28th 
August 2011, Kalaiya, IN-3-2 18th October 2011, Liwang, IN-5-8 23rd October 2011, 
Kathmandu. 
705 IN-0-7 29th November 2010, Kabul. 
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humanitarian or military action) and some form of change in the political dynamics; 
these must be supported by long-term economic improvement. 
For the inhabitants of Village A and Nahr-i Sarraj more broadly there was an 
immediate need to stop the violence and reinforce the connection between security 
and stability. In effect this was a definition of stability as freedom from violence. The 
respondents were clear this would involve substantial changes to the nature of the 
conflict, including the removal of ISAF forces.706 In common across the conceptions of 
what would bring stability were the ideas that the population must be able to engage 
the government on an equal footing and that there must be a political resolution; as 
one respondent described it, “stability can be brought when the people can agree and 
be happy with the government and those who oppose the government should 
negotiate with them, find the reason and solve the problem and increase the 
reconciliation process to reduce fighting.”707  
It is striking to compare this local perception to those of the interveners connected 
with the Nahr-i Sarraj, where stabilisation priorities lay in promoting “security and 
justice” by supporting the Afghan Local Police,708 or supporting governance or 
development projects.709 There were dissenting voices amongst the interveners who 
could see that any stabilisation approach that did not address the political context in 
which the conflict was prosecuted would fail. However an abundance of effort leading 
to tactical success could be achieved but this would not lead to strategic victory.710 
Stability was a three stage phenomenon and in the long-term the respondents were 
looking to economic growth and opportunity to sustain stability, not development 
projects. 
 In Rolpa a similar discussion can be seen: first, the association of violence and 
instability was powerful and personal safety and security were deemed requirements 
for stability.711 The interveners saw their actions as stabilising, and whilst they did not 
necessarily ascribe all stability to their activities they were confident beneficiaries 
were telling them that their projects were having an impact. However, there were few 
who linked instability to poverty,712 and, for the most part, respondents who had been 
                                                     
706 EA-2-4 5th December 2010, Nad-i Ali: or the pagans as some referred to foreign 
forces, LL-2-5 13th December 2010, Nahr-i Sarraj 
707 EA-2-5 6th December 2010, Gereshk. 
708 IN-2-3 9th December 2010, Kabul. 
709 IN-2-1 5th December 2010, Kandahar and IN-2-9 3rd December 2010, Washington. 
710 IN-2-2 7th December 2010, Kabul and IN-2-9 3rd December 2010, Washington. 
711 EA-3-6 12th October 2011, Liwang, EA-3-8 14th October 2011, Gajul, LL-3-4 14th 
October 2011, Gajul, EA-3-14 16th October 2011, Gajul, NL-3-1 16th July and 19th 
September 2011, Kathmandu. 
712 EA-3-10 15th October 2011, Gajul, LL-3-8 17th October 2011, Liwang. 
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beneficiaries of those same projects in the post-2006 environment did not connect 
the development projects to stability; instead, they reached directly for the second 
element, namely politics as being the source of stability,713 the actions of the 
communities themselves714 and the necessity for all groups to work in a system.715 If 
development was considered a source of stability in the eyes of some, there was 
agreement that development could only progress with political consensus reinforcing 
the idea that it is politics which drives stability.716 Furthermore, local conceptions of 
development and economic growth were conflated. Behind the use of the word 
development was the requirement for economic growth, the third step to stability.717 
In fact whilst the current stability of Gajul was disputed for those that did feel there 
was stability currently it was because of political consensus, both national and local.718 
For respondents in Kalakan, there were even stronger associations between stability 
and violence, and political decision making representing parts one and two of 
stabilisation. Clearly the destabilising effects of the conflict, the internecine killings 
during the 1980s and early 1990s, and the subsequent removal of the population by 
the Taliban thereafter, left a powerful mark on the respondents. Stability “belongs to 
the people,”719 for respondents in Kalakan the strength of feeling on this component 
was stronger than in other areas because of the communities’ decision to address 
long-standing grievances associated with the killings during the conflict.720 But despite 
these brutalising experiences the respondents again came back to the concept that 
stability is formed by central level political decision making721 in conjunction with local 
leadership. 722 Despite long-standing and largely positive experiences of development 
projects the respondents did not link them to stability;723 however they did identify 
future threats to stability in the third stage of stabilisation, where the potential for 
economic collapse and unemployment connected with the imminent departure of 
                                                     
713 EA-3-5 12th October 2011, Liwang, EA-3-6 12th October 2011, Liwang, LL-3-2 12th 
October 2011, Liwang. 
714 EA-3-3 11th October 2011, Gorahi, LL-3-8 17th October 2011, Liwang. 
715 NL-3-1 16th July and 19th September 2011, Kathmandu, LL-3-9 18th October 2011, 
Liwang. 
716 EA-3-12 15th October 2011, Gajul and LL-3-6 15th October 2011, Gajul. 
717 LL-3-8 17th October 2011, Liwang. 
718 LL-3-7 15th October 2011, Gajul, EA-3-13 16th October 2011, Gajul. 
719 IN-1-11 25th October 2010, Kalakan. 
720 LL-1-14 13th November 2010, Mushwani. 
721 LL-1-2 10th October 2010, Aqa Sarai,  LL-1-3 14th October 2010, Aqa Sarai. 
722 IN-1-11 25th October 2010, Kalakan. 
723 IN-1-4 17th October 2010, Aqa Sarai. 
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ISAF again re-connected the maintenance of stability to economic growth724 as well as 
political instability.725 
In Bara the same story was repeated: the link between insecurity and stability is 
identified,726 in particular for those who participated and benefited from the self-
defence group that provided short-term security.727 There were those amongst the 
interveners who again promoted development as being a component of stability728 
and a few residents thought the projects were helpful but could not provide concrete 
ways in which they affected stability. Instead they linked stability to economic 
growth.729 But the long-term restoration of stability lay not in the enforcement of 
security by the Maoists, the government or the self-defence group, but in political 
progress and the signing of the CPA.730 These gains were in jeopardy because although 
the immediate threats to stability, the armed groups, were being addressed by active 
government initiatives such as the Special Security Plan,731 even those charged with 
implementing the plan saw the real driver of stability being politics, both national and 
local.732 
The fundamental cause of instability across all the case studies is political groups, both 
local and national, which either promote consensus or violent resistance. Stability can 
be provided primarily as a function of simultaneous local and national political 
processes supported or undermined by actions in security, and can be restored or 
maintained (but not provided by) indigenous economic development activity. In this 
conception stabilisation intervention should first aim to support the political process 
over and above security assistance and development programming; in short it should 
support the expansion of both local and national political legitimacy formation.  
                                                     
724 NL-1-1 19th October 2010, Kabul and LL-1-10 20th and 21st October 2010, 
Mushwani. 
725 LL-1-6 18th October 2010, Kalakan and LL-1-8 19th October 2010, Kabul. 
726 NL-4-1 9th August 2011, Kathmandu, EA-4-1 23rd August 2011, Haraiya, EA-4-2 
23rd August 2011, Haraiya, EA-4-3 24th August 2011, Haraiya, EA-4-4 24th August 
2011, Haraiya, EA-4-6 25th August 2011, Haraiya, EA-4-7 25th August 2011, Haraiya. 
727 EA-4-9 25th August 2011, Haraiya, LL-4-1 24th August 2011, Haraiya. 
728 EA-4-1 23rd August 2011, Haraiya, EA-4-2 23rd August 2011, Haraiya, LL-4-4 24th 
August 2011, Haraiya. 
729 LL-4-4 24th August 2011, Haraiya, EA-4-7 25th August 2011, Haraiya. 
730 NL-4-1 9th August 2011, Kathmandu. 
731 NL-4-3 16th August 2011, Kathmandu; IN-4-7 21st October 2011, Kathmandu, EA-4-
12 28th August 2011, Kalaiya, IN-4-2 28th August 2011, Kalaiya, IN-4-4 28th August 
2011, Kalaiya. 
732 EA-4-4 24th August 2011, Haraiya, LL-4-1 24th August 2011, Haraiya, LL-4-2 24th 
August 2011, Haraiya, IN-4-1 26th August 2011, Haraiya, LL-4-7 26th August 2011, 
Haraiya, EA-4-11 28th August 2011, Kalaiya, IN-4-5 29th August 2011, Kalaiya. 
The search for stability through stabilisation: Case studies from Afghanistan and Nepal 
262 
The stability paradigm 
Thus far this chapter has presented a comparative analysis across the field sites 
looking at 1) periods of stability; 2) culture and context; 3) modes of intervention; 4) 
political legitimacy and; 5) conceptions of stability, which challenges the hypothesis 
presented at the beginning of this thesis which was: ‘that stability is driven by local 
political settlements and produced by local political legitimacy formation which can be 
supported by interventions.’ 
It would seem that only part of this hypothesis is correct: local political settlements 
and processes are vital but they are insufficient without a permissive higher level of 
national political context in which the local political actors can situate themselves. 
Importantly, democratic governance does not seem to matter more than non-
democratic systems of governance in supporting stability. Furthermore, the 
hypothesis is also only partially correct in regard to general interventions supporting 
stability; three specific forms of interventions would seem to support stability: the 
first is humanitarian activity which provides the opportunity for the population to 
return to their ante-conflict condition, the second is security support to enforce 
stability, and the third is long-term economic growth to sustain stability. Security 
interventions were only successful if the direction of the political settlement at a 
national level was positive (Nepal) and were unsuccessful if the political direction was 
negative (Afghanistan). Economic growth was necessary to maintain stability, which 
means that the broad conception of social and economic development should be 
discarded as a useful concept in stability; instead it should be replaced by tightly 
defined notions of humanitarian action and a secondary component of economic 
growth.  
This would then re-formulate the hypothesis as follows: 
Stability is driven by both local and national political settlements which are produced 
through processes of political legitimacy formation which can be democratic or 
otherwise; these processes can be supported by limited humanitarian and security 
interventions and maintained by economic growth. 
If this hypothesis is accurate then the new stability paradigm would present a 
challenge to current orthodoxies about the potential impact of interventions on 
stability and will be tested in the following chapter against the theories of 
statebuilding, COIN and development. 
Conclusion 
In conclusion this chapter has analysed the data from the field sites according to the 
five themes linked to the dependent and independent variables of the local political 
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economy, the insurgencies, stabilisation interventions, political legitimacy and 
conceptions of stability. 
The analysis has suggested that there have been significant periods of stability in the 
four field sites which present certain factors about the nature of stability, including 
the connection to security, the need to enforce the rules of the game and the fact that 
stability can be imposed, which affirmed a historical link between stability and the 
promotion of social order and that these components can be maintained locally 
through the use of force. The chapter also outlined issues with the political economy 
of the field sites, case studies and the nature of their insurgencies. The ideological 
battlegrounds underpinning the insurgencies are significant and are a reflection of the 
failed attempts at state formation. The attempts at state formation led to significant 
distortions in the states and the field sites, leading them to be dependent on the 
international system with a weak sense of sovereignty. The research asserts that these 
dynamics and concerns about stability are common to a number of states and 
territories, strengthening the extrapolation of the findings beyond the case study 
areas. 
The chapter then suggested that there was a strong relationship between security and 
stability, indicating that not all interventions are equal in their potential impact on 
stability. Security was found to be significant but insufficient because of the 
requirement for political leadership and will at the local and national levels to allocate 
resources and maintain social structures. Both governance and development 
interventions, when focused on technical processes seem to be weakly associated 
with stability across the field sites, except where governance allows new political 
settlements and where development is focused on humanitarian action which can 
return a population to an ante-conflict state. However, any local intervention is 
superseded by the requirement for national political stability or, at the very least, the 
existence of a positive process in political agreements between conflicting parties. The 
capability or level of resources available to impose stability are irrelevant if there is no 
political backing to transform physical safety into longer-term stability. A significant 
tension arises however from national leaders being unable or unwilling to allocate 
political will and resources to ensure stability in all areas, meaning exogenous support 
for stability is a function of host nation politics rather than capability. 
This led to the considerations of the conceptions of stability amongst the respondents, 
which reinforced the view developed through assessing processes of stability and 
stabilisation above; namely that whilst there is a strong security component to 
stability it is over-ridden by the necessity for political consensus at both the local and 
national level. There was also significant scepticism amongst respondents about the 
impact of development activities on stability except amongst the interveners 
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themselves. Collectively this analysis challenges the use of stabilisation as a policy tool 
and has led to a reformulation of the stability paradigm which will now be used to test 
the theories of intervention, statebuilding, COIN and development, which underpin 
Liberal interventions that purport to support stability. 
 
 
  
The search for stability through stabilisation: Case studies from Afghanistan and Nepal 
265 
Chapter 9 – On Stability 
Introduction 
This chapter will examine the revised hypothesis against the theories discussed in the 
literature review in Chapter 2. The revised stability hypothesis argues that ‘stability is 
driven by both local and national political settlements which are produced through 
processes of political legitimacy formation which can be democratic or otherwise; 
these processes can be supported by limited humanitarian and security interventions 
and maintained by economic growth.’ This conception of stability will be used to 
interrogate whether current theories on of statebuilding, COIN and development 
meet the requirements of creating stability through the lens of the hypothesis which 
was developed from the field research. The three theories represent the vanguard of 
the way in which policy and practice has outstripped academic discourse with regard 
to stabilisation methods and articulate the conceptions of interventionism which are 
rooted in Liberal philosophy discussed in Chapter 2. 
The chapter concludes that all three operational areas: statebuilding (political), COIN 
(security) and development can provide elements of stability in different ways. 
However, they are either insufficient in and of themselves, or carried out in such a 
way that they can contribute to instability rather than stability. The chapter also 
concludes that the overall paradigm of the state system, the Westphalian state and 
the current orthodoxy of Liberal interventionism is challenged by the stability 
paradigm. The tools that have been developed (statebuilding, COIN and development) 
to address instability constitute an insufficient corporate body of theory because they 
are mutually incompatible when implemented simultaneously. 
As a result, the chapter posits that other conceptions of fragility, risk and ‘stable-ness’ 
are required in order to conceive of interventions that can foster long-term stability in 
the interests of the population, the current and emerging political elites, and the 
international system. This ‘stability theory’ leads to a final discussion presenting a 
hierarchy of activities which can promote stability.  
Testing theories against the hypothesis 
In this section the revised hypothesis will be tested against modern statebuilding, 
COIN and development theories before being tested against the concepts contained 
within the Liberal peacebuilding agenda. This builds upon the literature review 
(Chapter 2) which highlighted the gaps inherent in these theories when applied to 
intra-state conflicts with significant intervention, including: a poor understanding of 
what local stability is and how it is formed, and the extent to which exogenous actions 
can support stability. Through this process the specific characteristics of stability and 
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subsequent relevance of stabilisation activities will emerge and this leads to a 
discussion about stability’s relevance to international order. 
Statebuilding 
As discussed in Chapter 2 there are many schools of thought on statebuilding, and 
indeed the nature of state formation; however, for the testing of this hypothesis it 
was necessary to interrogate one theory that has been applied in governance 
interventions in the case study contexts. The author recognises that the theories have 
not been evenly applied in part because of the time periods involved, instead the 
analysis is looking for explanatory relevance of the theories in contemporaneous 
conflicts. The statebuilding theory articulated through the RAND Corporation, as 
discussed in Chapter 2, was chosen because whilst it was published after the Nepal 
conflict ended and late in the prosecution of the current Afghan conflict, it drew on 
social and political theory from the previous decade and discusses both case studies as 
part of its argumentation. It states that nation-building (the US term for statebuilding) 
“involves the use of armed force as part of a broader effort to promote political and 
economic reforms with the objective of transforming a society emerging from conflict 
into one at peace with itself and its neighbors” (Dobbins et al, 2007, p. 1). The 
selection of a US-centric model of statebuilding was deliberate as it is the mode under 
which Liberal statebuilding is likely to be attempted by external interveners. 
To re-state the revised stability hypothesis from Chapter 8:  
‘Stability is driven by both local and national political settlements which are 
produced through processes of political legitimacy formation which can be 
democratic or otherwise; these processes can be supported by limited 
humanitarian and security interventions and maintained by economic growth.’ 
The following issues appear to be relevant to a discussion on statebuilding and 
stability: transformation and evolution, political and economic life, the regional 
environment and the use of force. 
The formation of states has rarely been achieved non-violently, because it is a process 
rooted in the necessity to dominate the use of force in a given territory which means 
other pretenders must either acquiesce or contest it, which is likely to lead to 
bloodshed (Tilly, 1990, pp. 68-72). This is a foundational element of state formation 
and despite significant efforts to reduce the levels of conflict through international 
mechanisms (namely the United Nations) the resort to violence to build a state has 
not been removed. What is new in current conceptions of statebuilding is the 
requirement to transform societies in the process. As a result it is not simply necessary 
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to dominate the use of force, the state must also be accountable, responsive and 
transparent in its actions.733 
While it could be argued that statebuilding is transformative, the notion that societies 
should pursue political, economic and social transformations at the same time would 
seem to be problematic. In the context of stability this would seem to be a foolhardy 
approach rather than a well-considered one. This is because of the hierarchical nature 
of requirements for stability outlined in the field data: the provision of personal 
security and safety, a broad political consensus, and humanitarian action to maintain 
the population. A statebuilding or state transformation agenda will be equally 
problematic because transformation necessitates instability, and stability in the 
conception of respondents would only allow for gradual and evolutionary change. The 
provision of security and political consensus does not require full state structures and 
does not necessitate democratic governance which, as described in Chapter 2, are 
foundational elements of current statebuilding theory. A stability focus would 
emphasize evolution rather than transformation, calling in to question some of the 
expansive claims about the needs and requirements for statebuilding outlined in 
Dobbins’ conception.  
In short the agenda within statebuilding is the export of democracy for the twin 
reasons that democratic states are less likely to go to war with each other and less 
likely to prosecute genocide against their own populations (See p. 41). This is 
undermined by the fact that “newly emerging democracies … are often prone to 
external aggression and internal conflict” (Dobbins et al, 2007, p. 190). Given that 
democratisation is the assumed model of political governance in statebuilding it is 
surprising that the statebuilding theory also admits that new democracies are in fact 
violent and therefore destabilising. The same statebuilding approach calls for the 
wholesale revision of the rules of the game which are the central component of 
stability. 734 The theory argues that statebuilding should include organising elections, 
fostering civil society and a free press and to do so simultaneously. (Dobbins et al, 
2007, pp. 191-2). 
This modern view of statebuilding does not fit with the stability paradigm, which 
would require a fundamental revisiting of statebuilding principles. A revised approach 
to statebuilding that takes stability as its cornerstone would turn it into a more 
historically valid process of gradual and piecemeal change with occasional bouts of 
instability and violence supporting the notion that stability and instability are not 
binary but environments on a continuum. This does not suggest that were democracy 
                                                     
733 McGee & Gaventa, 2010, pp. 4-6; World Bank, 2012, pp. 20-21. 
734 Which would allow for a broad discussion on the function and role of the state (C/f 
Day, 2002, pp. 205-7) 
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to be a guiding principle or demand of the population, as in Nepal, that it should be 
ignored, but that the prevailing political direction of the population should be taken 
into account because systems imposed from outside are less likely to be stable in the 
absence of a strong internal will to adapt the rules of the game. 
Unlike other theories, statebuilding makes specific reference to the regional context 
of the state in particular, that the state that is built should be at peace with its 
neighbours. In line with the political transformation envisaged through statebuilding 
this is rooted in the democratic peace argument, which has been found to be weakly 
associated with stability (for more detail see Chapter 2). Democracy promotion does 
however feature within the US national security paradigm of supporting friendly 
democratic states in regions which are not necessarily democratic nor pro-US, such as 
East Asia or the Middle East. However, the stability paradigm would suggest that the 
export of democratic norms in a manner which over-extends the political environment 
of the region may invite destabilisation, challenging a fundamental precept of US (and 
UK) strategy (The White House, 2010, pp. 37-8; HMG, 2011, pp. 11-12). 
In addition to the nature of the political system, the broader regional context of a 
state is vital and, as argued during the case study chapters, the level of influence of 
neighbouring states has been a significant factor in terms of national stability; 
including the blockades of both Afghanistan and Nepal, which led to changes in 
government, and the ongoing influence that both Pakistan and India retain over 
elected and executive officials in Afghanistan and Nepal respectively (see p. 241). 
However it is unclear from the stability paradigm whether greater stability can be 
achieved when there are doubts about the democratic peace argument, and where 
the establishment of pro-Western democratic regimes may invite the malign influence 
of neighbouring states, who may simply have been satisfied with an outcome which 
resumed or returned the ante-conflict situation.  
Implementing a statebuilding transformation may invite destabilising interventions by 
neighbouring states and, as discussed in Chapter 8, given that both Afghanistan and 
Nepal’s sovereignty is limited by their degree of dependence on regional neighbours 
and the international system, the necessity or even possibility of strong statebuilding 
would seem to be in doubt. Finally, the modern conception of statebuilding is that it 
requires the application of force. This, unlike the democratic peace argument, seems 
to be a robust component of statebuilding theory and confirms some of the internal 
inconsistency in statebuilding itself. As discussed in Chapter 2, state formation in most 
contexts has been violent (see Moore (1966), Claessen and Skalnik (1978) and Tilly 
(1990) in footnote 18 and pp. 23 and 24 ) which challenges whether the stability 
paradigm can in fact be used to build states because violence is destabilising. There is 
however one critical component which may have been overlooked: state formation, 
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i.e. the creation of new states, has since the end of World War II largely ceased. Both 
the processes of decolonisation and the collapse of the Soviet Union allowed a 
number of states to re-emerge but they often did so from a pre-existing entity and 
since 1991 it can be argued that only two new states have been formed.735 
Therefore processes of state formation, while historically important and potentially 
instructive, may not provide a sufficient basis upon which to design interventions that 
support statebuilding in the context of a fully formed international state system. 
Where states are not being built they are being transformed by intervention, it is 
possible to question the principles of state formation. The state in the modern 
conception of statebuilding is expansive, delivering or fostering economic growth, 
basic services, social development and political emancipation as well as maintaining 
peace and security in the region and for its population. This is a particularly Western 
and 21st Century notion of the state. Its sheer expansiveness may be the element 
which invites violent resistance and therefore it requires the use of force to impose it, 
which would then return the stability debate to questions of political priorities and 
setting the (limited) rules of the game before considering how to build a state, which 
may be feasible with less violence. 
In summary, the theory of statebuilding has become divorced from its foundations in 
state formation and replaced significant elements with philosophical concepts of what 
is considered right and good for a state to do in modern Western society. These ideas 
are then carried out through an expansive approach to reform which imposes 
democracy, specific notions of the rule of law, social relations and the necessity for 
international peace. The stability paradigm does not challenge the necessity for a 
state, nor does it preclude that statebuilding is likely to be, if not must be, violent; 
instead it challenges the extent of the statebuilding transformation, and suggests that 
an evolutionary approach would be more stable, which could involve accepting non-
democratic governance traditions. It also suggests greater emphasis is required in 
                                                     
735 Slovakia and the Czech Republic formed out of Czechoslovakia in 1993; Eritrea 
seceded from Ethiopia in 1993, Palau achieved independence from the United States 
in 1994; East Timor achieved independence from Indonesia in 2002, Montenegro and 
Kosovo split from Serbia in 2006 and 2008 respectively; and the creation of South 
Sudan from Sudan in 2011. Various sources. Of these seven state formation events, 
the European states that were formed were the latest chapter in the dissolution of the 
Soviet and Communist systems after 1991 and East Timor had been seeking 
independence as part of the decolonisation movements in the 20th century a category 
which would also include Palau. Outside of the processes of decolonisation and the 
collapse of the communist bloc, state formation can only be said to be occurring in 
Eritrea and South Sudan.  
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promoting state sovereignty given the dependency of some states on regional 
neighbours and the international system. 
Counterinsurgency 
As identified in the literature review, counterinsurgency doctrine has evolved 
significantly over the last decade, but has been built upon post-colonial 
counterinsurgency doctrine (see p. 46). In analysing the new conflicts both the US and 
UK COIN doctrines (JP3-24, 2009, pp. I-2-6; MoD, 2009a, pp. 1-7) promote population-
centric COIN in part supported by thinking about changes in the nature of conflict 
since the end of the Cold War, notably Mary Kaldor’s “New Wars” and Rupert Smith’s 
“War amongst the People” (Smith, R., 2005, p. 23; Kaldor, 2006, pp. 27-32). This 
section will test whether population-centric COIN is theoretically capable of achieving 
stability according to the revised stability hypothesis. In order to do this it takes the 
definition of COIN contained in the US Counterinsurgency Doctrine JP 3-24:736 
“COIN is comprehensive civilian and military efforts taken to defeat an 
insurgency and to address any core grievances. COIN is primarily political and 
incorporates a wide range of activities, of which security is only one. Unified 
action is required to successfully conduct COIN operations and should include 
all HN, US, and multinational agencies or actors. Civilian agencies should lead 
US efforts. When operational conditions do not permit a civilian agency to lead 
COIN within a specific area, the joint force commander (JFC) must be cognizant 
of the unified action required for effective COIN. Ideally, all COIN efforts protect 
the population, defeat the insurgents, reinforce the HN’s legitimacy, and build 
HN capabilities. COIN efforts include, but are not limited to, political, 
diplomatic, economic, health, financial, intelligence, law enforcement, legal, 
informational, military, paramilitary, psychological, and civic actions. As 
capable insurgents evolve and adapt, counterinsurgents must evolve and 
adapt” (JP3-24, 2009, p. I2) 
To re-state the revised stability hypothesis;  
                                                     
736 Whilst a number of issues were highlighted in the literature review (see p. 44) it 
can be taken as the leading conception of COIN in the early 21st century and 
influenced the prosecution of both the Afghan and Nepali COIN efforts. While there 
may be differences of opinion about the weight of importance of the various elements 
within COIN the overarching theme across the military commands (US and Nepali in 
this case) is in agreement. This analysis does not attempt to identify whether COIN 
Operations in either Afghanistan or Nepal were successful or not, it is aimed at 
understanding whether COIN theory would lead an operation to achieve stability as 
understood through the research data. 
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‘Stability is driven by both local and national political settlements which are 
produced through processes of political legitimacy formation which can be 
democratic or otherwise; these processes can be supported by limited 
humanitarian and security interventions and maintained by economic growth.’ 
Several areas of dissonance seem to be evident from these definitions, including the 
balance between civilian and military action, the implication of the broad scope of 
activities that can be carried out as part of a counterrevolution in COIN and the 
position of the civilian population. 
One of the areas of striking convergence between COIN and stability is the 
foregrounding of political leadership and engagement. Whilst both COIN and stability 
identify politics as the fundamental organising concept of their interventions, which 
might imply that there is synergy, even synonymity, between the two paradigms, this 
early convergence is tested in other areas. In this regard modern COIN doctrine draws 
heavily on 20th Century conceptions of COIN which understood the nature of insurgent 
violence as being primarily political. 737 However, modern military doctrine on COIN is 
remarkably silent on the political aspects of the conflict, which it states should be led 
by civilian actors (JP3-24, 2009, pp. I-2). This leaves COIN with an unarticulated 
political vision, noted below in the range of activities suggested, which present 
problems as the theory moves towards action because it absorbs the dogma inherent 
in other aspects of Liberal interventions, in particular statebuilding’s predilection for 
promoting democratic governance as discussed above. 
For the stability paradigm politics is of primary importance. Throughout the field 
studies the connection made between politics and stability was clear trumped all 
other forms or sources of instability. However, the nature of the impact of political 
decisions on stability is clearer in the stability paradigm than it is in COIN theory. This 
means that for stability to be attained both local and national level political 
agreement must be reached regarding the rules of the game, about the structure of 
power and the distribution of resources. This is a significant level of specification 
which still allows for alternative approaches to political settlements being attained, 
whilst COIN remains silent on these issues because it is subordinate to Liberal political 
philosophy now articulated by statebuilding. This dissonance is starkest when 
considering the implication of the concept of ‘process’ in stability and stabilisation 
which is largely absent in COIN theory because it does not address what political 
approaches could be used to form political consensus.  
                                                     
737 For example “The beginning of wisdom is to grasp and hold on tightly to the idea 
that insurgency is a profoundly political problem” (JP3-24, 2009, pp. II-1) citing 
Anthony James Joes’ Resisting Rebellion: The History and Politics of 
Counterinsurgency, 2006, University Press of Kentucky. 
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A further conceptual dissonance between COIN and stability is that counterinsurgency 
and insurgency are understood to be two sides of the same conflict (JP3-24, 2009, pp. 
I-2);738 whereas it is not clear that stability and instability can be viewed as 
dichotomous. Instead, much as there is a continuum of violence, there would seem to 
be a continuum of stable-ness. There cannot be a continuum of (counter-)insurgency 
because COIN attempts to shift an environment to a very specific end-point with the 
community or area becoming (or remaining) broadly pro-government in their 
disposition and able or willing to resist overtures from insurgents which would make it 
‘anti-government’. This dichotomy is implicit in the structure of seminal works on 
counterinsurgency, including David Galula’s work, which tasks counterinsurgency with 
tackling “revolutionary war” (Galula, 1964, p. 1), and John Nagl’s analysis, which 
implies that counterinsurgency would revolutionise armies because they have to learn 
to fight a different kind of war (Nagl, 2002, pp. 192-205). David Kilcullen has also 
argued that argued that modern insurgencies require significant adaptation by 
counter-insurgents (Kilcullen, 2006, pp. 121-4). 
The revolutionary nature of counterinsurgency allows it to consider almost all aspects 
of social, economic and developmental life under its remit, meaning that processes of 
counterinsurgency must, by definition, be destabilising, even in areas that are not 
directly affected by current insurgent activity. This is why the application of 
statebuilding or COIN approaches in Kalakan seemed to have little connection to 
stability. If it is to be successful, the insurgents must lose the battle of wills for the 
direction of the nation, which can only be done through national political processes 
(confirming the political primacy of COIN as noted above). Whilst this does 
synchronise with the conception of stability being linked to central political authority, 
it differs in the role that the political elite should take to counter the threat. A stability 
model would suggest more gradual change closer to an evolution as discussed with 
regards to statebuilding, whereas a counter-insurgent approach requires 
counterrevolution to undermine the insurgency.  
Connected to the revolutionary conception of COIN there is almost no limit on the 
range of activities that could be significant in achieving the aim of the counter-
insurgent, from hard security to rule of law, development, economic, political and 
soft-power interventions such as psychological operations. Counterinsurgency is total 
war, not in the industrial sense (Smith, R., 2005, p. 105) but in the political, social and 
                                                     
738 Some authors agree with the dualistic nature of insurgency and COIN but also note 
that the nature of the conflict is always shifting and that the analogy of the coin is 
correct, though this should not imply that the nature of the conflict is static (Kilcullen, 
2006, p. 112).  
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cultural spheres.739 This is in part why the definition of COIN suggests a wide range of 
actors should be engaged. Despite this mass of activity there is some hierarchy: in 
particular that COIN is considered “primarily political” (JP3-24, 2009, pp. I-2) which 
facilitates other activities to be carried out; similarly the “military forces are a delivery 
system for civilian activity”740 confirming security is not necessarily the primary area of 
activity.741 
The conception of stability derived from the field data would suggest that it is no less 
political but is more proscribed in terms of its social and economic implications, 
meaning that whilst there is a similar hierarchy in the importance of political over 
security activities, stability can be achieved through a more limited range of activities. 
Therefore, whilst much has been made of the derivation of stabilisation, or stability 
operations, from COIN theory (FM3-07, 2008, pp. 2-1) stability operations may only 
have limited utility for COIN operations. Particular consideration needs to be given to 
the potential impact of non-military interventions in the different categories of 
development interventions. Humanitarian action can be stabilising and is also 
identified as part of the FM3-07; however, this does not link well to the expansive and 
revolutionary nature of COIN. Humanitarian action and short term stability operations 
in the development or economic spheres can, at best, only hope to return 
communities to an ante-conflict state. This may be positive for stability, but is less 
supportive of the aims of COIN. 
A final area of discussion is how COIN and stability differ in the minds of the 
population. For modern COIN it is clear that the population is the prize; however, it is 
not clear that this is applicable to conceptions of stability in two ways. Firstly, by 
identifying the population as an objective robs them of the agency to affect change, 
despite the fact that they often have a pivotal role in deciding whether or not the 
insurgency will be allowed to thrive in their area as in Haraiya VDC (see p. 217). Whilst 
respondents across the field sites discussed the role of the people in ensuring stability 
this was discussed in the context of a local political construct. Periods of stability were 
identified when there was a local political settlement which the majority could at least 
go along with if not fully agree with, therefore the stability focus should be on a sub-
group of local leaders and their connections to and acceptance of the national level 
                                                     
739 And possibly in moral, ethical and philosophical terms. 
740 Counterinsurgency: A Guide for Policy-Makers United States Government, 
Interagency Counterinsurgency Initiative, May 2008 (JP3-24, 2009, pp. I-1). 
741 One respondent during the interview went as far as to say that 80% of the COIN 
campaign in Afghanistan should be political, and 20% focused on security. However, it 
was necessary to enforce security in some locations to allow the political work to 
move ahead. IN-0-1 7th October 2010, Kabul. Whilst the sentiment may be accurate, 
practice would suggest the opposite. 
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political system and their downward connections to the population. Stability is 
produced in the relationships between leaders at different levels and whilst the 
population acts as a source of legitimacy and support for local leaders, they can also 
prevent local leaders acting beyond social norms.742  
Secondly, the host-nation state is assumed to enact COIN as a form of 
counterrevolution to win the will of the population 743 and the state should be 
working “with its population and for economic revival and political reconciliation to 
occur”.744 However, a stability paradigm would suggest that the population is not the 
primary goal. Further experiences of insurgency and counterinsurgency suggest that 
social revolution must, by definition, be destabilising for it to be effective, and by 
engaging the population in a revolution, the state must be an agent of destabilisation. 
Stabilisation should instead focus on the restoration of the ante-conflict situation in 
terms of social and economic well-being or in terms of an evolution of the political 
system. 
Whilst there is some overlap between the stability paradigm and COIN theory, it is 
clear that there are a number of problematic areas if interveners are to assume their 
actions will be stabilising by applying a COIN framework. Further it is not clear that 
stability operations would support COIN causing dissonance between COIN and 
stabilisation operations and doctrine when implemented in the same battle space. 
Although there is some agreement on political primacy, there is less agreement about 
the nature of the political vision because of the philosophical divergence between 
stabilisation and statebuilding regarding political systems (discussed above), how 
much change (or revolution) is required for success, what the range and hierarchy of 
activities should be, and what the role of the population should be. This suggests that 
whilst there may be similar starting points for stability and COIN these conceptions 
should articulate a different range and form of intervention and achieve different 
outcomes. 
Development 
As noted in the literature review, and in the findings from the field studies, 
development is an exceptionally broad area, and throughout this thesis it has been 
used to explore interventions that effect economic and social development across a 
spectrum of activity running from humanitarian action to ‘hot stabilisation’. The 
                                                     
742 This could return the focus of military activity to effects based operations, which 
one respondent noted had been abandoned in favour of population-centric COIN. IN-
0-7 29th November 2010, Kabul. 
743 Counterinsurgency: A Guide for Policy-Makers United States Government, 
Interagency Counterinsurgency Initiative, May 2008 (JP3-24, 2009, pp. I-1). 
744 Ibid. 
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dominant weight of activity has been carried out by mainstream NGOs and the private 
sector. Underpinning both economic and social development, and all of the 
environments under which assistance is provided, is the conception that development 
presents a core component of societal progress. In theoretical terms this means 
conceptions of development are linked to the pursuit of freedom as identified by 
Hayek, and Smith before him with regard to economic development, and Amartya Sen 
with regard to interventionist social development (Sen, 1999, p. 35; Hayek, 1978, p. 
268). This Liberal philosophical tradition can clearly be identified in the theories of 
development identified in Chapter 2 which are being tested as part of this thesis, 
which are: 
“Sustainable Economy  
The ability of the people to pursue opportunities for livelihoods within a system 
of economic governance bound by law. 
Social Well-Being  
The ability of the people to be free from want of basic needs and to coexist 
peacefully in communities with opportunities for advancement” (USIP, 2009, 
pp. 2-9). 
To re-state the revised stability hypothesis;  
‘stability is driven by both local and national political settlements which are 
produced through processes of political legitimacy formation which can be 
democratic or otherwise; these processes can be supported by limited 
humanitarian and security interventions and maintained by economic growth.’ 
A number of areas of contention seem be clear between these definitions, including 
the impact of ‘progress’ in society, the way that the provision of basic needs affects 
conflict and the manner through which aid or development interventions are 
delivered and finally whether the interventions actually have an impact on stability. 
The concept of development as ‘progress’ runs deeply within the theories outlined 
above and can be traced back to the Liberal paradigm, to Adams and those that 
followed him, as the capitalist system was first expounded (see p. 22). Within this 
viewpoint economic growth and the protection of the system which fosters it is critical 
to the achievement of social wellbeing and allowing people to “pursue opportunities 
for livelihoods” (USIP, 2009, pp. 2-9); however, this is laden with presumptions about 
how an economy should be structured, hence the critique of processes associated 
with the modern Washington Consensus (see p. 54). In common with the theories of 
statebuilding, particularly COIN, development envisages significant social change, but 
over both the short and long term, as highlighted in the case studies, development 
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can be a driver of instability as much as it could be seen to be stabilising (for example 
the HAVA in Nahr-i Sarraj or education in Gajul). 
The stability paradigm may in some respects be perceived to resist ideas of economic 
and social advancement because of its emphasis on political settlements and 
association with previous periods of oppression, the restriction of economic 
opportunities and political freedom; however, a closer reading of the stability 
paradigm situates economic growth and social development as components of a 
healthy environment capable of providing opportunities for younger generations – the 
primary question from a stability perspective would be how the political settlement 
fosters the breadth of engagement in economic opportunity and social betterment 
required to limit the destabilising processes which development engenders. In this 
regard the expansion of economic opportunity is a lower level priority for stability 
than creating a supportive political system though it may have a strong role in 
reinforcing stability over the medium to long-term once a political system has been 
established. 
If the stability paradigm is accurate and economic and social development is as much 
a threat to stability as it is a potential supporter, it is possible to question other 
components of the developmental paradigm of intervention. In particular whether the 
provision of basic needs, can reduce instability by preventing conflict, a notion 
espoused as far back as the Truman doctrine in 1947 (see p. 29). The driving idea is 
that those who are free from want will not enter into violent conflict. However, the 
stability hypothesis asserts that the violence which underpins conflicts in insurgencies 
are inherently political, and evidence from the field sites does not support the notion 
that impoverished groups orchestrated violence. Instead, the social groups that led 
the resistance groups in both case studies were not manifestly poorer or more 
excluded than other local leaders.  
In fact, the most disadvantaged groups have for the most part attempted to shelter 
from the conflict rather than participate in it (for example the Dalits in Gajul and 
Haraiya). The conflicts have been prosecuted by wealthier members of the 
communities often against other wealthy individuals. Though they have, at times, 
used the rhetoric of rural emancipation and poverty alleviation (see pp. 181 and 219) 
this is insufficient to explain the targeting and mobilisation during the conflicts in any 
of the four sites. Furthermore, the provision of basic services during the conflicts did 
not seem to be associated with increased or decreased mobilisation of combatants or 
experiences of violence. Not only have these interventions failed to promote stability, 
they were demonstrated to be irrelevant to local community stability, and were 
criticised for contributing to the de-legitimisation of the state through fostering 
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corruption, by displacing the state from its responsibilities, or causing retribution 
against individuals who supported the projects.  
In these instances development does not seem to address the ‘root causes’ of a 
conflict in a way which can be anything other than destabilising. Furthermore, it is not 
clear that focusing on root causes is a useful way of understanding or addressing 
insurgencies and the stability paradigm would suggest that it is not possible to address 
economic inequality without addressing more important political conflicts. In both 
Afghanistan and Nepal the evidence that the insurgencies were driven by ‘root cause’ 
motivations seems weak, or at best mixed. Afghanistan’s conflicts were driven by 
external military interventions and perceived threats to the interests of political 
groups e.g. land-owners and Islamists in the 1980s who supported the Jihad and most 
recently the Taliban. In Nepal the Maoists made significant use of the rhetoric of 
exclusion across economic, social and ethnic lines as being drivers of the resistance 
but they were not successful in mobilising disadvantaged groups and once in power 
were unable to rectify many of the grievances they had identified. They were also not 
able to prevent the ethnically structured armed groups associated with the Maoists 
from turning on them for not fulfilling perceived promises about changes in political 
structures. 
It is not clear from the revised hypothesis that stability would be able to address 
economic inequality without addressing the political conflicts first. As the prelude in 
Chapter 7 illustrates with the metaphor of the bull and cart, it is clear that politics is 
the bull leading the cart with all of the social and economic issues that it contains. In 
the same way the stability paradigm sees economic issues as a secondary level 
concern important for the maintenance of stability but not the restoration or creation 
of stability. From this theoretical point it can be argued that high levels of inequitable 
growth may contribute to instability, but it would seem to be an insufficient condition 
because the prior examples of stable periods in both Afghanistan and Nepal suggest 
that unequal social, political and economic relations can allow for a stable 
environment to form. The only periods of reasonably equitable economic growth have 
been derived from internally driven investments, which have promoted long-term 
employment growth e.g. in Haraiya and Kalakan. These investments may be driven by 
increases in consumption, particularly in construction after conflict, which may imply a 
need for external investment. 
These are substantive critiques of the broad processes of development but they do 
not exclude the potential significance of emergency humanitarian action to save life 
and repair property. However, these critiques present a more limited range of 
potential areas which may be stabilising and which exclude most of the social 
development agenda and exogenous activity in economic development because the 
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examples of economic development promoting stability were driven by national 
consumption or local capital investment. Conceptually, this is very significant because 
medium and long-term development processes must be destabilising if they are to 
have an impact, whereas humanitarian action can restore, to an extent, communities 
to their land with the services to which they were accustomed to relatively quickly and 
with limited expenditure. 
The stability hypothesis confirms some of the critiques emerging in the literature 
regarding the limitations of development projects in winning hearts and minds or 
providing a consent winning outcome (see p. 56) and extends this critique to argue 
that development activities provide few short-term benefits in terms of stability and 
must be considered to be destabilising before they can be understood to be stabilising 
because of the philosophical orientation of both social and economic development 
interventions to promote change. A further challenge to the significance of 
development is the limited degree to which projects can promote the social contract, 
a cornerstone of Liberal philosophy regarding the state, which is a consequence 
largely of the way in which development projects are implemented through NGOs, 
private development companies or state bodies that are known to be funded by the 
international community in some form. The state in these relationships is simply one 
contracting body among many, not one which must respond to the demands of the 
population with the use of its own limited resources. 
The field data does not seem to suggest that recipients were concerned about which 
agency delivered development, though there did seem to be a preference for 
consultative mechanisms, which would challenge the argument within the 
development community that they are inherently best suited to deliver development 
(see p. 52). Therefore the fact that military forces have delivered development seems 
largely irrelevant to respondents because they consider them to be one of several 
foreign sources of investment. Whilst this may provide succour to those who support 
the use of CERP as a model of delivering aid, it along with all other forms of externally 
funded development is simply irrelevant in comparison to the real economies of the 
field sites, whether licit or illicit. External funding is extremely volatile, prone to delays 
and a lack of long-term engagement, unlike the economic sectors which have 
provided the long term expansion of economic opportunity (i.e. economic stability) for 
the populations in Haraiya, Village A and Kalakan, which lie in timber, opium and 
construction. Unless exogenous development funding shifts to long-term economic 
investment, it will continue to provide limited, short-term incentives to the population 
and will therefore be inherently destabilising. 
In summary, the stability paradigm applies significant critiques to the application of 
development as a tool for promoting stability except in a proscribed manner focused 
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on humanitarian action. However, it is clear that stability can be maintained (and to 
some extent mitigated) through the expansion of economic opportunity, which 
contributes to the critique that the misunderstanding about the link between 
progress, development and stability is dangerous and presents a paradigmatic 
challenge to how interveners should engage other states to promote stability.  
In conclusion, through the application of all three theories in support of stability, it is 
evident that the stability hypothesis is supported by some but not all of the 
components of modern iterations of the theories of statebuilding, COIN and 
development. However, in each case they fail to fulfil all components of stability, 
meaning that stabilisation interventions can be confused as the bastard child of all or 
none. The discussion has therefore come full circle, and the derivations of these three 
areas from conceptions of the Westphalian state and Liberal peacebuilding must be 
re-examined.  
Challenging the Westphalian and Liberal peacebuilding paradigm 
The discussions preceding this section have highlighted how the stability hypothesis 
cannot be fulfilled by the sub-strands of the Liberal project (statebuilding, COIN and 
development) and therefore it is necessary in turn to interrogate whether stability is a 
usable concept within the Liberal agenda. This discussion draws on the conclusion of 
Chapter 2, which argued that the component parts add up to an incoherent mode of 
intervention which attempts to export Liberal concepts to the rest of the world in 
order to protect the interests of the intervening states. As Barnett and Zürcher have 
argued, statebuilding is an articulation of peacebuilding which should probably be 
more accurately referred to as the Liberal peacebuilding paradigm that is articulated 
through the promotion of a specific form of the Westphalian state model i.e. the 
market-orientated Liberal democracy (2009, pp. 26-8). On a spectrum of intervention 
COIN is simply the most robust of available approaches and development the least 
robust.  
Whilst it has been useful to interrogate stability and its connections or dissonance 
with the three modes of intervention, it is at the ethical and philosophical levels 
where issues of stability can be most sharply examined. This section looks across the 
areas of activity derived from the theoretical discussions as well as innovations in 
philosophical concepts about the state, society and stability to establish whether 
stability is a viable organising principle for intervention within Liberalism. Through this 
examination it will become clear that stability is a distinct agenda and were it to be 
applied fully would alter the emphasis that interveners give to their actions in the 
pursuit of the maintenance of international order. It is also clear that stability is not a 
challenge to Westphalian conceptions of the state; indeed it reinforces the centrality 
of a polity with defined and proscribed roles as being a pre-requisite for international 
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and internal order; however, it challenges the way in which interveners apply modern 
innovations in their own states on others. 
Stability: innovating ahead of its time? 
As discussed in Chapter 2 notions of state formation and its ability to promote stability 
in the 21st Century are deeply aligned to Western conceptions of state formation and 
re-historicising of their experience and the exportation of these views to other states. 
Modern conceptions of the state and society have evolved significantly over the last 
400 years, and as noted in Chapter 2, previous aspirations of liberty (Hayek), peace 
(Kant), social order (Hobbes), economics (Smith), and war (Clausewitz) have in some 
respects been both fulfilled and surpassed by technological advancement, social 
change and political processes in the Western states. These concepts have been 
refined, adapted and moulded into action, and while they may build upon one 
another, in significant ways they also play off one another as variations within the 
same Liberal Western paradigm. These variations can be seen clearly in debates about 
social order and peace (Kant vs. Hobbes) or how markets function (Keynes vs. 
Friedman).  
In these examples, which have underpinned the development of theories of 
intervention, there is little questioning of the underlying philosophical assumptions of, 
for example, the relevance of credit in economic development. Instead the debates 
centre on mechanisms and sequencing; as a result, few fundamental questions are 
asked about the main thrust of Liberal Western philosophy which underpins 
intervention activities. This may be less of an issue when discussing these activities in 
areas which are the dominion of Western states (i.e. their own territories) because 
the vast majority of the polity and the systems which support them are philosophically 
attuned to them. This is another proposition altogether in territories or states which 
have significantly different philosophical, ethical and legal traditions as noted in the 
discussion in Chapter 8 on culture and context. 
At this point it is important again to reflect on the histories of both Afghanistan and 
Nepal, who have repeatedly rejected external interference in their affairs and at 
various points have structured themselves in opposition to Western philosophy at 
some stage in their history. The interventions described in this thesis are not simply 
projects supporting road building or training an army, but the importation of a 
philosophical tradition which has little or no traction amongst the broad population of 
the host-nations. In many respects it is necessarily to reconcile the paradigm of the 
West with that of the rest.  
It is then legitimate then to ask whether stability is an innovation or simply a re-
iteration of pre-existing approaches in which the Western world attempts to manage 
problems emerging in the state system; Duffield thinks of this as the way in which the 
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capitalist, and now Liberal states, use the elites of the non-Western states to fight 
barbarians who threaten the ‘perceived’ security of international order (Duffield, 
2005, pp. 148-51). Does stability present a new way of doing business on the ground, 
or, much like peacebuilding and statebuilding, will it be a catch-all phrase for a range 
of activities articulated from an ill-defined strategic desire? In many respects the 
catch-all nature of stability may explain some of the crossover between stability and 
elements of the theories discussed above. Fundamentally the proposition that the 
stability paradigm adds anything new to the management of the international system 
rests on whether stability is a concept that has relevance outside of Western 
processes of intervention as both India and China seek stability (see p. 3). 
In this regard the lenses discussed in Chapter 1 become more significant because it is 
through the changing structure of the international system that stability may offer 
alternative approaches to intervention as they are currently practiced, and 
predominantly funded by the Western bloc. The Liberal system is not monolithic nor is 
it on an inexorable path to consolidated globalisation. Instead, several centres of 
power exist745 which are drawing closer together but continuing to exclude the south, 
contributing to the creation of political-security emergencies such as those affecting 
small states like Afghanistan and Nepal (Duffield, 2001, pp. 2-5). As the relative power 
of the Western states declines in comparison to emerging powers in the East the 
world is moving away from the uni-polar post-Cold War era to a much more complex 
environment.  
The stability paradigm is therefore one that is currently unfulfilled; interventions, such 
as those undertaken since the research began, in Libya, Egypt and South Sudan have 
continued to follow the Liberal interventionist path. However this is changing as 
significant regional and global powers, namely Russia, China and India, vie to influence 
and shape interventions and apply their own lenses of stability. Stability may become 
more relevant as the bar of the lowest common denominator is promoted and some 
of the most idiosyncratic forms of Western intervention are stymied. Stability may yet 
come of age, but it may also present a moral and ethical challenge to the West. 
Stability: bringing clarity or adding confusion? 
Given its as yet unfulfilled potential to challenge Liberal political philosophy it is worth 
considering whether stability provides greater clarity through which interventions can 
be organised or not. In some respects it is obvious that there should be some tension 
between stability and other aspects of interventions, but if it is currently insufficient 
as a discrete concept does it add anything to the theories of intervention which have 
been discussed in this chapter. 
                                                     
745 Broadly speaking, Europe, North America and East Asia. 
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As demonstrated through the field studies, analysis and theory testing, it is clear that 
the range of activities undertaken by the international community are not necessarily 
compatible and, in the worst cases, can undermine one another. This is a point also 
made by Call (2008, pp. 2-3) who argued that there are tensions between 
statebuilding and peacebuilding; but he went on to argue that what fails to occur is 
some application of prioritisation rather than simply attempting everything at the 
same time. Having identified this problem, it is important to question whether 
stability provides a rationale for prioritisation and simplification across the range of 
interventions. Here the answer is more straightforward in the sense that the stability 
paradigm, if used appropriately, could be moulded to specific locations politically, 
with proscribed aims in terms of the protection of life and economic maintenance. 
That framework should allow interveners both the ability to constrain their actions by 
defining what is and is not essential (and what would be desirable); and what may be 
undesirable to do if there is insufficient host national political support at both national 
and local levels. This may be instructive, but it is unclear whether institutions would 
show the restraint required not to repeat the mistakes in both peacebuilding and 
statebuilding by claiming that all areas of activity deserve prioritisation.746 
The stability paradigm may provide a challenge to modern Liberal interventionism, 
though it will only be relevant in the future when non-Western political blocs have the 
political will, financial clout and military capability to engage in a meaningful manner. 
Currently this agenda has only partially been fulfilled and may contribute to the 
confusion about whether the stability paradigm is extant. In all likelihood it could be, 
but it is not yet fully articulated. However, the stability paradigm could be used at a 
lower level to create prioritisation about core requirements for interventions. This  
would restrain some of the ideological components of Liberal interventionism and yet 
broaden international support and reduce resistance to interventions in host nations 
because the interventions would be more proscribed and culturally attuned to their 
environments. Building on this theoretical and philosophical critique it is important to 
consider how stability could be understood to promote a form of intervention distinct 
from statebuilding, COIN and development, simply because it looks across all aspects 
and types of intervention and allows prioritisation and harmonisation to be central 
components.  
Towards a theory of stability and practice of stabilisation  
Thus far the thesis has sought to identify the gaps in both the philosophical and 
theoretical conceptions of intervention and stability through the field sites in 
Afghanistan and Nepal. The stability paradigm appears to be a useful vehicle to 
                                                     
746 For a discussion on this relating to Afghanistan see Dennys, 2011, pp. 10-12. For a 
more general critique of statebuilding and peacebuilding see Paris, 2009, pp. 54-8.  
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challenge the current conception of intervention, however the extent of its impact will 
be unclear without clear engagement by non-Western powers. Whilst that is a future 
consideration this closing section will suggest a theory of stability and a hierarchy of 
stabilisation activities that builds upon the stability paradigm. 
Theory of stability 
The stability paradigm is significant because it can present a potential end-state for an 
exogenous intervention when correctly articulated, primarily because a proscribed set 
of aims and objectives can be derived from it. Unlike the statebuilding and 
development theories which have been tested, interventions to support stability 
should not be restrained within a particular specialism because they can be applied to 
a broad range of risk areas and potential actions. Furthermore, the stability paradigm 
is able to assess the importance of the state as one of many potentially unstable 
components, which cannot be done through statebuilding and COIN as they are 
predicated on supporting the state. Theoretical innovation needs to incorporate the 
necessity to remain aware of almost all sectors and potential issues that could impact 
stability, within an understanding that there are likely to be only a few factors which 
will be of significance. To conceptualise this point it is important to move away from 
the state as the central point of analysis or indeed as the main component requiring 
stabilisation as understood in current Liberal interventionism. 
The theory of stability can be used to focus on the key relationships which maintain 
stability, which include the political elite, the state and the population. Tensions in the 
relationships between these three components would undermine both local and 
national political legitimacy, thereby undermining stability as conceived of from the 
stability hypothesis. Interventions in security, development and the economic spheres 
play supporting or structuring roles but are subordinated to the political relationship 
between these groups at different levels; for example, whilst there may be economic 
inequality between a political elite and an ethnic community it will be the political way 
in which the groups address the inequality that would lead to instability, not the fact 
that the inequality exists. 
In this theory stability lies in the nature and form of connections within and between 
social groups, political elites and the state. These relationships are governed by 
political structures which shape the nature and form of the connections. Changes to 
any one of those components can affect stability, however not all components have 
the same scale of impact, and understanding the relative weight or importance of one 
issue over another is critical in identifying prioritised engagement. The nature of these 
connections relate to geographic and physical conditions; for example, locations with 
sea ports have access to connections that land locked countries do not have. The 
nature of the physical environment also predicates some of the economic activities 
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which the population can engage in. The form of connections relates to the social 
structures, meaning the traditions and norms, within a society, that structure 
connections. Potential avenues for investigation include; who in the community has 
greatest access to which resources? Who are the decision makers and who are 
‘disconnected’?  
However both the nature (location) and form (society) and their significance to social 
groups, political elites and the state are structured by the political space in which they 
exist. Most of these political spaces are states with their own pedigree partly shaped 
by the nature and form of the space and people they govern. The combination of 
these elements, and their connections, will dictate the nature of stability in a given 
area, simply put, the greater number of connections the more stable the 
environment. Equally, it would be possible to identify the quality of connections and 
in cases where one connection dominated others, for example the significance of an 
illicit trade or over-reliance on aid, the dynamic would be unstable, because the area 
would be over reliant on one component for stability. The same elements dictate 
what actions (both indigenous and exogenous) could be taken to promote or reduce 
stability, noting that previous interventions may preclude the use of certain 
interventions in the future. 
The space for exogenous support is constrained by the boundaries of the political 
space in which the social groups, political elites and state find themselves. Acting 
beyond the political space will largely be irrelevant to the actors or could introduce 
destabilising dynamics by encouraging an indigenous actor to work outside their 
political environment. However, within that space the range of potential interventions 
could be broad, though as discussed below in the hierarchy of actions, they are in fact 
significantly proscribed if stability were to be the objective of the intervention. 
Figure 10 attempts to capture the conception of stability and locates exogenous 
intervention as effective only if carried out within the confines of the political 
environment and the nature of local conceptions of security, development and the 
local economy. The connections described above are represented by the arrows which 
show the primacy of politics over other issues and the significance that the political 
environment has in structuring the relationships between the key actors that provide 
stability, the political elite, social groups and the state. 
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Figure 10 Theory of stability and exogenous intervention (Source: Author, 2012) 
Hierarchy of stability 
In addition to providing a way of conceptualising stability based on connectivity, the 
stability paradigm also offers a way of prioritising which activities are potentially 
stabilising, which are not, and which could be destabilising. This does not preclude 
interventions being implemented which may not directly support stability, but which 
support a later intervention which does support stability, but this ensures that the 
sequencing and prioritisation of interventions to support stability is more robust. 
Figure 11 outlines an approach to stabilisation which foregrounds two elements: 
firstly, the nature of the local and national political environment and secondly, the 
personal safety and security of the local population. The political line of operation can 
be engaged with in a number of ways but the stability hypothesis would suggest that 
there are a limited viable means for exogenous states to engage with and encourage 
national leaders to form a political consensus. There are even fewer options at a local 
level because local agency will be constrained by the nature of the relationship 
between the local and national political spheres. This would mean adjusting 
‘governance’ reforms away from technical processes, in particular ones which attempt 
to promote the delivery of substantial amounts of development funding because it is 
likely to be destabilising. Instead, work should focus on supporting political dialogue 
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and processes acknowledging the relatively weak position of exogenous actors in 
promoting political reconciliation. 
 
 
Figure 11 Hierarchy of activities for exogenous activity to support stability (Source: 
Author, 2012) 
The sphere of personal safety and security is not simply about the provision of security 
by armed forces, whether indigenous or not, but also encompasses humanitarian aid, 
which would promote the safety of the population (i.e. provision of life-saving 
interventions in shelter, water and or food). Humanitarian action could be allowed to 
proceed irrespective of the context of the political sphere, because, in essence, it 
should only be about the restoration of a population to their community or holding 
groups in stasis; for example in refugee camps, whilst a political conflict is resolved. 
This is morally challenging but fulfils the humanitarian requirement of Liberalism 
without allowing the exportation of other components of Liberalism, which may 
promote instability.  
However, the political sphere has direct implications for the nature of security 
engagement that exogenous actors would be able to carry out. It would, for example, 
not be possible to carry out a COIN campaign under a stabilisation mandate because, 
as discussed above, COIN necessitates a social, political and economic 
counterrevolution against the insurgency. Critically, unless there is complete political 
backing from the host nation the COIN effort will move beyond the will and capacity 
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of the state to sustain it in the long-term. The same logic would apply to other forms 
of exogenous support to the security sector such as SSR. As a result the political realm 
restricts security interventions to the protection of the population unless there is clear 
political backing for a more aggressive posture whose agency lies in the host-nation 
and not with the intervener. 
If successful, these limited actions should support longer term stability, which can be 
maintained through the expansion of economic opportunity, meaning that as the 
threat reduces the level of effort in the political, security and humanitarian spheres 
should reduce. However, this should not imply that development as currently 
practiced will be able to support stability and further work is required to investigate 
the degree to which development activities may contribute to instability. This 
prioritisation would result in a curtailing of a number of activities currently called 
stabilisation and the focus would be shifted to security and humanitarian aid instead 
of justice, reconciliation, governance, economic development and infrastructure 
(FM3-07, 2008, pp. 2-5; Stabilisation Unit, 2008a). 
The theoretical innovations implied by the stability hypothesis would allow a new 
analysis of unstable environments threatened by politically-orientated violence. This 
would mean not focusing on the state as a potential source of stability, but as one of 
several actors who could be both stabilising and destabilising in their actions, and in 
particular the degree to which national and local level political actors are able to work 
together in a mutually reinforcing system. This stability hypothesis allows for a radical 
prioritisation of the broad range of activities that exogenous Liberal states have 
undertaken to promote stability in other states. In particular, this focuses on non-
technical forms of political engagement which allow locally adapted forms of 
governance to be fostered and a refocusing of security and development activities 
solely on the protection of civilians unless robust political backing can be identified at 
all levels of the host-nation. Finally, it suggests that economic development assistance 
should focus on broadening of economic opportunities through harnessing local 
capital investment rather than social development and foreign direct investment. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has argued that the theories of Liberal interventionism are not well-
suited to promoting stability in large measure because of their insistence on the 
export of Western democratic governance which undermines both political and 
security interventions, in particular statebuilding and COIN. These theories correctly 
identify the political nature of the threat posed by insurgencies but can only respond 
to them through a process of transformation or counterrevolution. For these 
processes to be successful they must be destabilising and therefore they are unable to 
promote the stability of a region and are prone to failure because host nation states 
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may not be able or willing to perform the complex transformations required to 
respond to the insurgent threat.  
The stability paradigm also radically undermines the concept that development can be 
seen as a stabilising process except when it is focused on the limited provision of 
humanitarian assistance. Development is a change process and, much like the 
transformations and counterrevolution supported by statebuilding and COIN, it 
necessitates instability. However, development actions are often divorced from the 
political nature of the threats and are often irrelevant as much as they are sources of 
instability.  
This theoretical analysis means that stability could be a radically different approach to 
structuring international intervention. However, when pursuing this discussion across 
the precepts of Liberal philosophy it is not possible to identify a way in which stability 
could restrain the more idiosyncratic concepts that Liberal philosophy attempts to 
export. As the international balance of power shifts to a multi-polar world where 
other states, who also value stability, come to the fore and shoulder the costs of 
intervention it is likely that the Western Liberal tradition will be challenged, though 
this may take some time. That is not to say that stability is not a useful theoretical tool 
or a potential device for prioritisation, but simply that the higher applications of the 
stability paradigm are yet to be fulfilled. This chapter has posited one way of 
understanding stability based on the connections between political elites, social 
groups and the state, who operate within their political dynamic and how that is both 
structured by, and contains, the nature of security, economy or development within a 
country. This suggests that the nature and form of connections within and between 
these groups are key determinants in promoting stability and that the more 
connections groups have the more stable they are likely to be. 
At an operational level the stability paradigm also allows for a refocusing of effort on a 
core set of areas in the political, security and humanitarian spheres to maintain 
stability. In terms of political interventions this would mean specifically moving away 
from technical governance approaches to more consensual, gradual and proscribed 
political support for dialogue between parties whose relationships are at the core of 
stability. Security and humanitarian activities would likewise be proscribed and 
focused on the immediate protection of the population, fulfilling humanitarian 
imperatives, whilst reducing the risk that interventions will pursue more invasive 
interventions beyond the political will and remit of the main stakeholders who provide 
stability, namely the political elites, the population and the state. 
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Chapter 10 – Conclusion 
This final chapter provides a brief review of the thesis and a summary of the main 
findings of the research. The chapter will also discuss the implications from the 
findings in the context of the inevitable limitations of the research design. Some broad 
proposals for further research are suggested and potential policy implications from 
the findings before a post-script. 
Chapter summary 
The thesis started by questioning the logic of Liberal interventionism in promoting 
stability, which is identified as a central aim in the maintenance of the international 
system. It argued that the viral nature of threats in countries affected by conflict and 
state fragility predisposed the Liberal states to prosecute interventions as a 
comprehensive reinvention of those states through political, security and 
development support. Despite this bold assertion by the Liberal states the entire 
venture was opaque because of the varied lenses which states and intervening 
departments applied to the threats they were supposed to be addressing. 
Chapter 2 argued that the logic of Liberal interventions was rooted in a specific 
interpretation of the European Westphalian state formation experience which had 
limited relevance to the ‘fragile’ territories whose philosophical, cultural, political and 
social contexts were markedly different. Furthermore, the propagation of modern 
interpretations of Liberal philosophy was not only a historical, but internally 
inconsistent because the main modes of intervention, diplomacy, defence and 
development had evolved distinct motivations and justifications for their 
interventions that created one of two distorting layers in the intervention logic. A 
second layer of distortion became apparent when this ideological form of intervention 
was applied in the context of non-Liberal, non-Westphalian states. These distortions 
and philosophical opacity have prevented fundamental questions about the logic of 
interventions aimed at stability and stabilisation from being asked and answered; 
these questions are: ‘what is stability?’ and ‘what interventions support it?’ 
Chapter 3 introduced the stability hypothesis through which the research was carried 
out in order to understand local conceptions of stability in four communities in 
Afghanistan and Nepal, who had experienced significant conflict over the last 
generation alongside a range of interventions by exogenous actors, their own states 
and insurgents. By tracing the processes of intervention over the last generation and 
linking them to local conceptions of stability, the research was designed to interrogate 
both the proposed stability hypothesis and three theories critical to current Liberal 
interventions, namely: statebuilding, COIN and development. The research aimed to 
provide a critique of the theories as applied to stabilisation and to grapple with ways 
of conceiving and understanding stability that reflected the experiences and 
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perceptions of the four communities. This was conceived of by presenting the 
dependent and independent variables which were analysed through five themes in 
Chapters 4 to 8 which included: 1) periods of stability; 2) culture and context; 3) mode 
of intervention; 4) political legitimacy and; 5) conceptions of stability. 
Chapters 4 to 7 discussed the field data at length presenting four stories of stability 
and stabilisation from the field sites. The processes of Indigenous Stabilisation were 
explored in Aqa Sarai village in Kalakan district in Afghanistan, as a way of explaining 
current experiences of stability after the conflicts of the last generation. It argued that 
stability in Kalakan and the wider Koh Daman region could only be adequately 
explained through the political agreements at both community and regional levels, 
which have allowed a number of extant local conflicts and non-violent competition 
between regional political leaders to be addressed. In the context of the political 
processes which wrought stability there were a number of other interventions by 
external actors in the political, security and development spheres.  
The impacts of political action on stability by external actors was confined to 
structuring the political system, though the data suggests that a democratic system 
was not the only way in which political leaders would have been able to continue their 
competition non-violently, which questions the centrality of democratisation in 
promoting stability. The security interventions were largely welcomed by the 
population but were not identified as the drivers of stability, which was fundamentally 
influenced by Afghan politics. Though development interventions focused on social 
development were not associated with stability, the humanitarian support provided 
by NGOs from 2001 was vital in the restoration of the community and a fundamental 
component of stabilisation. Exogenous attempts at economic development were 
largely irrelevant and dwarfed by the scale of indigenous private sector investment, 
which has helped maintain stability in the medium term. 
Chapter 5 discussed processes of Exogenous Stabilisation attempted in Village A, 
Nahr-i Sarraj district, Helmand province. It argued that the tactical success in 
stabilisation that was achieved by ISAF in the security sphere was beyond the writ of 
the host nation and was irrelevant in terms of stability, because it would not support 
strategic victory in a COIN campaign. This disconnect between the Afghan 
government’s willingness and capability and that of ISAF to engage the Upper Gereshk 
Valley undermined all exogenous efforts at stabilisation in the area. Politics trumped 
all other factors in understanding past and present instability. Development was not 
simply irrelevant but in all likelihood attempts to engage the population in 
development activities led to displacement and the deaths of some participants. 
Importantly, recent development interventions had little understanding of the long-
term impacts of development through the HAVA and whilst the idea of a social 
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contract being formed through development was advanced by interveners it had little 
local resonance. Local conceptions of stability were rooted in the need to assert order, 
or the rules of the game, so that the population and their political leaders could be 
held to account within a generally acceptable framework. Stability was also identified 
as a second rate goal, which was trumped by a desire for peace. 
Chapter 6 presented an alternative perspective by interrogating processes of 
Insurgent Stabilisation in Gajul VDC, Rolpa district, Nepal. It argued that many of the 
limitations of the interventions in statebuilding, COIN and development to create 
stability applied to insurgent forces as well as host nation governments and by 
extrapolation to exogenous interveners. The Maoists were able to provide sufficient 
security and promote a functioning governance system, but this was largely by the 
application of substantial force. Development played an incidental role in the 
promotion of a dead stability, and the overzealous attempts at ideologically driven 
social and economic development by the Maoists have unravelled since the signing of 
the CPA. Over the long term, the promotion of education can be seen as a 
destabilising force because a significant proportion of senior Maoist leadership in the 
VDC and wider district emerged from the education system. The national conflict was 
appropriated by some members of the local leadership who used the conflict to their 
own ends and this challenges the idea that stability can be addressed through 
population-centric interventions; in Gajul it was found to be amongst the local 
leaders. The state in Liwang, the district headquarters, demonstrated that attempts to 
provide ‘development’ in areas of extreme flux are liable to corruption and misuse. 
Chapter 7 explained how in Haraiya VDC, Bara district, Nepal, no overall control was 
secured by either side. The response of the community was to form a self-defence 
group which led to a process of Failed Self-Stabilisation as the group was unable to 
expand stability beyond a small area around the main market and the region was 
plagued by a number of criminal and politically-orientated armed groups during and 
after the conflict. The Nepali state ceded territory to the Maoists despite the weak 
challenge posed by the PLA in Bara district, in large part because a substantial 
proportion of the population simply removed their support for the state to avoid 
being drawn into the conflict. However, the Maoists lacked sufficient local support or 
personnel to provide robust governance, and leaders from the Panchayat era re-
established themselves to provide a modicum of governance, which involved 
maintaining a basic link to the state bureaucracy to ensure health and education 
services continued to function. There was extensive development programming in the 
region which was not linked by respondents to stability formation. Additionally, the 
poor record of Maoist mobilisation amongst disadvantaged communities, was linked 
to their association with the Pahadi settlers rather than the attempts at development 
which targeted the Madeshi Dalit communities.  
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Chapter 8 presented an analysis across the field sites interrogating five themes,747 
which had been introduced in Chapter 3 as a means of establishing the stability 
paradigm; these themes demonstrated that previous experiences of stability were not 
necessarily supported by democratic governance systems with capable bureaucracies 
and accountable security forces – core tenets of the Liberal paradigm of intervention. 
Instead, stability in the past had often been enforced through processes and systems 
which are locally acceptable for parts of the population. The challenge of supporting 
stability is that the exogenous interventions in the field sites have not been 
compatible with experiences of state formation and may have made instability chronic 
by ensuring that the states which are supported have become dependencies on the 
international system and regional neighbours. The chapter also argued that the 
findings from the research could be extrapolated to a number of other areas which 
demonstrated similar characteristics, including states which politically and fiscally 
depended on regional neighbours and the international system to maintain their 
sovereignty with significant rural populations reliant on agricultural production. 
From amongst the interventions only a limited number of activities seem to be 
connected to stability formation and maintenance. First and foremost it is the 
combination of local and national politics that produces stability. However this cannot 
be achieved without the population being able to meet their most basic humanitarian 
needs and a modicum of personal security; this is a significant and reduced conception 
of intervention which would suggest expansive attempts at COIN, or development, 
may be unhelpful in promoting stability. Despite the primacy of politics, which was 
noted in the original stability hypothesis, the analysis argued that the formation of 
local political legitimacy is insufficient and cannot provide stability without national 
political stability: the two are symbiotic and one without the other will lead to the 
other being unstable. In the final theme the chapter argued that interveners often 
justify their actions as being stabilising but with little empirical evidence to support 
their claims. Nor do they identify an understanding of what local conceptions of 
stability actually are. 
This disconnect means that exogenous support to stabilisation is likely to be 
misunderstood by local communities who in fact demonstrated a conception of 
stability that is both hierarchical and operationally limited, focusing on core political 
agreements at both national and local levels, the requirement for basic security and 
the meeting of fundamental needs through humanitarian support. It concluded that 
the original stability hypothesis proposed in Chapter 3 was insufficient and suggested 
a modified version of the stability hypothesis; “Stability is driven by both local and 
                                                     
747 1) periods of stability; 2) culture and context; 3) mode of intervention; 4) political 
legitimacy and; 5) conceptions of stability. 
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national political settlements which are produced through processes of political 
legitimacy formation which can be democratic or otherwise; these processes can be 
supported by limited humanitarian and security interventions and maintained by 
economic growth.” 
Chapter 9 built on the revised stability hypothesis to interrogate whether the primary 
modes of Liberal interventions – statebuilding, COIN and development – were able to 
provide stability. It concluded that none of the current theories are able to articulate 
interventions which would be stabilising; indeed, they are all theories of 
transformation and counterrevolution and are a priori destabilising. Despite this, both 
statebuilding and COIN correctly identify the primacy of politics though they are 
bound by their Liberal heritage to conceptions of democratic governance and they fail 
to overcome the limitations of exporting Liberal European philosophical traditions to 
territories in extreme flux. These limitations led to a proposed way of understanding 
instability through the stability hypothesis which could provide a theory of stability. In 
this theory stability is rooted in the connections within and between social groups, 
political leaders and the state, and their ability to access security, development and 
economic goods within the confines of their political and philosophical traditions. 
Exogenous support could then be understood to be stabilising only to the degree to 
which it strengthens existing relationships or promotes new ones. 
Main findings 
In conclusion, stability as an organising principle of intervention that Western states 
use to articulate their security interests is not fully compatible with traditional 
political, security and development activities usually mobilised to address problems 
arising from ‘fragile’ states. In particular the forms of intervention, most recently 
articulated through statebuilding, COIN and development, may not be stabilising and 
may undermine stability (and each other) in pursuit of a multi-track process of change 
embodied through modern Liberal interventionist approaches to managing the 
international system. Therefore the stability paradigm is only partially extant because, 
whilst it may be a stated desire of the guardians of international order, it does not 
appear to be supported by the interventions those guardians use to maintain order.  
The case studies from Afghanistan and Nepal challenge the theoretical underpinnings 
of interventions in the international system, which have been articulated through 
statebuilding, COIN and development and whether they can support stability at all. 
These three approaches do not all lead to stability and may in fact undermine each 
other and therefore may, to some extent, be self-defeating. Whilst there are a range 
of tools and processes available to the international community, the interventions in 
both cases have been to support or attempt a simultaneous multi-track 
transformation of societies and political entities in the search for ‘stability’. In both 
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cases these have failed, in large part because the ‘other’ (the host nations), have been 
unwilling to follow the multifarious paths laid out before them, often with good 
reason. Instead, the political elites have prevaricated, resisted and shaped the political 
changes and conflicts of the last generation for their own, at times parochial, 
interests. 
In the case studies stability is driven not through programmes but instead rests on a 
combination of political agreements at both the national and local levels and is 
supported by the structure of the economy and access to resources. Exogenous 
support to stability has been limited to structuring political environments and 
supporting the restitution of communities on their land through humanitarian action. 
This conception of a stability paradigm with a hierarchical approach to activities could 
be useful in exploring new ways of understanding fragile environments and the theory 
of stability posited at the end of the previous chapter acts as a challenge to further 
interrogate the relevance of stability and stabilisation to intervention, peace and 
conflict in the 21st Century. 
Local respondents’ conceptions of stability and their experiences of conflict and 
instability have forged an understanding and appreciation of stability which is quite 
distinct from the conceptions derived from Liberal interveners. Their priorities were 
more limited, less transformative, and more focused on the protection of life and the 
continuation of basic livelihoods in the context of exceptionally volatile political 
relationships both locally and nationally. External interventions were largely 
misunderstood and considered to be irrelevant even when they could be 
implemented effectively. Stability is not as robust as peace, but it is an environment in 
which the respondents were familiar and experienced many times over the years of 
conflict, and it was sufficient to allow them and their communities to remain where 
they were as they attempted to avoid, for the most part, being drawn in to the 
conflicts raging around them. 
A significant proportion of activity funded and implemented by interveners including 
external actors, states and insurgents, bears little relation to stability. Statebuilding 
approaches transform the nature of the state and insist on technical reforms and 
democratic governance mechanisms which may or may not resonate with local 
decision making or historical experiences of state formation. COIN theory correctly 
identifies the primacy of politics in addressing insurgencies but advocates a 
destabilising form of comprehensive counterrevolution which may promote 
instability. Development theory bears little relationship to the drivers of conflict and 
insurgencies locally, and mechanisms to connect governance systems and 
development spending may undermine rather than support the state. Furthermore, 
the research has confirmed critiques of this comprehensive approach, highlighting 
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that elements within it are often working in contradiction (see p. 38; Patrick & Brown, 
2007, pp. 6-8). This critique has been extended by linking the contradictions back to 
theoretical and philosophical tensions within Liberal interventionism. 
The research findings challenge the paradigm of Liberal interventionism. Whilst 
stability provides a way of re-casting interventions, the interventionist tendencies 
inherent within Liberalism - which have affected both peacebuilding and statebuilding 
particularly - would not be addressed by asserting the value of stability within the 
national security priorities of the states who structure the international system. The 
lenses would remain dominant, until a point when the non-Western states were able 
and willing to resource interventions which would constrain some of the more 
ideological components of Liberal interventionism. These are significant issues 
because they build on nascent critiques of hearts and minds operations and consent-
winning activities and interrogates the extent to which they affected stability.748 
Furthermore, the research has extended the stability debate to the village level 
whereas before it had been focused at the national level or at the next level down in 
sub-national governance.749 The answers to the two research questions suggested 
that the interventions’ connection to the political and security foundations of stability 
was limited. Finally, the analysis prompted many questions which are discussed below 
regarding further areas of research, and provided an initial starting point to re-dress 
some of the ideologically driven but unfounded assertions made about a range of 
activities that support stability which are termed ‘stabilisation’.  
Implications of findings 
There are several implications from the findings, some of which require further 
research (discussed below) including: a potential way of recasting the debate and 
understanding of fragility and instability, a hierarchical prioritisation of stabilisation 
activities and, most significantly, the beginnings of a debate about what is the lowest 
common denominator of stability amongst the states in the international system. 
Based on the stability hypothesis, the research has been able to outline a theory of 
stability which could provide a reinvigorated way of analysing contexts affected by 
political threats such as insurgencies. Focusing questions of stability around the 
number and nature of connections between social groups, political elites and the 
state, and situating those connections within both their political environment and the 
security, economic and development constraints they face, allows interveners to 
conceive of different and hopefully more effective interventions which would begin to 
address the interests of the international community, the needs of the population and 
                                                     
748 See for example Gordon, 2010; Fishstein & Wilder, 2012; Wilder A., 2010; Wilder A., 
2010a; and discussed in Chapter 2 (p. 52) 
749 For example Lawson et al, 2010, pp. xvii-xix. 
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the demands of current and emerging political elites. This would move the 
international community away from focusing on the state as a threat to international 
security and technical approaches to remedying its perceived deficiencies; instead, it 
would highlight the cultural and historical norms of statehood and stability within 
states and territories, allowing for a more nuanced way of understanding the threats 
to the international system. Accepting a degree of ambiguity, a degree of instability, 
and ceasing the search for an undefined end-point of ‘stable-ness’, would promote a 
less ideological, more rounded debate about the needs of states to provide certain 
goods within the international system and their populations. 
For the interveners, at least, the stability hypothesis also provides a rationale for 
limiting and focusing interventions on a proscribed list of activities in place of the 
expansive, all-encompassing approaches advocated in recent years. This would involve 
limiting exogenous support within the political sphere of the host-nation, focusing less 
on technical governance innovations, and increasingly on political settlements and the 
basic protection of the population in terms of physical safety and security. This would 
still allow humanitarian action to fulfil the humanitarian imperative to protect life but 
would avoid interventions from attempting to revolutionise and transform societies 
that are under increasing stress from processes of globalisation and the demands of 
their own populations. Longer term support would then focus on economic growth, 
though the findings would suggest that this is most efficiently generated at a sub-
national level through local level capital, rather than foreign, investment. 
A final geo-strategic implication of the research is the way it highlights how the 
competing lenses of stability embodied in UN resolutions, and multi-lateral strategies 
and national security documents, allows a dysfunctional form of intervention to be 
carried out. By implication, extrapolating the stability hypothesis and theory to the 
international arena could allow states to identify their minimum requirements for 
stability in the international system. These are not insignificant implications and must 
be tempered with the limitations of the research and the requirement for further 
research to validate or confound the findings of this thesis. 
Limitations of the research 
Despite the breadth of theoretical discussion and the variation across the field sites 
there are several clear limitations on the findings. Some of these stem from the 
research methodology and were discussed in Chapter 3 (p. 100), which included the 
nature of case study research and the inevitable restrictions of attempting to 
understanding complex and subjective terms such as peace and stability across several 
languages. These pre-identified limitations are primarily methodological and can be 
addressed in future studies as suggested in the following section, which would assist 
in moving the stability and stabilisation debates forward; however, limitations also 
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emerged during the research, analysis and discussion of the findings in Chapters 8 and 
9, which deserve specific mention here. These issues include how the research 
findings can be extrapolated to other geographical areas as well as other threats to 
stability; the need for further theoretical interrogation; the incomplete form of the 
stability hypothesis and theory; and the relationship between the stability theory and 
Liberal philosophy. 
As discussed in Chapter 8 the site selection means that caution needs to be applied in 
extrapolating the findings of the research. The field sites are primarily rural 
agricultural areas though often with a large urban centre within a few hours’ travel. 
There is some light industry present but for the most part the areas are not 
industrialised and some elements of the communities are barely part of the cash 
economy though, where there is significant liquidity, it is often in the illicit economies. 
This rural focus was made primarily because of limitations on time and space, given 
that the inclusion of urban areas would have increased the number of case studies 
and variables that required investigation. All the sites have been affected by conflict 
and have had a number of interventions carried out within them, whether they were 
humanitarian, development, political or security related, and they do currently have 
some form of state presence either through the provision of services or security forces 
(excluding Village A).  
Both Afghanistan and Nepal are poor states dependent on aid and are unwilling or 
unable to resist the interventions of powerful states including their neighbours. In 
both countries the political elites have struggled to address the conflicts that have 
raged in their territories for many years. While a number of other states fit many, if 
not all, of these criteria, care should be taken with simply extrapolating from the 
trends seen in the data. However, it is worth dwelling on the fact that, as identified in 
Chapter 8, there are a number of states which have largely agricultural economies, 
with fractured political elites and incomplete political transitions dependent on the 
international system and regional neighbours.750 This suggests that the implications of 
the research could be considered to be potentially relevant to a number of other 
locations. 
Further, intra-state conflicts are in fact relatively common, and whilst the rate of intra-
state conflict is not a focus of the study it is worth noting that the Uppsala University 
                                                     
750 Including many of the “fragile and conflict-affected” states that have endorsed the 
recently proposed New Deal on Statebuilding including; Afghanistan, Burundi, Central 
African Republic, Chad, Democratic Republic of Congo, Guinea Bissau, Guinea, Haiti, 
Liberia, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Sudan, Timor-Leste, Togo. See 
HLF-4, 2012b. 
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Conflict Dataset counted twenty-nine states with intra-state conflict in 2011.751 
Though not all intra-state conflicts can be characterised as insurgencies (Sarkees, 
2010, pp. 5-7), a number of those clearly are ongoing insurgencies which would allow 
the findings to be extrapolated to those areas, in particular when cross-referenced 
against the states identified by the Busan High Level Panel on Aid Effectiveness as 
“fragile and conflict affected” which are targets of statebuilding interventions.752 
This does, however, point to a limitation that requires further exploration with regard 
to the nature of political conflicts and stability, which has been the focus of this study, 
and whether threats to stability which have less significant, or no political content, 
should be conceived of, analysed and responded to in a different manner. The 
introduction argued that the policy of stabilisation was meant to address threats to 
stability, which included states unable to control their territory, respond to climate 
change, eliminate criminal and terrorist networks and contain nuclear proliferation (p. 
1). Evidently not all of the aforementioned threats are capitalised on by insurgencies, 
in particular climate change, and not all insurgencies are of significance to the 
international community. The findings on insurgencies suggest the overarching 
primacy of political action and the broad failure of both host nations and the 
international community to be able to provide the requisite political leadership and 
vision to address the threat posed by the insurgencies. This undoubtedly would be 
different when addressing threats which are primarily a political and further work 
would be required to consider the implications of stabilisation activities in those areas. 
The second major set of limitations relate to the theories interrogated during the 
analysis: the proposal of the stability hypothesis and theory and the links this has to 
Liberal philosophy. As stressed previously (see p. 266), the selection of the three 
theories which have been tested during the thesis was somewhat arbitrary, because 
within statebuilding, COIN and development there are a number of competing 
theories and strands of argumentation amongst academics and practitioners. A 
selection of theories had to be made to provide a focus for the analysis and as argued 
                                                     
751 The full list includes: Afghanistan, Algeria, Cambodia (Kampuchea), Thailand, 
Central African Republic, Colombia, Ethiopia, India, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Ivory Coast, Libya, 
Mauritania, Myanmar (Burma), Nigeria, Pakistan, Philippines, Russia (Soviet Union), 
Rwanda, Senegal, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Syria, Tajikistan, Thailand, Turkey, 
Uganda, Yemen. In total there were thirty-seven conflict entries, states with more 
than one conflict were only counted once and one conflict involving the United States 
was excluded, UCDP, 2011. 
752 Using 2011 as the base year five states appear in both lists (Afghanistan, Central 
African Republic, Sudan/South Sudan, Somalia,). If the analysis was to include all 
states that had been affected by insurgencies and statebuilding interventions in the 
last decade it would include most of the states identified in Busan, see HLF-4, 2012b. 
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earlier this has been defended on the basis that the selection of the three theories has 
been relevant to both of the case studies. 
This analysis can however only be limited because there has not been space to delve 
in to other variants of the schools of thought on how to conceive of a COIN campaign, 
how to structure statebuilding or how to develop poor rural communities. Whilst the 
theories chosen represent the mainstream it is feasible that a different combination of 
non-mainstream theories in each area may respond to the stability hypothesis in a 
different manner which would challenge the notion that the stability hypothesis lays a 
platform from which Liberal philosophy can be challenged. 
Subsequently, the stability hypothesis developed in Chapter 8 and the outline of a 
theory of stability provided in Chapter 9 should be seen in the context of the practical 
limitations discussed above, and the limitations of the theoretical discussion. Further 
work is required to test the hypothesis, refine or challenge it in other contexts, and by 
applying other theoretical frameworks to it before the suggested hypothesis can be 
seen to be robust. Similarly, whilst the theory of stability may provide a framework to 
understand stability, it would need to be tested in order to understand whether it 
provides a coherent and useful approach to issues of stability. Both of these 
limitations suggest caution should be applied in using the current form of the stability 
hypothesis to challenge Liberal philosophy. The Liberal tradition is a significant corpus 
of work, and whilst the stability hypothesis can be used to challenge Liberal thinking, 
until it is demonstrated to be extant in more locations and conflicts it will be difficult 
to suggest that it has identified a weakness in the application of Liberal 
interventionism. Even when these conditions are fulfilled it must be recognised that it 
would require a significant philosophical debate and evolution to challenge the Liberal 
tradition in this regard. 
Recommendations for future work 
This final section suggests some of the initial steps that would be required to address 
the gaps and limitations discussed above. There are a number of research implications 
that need to be considered were the stability theory to be tested. If one were to test a 
theory of stability one would have to consider social, political and economic ties 
within and between groups, which would require advancing the ‘audit’ approach used 
in this thesis to move to a more systematic and comparable research tool which could 
consistently combine both qualitative and quantitative data. Furthermore, to fully 
understand the implications of time on stability, both in terms of the impact of 
interventions as well as the differences between chronic and acute instability, the 
research design would need to be carried out over a longitudinal time frame. It seems 
likely that, at a macro level (the nation state), some secondary data will already be 
available. More work is required at the micro level, particularly in testing the hierarchy 
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of components in the stability definition. It would also be instructive to utilise an 
alternative method of collecting and analysing data, moving away from semi-
structured qualitative interviews to an approach which can be more easily replicated. 
Two significant variables require further investigation: firstly, it would be instructive to 
test the stability theory on a political threats, such as natural disasters, to identify 
whether this would challenge either the hierarchy or theory of stability. In particular, 
do natural disasters change the connections within and between the key stakeholders 
in ways which are distinct from the changes made as a result of political threats. 
Secondly, the cases here focus on small states, without substantial economic or 
political importance in the international system in their own right, which are 
dependent on the international system. It would be instructive to understand whether 
the same dynamics apply in larger states (such as Pakistan) dependent on the 
international system which are facing insurgencies as well as large states who do not 
rely on the international system and apply very different approaches to dealing with 
insurgencies, such as India or Russia. 
As well as the potential to test a monitoring system for stability, there are two areas 
of conceptual and philosophical work that would be useful in interrogating the 
stability theory. The stability theory’s suggestion that reducing the level of 
international intervention may result in better, more stable, outcomes requires 
counter-factual testing. Astri Surhke has made a similar point specifically in regard to 
Nepal (Suhrke, 2009, pp. 44-6), though it would be instructive to test the validity of 
this argument in other contexts to provide a robust data set of what types of actions 
may be stabilising and what are not.  The limitation is that for the most part 
interventions are often comprehensive and multi-faceted and identifying such 
examples is difficult. Finally, Liberal interventionism will continue to reinvent itself, as 
it has done over the last two decades, and a robust philosophical debate is required to 
identify the tensions between Liberalism as applied in Western states and Liberalism 
as applied in other contexts. Examining a further set of tensions between Liberal 
interventions and local political philosophies, as a way of exploring the significance of 
interventions on local culture, context and history, would also be useful. 
Policy implications 
During 2012 several initiatives have sought to understand the factors which have 
caused state fragility to persist in countries affected by conflict. This has included the 
Busan initiative, which agreed a New Deal on statebuilding and peacebuilding in 
February 2012, and the OECD’s investigation into global factors which influence 
conflict and fragility (OECD, 2012, pp. 3-7). Emerging from these processes is an 
understanding that Liberalism and associated globalisation is as much a cause of 
instability as a potential avenue for addressing fragility. The policy discussions 
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emerging from these debates are currently incomplete but include promoting more 
accountability by donor states, understanding the dark side of globalisation, the 
stresses that Liberal trade and fiscal reforms place on fragile states, and the limited 
degree to which externally funded aid actually supports economic growth. It has taken 
nearly two decades for the Liberal interveners to comprehend the limitations and risks 
associated with exogenous action. As a result they may be moving towards 
interventions which focus on promoting legitimate politics, basic security and justice 
provision, employment and fiscal independence (4th High Level Forum on Aid 
Effectiveness, 2012, p. 2). 
These are potentially significant changes, but the current direction of the debate is 
less radical than what is suggested by the data, which would entail a re-orientation of 
exogenous support to bolster locally acceptable and achievable political settlements. 
These actions would include: 
1) Substantially reducing aid to dependent states over time as a means to 
increasing their own legitimacy and independent action 
2) Slowing the pace of economic liberalisation in areas where regional economies 
are more significant than the wider global economic system, and focusing 
external support on integrating regional economies to promote growth 
3) Bolstering mechanisms for support to civilian non-governmental and military 
capabilities in order to respond to humanitarian crises 
4) Limiting the scope of UN Security Council resolutions on interventions in fragile 
states, in order to focus on maintaining fundamental services to fulfil 
humanitarian principles but resist expansive attempts at comprehensive 
transformations of other states until there is a coherent and stable political 
settlement with which the international community can engage. 
 
 
دش مامت 
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Post-script 
In spring 2012 I returned to Kabul, Helmand and Nahr-i Sarraj district in Afghanistan as 
part of a transition review on behalf of the Helmand PRT’s Head of Mission. My remit, 
to identify priority areas for the PRT to support the stability of the Afghan state in 
Helmand before it closes down in 2014 was broad and in some senses provided the 
opportunity for a real life application of what I had learned from the research 
methodology applied in this thesis with the advantage of being able to work in a team 
who brought a range of skills and experience to the data collection and analysis. 
Throughout the Joint Transition Review civilian and military staff were concerned that 
the years of interventions and the rhetoric of progress did not match the reality of the 
exceptionally costly, hard fought and fragile gains which could be wiped away by a 
messy transition and an Afghan political elite whose support for the ISAF mission was 
incomplete. 
Kalakan’s leaders continue to watch events in Kabul and southern Afghanistan warily, 
positioning themselves for what many believe will be renewed conflict after 2014. In 
Aqa Sarai, the village leaders are grappling with how to deal with the environmental 
impact of the smoke from the brick kilns established in recent years. The leaders of 
Village A, in Helmand, are scattered and those living in Kabul remain in squalor, 
abandoned by patrons and shunned by the President and his aides, because the 
reality of Helmandi IDPs living in Kabul would undermine the narrative of progress 
towards the transition being promoted by ISAF and the Afghan government. The 
village itself remains outside of state or ISAF control. 
Nepal too faces an uncertain future. Caught between the behemoths of India and 
China; its leaders have struggled for years to complete the Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement, and the appointment of Prime Minister Baburam Bhattarai in August 2011 
presented what may be the last realistic hope of completing the CPA in its current 
form before the tensions under the surface of the Maoists’ party and the pressures 
from armed groups becomes greater. Ultimately, despite the long-standing 
engagement of the international community and regional neighbours, Nepal faces an 
unstable future, as it struggles to address two critical strategic issues: how best to use 
its strategic water resources and how to control its porous borders. 
Whilst the Maoists in Rolpa are calling for the People’s War to be restarted, Gajul has 
remained peaceful and stable, with little opportunity available for political debate, 
allowing Gajul’s leaders to concentrate on how best to use the development spending 
that has been flowing into the area for several years. Bara remains fragile with the 
population threatened by armed groups, whilst those in Haraiya VDC for the most part 
are simply seeking to avoid conflict and get on with their lives. The development gravy 
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train continues to be looted through the all-party mechanism and there are 
widespread complaints about the iniquity of the political settlement. 
In all the field sites the arguments about the nature of the state and its relationship 
with the population are far from over and they remain significantly, and dangerously, 
reliant on the international system and regional powers. For the people living in the 
four villages there will be periods of instability in the future; whether external 
interveners can help stabilise them will depend on whether we can learn from the 
mistakes of the past.  
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Appendix A - Letter to respondents 
Dear Sir / Madam, 
Re: Request for interview 
I am a PhD Researcher at Cranfield University in the UK where I am looking in to the 
impacts of external interventions, often called stabilisation, on stability and legitimacy 
in conflict situations. I would be very interested in interviewing you as part of my 
research as I believe that you will be able to provide unique and important insights 
which are relevant to my research area. 
My PhD is called “Understanding interdependencies in Stabilisation in Afghanistan and 
Nepal”. I am carrying out interviews with over 100 respondents in 4 case studies in 
Afghanistan and Nepal. Some of my respondents will be from local communities, 
including local informal leaders and economic actors. I will also be interviewing 
relevant national leaders in Kabul and Kathmandu along with a selection of 
international actors from a range of NGOs, bi- and multi-lateral institutions and 
embassies. 
I am based at the Centre for Security Sector Management (CSSM), at Cranfield 
University. My supervisor is Dr. Ann Fitz-Gerald. If you wish to contact my department 
details can be found on the Cranfield University website www.cranfield.ac.uk  
If you agree to the interview I would like to ask your permission to be able to record 
the interview, if you wish I can send you an English transcript at a later date. If you 
prefer not to be recorded I will take notes during the interview. Unless you instruct 
me otherwise I will assume that you do not want to be identified in the writing up of 
the research and interviewees will be assigned separate alpha-numeric codes which 
will be used in any material produced from the research whether that is in verbal 
presentations or written text. 
The range of issues I would like to discuss may take 2 hours to go through with you in 
the interview, though some interviews may be shorter. Most of the interview 
questions will be about specific interventions by external actors or the state in a 
specific location (from the 4 case studies). I may also ask you about your experiences 
of the state and a range of interveners over the last 20-30 years. Many of the 
questions will be about perceptions and your view with regard to the state, the 
community and/or the intervener. It is not necessary for you to have complete 
knowledge of the interventions we discuss as the perceptions of those processes are 
as important as what actually happened. 
In a few cases additional interviews may be useful and I will endeavour to tell you as 
early as possible whether I think additional sessions may be helpful and to ask your 
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permission for each subsequent interview. During the interviews you may decide not 
to answer a question or to halt the interview at your discretion. 
I look forward to hearing from you soon. Yours, 
Christian Dennys 
  
The search for stability through stabilisation: Case studies from Afghanistan and Nepal 
306 
Appendix B – Interviewee List 
 
S/n 
Country 
Case Study 
Interviewee 
Location 
Date Language 
1 Afghanistan Kabul 07/10/2010 English 
2 Afghanistan Aqa Sarai 10/10/2010 Dari 
3 Afghanistan Aqa Sarai 10/10/2010 Dari 
4 Afghanistan Aqa Sarai 12/10/2010 Dari 
5 Afghanistan Aqa Sarai 12/10/2010 Dari 
6 Afghanistan Kabul 13/10/2010 Dari 
7 Afghanistan Aqa Sarai 14/10/2010 Dari 
8 Afghanistan Aqa Sarai 14/10/2010 Dari 
9 Afghanistan Kabul 16/10/2010 English 
10 Afghanistan Aqa Sarai 17/10/2010 Dari 
11 Afghanistan Aqa Sarai 17/10/2010 Dari 
12 Afghanistan Aqa Sarai 17/10/2010 Dari 
13 Afghanistan Kalakan 18/10/2010 Dari 
14 Afghanistan Aqa Sarai 18/10/2010 Dari 
15 Afghanistan Kabul 19/10/2010 Dari 
16 Afghanistan Kabul 19/10/2010 English 
17 Afghanistan Kabul 19/10/2010 Dari 
18 Afghanistan Kalakan 20/10/2010 Dari 
19 Afghanistan Mushwani 20/10/2010 Dari 
20 Afghanistan Mushwani 21/10/2010 Dari 
21 Afghanistan Kalakan 25/10/2010 Dari 
22 Afghanistan Kalakan 25/10/2010 Dari 
23 Afghanistan Kalakan 10/11/2010 Dari 
24 Afghanistan Mushwani 13/11/2010 Dari 
25 Afghanistan Kalakan 13/11/2010 English 
26 Afghanistan Kalakan 13/11/2010 Dari 
27 Afghanistan Bagrami 14/11/2010 Pashto 
28 Afghanistan Bagrami 15/11/2010 Pashto 
29 Afghanistan Bagrami 17/11/2010 Pashto 
30 Afghanistan Bagrami 18/11/2010 Pashto 
31 Afghanistan Kalakan 19/11/2010 Dari 
32 Afghanistan Bagrami 21/11/2010 Pashto 
33 Afghanistan Kabul 27/11/2010 English 
34 Afghanistan Kabul 28/11/2010 English 
35 Afghanistan Kabul 28/11/2010 English 
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36 Afghanistan Kabul 29/11/2010 English 
37 Afghanistan Kabul 29/11/2010 English 
38 Afghanistan Kabul 12/02/2010 English 
39 Afghanistan Kabul 12/03/2010 English 
40 Afghanistan Washington 12/03/2010 English 
41 Afghanistan Gereshk 12/04/2010 Pashto 
42 Afghanistan Kabul 12/04/2010 English 
43 Afghanistan Gereshk 12/05/2010 Pashto 
44 Afghanistan Nad-I Ali 12/05/2010 Pashto 
45 Afghanistan Kandahar 12/05/2010 English 
46 Afghanistan Gershk 12/06/2010 Pashto 
47 Afghanistan Kabul 12/07/2010 English 
48 Afghanistan Gereshk 12/08/2010 Pashto 
49 Afghanistan Kabul 12/08/2010 Pashto 
50 Afghanistan Kabul 12/08/2010 English 
51 Afghanistan Kabul 12/09/2010 English 
52 Afghanistan Kabul 12/09/2010 English 
53 Afghanistan Kabul 12/11/2010 Pashto 
54 Afghanistan Kabul 12/12/2010 English 
55 Afghanistan Kabul 12/12/2010 English 
56 Afghanistan Nahr-i Sarraj 13/12/2010 Pashto 
57 Afghanistan Lashkar Gah 13/12/2010 Dari 
58 Afghanistan Gereshk 14/12/2010 Pashto 
59 Afghanistan Kabul 15/12/2010 Pashto 
60 Afghanistan Copenhagen 20/07/2011 English 
61 Nepal Kathmandu 26/07/2011 Nepali 
62 Nepal Kathmandu 09/08/2011 English 
63 Nepal Kathmandu 09/08/2011 Nepali 
64 Nepal Kathmandu 10/08/2011 Nepali 
65 Nepal Kathmandu 11/08/2011 English 
66 Nepal Kathmandu 12/08/2011 English 
67 Nepal Kathmandu 15/08/2011 English 
68 Nepal Kathmandu 16/08/2011 English 
69 Nepal Nawalparasi 18/08/2011 Nepali 
70 Nepal Haraiya 23/08/2011 Nepali 
71 Nepal Haraiya 23/08/2011 Nepali 
72 Nepal Haraiya 23/08/2011 Nepali 
73 Nepal Haraiya 24/08/2011 Bojpuri 
74 Nepal Haraiya 24/08/2011 Bojpuri 
75 Nepal Haraiya 24/08/2011 Bojpuri 
76 Nepal Haraiya 24/08/2011 Nepali 
77 Nepal Haraiya 24/08/2011 Bojpuri 
78 Nepal Haraiya 24/08/2011 Bojpuri 
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79 Nepal Haraiya 25/08/2011 Nepali 
80 Nepal Haraiya 25/08/2011 Nepali 
81 Nepal Haraiya 25/08/2011 Nepali 
82 Nepal Haraiya 25/08/2011 Nepali 
83 Nepal Haraiya 25/08/2011 Nepali 
84 Nepal Haraiya 26/08/2011 Nepali 
85 Nepal Haraiya 26/08/2011 Nepali 
86 Nepal Haraiya 26/08/2011 Nepali 
87 Nepal Haraiya 26/08/2011 Bojpuri 
88 Nepal Kalaiya 28/08/2011 Nepali 
89 Nepal Kalaiya 28/08/2011 Nepali 
90 Nepal Kalaiya 28/08/2011 Nepali 
91 Nepal Kalaiya 28/08/2011 English 
92 Nepal Kalaiya 28/08/2011 Nepali 
93 Nepal Kalaiya 28/08/2011 English 
94 Nepal Kalaiya 28/08/2011 Nepali 
95 Nepal Kalaiya 28/08/2011 Nepali 
96 Nepal Kalaiya 29/08/2011 English 
97 Nepal Kalaiya 29/08/2011 Nepali 
98 Nepal Kathmandu 19/09/2011 Nepali 
99 Nepal Kathmandu 19/09/2011 Nepali 
100 Nepal Kathmandu 19/09/2011 Nepali 
101 Nepal Kathmandu 19/09/2011 English 
102 Nepal Kathmandu 27/09/2011 English 
103 Nepal Kathmandu 27/09/2011 English 
104 Nepal Gorahi 10/10/2011 Nepali 
105 Nepal Gorahi 11/10/2011 Nepali 
106 Nepal Liwang 12/10/2011 Nepali 
107 Nepal Liwang 12/10/2011 Nepali 
108 Nepal Liwang 12/10/2011 Nepali 
109 Nepal Liwang 12/10/2011 Nepali 
110 Nepal Gajul 13/10/2011 Nepali 
111 Nepal Gajul 13/10/2011 Nepali 
112 Nepal Gajul 14/10/2011 Nepali 
113 Nepal Gajul 14/10/2011 Nepali 
114 Nepal Gajul 14/10/2011 Nepali 
115 Nepal Gajul 14/10/2011 Nepali 
117 Nepal Gajul 15/10/2011 Nepali 
118 Nepal Gajul 15/10/2011 Nepali 
119 Nepal Gajul 15/10/2011 Nepali 
120 Nepal Gajul 15/10/2011 Nepali 
121 Nepal Gajul 15/10/2011 Nepali 
122 Nepal Gajul 15/10/2011 Nepali 
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123 Nepal Gajul 16/10/2011 Nepali 
124 Nepal Gajul 16/10/2011 Nepali 
125 Nepal Gajul 16/10/2011 Nepali 
126 Nepal Liwang 17/10/2011 Nepali 
127 Nepal Liwang 18/10/2011 Nepali 
128 Nepal Liwang 18/10/2011 Nepali 
129 Nepal Gorahi 19/10/2011 Nepali 
130 Nepal Gorahi 19/10/2011 Nepali 
131 Nepal Kathmandu 08/08/2011 English 
132 Nepal Kathmandu 21/10/2011 English 
133 Nepal Kathmandu 23/10/2011 English 
134 Nepal Kathmandu 23/10/2011 English 
135 Nepal Kathmandu 24/10/2011 English 
136 Nepal Kathmandu 25/10/2011 English 
137 Nepal Kathmandu 25/10/2011 Nepali 
138 Nepal Kathmandu 26/10/2011 English 
139 Nepal Kathmandu 30/10/2011 Nepali 
140 Nepal Rolpa 31/10/2011 Nepali 
141 Nepal Kathmandu 10/11/2011 English 
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Appendix C - Field work timeline 
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Appendix D - Risk Assessment 
Note: 1 is low 5 is high 
Risk Further Description 
Probability 
(1-5) 
Impact 
(1-5) 
Mitigation strategy 
Probability 
(1-5) 
Impact 
(1-5) 
Methodological       
Deadlines are missed 
for the delivery of the 
Literature review and 
methodology chapter 
 3 5 
An early start has already been made on a literature 
review with elements from the paper ‘Contextualising 
Stabilisation’ that can be recycled in to the new 
literature review.  
2 5 
Significant revisions are 
recommended by 
review panel 
 3 5 
Two months of additional revision and preparation 
time have been included in the project plan 
3 3 
Site selection is 
affected by insecurity 
in Afghanistan 
 3 4 
Two sites, Kunduz and Bamyan have been chosen in 
addition to sites near Kabul to ensure regular access to 
at least two field sites 
2 3 
Site selection is 
delayed Nepal 
Delays to travel are unlikely, 
though it may take longer than 
expected to move forward with 
site selection on the ground 
because I have not been before 
3 4 
Booking flexible tickets to ensure I can stay longer if 
necessary 
2 3 
Physical       
Sickness  
It is likely I will get sick at 
somepoint, though the most 
likely illnesses will probably not 
be debilitative  
4 4 
Travel insurance and ensuring I am generally in good 
health and take medical kit with me on all travel 
2 3 
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Security incident 
resulting in injury 
Physical injury as a result of 
security incidents (IEDs, 
kidnapping), predominantly for 
Afghanistan 
4 5 
In particular for Afghanistan I will be hosted by CPAU a 
local organisation, who I have worked with many times 
over the last 3 years and will follow their security 
guidance.  
2 5 
Field researchers or 
assistants are unable 
to work, or affected by 
insecurity 
 3 5 
Time will be spent on identifying suitable researchers 
and assistants including ensure their social and 
physical situation and to ensure that they also have 
adequate insurance should they require it 
2 4 
Fieldwork related       
Delays to field work 
occur 
For example major natural or 
manmade disasters or political 
change in any of the 3 
countries. 
3 5 
Whilst it will not be possible to limit the probability of 
these changes it will be possibly to alter the scheduling 
of the case studies quite significantly, and in the worst 
case scenarios alternative countries (including Kosovo 
and Yemen) are being considered as part of the 
research design. 
3 3 
Funding   4 5 
For Afghanistan funding has been arranged to cover 
lodging, travel and a Interpreter. In Nepal some 
funding is still needed and applications will be made to 
meet the unfunded lines. Emergency funding is 
available if required. 
2 3 
Field Research in 
Afghanistan is 
cancelled because of 
insecurity 
Sites cannot be accessed 
because of insecurity or 
4 5 
I will pre-identify secondary sites within Afghanistan 
and alternative countries if the situation deteriorates 
too far 
4 3 
Field research in Nepal 
is affected by political 
change and insecurity 
Original sites are inaccessible 
or no longer relevant to 
research questions 
3 5 I will pre-identify secondary sites within Nepal  2 3 
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Analysis of data 
collected is not 
possible because of 
poor quality  
This risk mainly relates to 
Afghanistan where I may not 
be able to reach field sites 
3 5 
Significant time will be spent on training researchers 
for Afghanistan 
2 5 
Ethics       
Risk to participants 
(Afghanistan) 
Participants may be perceived 
to be supporting the ongoing 
intervention, the risk is highly 
physical 
4 5 
Research design will ensure that individuals are able to 
be interviewed in a secure environment which may 
also disguise the fact they are participating in a 
research project to outsiders (the participants 
themselves will be given full information regarding use 
of data and information). This may include for 
example, using the offices of a local NGO to invite 
participants to. The participants may be legitimately 
going to the office for other business rather than 
participating in a research interview. 
2 5 
Risk to participants 
(Nepal) 
Participants may be perceived 
to be partisan, risk may be 
more social or political than 
physical 
3 4 
Participants will be interviewed in secure 
environments and the objectives of the research will 
be made clear to them.  
2 3 
Risk to participants 
(International) 
Some of the findings may 
indicate failures in the part of 
some international actors 
(organisations or individuals) 
which may be negatively 
reported or received 
2 3 
Information for International respondents will most 
likely be anonomised, particularly for Afghanistan. 
1 3 
Confirmation of use of 
data from participants 
It is important to feedback to 
participants how their 
4 5 It is important to validate conclusions that the 
participants have the opportunity to feedback in to the 
2 5 
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and conclusions drawn 
from their input 
information is being used and 
the analysis that has stemmed 
from their work (cf with APRO 
approaches to Ethnical 
Research) 
final process. This will be factored in to research 
design and resources allocated to it. 
 
Note: 1 is low 5 is high 
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Appendix E - Budget 
Afghanistan         Funded 
Flight to Afghanistan from UK Rtn Flight £900.00 1 £900.00 Y 
Accommodation costs (Kabul) Month £100.00 3 £300.00 Y 
Travel insurance 
Insurance 
Policy £500.00 1 £500.00 Y 
Field researchers Days £30.00 50 £1,500.00 Y 
Accommodation for Field Researchers Nights £15.00 50 £750.00 Y 
Per Diem for Participants (travel costs) Days £5.00 100 £500.00 Y 
Flights from Kabul to Kunduz (PhD Student, plus Researchers, twice) Flight £180.00 6 £1,080.00 Y 
Incidental costs (pens/paper etc) Lumpsum £100.00 1 £100.00 Y 
Sub-total Afghanistan       £5,630.00   
Nepal           
Flight to Nepal from UK Rtn Flight £900.00 2 £1,800.00 Y 
Salary for Interpreter Months £500.00 6 £3,000.00 N 
Local travel costs (car + driver) Days £30.00 100 £3,000.00 N 
Sub-total Nepal       £7,800.00 
 Total       £13,430.00 
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